



Finnish Centre of Expertise in  
Comprehensive Crisis Management

# Good Practices of a Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management





The Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management:  
The Finnish Defence Forces International Centre and  
Crisis Management Centre Finland

Good Practices of a Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management

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THE FINNISH CENTRE OF EXPERTISE IN COMPREHENSIVE CRISIS  
MANAGEMENT: THE FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES INTERNATIONAL  
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HELSINKI 2015

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Jari Mustonen (Ed.): Good Practices of a Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management

The Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management:  
The Finnish Defence Forces International Centre and Crisis Management Centre  
Finland

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## Preface

**Jukka Tuononen, Director of Crisis Management Centre Finland**

**Timo Hämäläinen, Commandant of Finnish Defence Forces International Centre**

The Finnish Centre of Expertise on Comprehensive Crisis Management was founded in 2008 by two independent organisations with a mandate to provide training for personnel to be deployed to international crisis management and peacekeeping operations: the Crisis Management Centre Finland<sup>1</sup> (CMC Finland) and Finnish Defence Forces International Centre<sup>2</sup> (FINCENT).

Traditionally, in Finland there has been close cooperation between the various security authorities, facilitated by the small size of the population and the relatively low administrative ‘barriers’. Building on this spirit of collaboration, the Centre of Expertise was founded with the purpose of creating and formalising a framework for the already existing cooperation between CMC Finland and FINCENT.

The founding of the Centre of Expertise coincided with the drafting of Finland’s Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy, which, finalised in 2009, is a unique document internationally, as it lays out a national strategic vision for increasing a comprehensive approach for Finnish participation in crisis management activities. With the overall objective of improving the coherence and effectiveness of international efforts to respond to crises and conflicts, the strategy aims to strengthen the comprehensive approach, particularly in situations in which Finland engages means of civilian and military crisis management in response to international conflicts or post-conflict reconstruction. The strategy also emphasises intensification of national

<sup>1</sup> CMC Finland, founded in 2007 and located in Kuopio, Finland, is a governmental institution and a centre of expertise in civilian crisis management and civil protection. The main tasks of CMC Finland are to train and recruit experts and to ensure their logistical and material preparedness for international civilian crisis management, peacebuilding and civil protection missions, as well as to conduct research focusing on civilian crisis management and civil protection. CMC Finland, operating under the Ministry of the Interior, acts as a national head office for all seconded Finnish civilian crisis management and civil protection professionals.

<sup>2</sup> FINCENT, until 2001 known as the UN Training Centre, was founded in 1969 as the first peacekeeping training centre in the world. FINCENT concentrates on organising courses, seminars and exercises within the framework of the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the African Union (AU). From the beginning of 2015 onwards, FINCENT functions as part of the Finnish National Defence University, with its main tasks and functions remaining unchanged.

training cooperation and thus supports the work of the Centre of Expertise.

The core task of the Centre of Expertise is to promote understanding of coordination and comprehensiveness of crisis management in the context of building national crisis management capacity. This task is implemented primarily through organising joint training and seminars, and by conducting research and publication activities; something to which this publication aims to contribute.

Training has been at the forefront of the activities of the Centre of Expertise since its founding. The first joint training course, the Integrated Crisis Management (ICM) course, was piloted in November 2008 and has since been organised annually and has become the ‘trademark’ of the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management. The objectives of the ICM course are to enhance knowledge and understanding of integrated and comprehensive crisis management approaches, as well as to enhance collaboration and coordination among the different actors, namely military, civilian crisis management, humanitarian and development aid actors, and local stakeholders. For this purpose, the courses are attended by military, police and civilian experts representing various areas of expertise, with a view to facilitating their cooperation and working towards a common goal.

Whilst the ICM course continues to be organised in Finland, the ICM concept of joint training with the military, police and civilians has expanded into Eastern Africa, with the first African ICM course having been organised by the Centre of Expertise in 2011 in Khartoum, Sudan. The course is a part of Finland’s support for building the capacity of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), which is one of the five regional standby forces under the African Union. To date, a total of seven ICM courses have been organised under the auspices of the EASF, with another course planned for later this year. From 2011 onwards, the centre has also organised Security Sector Reform courses in cooperation with the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), and lately also in cooperation with the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). In May 2015, the centre will organise a pilot course on European Union Comprehensive Crisis Management, in cooperation with ESDC.

Since 2013, the organisations have deepened their cooperation in regard to their core training courses – the United Nations Military Experts on Mission course (by FINCENT) and the European Union Concept Core Course (by CMC Finland) – by partially merging the practical field training exercises that are an essential part of the courses. Utilising a common scenario for the exercise and sharing the same training ground and facilities, including a live artillery firing range, as well as engaging with the same counterparts that operate in most of the mission areas, increases the realism of the exercise and subsequently the learning experience for the course participants, be

they civilian, police or military experts. From the point of view of the organisations, sharing resources and knowledge is also naturally cost-effective and reduces the costs of the courses.

In addition to joint training, another form of cooperation under the Centre of Expertise is seminars. The Centre has organised seminars on contemporary topics related to peacekeeping, peacebuilding and crisis management, both independent events and as part of the ICM courses. In line with the objectives of Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy – to promote dialogue with civil society and NGOs – the Centre of Expertise has, in cooperation with KATU (the Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network), annually organised a joint seminar on themes related to comprehensive approach to crisis management.

As regards research and publication activities, so far both CMC Finland and FINCENT have conducted their research and publication independently, and this is the first publication by the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management. The purpose of the publication *Good Practices of a Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management* is to present some positive examples from various organisations about enhancing the comprehensive approach to peacekeeping, peacebuilding and crisis management activities, in terms of both national capacity-building activities and as lessons learned from various missions and operations. We are thankful to the authors of the articles for taking the time to contribute, and we hope that this brief publication will open the door for future publications by the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management.



# Introduction

## Jari Mustonen

Among the challenges facing contemporary peacekeeping, peacebuilding and crisis management activities, the topic of cooperation, coordination and interaction between the multitudes of international actors that are engaged in this field has drawn a lot of attention and has been a topic for wide discussion. A comprehensive approach, a whole-of-government approach, an integrated approach, comprehensive crisis management and integrated crisis management – to name only perhaps the most common concepts – represent different approaches through which international organisations (and some contributing states for that matter) have attempted to increase the coherence of their engagement, and actions, related to peacekeeping, peacebuilding and crisis management.

As regards the concept of comprehensive approach to crisis management, ‘comprehensive crisis management’, it is important to have an understanding of what we mean by such concepts. No commonly agreed definition exists, but different organisations and countries have formulated their own approaches, all of which refer in general to improving cooperation, coordination, interaction, interoperability and complementarity, either internally or externally, in the fields of military crisis management or peacekeeping, civilian crisis management, peacebuilding and development. As an example, Finland’s Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy emphasises the synergies of cooperation in the efficient use of limited resources, noting that ‘while the roles and responsibilities of military and civilian crisis management, development cooperation and humanitarian aid are distinct, they can be mutually complementary. The objective is to improve coherence and effectiveness with due regard for each actor’s area of responsibility and expertise.’<sup>3</sup>

Whilst the purpose of this publication is not to take stock of the different definitions or their interpretation or to redefine them, some of the concepts, such as those of the United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), will be briefly presented in order to introduce the context of the comprehensive approach. The publication is not, in this regard, comprehensive, as it falls short of including the concept of, for instance, the European Union, or of the various countries that have developed a national approach or processes to develop a comprehensive approach in their participation to peacekeeping and crisis management operations.

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<sup>3</sup> Finland’s Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy, 13 November 2009, unofficial translation.

The publication comprises articles that focus on some of the good practices and experiences in the field of a comprehensive approach to peacekeeping, peacebuilding and crisis management. The aim of the publication is to bring out organisational or personal experiences of perceived good practises and lessons learned from either national or international institutional arrangements that seek to increase comprehensiveness, on joint training or exercises involving multiple actors (military, police and civilian), and cooperation between institutions operating in the context of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and crisis management. The main purpose of the articles, regardless of their exact thematic or geographical focus, is to bring out good practices gained through joint efforts, with a view to sharing practices and processes that have been found to be useful.

This is also reflected in the composition of the publication. The first two articles focus on what a comprehensive approach to crisis management actually means to different organisations and in different contexts. The following articles then provide examples of institutional arrangements, at various levels, that bring together the expertise of civilians, police and military under shared political vision and leadership to implement a comprehensive approach.

In the opening article, Dr. George T. Hodermarsky introduces and explains the concept of a comprehensive approach, and examines its principles and mechanisms. Dr. Hodermarsky also provides some interpretations of a comprehensive approach by international organisations, as well as national perspectives of the concept. Utilising these principles, Scott Moreland looks at the comprehensive approach in the context of United Nations multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Further, Mr. Moreland provides an overview of UN peacekeeping and presents the UN multidimensional peacekeeping model.

In his article, Dr. Ari Kerkkänen emphasises the importance of understanding the conflict setting and policy decision-making as prerequisites for comprehensiveness, arguing that there cannot be a comprehensive approach without such an understanding. To make his point, and also to demonstrate the longstanding nature of some of the challenges of synchronising different military and civilian objectives and activities, Dr. Kerkkänen provides practical examples from the Mandatory Palestine and Afghanistan. In reference to the common principles to be adhered to while pursuing the comprehensive approach, he promotes the principles of human security as a framework for a comprehensive approach.

Relating to good practices gained from seeking complementarity and a more comprehensive approach at the level of institutional or organisational arrangements, Dr. Volker Jacobs and Ms. Irene-Maria Eich from ZIF (the German Center for

International Peace Operations) present Germany's comprehensive national training partner platform for military, police and civilian training institutions. In order to meet the various training needs for personnel in contemporary peace operations, the platform seeks to apply a comprehensive training approach by developing and conducting joint training courses. In addition to the various multidisciplinary training activities, the article also presents a national solution to foster cross-departmental cooperation at the political or policy level to facilitate internal, national cohesion.

Further, in regard to institutional arrangements, the article by Lyndon McCauley introduces RAMSI (the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands), which is an interesting example of a regionally organised crisis response mission that has no involvement from the United States, Europe or the United Nations. The example of RAMSI presents some of the notions addressed in the earlier articles on the concept and challenges of – and also prerequisites for – a comprehensive approach, including a whole-of-government or interdepartmental response under civilian lead, clear division of tasks between the different components of the mission, and a clear political direction with a notably long-term commitment. RAMSI also represents an organisation that successfully transformed, and downscaled, its presence in the Solomon Islands in a planned and coordinated fashion between the different components of the mission.

By presenting some examples of good practices from current practices, activities and arrangements, the publication aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion on a comprehensive approach in crisis management, and in conflict resolution and peacebuilding more widely. Whilst the examples provided by the authors only represent a small sample of activities that seek to apply a comprehensive approach in crisis management, the observations and lessons identified may be useful in terms of other contexts as well. Even though it is widely agreed that 'one size fits all' thinking does not apply in the context of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and crisis management, identifying and applying good practices – or at minimum avoiding some of the mistakes made in past operations – should improve the comprehensiveness of the current and future interventions by the various actors.

# Principles and Mechanisms of a Comprehensive Approach

**Dr. George T. Hodermarsky**

## Objective

To introduce benefits, issues, considerations, risks, costs, and resource requirements for the coordination of uniformed troops, civilian agencies, and private sector organizations that share operational space in a zone of conflict or crisis.

Although no universally accepted definition of a comprehensive approach exists, it is possible to explain the concept. Recognizing the lack of a commonly accepted definition, the chapter uses *mobilizing the resources of an entire society* as the basis of a working definition. It expands on the notion of a whole-of-government approach by including intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, academe, and the private sector.

Despite the fact that a comprehensive approach cannot be precisely defined, the principles and mechanisms it employs are widely accepted and applied. Additionally, the lessons learned in contemporary stability and peace operations demonstrate the benefits of a comprehensive approach, as well as the challenges to its implementation. Based on experiences in operations in the Western Balkans and Afghanistan, NATO created a Comprehensive Approach Action Plan. The tasks associated with this plan are implemented by a combined civil-military task force that includes all relevant NATO entities and commands.

## Highlights of the NATO Comprehensive Approach Action Plan (March 2012)

NATO support within the international community to a comprehensive approach to crisis management and stabilization operations. This includes political, civilian and military involvement in the planning and conduct of operations. NATO will strengthen cooperation with partner countries, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and local authorities. NATO recognizes the European Union and United Nations as key institutional partners.

NATO is not alone in its efforts to employ a comprehensive approach to operations.

Other informative examples include support for the Dayton peace accords on Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, the United Nations (UN)-mandated North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) campaign in Kosovo beginning in 1999, the peacekeeping intervention in Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2000, and the multinational European Union (EU)-led counterpiracy efforts conducted off Somalia.

There are multiple interpretations of a comprehensive approach. Its characterization by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands captures its essence and clearly indicates civilian leadership. Moreover, Sweden has been at the forefront of thinking about a comprehensive approach. Indeed, the Viking Exercises have been centered on the idea of cooperation among governmental (civilian, military, and police), intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations. Additionally, the doctrine emerging in the United Kingdom contains a particularly helpful definition of a comprehensive approach. Finally, the US National Security Strategy recommends utilizing the approach while not defining or expanding the concept.

#### National Perspectives

- Netherlands—*as civilian as possible, as military as necessary*
- Sweden—*integration of military and civilian activities including nongovernmental organizations*
- United Kingdom—*develop principles and collaborative processes to enhance the likelihood of favorable and enduring outcomes in particular situations*
- United States—*urge more comprehensive approach to regional security*

The 2010 version of the NATO Strategic Concept encourages the use of a comprehensive approach. Noticeably, it describes the NATO contribution to a comprehensive approach while recognizing that the Alliance does not possess the necessary civilian capabilities to employ the concept alone. Allied joint doctrine endorses the commitment to this approach by developing it beyond the strategic level. By using the term *international partners*, NATO acknowledges the wide participation required for completion of a broad set of missions.

In June 2013, a total of 114 nations were supplying more than 90,000 soldiers, policemen, and military observers to the United Nations in support of 15 peacekeeping missions. Although the world body does not use the term *comprehensive approach*, the Secretary General stated in the integrated strategic framework that “the guiding principle for all conflict and postconflict situations where the UN has a country team and a multidimensional peacekeeping operations, whether or not these presences are structurally integrated.”

**Figure 1.1 UN and OSCE Contributions**

**United Nations**

Multidimensional peacekeeping operations conducted by the United Nations establish an integrated strategic framework with a shared vision of strategic objectives and set of agreed upon results, timelines, and responsibilities

**Organization for Security and Cooperation**

Since its founding, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has pursued a comprehensive approach to security and remains the only international forum to place human, economic, environmental, and political-military dimensions of security on an equal footing.

UN Civil-Military Coordination is the system of interaction that involves the exchange of information, negotiation, deconfliction, mutual support, and planning undertaken at every level among military elements and humanitarian organizations, development organizations, and local civilian populations to achieve their respective mission objectives.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) endeavors to prevent conflicts from arising and facilitate lasting comprehensive settlements in conflict situations. It also enhances the likelihood of success in the post-conflict task of rehabilitation. OSCE police operations are essential for both preventing conflicts and restoring stability following them. The OSCE role, however, is limited by insufficient resources to act globally, and its legitimacy has been questioned by a number of participating nations even in its own region.

**Civil-Military Relations**

The United Nations has identified three broad levels across the interaction between civilian and military organizations: cooperation, coordination, and coexistence. Cooperation is more readily achieved in peacetime. However, in conflict situations, the divide between military and civilian activities reduces coordination to the level of coexistence and de-confliction.

### United Nations Guidelines

*Civil-military coordination is a shared responsibility of the humanitarian and military actors, and it may take place in various levels of intensity and form. Where cooperation between the humanitarian and military actors is not appropriate, opportune or possible, or if there are no common goals to pursue, then these actors merely operate side-by-side.*

*. . . [The] UN CMCoord basic strategy ranges from coexistence to cooperation.*

*In either side of the spectrum and in between, coordination—for example, the essential dialogue and interaction—is necessary in order to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, and minimize inconsistency. Shared vision may be a bit far-reaching, “mutual interests” might be a more realistic ambition.*

## Unifying Principles

While the term *comprehensive approach* is ill defined, it is essential to examine its principles. For this discussion the concept is identified as the *employment of unified principles in planning and conducting integrated operations focused on cooperation and coordination with all relevant actors in an increasingly complex environment*. The purposes of a comprehensive approach are developing cooperation among partners where feasible and integrating their various capabilities where possible. Its major tasks are developing both a shared vision of strategic objectives and an endstate, requiring mutual awareness of threats, risks, and actions of participants.

### Comprehensive Approach to Operations

#### — Purposes —


- Increase cooperation with international partners to avoid crises, manage conflicts, and stabilize post-conflict situations.
- Effectively integrate multiple stakeholders with diverse perspectives, authorities, capabilities, and objectives.
- Extend comprehensive approach principles to multidimensional security missions.

#### — Tasks —

- Develop shared vision of the strategic objectives and a set of agreed upon results.
- Create public-private sector partnerships to enhance an awareness of threats and vulnerabilities, assess risks, analyze collaboration, and manage incidents.

Employment of a comprehensive approach to operations will be challenging, thus its costs, risks, and level of effort must be justified by its benefits. For example, the theory of *comparative advantage* developed by the classic economist David Ricardo has relevance.

In its simplest form, it argues that nations should concentrate on industries in which they are most competitive and trade with others to obtain those products they do not produce efficiently. Extrapolating the theory to crisis management, organizations that are better at assisting refugees or providing humanitarian relief, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Medicens sans Frontiers, should lead those tasks, and while the armed forces should focus primarily on providing security and provision of strategic lift capabilities. With a comprehensive approach to operations, participating organizations are tasked to do those things that they do best. Obviously this theory has its limitations similar to models of a free market economy. However, applying its principles could yield efficiencies in allocating resources and reducing the duplication of effort. These principles are not a panacea for all of the problems that arise in a multidimensional operational environment but even modest gains in providing a framework for interaction and opportunities for efficiencies in the employment of various capabilities justify the effort of this approach.



Adapted from: UN Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies

While acknowledging its complexities and challenges, the development of a framework to enhance cooperation may lessen distrust and hesitancy among participants, boosting the number of organizations willing to accept responsibilities in cooperative missions.

## A Common Vision

Before they can be applied, the principles of a comprehensive approach to operations have to be identified. First, the shared vision functions on a very high level. At



times it is clearly stated and, for example, found in a United Nations mandate. Such manifestations by a respected worldwide organization greatly aid in reaching consensus on strategic objectives. Even with such direction, however, interpretations can vary widely. Second, congruence is defined as a state of agreeing or coinciding, of being compatible or conforming. This explanation is helpful because it is likely to be more acceptable and preferable to precise terms such as *integration* and *interaction*. Third, as mentioned earlier, some degree of cooperation and coordination enhances effectiveness. Fourth, and importantly, the successful application of a comprehensive approach to operations requires a deep level of understanding of the roles, missions, and capabilities of partners.

### Principles

A comprehensive approach to operations should be based on a common vision of strategic objectives, a congruence of effort, cooperation and coordination by relevant actors within an inclusive stakeholder network, and a shared awareness and due consideration of charters, interests, limitations, and perspectives.

The former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Admiral James Stavridis, observed in an article published in Prism (March 2011) that while the potential of a comprehensive approach remains “limited only by the desire to assist, in actuality it is difficult to mobilize, organize, and coordinate the activities of all these disparate actors. Even agreeing to a common purpose can be difficult to achieve, much less agreeing on where and how to do things.”

### Issues and Considerations

While an important element in effective comprehensive approaches to operations, working with nongovernmental organizations is challenging because of their large number and the variance in their contributions. An estimated 1,300 different organizations operated at times in Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, each organization has its specific mandate and objectives. Similarly, every military or civilian organization and private or governmental agency has its own culture and operating procedures, which may cause friction. Some organizations desire a maximum degree of cooperation and interaction while many also prefer or even insist on operating independently. Understandably, these factors often preclude the establishment of common procedures.

Globalization with its associated benefits and adverse effects, combined with technological advancements have created an operational environment with further complexities and issues that have not been previously encountered. For diverse reasons, organizations are reluctant to accede to long-term agreements. Hence cooperation

tends to be ad hoc and situation dependent. While this approach may allow for more flexible and tailored coordination mechanisms once a mission is established, the lack of formal bonds discourages pre-crisis contact among unknown partners, and forces inefficient in-stride coordination processes in the initial phases.

## Keeping One's Distance

Although a comprehensive approach to operations is dependent on interaction, many players, particularly nongovernmental organizations, make their contributions based on neutrality and independence. This need for impartiality, especially among humanitarians, may lead to friction as these organizations must often interact with both legitimate yet corrupt regimes as well as factional or insurgent groups to gain access to all populations in need.

### Risks

- Neutrality and independence dilemma for nongovernmental organizations
- Perceptions of complicity with corrupt regimes
- Tension between near-term military imperatives and longer-term development objectives
- Legal restrictions on government support of nongovernmental organizations
- Compromise of organizational mandates resulting from information sharing

In addition, organizations whose objectives are long-term development (primarily civilian) are at times at odds with short-term security needs (normally military). To varying degrees most nations restrict the level of support they provide to nongovernmental organizations. Information sharing is a key principle, but it may be challenging to execute. However, it may be possible to share the following types of information:

- *Security information*—data on civilians and situation in the area of operation
- *Humanitarian locations*—staff and facilities inside a military theatre
- *Humanitarian activities*—routes and timing of convoys and airlifts to avoid endangering humanitarian operations or warn of conflicting activities
- *Mine-action activities*—information relevant to mining
- *Population movements*—major movements of civilians
- *Relief activities*—efforts undertaken by the military
- *Post-strike information.*

## Financial Oversight

All operations have limited resources with transport and logistics assets particularly

in demand. Any requirement to share these will result in complications and possible friction. Effective management of relief and reconstruction funding requires mutual understanding and commitment by all involved parties, as well as the imposition of an infrastructure and resources to maintain oversight.

#### **Costs**

- Limited resources and logistics shared among multiple organizations
- Challenge in maintaining oversight and fiscal controls
- Establishment of pre-crisis training and exercises
- Requirement for compatible communications equipment and procedures

The benefits of pre-crisis interaction and training are abundant and obvious. However, event sponsorship and funding, and the opportunity costs associated with participation continue to limit the number and scope of such exercises. Traditionally, military organizations support and rely heavily on training and exercises. Conversely, nongovernmental organizations normally do not have the resources or desire to participate in such events even if their value is appreciated. Effective information sharing, even if limited by organizational mandates, requires compatible equipment and procedures, a situation that has its own inherent costs.

#### **Civil-Military Cooperation and Coordination**

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC): coordination and cooperation in support of mission between NATO commander and civil actors including national populations and local authorities, as well as international, national, and non-governmental organizations and agencies.

—NATO, AJP-3.4.9

Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO): effective coordination of actions by all relevant European Union actors involved in both the planning and subsequent implementation of European Union responses to crises

—European Union Military Staff, Document 14457/03 (2003)

## **Models for Employment**

If mechanisms, structures, and processes are lacking, it follows their development could benefit from the use of a model. However, there is an inherent danger in adopting a conceptual model because complex problems are ill-suited for one-size-fits-all solutions. Nevertheless, civil-military cooperation, although primarily employed at the tactical level, could provide some insights and a possible foundation for a comprehensive approach to operations. Both the NATO and EU definitions are similar and state the

need for cooperation by all relevant actors. While models have value, a comprehensive approach must consider elements beyond those normally associated with the concept.

A paradigm of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is useful in presenting its principles, which often represent a synthesis of similar recommendations. Importantly, the CIMIC concept and a comprehensive approach to operations are not the same thing. However, as the relevant NATO doctrine publication states, applying CIMIC principles will contribute to a comprehensive approach. They help in governing the military direction of CIMIC, as well as the civil-military relationship. Moreover, the principles guide internal military processes and underpin effective civil-military relationships. It should be remembered that comprehensive approaches must:

- Share awareness of issues and complexities of a crisis
- Identify unique actors and appraise their contributions
- Examine and understand motivations and objectives
- Be based on mutual respect and trust
- Defer to civilian authority even when primarily military
- Promote effective communication among participants.

Historically, both governments and organizations have developed structures that facilitate communication, cooperation, and coordination, which are manifested in numerous forms. Their functions have varied from near-traditional command and control to limited information sharing. In terms of nomenclature, distinctions among these structures are frequently distorted. There are multiple candidates that can serve as models. Significantly, most of these structures are civilian in nature with militaries playing critical but nonetheless supporting roles.

UN-CIMIC is the international military framework for civil-military coordination for the complete range of operations to include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace building. The role of the United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) is facilitating dialogue and interaction between the civilian and military participants, protecting and promoting humanitarian principles, avoiding competition, minimizing inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursuing common goals.

### Candidate Models

- Civil-Military Operations Center
- European Union Naval Force Somalia
- Humanitarian Operations Center
- Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
- Joint Support Force
- Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Steering Committee
- Special Staff Offices
- United Nations Civil-Military Coordination
- United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination

Even though the purpose of civil-military operations and humanitarian operations centers are similar, there are significant differences. The former is established for a combined joint task force and the latter by the government of the nation concerned, the United Nations, or possibly the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in unilateral US operations. Humanitarian operations centers, especially when organized under UN auspices, are structured horizontally without any command or control authority, where participants are ultimately responsible to either their own organization or country. Lastly, the European Union Naval Force Somalia, which is conducting Operation Atalanta, is particularly relevant to an analysis of maritime security.

### Multidimensional Missions

Geopolitical factors such as globalization, competition for resources, and international stability are evolving rapidly. Multidimensional missions perform numerous tasks: military, police, rule of law, human rights, reconstitution, public information, et al. Like a comprehensive approach, no universally accepted definition of a multidimensional mission exists. What is clear, however, is that the missions examined herein go beyond military operations and need multiple components to be effective.

The principles of a comprehensive approach can be extended to multidimensional security operations in support of maritime and cyber missions, which go well beyond military activities. Such operations include multiple players drawn from national civilian agencies, international and nongovernmental organizations, commercial and social media, and private industry.

Regardless of organizational structure, comprehensive approaches to operations must be guided by best practices developed through prior experience. Although this chapter has been focused on organizations, these structures are comprised of people, and interpersonal skills based on mutual respect are fundamental to effective interaction. Most operations will be at best unorganized, and at times chaotic, especially during their early days. The effects of this disorder can be mitigated through precision in

terminology, which is critical to mutual understanding. The operational environment will be increasingly complex and will need to be adapted to changing conditions. Furthermore, when determining military courses of action, the effects on other players must be considered. Many of the risks associated with a comprehensive approach could be reduced through pre-crisis training and the establishment of a common lexicon. The United Nations, NATO, and other organizations offer relevant programs that could enhance the effectiveness of operations employing a comprehensive approach. Finally, the undesired effects of military actions must be considered, as well as the perceptions of the independence and neutrality of the role and mandates that distinguish individual cooperating organizations.

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# Multidimensional Peacekeeping

**Scott Moreland**

Peacekeeping operations are implemented not only to maintain security but also to reestablish public order, protect civilian populations, impose the rule of law, and disarm, train, and integrate former warring parties into society. To carry out these missions, the United Nations (UN) Security Council issues mandates sanctioning peacekeeping operations in response to crises or conflicts that threaten international stability. Peacekeepers may be deployed as blue helmets under direct control of the United Nations or part of a coalition or unilateral command authorized under a UN mandate, such as the African Union-led forces in Somalia and the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions are opportunities for applying the principles and mechanisms of a comprehensive approach.

In addition to deploying security forces, UN peacekeeping operations are legitimate international coordination mechanisms that enable a range of partners to make contributions. In practice, multidimensional peacekeeping furthers political, economic, and humanitarian development efforts by securing operational space in both conflict zones and during crises. Security operations are generally coordinated among official bodies but also include ways to facilitate ad hoc arrangements among peacekeeping forces and nonaligned humanitarian actors, security support to local authorities, and authorization to intervene in cases of acute humanitarian crisis at the tactical level.

## Objective

To provide an overview of multidimensional peacekeeping, explore practical examples of complex operations, and identify comprehensive approaches to peacekeeping operations that unify diverse aims and enhance coordination.

In considering the applicability of multidimensional peacekeeping as an exemplar of a comprehensive approach, this chapter examines both existing and emerging coordination mechanisms among key actors. The examination is based on current operations and aimed at enhancing the appreciation of multidimensional peacekeeping, identifying best practices, and applying lessons learned. Additionally, this chapter utilizes the essential principles and mechanisms of the comprehensive approach discussed in the previous chapter.



## A Practical Model

The United Nations has not sanctioned the *comprehensive approach* as doctrine, but that is largely a question of semantics. However, the *multidimensional approach* has been defined by a UN resolution as a coherent operational model for synonymous concepts that links the comprehensive approach to peacekeeping operations. The emphasis placed on coordinated and sustainable solutions relates to the goal of a comprehensive approach.

### UN Multidimensional Approach

*... a comprehensive, coherent, and integrated approach to the maintenance of international peace and security by preventing conflicts, preventing relapse, and building sustainable peace through effective preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding strategies. —Resolution 2086 (July 21, 2013)*

While the United Nations endorses and actively seeks to implement a comprehensive approach to multidimensional peacekeeping, it faces many of the operational problems that also weakened NATO efforts in Afghanistan. Shifting allegiances, fluid security conditions, and internal disunity constantly threatened mission effectiveness and credibility in complex crises in the Darfur, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Syria.

This chapter looks at the comprehensive approach in the context of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The topical sections are sequenced to provide an appreciation of multidimensional peacekeeping as a practical model for implementing the approach. From this point of departure, key tasks associated with peacekeeping will be examined with both the actors and organizational structures required to accomplish them. The chapter presents a model for deriving key multidimensional tasks from the mandate and associated lines of effort. This systematic approach links missions to accompanying tasks and desired outputs and culminates with an evaluation that attributes benchmarks and quantifiable productivity to measure task completion. This examination demonstrates interdependency connected to coordinated lines of effort and validates the comprehensive approach.

Despite the imperative to make use of a comprehensive approach to multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the fundamental complexity and fragile security conditions of the missions pose numerous challenges. Many UN operations are designed with the uniformed military and police forces running security missions in the same space as nongovernmental organizations and UN activities. It is common for such entities to coordinate with financial institutions, development agencies, and nongovernmental organizations that react to public and private interests. In addition to developing

military capabilities, regional organizations such as the European Union have also been developing and are deploying civilian response capabilities. The management or at least effective co-existence with mission actors presents unique and daunting challenges for leadership, mission coordination, and unity of purpose. Some of the more common challenges will be examined with possible options based on the unique characteristics of missions and actors that facilitate the application of a comprehensive approach. Finally this imperative will be reprised and the best practices and lessons learned from peacekeeping operations reviewed to inform mission planning.

## Vital Partnerships

The United Nations is the leading guarantor of peace. The complexity of modern conflicts and crises demands a flexible and responsive peacekeeping capability. Peacekeepers must be able to operate effectively among warring factions, criminal gangs, and citizens in need of security and humanitarian aid. Moreover, peacekeeping relies on political commitment, as well as national contributions of reliable and sustainable support.

### UN Overview

- No standing peacekeeping force
- Peacekeeping operations completely dependent on donor nations
- Peacekeeping budget under one percent of global military expenditures
- Funding, personnel, and resource shortfalls overcome by depending on partnership with host nations and external support

Peacekeeping operations must also be buttressed by proper, legitimate, and effective authorities to attract both local and international backing. In sum, peacekeeping missions cannot achieve their objectives without the prospect of reconciliation.

UN peacekeeping needs adequate and efficient means to gain competitive advantage. New force structures such as formed police units and military intervention brigades provide tactical advantages, more agility, and deterrent effect for peacekeeping missions. Coupled with satellite mapping and collaborative information networks, the stakeholders can better understand actions that impact on success. But these specialized forces and capabilities are not available to many troop-contributing nations. Thus the United Nations must depend on partners more closely identified with warfighting than peacekeeping.

The same is true in those cases when, for various reasons, the United Nations depends on security partnerships rather than so-called *blue helmet* forces to fulfill a mandate of the Security Council. Whether adjunct security support involves African Union

peacekeepers in Somalia or French-led troops in Mali, it provides essential peace enforcement capabilities in volatile regions. As the United Nations increasingly turns to external forces, its mandates must clearly specify actions and restraints that will sustain legitimacy and direct transition to sovereign authority without unduly hampering mission effectiveness.

## Modern Challenges

The term *peacekeeping* has traditionally been identified with lightly armed personnel who maintain separation between two sides in a conflict that agree to stop fighting. In the past, conflicts requiring peacekeeping operations were usually between two nations (interstate). By contrast, some recent conflicts have involved two or more factions in the same country (intrastate). Civilians are often targeted alongside the military, and the groups involved do not customarily observe the law of war. Given the sophistication and risks associated with peace operations efforts such as peacemaking and rebuilding are required.

Peacekeeping creates time and breathing space for diplomatic efforts to address the underlying causes of conflict. It utilizes military power to create conditions conducive to pursuit of a diplomatic solution. Traditional peacekeeping operations are defined by the following features:

- Involved parties agree to external intervention
- Conflict between two or more nations contained within a defined battlespace
- International laws of armed conflict accepted by the combatants
- Impartiality exercised on the part of peacekeeping force
- Minimum use of force.

Modern conflicts are a complex mix of internal and international influences. Their roots may be mainly internal, but they are complicated by cross-border involvement either by states or by economic interests and other international players who have an interest in the conflict. As a result, the structure of peacekeeping missions has also changed.

## Multidimensional Options

UN peacekeeping operations involve military, police, political, civil affairs, rule of law and election monitoring, human rights, humanitarian affairs, reconstruction, public information, et al., which are essential to multidimensional missions. However, traditional peacekeeping often delivers inadequate intervention. As a consequence, peacemaking or peacebuilding—even peace enforcement—are better means of achieving and sustaining peace.

### Peace Operations

- *Peacemaking*—employs diplomacy and negotiation to intervene in conflicts
- *Peacebuilding*—refers to UN action to establish conditions for peace by the empowerment of legitimate governance and protecting vulnerable peoples
- *Peacekeeping*—includes reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, improving security forces, strengthening the rule of law, improving respect for human rights, providing developmental assistance, and promoting peaceful mediation and reconciliation techniques

Peace enforcement refers to situations addressed under chapter 7 of the UN Charter, namely, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” Accordingly, it is usually reserved for violent conflict and departs somewhat from traditional peacekeeping. Its mission characteristics may include:

- Deployment of peacekeepers without consent of all sides in a conflict
- More interaction between uniformed troops and humanitarian agencies
- Complex and long-term mission objectives involving various applications of military forces including maintaining, consolidating, and imposing peace, as well as reconstruction, intervention, and humanitarian support.

Peacekeeping operations have taken on a new face over the past decade. The lack of donor funding, equipment, and professional and technically competent troop contributions has been a major limiting factor in many blue helmet operations. Because of the capability gap, many UN operations are delegated to either non-UN regional or multinational security forums such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and African Union. This is particularly true of peace enforcement operations, which involve regional security imperatives and assertive military responses that may not be attainable or appropriate under direct UN auspices.


### Command and Authorities

The UN Integrated Mission Planning Process (June 13, 2006) stated “an integrated mission is one in which there is a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objectives of their common presence at the country level.” In recent crises, traditional military command and control leadership has been challenged. Senior officers understand that operations are only one component of a larger campaign with a range of participants including host nation governments, external government agencies, international and regional organizations, and nongovernmental and private sector actors. Since the military cannot impose leadership on these diverse but essential partners, leaders must internalize how leadership must include coordination and consensus, the essentiality of trust and information sharing, and the necessary constraints that bar full integration.

Integrated missions provide a means to operationalize the concept of a comprehensive approach. They are defined by common purpose and the mutual awareness among various participants united under a mandate. Such missions are personified by a cooperative spirit and coordinated lines of activity. Their structures are influenced by operational conditions and intricate amalgams of political, humanitarian, security, and development imperatives. Likewise every mission requires unique capabilities tailored to meet the characteristics of the operational space. Integrated missions usually distinguish between lines of command, coordination, and communication. What is more, leaders must adapt concepts of mission command to focus on the synchronization and harmonization of diverse participants who are entangled within the same complex and disordered operational space.

Initial attempts to enshrine integrated missions into fixed organizational structures and operational models proved to be difficult and counterproductive. As the multifaceted nature and inherent complexity of integration missions became evident, research shifted from standardized mission templates to a more agile visualization that first analyzed the operational requirements, then designed a suitable mission structure. As the integrated mission concept moved to the field, immediate conflicts emerged that necessarily imposed barriers on the full integration of all mission actors. For example, the need to safeguard humanitarian impartiality and neutrality often superseded the perceived efficiencies and enhanced security that might be gained by openly cooperating with military peacekeepers. Full mission integration may be tempered and limited by the factors that enable the success of a peacekeeping mission, namely credibility, legitimacy, and national or local ownership. Mission leaders must place the peacekeeping principles at the forefront and remember that coordinated efforts only enhance operational effectiveness when they are carefully orchestrated to uphold the legitimacy of the mission and its actors. The accompanying model offers one graphical representation of how these disparate mission elements might be stitched together into a cohesive organizational structure.

Figure 2.1 Model Organizational Structure for Integrated Missions



The lines in the model organizational structure connecting various components reflect a flexible organizational network rather than a command structure. Agents connect to the mission according to their functions, responsibilities, and contributions. This delicate balance demands strong and responsive leadership in each functional area. Humanitarian agents must determine how they might cooperate with peacebuilding and peace consolidation components, especially in the midst of active conflict. Humanitarian space is also operational space, and mission leaders must appreciate the nexus of the two in order to achieve operational coherence among other elements of the UN mission, as well as external actors.

### Effort, Responsibilities, and Tasks

The transition from conflict to sustainable peace is both delicate and arduous. A range of simultaneous and mutually supporting activities must be harmonized or de-conflicted for peace and accountable governance to take hold. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions require united and sustained political leadership, as well as a mandate and donor backing to provide requisite authority, finances, expertise, and

resources. Peacekeeping operations are fraught with scant resources and difficult conditions that necessitate focus on the most essential tasks. The UN Capstone Doctrine identifies core strategic peacekeeping tasks to:

- Create a secure and stable environment and strengthen the ability of the state to provide security with full respect for the rule of law and human rights
- Facilitate political processes by promoting dialogue and supporting legitimate and effective institutions of governance
- Provide a framework to ensure UN and other international actors pursue activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

Operationalizing these tasks requires aligning several lines of activity in a comprehensive plan. Key peacekeeping functions are stipulated within a broader campaign plan including added tasks that may require support, coordination, or at least mutual cognizance between uniformed peacekeepers and other lead agencies and organizations.

#### Peacekeeping Functions

- Facilitate political processes
- Create secure and stable environment
- Strengthen rule of law with respect for human rights
- Promote social and economic recovery

These tasks address crosscutting issues that have an impact on the implementation of the peacekeeping mandate and ultimately the transition to legitimate and effective governance. Mission leaders need to be aware of how their actions and aims impact the range of tasks, and at the least not work at cross purposes. Further, military leaders in particular must be cognizant of needs for political primacy and their command and coordination relationships with political leaders. They must adopt a consultative and unified approach to develop the trust and teamwork necessary to accomplish complex post-conflict tasks.

### Challenges and Considerations

It is now commonplace for a peacekeeping operation to share the same operational space with humanitarian nongovernmental organizations and UN specialized agencies, funds, and programs, as well as international financial institutions, development agencies, and direct donor programs sponsored by external governments. Mission command and coordination mechanisms may not always be explicit, and even when coordination frameworks exist, they cannot be imposed and are hostage to the goodwill and compliance of the contributing agencies and organizations.

The cohabitation of military operational space and humanitarian space is a perennial challenge in multidimensional peacekeeping. Peace enforcement missions in particular may place tactical security requirements at odds with impartial humanitarian assistance. Recent operations have evidenced that providing military assistance through quick impact projects or command directed local development efforts can be important components of the toolkit of commanders. As a result, military units are increasingly involved in delivering relief aid while humanitarian organizations must rely on the military to ensure the safety and security of their staffs and operations and also enable access to target populations.

Many humanitarian actors view an inherent dilemma between the need for a coherent approach by all UN entities and the need for humanitarian operations to maintain neutrality and impartiality. Where military assistance tends to have a tactical aim that shapes security conditions, humanitarians tend to go where the need is most acute, regardless of factional affiliations or political sympathies. Groups or communities that militaries may classify as threats may be seen in turn by nongovernmental organizations as legitimate interlocutors for the provision of humanitarian access to communities in need within areas they control. If humanitarians interact too closely or publicly with military units, there is a viable concern that their legitimacy and impartiality may be compromised. In addition, the militarization of foreign aid can lead to unanticipated security consequences. Well-meaning or tactically expedient military assistance may lead to perceptions that certain affected populations are favored over others, inflaming tension and perhaps leading to breakdowns in security and stability. Discreet coordination between uniformed peacekeepers and humanitarian agents can alleviate mission overlap, facilitate situational awareness, and prevent the unintended consequences of poorly coordinated military-led assistance efforts.

## **The Way Forward**

Peacekeeping remains a work in progress, and the complexity of modern conflicts and crises demands a flexible and adaptive approach. Increased demand for peacekeeping continues to stretch peacekeeping capacity thin, and reliance on national and regional security consortiums to enable and then augment UN peacekeeping is likely to increase. These missions demand sophisticated environmental awareness, professional discipline, and tactical restraint. Technical proficiency in high-end capabilities such as engineering, medicine, logistics, and air, land, and sea transport are likewise required.

With a broader range of objectives, UN operations are increasingly multifunctional. Military leaders must consider how security tasks relate to humanitarian, developmental, and political objectives. A broader range of objectives demands a new multidimensional approach that includes military, civilian, and police involvement. This diversity requires a unity of effort and purpose if the mission is to achieve coherence.



### Civil and Military Skill Sets

*Although the military remain the backbone of most peacekeeping operations, the many faces of peacekeeping now include administrators and economists, police officers and legal experts, de-miners and electoral observers, human rights monitors and specialists in civil affairs and governance, humanitarian workers and experts in communications and public information. — UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

It is also clear that peacekeepers must be capable of accomplishing a variety of tasks. In addition to a traditional security role, they are expected to uphold law and order, monitor human rights, and promote responsible and sustainable governance.

The comprehensive approach is one organizing concept for harmonizing the various efforts of a diverse assortment of contributors to multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Best practices for coordination and establishing unity of effort vary from one mission to another like the feasible level of cooperation among the participants. Leaders must understand their mission, the conditions, and operational contexts that introduce opportunities, as well as the constraints that impact a coherent approach to common aims and objectives. The approach is not a prescription or a procedure; rather, it is a conceptual framework designed to assist leaders in the analysis and execution of cooperative mechanisms to reinforce multifaceted campaign aims, while appreciating that there will be deliberate and legitimate limits to full mission integration. As the lessons derived from multidimensional peacekeeping missions are internalized, the comprehensive approach concept should remain a concept that is open to critical examination, evolution, and creative application.

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# From Principles to Practices - The Primacy of Understanding

**Dr. Ari Kerkkänen**

I was privileged to sign the founding memorandum of the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management, as Director of Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland), with the then Commandant of the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT), Colonel Mauri Koskela (currently Brigadier General), on 25 November 2008 in Kuopio, Finland. This new institution was established in order to develop a framework for cooperation between two Finnish national crisis management and peacekeeping training institutions, namely CMC Finland and FINCENT. Both institutions deliver crisis management and peacekeeping education for international missions, with CMC Finland training civilians including police officers, and FINCENT training the military. The aforementioned institutions had previously cooperated on a few occasions and the need for a joint framework had already been mutually recognised. The founding document thereby elaborated on the key objectives for establishing such a joint initiative, including the development of training, and an increased understanding of comprehensive crisis management. A further objective was to contribute to research, as well as to publish articles, relating to comprehensive crisis management.

The establishment of such an institution reflects an increasing emphasis for comprehensiveness, or the integrated approach, within peacekeeping and crisis management operations. This focus is owed, at least partly, to the more complex environment surrounding contemporary conflicts. Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan, for example, required a new approach that not only included efforts to stabilise the immediate conflict situation, but also supported comprehensive institution building and reform. The general consensus was that these reforms, ultimately necessary for the area's transition from conflict to stability and peace, required something additional to that of military-orientated support. One of the main dividing barriers among internationals operating in conflict zones, both in conflict and post-conflict settings, had traditionally been between military and civilian (including humanitarian) actors. Irrespective of the term used - comprehensiveness, an integrated approach, coherence, or the 'whole of government' approach - the key objective of these approaches was to reduce the barriers typically present between military and civilian actors, if not demolish them altogether, for the sake of a more sustainable peace effort. Logically, this emphasis and awareness for comprehensiveness was reflected primarily in the integrated training programmes of training institutions. The same conclusions were also drawn as a result of brainstorming that led to the establishment of the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management. This new

thinking was also reflected in national policy papers, as some EU member states began to produce government strategies for comprehensiveness.<sup>1</sup>

Despite terminological differences, the UN, EU and NATO all highlight the need for coordination in their peacekeeping and crisis management operations. The UN's guiding principle is an integrated strategic approach for all conflict and post-conflict situations, whereas NATO specifically uses the term comprehensiveness.<sup>2</sup> The EU speaks about Civil Military Coordination (CMCO), which is based on the Council-adopted document of 2003 suggesting principles for a framework of civil-military coordination. CMCO has been described as a culture of coordination - a culture that also includes the coordination of common political objectives. This is essential for ensuring the overall coherence of the EU's response to crisis.<sup>3</sup> The Wilton Park conference recommendation of 2012 further supports this comprehensive approach of EU, outlining a unified strategy with clear political goals.<sup>4</sup> The UN, with the longest experience in peacekeeping, and as the only global actor, has identified three broad levels of interaction between civilian and military organisations: cooperation, coordination, and coexistence. Whilst cooperation is more readily achieved in peacetime, in conflict situations the divide between civilian and military activities reduces coordination to the level of coexistence and deconfliction.<sup>5</sup> In addition, a UN resolution defines the multidimensional approach as a coherent operational model for these synonymous concepts, linking the comprehensive approach squarely with peacekeeping operations. Consequently, the comprehensive approach concept is now operationalised in integrated missions.<sup>6</sup> Without undermining the importance of terminology, it is more important to identify a common way of thinking behind the variety of terminologies available. Cedric de Coning agrees, stating that the "nexus between development, governance, politics and security has become a central focus of the international effort to manage transitions, and peacebuilding is increasingly seen as the collective framework within which these diverse dimensions of conflict management can be brought together in one common framework."<sup>7</sup>

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of an accurate understanding of a conflict setting, since this will lead to more comprehensive (and thus more successful) policy decision-making. I argue that, without developing policies based on this proper understanding, policies that are eventually reflected in mandates, comprehensiveness

<sup>1</sup> Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy was published in November 2009. [http://www.cmcfinland.fi/download/41979\\_Finland\\_s\\_Comprehensive\\_Crisis\\_Mangement.pdf?fe6bbf6db1b4d088](http://www.cmcfinland.fi/download/41979_Finland_s_Comprehensive_Crisis_Mangement.pdf?fe6bbf6db1b4d088).

<sup>2</sup> Hodermarsky 2014, 4.

<sup>3</sup> Mustonen 2008, 22.

<sup>4</sup> Keohane and Grant 2013, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Hodermarsky 2014, 5.

<sup>6</sup> Moreland 2014, 11-12, 15.

<sup>7</sup> de Coning 2012, iii.

will become an empty shell and an obscure concept that could even create unintended consequences. It also goes without saying that these policies must also be based on commonly agreed principles, such as the morally sound ethos guiding international peace efforts. To illustrate the need for understanding, and the barriers that currently exist between military and civilian pacification efforts, the example of Palestine will be studied. A further example will use the so-called provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) of Afghanistan to demonstrate how ill-guided policies have seriously impinged the ability to establish a comprehensive approach. Ultimately, the purpose of these examples is to strengthen the argument that, without a proper understanding of a conflict setting, comprehensiveness fails. Therefore, a few theoretical approaches such as protracted social conflict as framework for conflict analysis are introduced in order to enhance the understanding of the criteria for comprehensiveness.

### **On the need for understanding - precedence in Palestine**

When the British Mandate attempted to curb the violent uprising launched by Palestinian Arabs in the 1936 Arab Revolt, civilian and military authorities disputed the causes of these events. This demonstrates that civil-military barriers are not new constructions, but have historically been an issue. Sir Arthur Wauchope, the British Mandate's High Commissioner and Commander in Chief for Palestine at the time of the revolt and thus representing the highest Mandate authority as the head of the civil administration, remarked in 1937 that many issues were "cropping up between the Army and Civil Power", although he was also of the opinion that differing views could easily be solved with goodwill.<sup>8</sup> Palestine had just experienced its first phase of a fully-fledged revolt against the British Mandate, not only with use of violence, but also with a general strike declared in April 1936. This put the Mandate authority's capability to deal with disturbances at great risk; in fact, British governance of Palestine, as a whole, was in jeopardy. For the first time, the Mandate administration struggled to maintain law and order in the country. Such unrest was directly reflected in the emerging rift between the civil and military authorities, about the most appropriate way to respond to the revolt - both at an operational level in Palestine, and at a political-strategic level in London.

Wauchope had been well aware, since the early phase of the revolt, that soldiers wished to apply stronger measures. Air Vice-Marshal R.E.C. Peirse, Commander of the British troops in Palestine, advocated "subduing the Revolt by force including bombing of villages and towns as well as introducing martial law in some districts or in the whole country". Wauchope acknowledged that stronger measures could overcome some immediate difficulties the government faced, but it would generate bitterness that would need to be tackled in the future.<sup>9</sup> As High Commissioner, Wauchope's role in

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<sup>8</sup> Sir Arthur Wauchope, Letter to Cosmo Parkinson, 16 Aug 1937, CO 967/93, TNA, London.

<sup>9</sup> Sir Arthur Wauchope, Telegram to William Ormsby-Gore, 7 June 1936, (Ref. No. CF/203/36), CO

Palestine was to maintain British prestige, as well as restoring law and order to the area. Furthermore, with reference to the views of the Secretary of State on 10 June 1936, a further objective was to achieve a compromise over the status of Palestine that would not leave an embittered, rebellious Muslim population. This objective would not be achieved if drastic air and military action were to be applied, as proposed by Peirse.<sup>10</sup> These opposing positions, the conciliatory (civilian administration) versus the coercive (military), characterised the key difference between civilian and military authorities in Palestine, and were thus an underlying issue in the debate.

Wauchope understood the Arab revolt to be caused by three fundamental grievances against the government. Firstly, Arabs believed that they were promised an independent Arab state, which included Palestine. Secondly, the Balfour Declaration and its results caused resentment for Arabs living in the region. Thirdly, the government had disregarded its duty to encourage local autonomy. These grievances were felt throughout the Palestinian Arab society. Wauchope assessed that these grievances were real to the Arabs and, as such, they felt that they had been unjustly treated. A genuine fear of Jews establishing themselves in large numbers, gaining economic and political control over the whole country in the near future, only added to this sense of injustice.<sup>11</sup>

Documentary sources display clear evidence that Wauchope looked at the Palestinian situation from a wide perspective, keeping political and societal impacts always in mind. This is in contrast to the military view, which saw the situation more narrowly as an uprising against the British government that should be crushed. Different readings of the situation by the civilian and military authorities, as well as different conclusions about the most appropriate approach to combat the problem, are not only the result of different areas of responsibilities and different understandings of the command system, but also different understandings of the situation on the ground stemming from situational, political and security analysis. Wauchope justified his conciliatory approach by arguing that it was based on sound information and a developed understanding of the real reasons for the unrest. Wauchope was also of the view that experienced civil officers were more likely to possess this information than military officers, who lacked the same level of acquaintance with the people of the country.<sup>12</sup> This more holistic view of the situation was able to see that the restriction of military force was necessary to maintain long-term security for Mandatory Palestine. Wauchope, certainly

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733/297/2, TNA, London and Sir Arthur Wauchope, Telegram to William Ormsby-Gore, 22 Aug 1936, S25/22764, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem.

<sup>10</sup> Sir Arthur Wauchope, Telegram to William Ormsby-Gore, 22 Aug 1936, S25/22764, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem.

<sup>11</sup> Sir Arthur Wauchope, Telegram to J.H. Thomas, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Colonies, Dec 1935, (Ref. No.CF/409/35), CO 733/278/13, TNA, London.

<sup>12</sup> Sir Arthur Wauchope, Comments on Air Vice-Marshal Peirse's Secret Memorandum of 20 Aug 1936, S25/22764, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem (sent to Parkinson under formal personal letter on 22.8.36).

feeling immense responsibility as the highest Mandate official, did his utmost to find a peaceful and sustainable solution; and in part, his conciliatory policy contributed to the cancellation of the strike in October 1936, negating the deployment of more coercive methods at that time.

Since the Mandate's civilian and military authorities were unable to sort out their differences at the grassroots level, the issue had to be resolved from London. An interdepartmental conference at the Colonial Office was held on 16 February 1937, where strategies for the Palestine region were discussed. The conference concluded that the possibility of conflicting opinions between the High Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding could not be ignored. However, the fact remained that the High Commissioner, as head of the civil government in Palestine, held supreme and final authority on questions affecting Palestinian security - this would only change if the High Commission chose to delegate power to the General Officer Commanding.<sup>13</sup>

## **Failing policy limits practice - Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan**

It has already been acknowledged that the interventions in Afghanistan ran into trouble because of bad planning, insufficient local knowledge, and political divisions generated at home. Some even doubt whether the invasion would have been launched, had more thought been given.<sup>14</sup> The governments in the US and Europe, at the time in a state of post-9/11 shock, now realise that they should have conducted more research prior to entering Afghanistan. Jonathan Powell, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair's Chief of Staff, even joked that he became the government's Afghan specialist overnight with qualifications of having rushed out of 10 Downing Street to the nearest store and buying every book on the country he could find.<sup>15</sup> Within this context, with this level of understanding, knowledge and expertise about Afghanistan, is it any surprise that international expectations crumbled upon intervention? Indeed, more than a decade later, hardly any of the West's objectives have been achieved in Afghanistan. Security continues to deteriorate, the Taliban gains ground, corruption is at least as endemic as before, and the political system is in disarray; fractured and weak.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were created in Afghanistan in 2003, not only to assist the central government in providing security at a sub-national level, but to also facilitate civil-military co-operation - since PRTs consisted of both military and civilian personnel. The ratio between military and civilians depended on the PRT

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<sup>13</sup> William Ormsby-Gore on 15 Mar 1937, Minute Sheet, Reg. No. 0176/484, WO 32/4178, TNA, London.

<sup>14</sup> Quoted in Gray, John: *The Dangers of Democracy* (New York Review of Books March 20 - April 2, 2014, Vol. LXI, Number 5), p. 43 - original: David Runciman: *The Confidence Trap: A History of Democracy in Crisis from World War I to the Present* (Princeton University Press).

<sup>15</sup> Steele 2011, 221.

lead-nation model: American PRTs were characterised by an overwhelming military presence, while the German and the British PRTs, though also having a clear majority of military staff, introduced a stronger civilian presence.<sup>16</sup> PRTs eventually expanded to operate in 26 provinces under NATO command.<sup>17</sup>

Estelle Rouge has observed that the establishment of PRTs coincided with a broader reconsideration of traditional peacekeeping and statebuilding in post-conflict countries, with a move towards more integrated or comprehensive missions encompassing multiple agencies, and a plurality of different actors under a single command.<sup>18</sup> In Afghanistan, this rapidly led to the massive involvement of military units in delivering humanitarian and development assistance, via PRTs. The portrayed humanitarian nature of PRTs ignited a debate about the civil-military cooperation trend, especially among humanitarian actors, because military humanitarian activities blurred the line between humanitarian and military actors on the ground. This was thought to affect seriously the neutral and impartial image of humanitarian organisations working on the ground. Indeed, as Ramin Shirzay has noted, none of the UN civil-military guidelines proved particularly effective in improving civil-military cooperation in post-Taliban Afghanistan.<sup>19</sup>

PRTs aimed to win the hearts and minds of Afghans, especially through the implementation of humanitarian actions known as quick impact projects. These projects aimed to enhance acceptance of the intervention among local communities. However, unintentionally, this work created parallel development and humanitarian affairs structures to those already established by Afghans, as President Hamid Karzai lamented.<sup>20</sup> A second, and intentionally more obscure, aim of winning over local Afghans was the clear objective of PRTs in facilitating intelligence gathering in order to defeat insurgencies.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, and perhaps even more seriously, blurred civil-military lines caused increased risk for civilian humanitarian workers, since they were not easily distinguishable from military personnel. Above all, as PRTs had a different function - that of military and political - they could not merge with humanitarian actors having clearly different functions that were based on principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.<sup>22</sup> Barbara J. Stableton has candidly observed that this assumption of reconstruction and development buying stability in Afghanistan inadvertently created a chicken and egg situation in which the “egg” of improvements to human security

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<sup>16</sup> Rouge 2011, 5.

<sup>17</sup> Shirzay 2012.

<sup>18</sup> Rouge 2011, 2-3.

<sup>19</sup> Shirzay 2012.

<sup>20</sup> Shirzay 2012.

<sup>21</sup> Rouge 2011, 9.

<sup>22</sup> Shirzay 2012.



has yet to be laid.<sup>23</sup>

In summary, PRTs have not left a positive legacy for the comprehensive approach. Their real objective to support military intervention created the potential for harm within humanitarian agencies that worked with local communities. At the same time, PRTs obscured good governance practices by creating parallel developmental structures. PRTs were thus credited with delivering particular services, as opposed to the Afghan government. The principle of local ownership was undermined, and PRTs' militarisation of aid jeopardised the core humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. Therefore, in many instances, the US-led PRTs did more harm than good, by pursuing counter-insurgency imperatives through its reconstruction efforts.<sup>24</sup>

PRTs are an unfortunate example of how things can go wrong on the basis of inadequate knowledge and understanding of a country and its contextual conflict setting - for example, by not comprehending the real influence, role and capability of different local tribes. This can lead to the establishment of ill-defined policies, objectives, and intervention. The war on terror blinded the international community from adopting a more appropriate course of action that would have addressed the underlying causes of conflict and remedied societal concerns. As Stapleton has argued, the need to strengthen human security was not considered when pursuing intervention in Afghanistan. Using this approach to fight the war against terror could have provided a framework able to address the root causes of Afghanistan's protracted instability.

## **On understanding multiple complexities**

It is unlikely that a successful policy of peacekeeping and crisis management intervention can be achieved without understanding the very causes that led to such instability and violence. Likewise, in addition to using this understanding to create more appropriate policies, it should also influence the principles, or ethos, that dictates a particular intervention strategy. Many scholars have attempted to explain how underlying societal issues affect behaviour, thus leading to upheaval and subsequent conflict. Edward Azar has proposed a model that seeks to explain the emergence and persistence of the various kinds of conflicts in which peacekeepers have become involved with since the end of the Cold War. According to Azar, the protracted social conflict (PSC) model usually originates whenever communal groups (defined by shared ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural characteristics) are denied their distinct identity or the fulfilment of their collective developmental needs. More specifically, Azar's model lays out the following four specific indicators for the outbreak of a protracted social conflict: communal content, human needs, governance and international linkage. Communal content refers to the satisfaction levels of different parts of a multi-

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<sup>23</sup> Stapleton 2007, 47.

<sup>24</sup> Rouge 2011, 10-16.

communal society. Human needs implies the denial of such rights, as witnessed in a lack of access to, or participation in, the institutions of society. Governance refers to often parochial, fragile and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic needs, and finally, international linkage refers to weak, rigid and sectarian states that seek to contain PSC by cutting off external support for the domestic conflict actors, instead seeking external support for themselves. Azar's definition of PSC and other related approaches and models are important, because they create a better understanding of the roots and dynamics of complex and multidimensional conflicts.<sup>25</sup>

The critical factor in protracted social conflict, according to Azar, is that it represents the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions, and economic participation. The traditional preoccupation of relations between states has been critiqued as obscuring the proper understanding of such intra-state dynamics. Since states have the ability to either satisfy or frustrate basic communal needs, they can also, therefore, prevent or promote conflict.<sup>26</sup>

The principles of human security, although still a debated concept in itself, correspond well to Azar's definition of PSC. When human security principles are not met, this can result in societal challenges - challenges that often involve violence. Human security was defined for the first time in the 1992 UN Agenda for Peace as the freedom from fear and want. Human security has also been defined as prioritising the security of people rather than states.<sup>27</sup> The 2009 Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) defines human security as the liberation of human beings from those intense, extensive, prolonged, and comprehensive threats to which their lives and freedom are vulnerable.<sup>28</sup> The AHDR definition is especially useful as it is based on several meticulous empirical studies of Arab states, where human insecurity has been a major contributor to the societal upheavals of recent years. Many of the AHDR observations are applicable to Afghanistan, too.

Mary Kaldor<sup>29</sup> promotes the adoption of a Human Security Doctrine for Europe (especially in relation to its crisis management actions) with a number of principles: the primacy of human rights, legitimate political authority, a bottom-up approach, effective multilateralism, integrated regional approach, clear and transparent strategic direction.<sup>30</sup> Kaldor suggests that human security capabilities, based on those principles,

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<sup>25</sup> Hansen, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 2004, 9-10.

<sup>26</sup> Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Hugh 2005, 84.

<sup>27</sup> Duffield 2007, 111.

<sup>28</sup> Arab Human Development Report 2009, 17, 23.

<sup>29</sup> Mary Kaldor leads a Human Security Study Group in the London School of Economics and Political Science.

<sup>30</sup> See "A European Way of Security: the Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group" at

should encompass the concepts of conflict prevention, crisis management and civil-military coordination. In her view, human security capabilities require civil-military coordination in crisis management. Kaldor views human security as the reason for how and why civil and military capabilities should be combined, rather than a reflexive action used as part of a standard conflict toolkit.<sup>31</sup>

Others emphasise human security, also, such as Oliver Richmond's focus on the more emancipatory approach to human security: Human security is focused upon emancipation from oppression, domination, and hegemony, as well as want.<sup>32</sup> Caroline Thomas links human security explicitly with democratic governance: The qualitative aspect of human security is about the achievement of human dignity which incorporates personal autonomy, control over one's life and unhindered participation in the life of the community.<sup>33</sup> Despite differences in emphasis, and the lack of a commonly agreed definition, it can be argued that all definitions consider human security to be important, and that human insecurity can increase the risk of violence and conflict. It can be deduced from this logic, therefore, that the principles of human security must be addressed in order to be able to tackle, also by the means of peacebuilding, the root causes of a conflict. If these causes are not addressed, then the sustainability and impact of such peacebuilding activities will remain flawed, as is currently visible in Afghanistan.

In addition to recognising the causes of conflict, the complexity of such causes must also be considered, when attempting to understand societal upheavals, weak states, and fragile societies. Unless these complexities are recognised, peacebuilding even with a comprehensive approach will be doomed from the outset. Furthermore, whilst some progress has already been made in the development of a more integrated response to complex contemporary conflicts, it is not enough to recognise such complexity - something must be done about it, which means appreciation of the multiple, underlying causes of conflicts.

Cedric de Coning concludes in his profound study on complexity that there exists inherent limits and constraints regarding the degree to which coherence can be achieved in the peacebuilding context. If these limits, and the fact that they exist, are not recognised, this can also lead to problems - such as the blind pursuance of an idealised or maximum level of coherence, regardless of the context and potential effects of such

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[www.lse.ac.uk/depts/global/studygroup/studygroup.htm](http://www.lse.ac.uk/depts/global/studygroup/studygroup.htm); see also *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe. The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities*. Presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, Barcelona, 15 September 2004 at <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/2securitypub.htm>.

<sup>31</sup> Kaldor, Martin and Selchow 2008, 2.

<sup>32</sup> Richmond 2007, 460-461.

<sup>33</sup> Thomas 2000, 6-7.

coherence.<sup>34</sup> For instance, prioritising the security sector without simultaneously giving sufficient attention to related aspects of civilian control is likely to generate a number of medium and longer term negative side effects.<sup>35</sup> De Coning defines coherence as the effort to ensure that the political, security and development dimensions of a peacebuilding system in a particular crisis are directed towards a common objective. Moreover, de Coning also argues that coherence is about pursuing an optimal level of cooperation among actors in a given context.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, it is important to understand the complexities of the conflict setting, as well as the objectives, capabilities and needs of all actors involved in this pursuance of coherence.

## **Conclusions - the primacy of understanding, principles and policy**

The Palestine case study demonstrates that the traditional compartmentalisation and barriers between civilian and military actors has existed for many years. However, this example also underlined the crucial importance of making decisions based on comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the root causes of a conflict.<sup>37</sup> The sad state of affairs by pursuing comprehensiveness through PRTs in Afghanistan has shown grave limits of the concept in a situation where the political decisions and knowledge of the setting is severely limited. Understanding the complexities of contemporary conflicts, as well as the multifaceted factors and agendas associated with different peacekeeping efforts, should be a prerequisite for recognising inevitable limits that such complexity poses for comprehensiveness. Furthermore, such comprehensiveness, or integrated approach, is something that should not be pursued for the sake of acting together only.

Comprehensiveness, when it is to be applied, must therefore be based on an in-depth understanding of the context, including the existing limits of intervention and integration. Appreciating the root causes of any given conflict can ultimately lead to

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<sup>34</sup> de Coning 2012, 107.

<sup>35</sup> de Coning 2012, 286.

<sup>36</sup> de Coning 2012, 4, 292.

<sup>37</sup> Diplomats play a crucial role (in addition to intelligence gathering and academia) in providing information for decision-making. Unfortunately, as Ross has observed, diplomats on the ground have not proved very skilful at monitoring local political trends. Why this happens is easy to see, and has little to do with the personal skill of those individuals concerned. They tend to be posted for short periods, and usually only a minority are trained in local languages. Their need for comfort and increasingly, security, tends to place them in secure, expat enclaves where they have little contact with the “locals”. Real country experts, who are fluent in local languages and steeped in local customs, can grasp the understanding of the situation perhaps better than the temporarily posted diplomat. See Ross, *Carné: Independent Diplomat. Despatches from an Unaccountable Elite*. C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. Second Impression 2009, 211-212. It is to be noted in this regard, that the example given in the beginning about Wauchope fits Ross’ argument. He argued for the sake of local knowledge, skills in local languages, and cultural knowledge, in order to understand the situation appropriately.

more sustainable policy formulations which, by necessity, take into account important principles - such as human security, for example. Directly addressing root causes supports the formulation of peacebuilding interventions that have the potential to genuinely contribute towards the recovery of a state in conflict. Clear policy decisions can then be reflected in clear and unambiguous mandates, which are able to provide an undisputed delineation of tasks for different peacebuilding actors - a necessity that Jari Mustonen has already observed in his study.<sup>38</sup>

How does all of this relate to the activities of the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management, established in Kuopio? This network, which already provides operational education regarding comprehensiveness, supports the arguments made in this paper - that there is no room for the successful operationalisation of comprehensiveness unless political-strategic decisions are also made, and mandates drafted, that take into account the root causes and complexities of a given conflict situation. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that comprehensiveness can only prove successful if it is used appropriately - the simple establishment of joint operations cannot remedy faulty policy strategies.

Considering the shift in operational training, to define different areas of responsibilities between different actors but to have these different actors cooperate with one another, then already a lot has been achieved. This success can be exemplified by the Integrated Crisis Management training programme<sup>39</sup>, which consists of subjects such as the UN's integrated mission concept, development assistance, humanitarian assistance, civil-military coordination, and human security. The purpose of comprehensiveness should not, by misconception, be understood as a full integration of actors, activities, and responsibilities any more than different sectors of well-functioning societies are integrated. In extreme, potentially integration in peace interventions would portray a skewed model of a society for countries in conflicts. However, the opportunity for more sustainable and tangible peace intervention impacts are greater when mission participants are already educated in comprehensiveness, as well as once the right policy decisions are in place. Therefore, the primacy rests with policy and principles, based on a deep understanding of each unique conflict situation.

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<sup>38</sup> Mustonen 2008, 36.

<sup>39</sup> Integrated Crisis Management Course: Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management, 7-13 June 2014, Kuopio, Finland.

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# Germany's Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform - A Successful Model

**Dr. Volker Jacoby and Irene-Maria Eich**

## Introduction

### *What is Germany's Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform?*

In Somalia, the war over ideology and national power between the Islamist group al-Shabaab and the Federal Government of Somalia continues for an eighth consecutive year. In Sudan, the militant group SPLM/A-North and the government continue to fight over the autonomy of the states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, militant groups such as M23, Mayi-Mayi and FDLR are battling for sub-national dominance, as well as resources in the Kivu Province. Examples of this kind illustrate the complexity of contemporary conflicts, the root causes of which range from political power struggles over divergent ethnic identities to trading routes and access to resources. All of these conflicts involve various stakeholders, and importantly also non-state actors. In light of such complexity, a sharp distinction between crisis prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding does not appear to be very useful. Instead, the different aspects or dimensions of international peace operations need to be interlocked, with civilian, police and military planning, implementation and evaluation coordinating appropriately. This is to ensure that all relevant actors contribute to a coherent crisis response - an aim that forms the basis of the concept known as the comprehensive approach.

As different German actors increase their engagement in international peace operations, consideration for the comprehensive approach in German politics is becoming a necessity. At the political-strategic level, the approach was first introduced through its inclusion in the 2006 "White Paper" of the German Federal Government. Since then, cooperation among military, police and civilian institutions for mission training has grown considerably, with the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) even initiating the development of a comprehensive qualification network - the *Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform* - in November 2008.

Comprising of seven different military, police, and civilian training institutions, which include all relevant national institutions involved in the training for international peace operations, this platform is committed to *a comprehensive training approach*.

*The Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform* facilitates regular dialogue and information exchange between all involved institutions, as well as the implementation of joint training courses, and the joint design and further development of trainings.



The exchange of trainers encourages a diversified training approach, and participants from different organisations can get to know each other prior to deployment, thus improving communication and coordination between the individual actors both at institutional headquarters and in the field.

### ***The Need for an Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform***

Peace operations are cross-departmental tasks, involving many different policy fields such as foreign, security, and development policy, as well as humanitarian assistance. Hence, in any given mission, a substantial amount of contact is required between these different actors - which also include military, police and civilian personnel. Thus, on the operational level, i.e. in the field in a particular crisis area, as well as on the political level, the comprehensive approach is an issue of fundamental importance. Therefore, in order to prepare personnel appropriately for the realities of a mission environment, it is logical to ensure that this comprehensive approach is implemented in all training prior to deployment to a peace operation. Jointly conducted training courses reflect more accurately the complex realities of peace operations, sensitising the participants to potential opportunities and challenges of interaction in the field. They also provide personnel with strategies for developing successful cooperation. Furthermore, getting to know the organisational philosophies, communication structures, working cultures, and decision making processes of other actors involved in a crisis area helps to overcome prejudices and fosters mutual appreciation between actors. This not only improves cooperation both at home and in the field, but can also increase the efficiency of a mission.

Moreover, since certain training modules are already given to the military, as well as police and civilian personnel, they can therefore be taught together. This is the case when it comes to general topics such as mission administration, mentoring or gender issues, as well as particular soft skills that are independent of the specific tasks and concerns facing different actors in this intercultural working environment. Furthermore, joint training courses make use of potential synergies concerning resources (e.g. financial, personnel). For instance, in the case of security training, ZIF as a civilian training institution can benefit from having access to military facilities when organising certain activities - in mine awareness training or their “Hostile Environment Awareness Training” (HEAT) course.

However, it is important to keep in mind that the comprehensive training approach is not about the homogenisation of processes and institutions. Rather, the concept aims to locate overlapping areas of interest that can be used to maximise the mutual benefits of cooperation.

Through the development of joint training courses that embrace the spirit of the

comprehensive approach, the existing knowledge, competencies and resources of all actors and institutions involved can be efficiently exchanged, pooled and exploited, thus making training and missions more effective.

In this respect, the structure of *Germany's Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform* has the potential to serve as an effective example of how the comprehensive approach can be utilised successfully within training.

## **Implementation Level**

### ***Actors / Training Institutions / Partners***

All relevant national institutions involved in the training for international peace operations are engaged in the *Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform*. The platform, thus, consists of three police academies, two training institutions of the armed forces, and two civilian institutions.

### **Police Training Institutions**

The participating police training institutions are the *German Federal Police Academy (BPOLAK)*, the *Police Academy of North-Rhine Westphalia*, and the *Police Academy of Baden-Württemberg*.

All three academies have training departments for international police missions, which provide mission-specific and pre-deployment training courses. For instance, the Police Academy of Baden-Württemberg provides preparatory courses for the UN Mission in Liberia, and the EU missions in Palestine and the Horn of Africa. The Police Academy of North-Rhine-Westphalia conducts training courses for missions in Kosovo, Georgia, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa. Moreover, both of these institutions also provide a broad variety of general training courses crucial for the preparation of police officers prior to, or during, international deployment, as well as post-deployment seminars (post-processing seminars and post-mission debriefings). In the spirit of the comprehensive approach, the training courses for international peace operations at the police academies are also open for civilian and military staff. Some of the courses were even developed and realised jointly with civilian and military partners - for instance, the international training course "Mentoring and Advising in the Field", conducted by the Federal Police Academy, and the "Women, Peace and Security" course, conducted by the Police Academy of Baden-Württemberg.

### **Military Training Institutions**

Germany's military training centres, the *UN Training Centre of the German Armed Forces* and the *Bundeswehr Command and Staff College (Bw FÜAK)*, provide courses that are also open to civilian experts and police officers from partnering institutions. For instance, the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College, which aims to prepare German military

officers for work in multinational and multidimensional peace operations, provides a number of course modules that are open to military officers from other states, as well as to German police officers and civilians from different fields of expertise. Among these courses is the UN-certified “United Nations Staff Officer Course” (UNSOC). The UN Training Centre of the German Armed Forces is an institution that develops multidisciplinary pre-deployment training for German mission contingents, UN military observers, and police forces. It also prepares situational awareness training and security modules, which are specifically developed for civilian agencies and non-governmental organisations operating in crisis areas - for instance, the HEAT course for EU mission personnel.

### Civilian Training Institutions

Last but not least, the *Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform* is completed by two civilian actors, which play a considerable role in promoting the network. These actors are *Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ, German Agency for International Cooperation), with its in-house professional development section *Akademie für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (AIZ, Academy for International Cooperation), and *Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze* (ZIF, Center for International Peace Operations).

AIZ's training courses related to this framework aim to provide participants with the core skills required for work in the field of international development, as well as the ability for these participants to make a realistic assessment of their role within the wider context of international development work. AIZ, in cooperation with the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College, thus provides courses such as “Civil and Military Interaction: Peacebuilding in Fragile Contexts, Challenges for International Co-operation” (ZUMI).

The core mandate of ZIF is to train, recruit and support civilian personnel for peace operations and election observation missions. Thus, ZIF maintains a national expert roster, and provides analysis, policy advice and conceptual contributions to the field of peace operations. ZIF applies the comprehensive approach both at the political level, when working closely with different ministries and international organisations, and also at the training level, when collaborating with the aforementioned civilian, police and military partner institutions in the framework of the *Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform*. For instance, together with the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College, ZIF has developed a conflict mapping exercise; which is conducted in “The Comprehensive Approach to Multi-Dimensional Peace Operations” (CAMPO) course.

ZIF also leads the European Commission funded ENTRi consortium (Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management), consisting of 13 European

partners. Some of these partners form part of Foreign or Interior Ministries, with others being non-governmental organisations. All ENTRi courses are free for civilians. Police and military participants are welcome to apply for ENTRi courses, but they should cover their own costs.

### ***Working Patterns***

Members of the *Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform* meet twice annually to facilitate dialogue and coordination between each other, with regard to joint training activities and standards.

These regular meetings provide a discussion forum where relevant information can be exchanged, and strategic and practical approaches developed collaboratively. In terms of strategic aspects, questions concerning the future development of partners, as well as trends found in contemporary peace operations and their subsequent implications for training, are discussed. With regard to practical developments, current training courses are evaluated, training curricula are designed and improved, and the partners agree upon the future distribution of training courses between institutions.

Within the framework of the platform, a number of training courses have been jointly developed and/or conducted by several of the partnering institutions. Additionally, also in the spirit of the comprehensive approach, some of the training institutions provide entire courses or course modules that are open to staff from partnering institutions.

### ***Training Courses***

Since its creation in November 2008, a number of joint training activities (courses and exercises) have been successfully realised. Many of these activities have also been comprehensive into the regular course programs of the respective training partners.

#### **Cooperatively Developed and Conducted Training Courses**

As stated above, some training courses have been cooperatively developed, or even conducted jointly. Among these are the “United Nations Mission Administration and Field Support Course”, the course on “Mentoring and Advising”, the “Women, Peace and Security” course, and the “Comprehensive Approach in Multi-dimensional Peace Operations” (CAMPO) course. All of these address subjects that concern every actor in international peace operations. Therefore, these courses are particularly well suited for efficient joint training in the spirit of the comprehensive approach.

The “*United Nations Mission Administration and Field Support Course*” was jointly developed by the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College and ZIF. This two-week long training course provides a general understanding of the operational procedures and mechanisms in the UN’s mission administration and field support functions. It aims

to provide participants with the knowledge and skills required for the planning, set-up and implementation of a mission, as well as ensuring the sustainable and efficient support and management of existing international field missions. The course is an excellent example of how the comprehensive approach can be implemented at the training level, creating a common management culture among future mission members who have different professional, organisational and cultural backgrounds.

The one-week training course on "*Mentoring and Advising*" was developed by ZIF and the Federal Police Academy, in cooperation with the Ministry for the Interior and Sport of the federal state of Saxony-Anhalt, and the UN Training Centre for the German Armed Forces. This is another successful example of interdisciplinary cooperation. The training course aims to convey to participants the significance of successful mentoring and advising for the implementation of a mission mandate. It also sensitises participants to the ways in which mentoring schemes and processes can successfully contribute to the local ownership and support of international peace efforts. To this end, the course covers basic strategies and concepts of monitoring, coaching and mentoring, as well as techniques for working with interpreters. Participants get to know the role of a mentor, which includes learning how to gain the respect of local staff as a precondition for undertaking this role. The course targets civilian experts, as well as police and military personnel, working as a mentor in the field of crisis management.

The course on "*Women, Peace & Security*" was developed as a response to the UN's and EU's strategic and operational inclusion of a gender perspective in their peace operations. The aim of this course is to contribute to this wider process, by preparing personnel properly on the topic of gender, thereby strengthening their ability to implement a gender perspective in their mission work - at all levels. An exceptionally high number of different actors were involved in the development of this course: the Police Academy Baden-Württemberg, ZIF, the department for International Police Operations of the Police Academy of North Rhine-Westphalia, the Police Force of Lower Saxony, and the UN Training Centre of the Armed Forces. The course is organised by the Police Academy Baden-Württemberg and supported by ZIF via substantial contributions concerning content. The training course facilitates discussion on the roles and status of women in different societies, also covering the definitions of various gender concepts and legal frameworks. The course also outlines the different roles assigned to military, civilian and police components, with regard to gender issues, as well as the various security concerns affecting women, men, girls and boys during and after a conflict - including sexual and gender based violence.

Finally, the comprehensive map exercise, the "*Comprehensive Approach in Multi-dimensional Peace Operations*" (CAMPO), was developed. This is regularly conducted by ZIF, together with the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College. A one-week exercise, this

course aims to enhance understanding surrounding the challenges faced when devising a comprehensive approach in international peace operations. Based on a complex conflict scenario, course participants must develop an “ideal” plan of action for a peace operation. Using conflict analysis strategies, participants first identify the starting points for conflict management. They then have to prioritise tasks from many different sectors (i.e. military, police, humanitarian, civilian). This encourages participants to identify both possibilities for, and the necessity of, cooperation. The exercise also outlines potential issues of conflict when it comes to this level of implementation. Thus, participants get to know the different approaches of actors on the ground, learning how diverse operational objectives can still complement one another. Other issue areas are also addressed - for instance, information access, communication, and consultation, as well as pragmatic interaction between different actors. This exercise promotes the comprehensive approach in two ways: first, its participants are from military, police and civilian backgrounds (in peace operations as well as development), and second, it makes the comprehensive approach and its implementation the primary subject of discussion.

### **Training Courses Open for Participants from Partner Training Institutions**

Many courses that were developed and conducted by one single institution welcome the participation of those coming from partnering institutions. Some examples include the course on “Intercultural Management and Behaviour”, the “United Nations Staff Officer Course” (UNSOC), and “Core Course Peace Operations”.

The course titled “*Intercultural Management and Behaviour*” is useful for everyone in the field since these common qualifications are needed for military, police and civilian personnel. All need to develop these soft skills, when in an intercultural working environment. This one-week course was developed, and is conducted by, the German Federal Police Academy. It confronts the participants with typical situations of intercultural conflict and provides in-depth understanding of the concepts of ‘cultural difference’ and ‘cultural interaction’ - concepts necessary for effective cooperation with the wide range of local and international actors present in contemporary peace operations.

The three-week long “*United Nations Staff Officer Course*” (UNSOC) was developed, and is regularly conducted, by the Command and Staff College of the German Armed Forces. It prepares staff officers for UN assignments at the planning level. Since this means working in multinational and multidimensional peace operations, as mentioned above, a limited number of places are open to police officers, ZIF expert pool members, and other civilian representatives, in order to reflect the multi-faceted nature of current UN peace operations. To practise interaction and cooperation between representatives of different organisational cultures in a realistic way, the course includes

a one-week map exercise (MAPEX), in which participants are given a decisive role (e.g. political affairs, military, police, humanitarian, development) that complements their individual skills and experience. Whilst in this role, participants are tasked to develop a comprehensive mission plan. This is a good example of how the comprehensive approach can make training situations more realistic and effective.

Finally, a two-week course called “*Core Course Peace Operations*” is conducted by ZIF. The Core Course is a pre-requisite for all German civilian experts intending to join the ZIF expert pool. The course also serves as preparation for experts who will be deployed to peace operations organised by the OSCE, the EU, and the UN. In the spirit of the comprehensive approach, this training course is also open for police and military personnel. Moreover, it contains a module on the comprehensive approach so that the concept itself is made the focus of the training, as is also the case in the CAMPO map exercise. However, the most important aspect of this course, in relation to the comprehensive approach, is the use of an overarching simulation exercise that has been developed jointly by military, police and civilians - this simulation aims to mainstream the comprehensive approach throughout the entire course.

Furthermore, due to the good cooperation in the framework of the *Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform*, a security module (HEAT) conducted by the UN Training Center of the German Armed Forces has been integrated into the Core Course curriculum, with soldiers working as trainers and role-players. This is a good example of how one member of the training platform, with the appropriate infrastructure and necessary technical knowledge, can provide relevant training to other partners. Thus, the *Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform* allows for making use of resource synergies, thereby making training more efficient. Such cooperation is necessary, since comprehensive training can only be realised when different training institutions pool resources and cooperate effectively.

### ***Comprehensive Training through International Multidimensional Exercises***

Beyond the training courses developed or provided within the framework of the *Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform*, ZIF enables its civilian personnel to participate in international military exercises, which is yet another possibility to train participants in accordance with the comprehensive approach. For instance, ZIF personnel supported the “Heeresführungsübung” (army command exercise) and the “Common Effort – DEU/NL Corps” exercise in 2011, as well as the “Four for Peace in Central Europe / 4-PCE” and the “Crystal Eagle NATO-UN” exercises in 2012 and 2013.

Furthermore, since 2011, ZIF has participated twice in the NATO-UN Civil-Military Exercise “VIKING” - the only multinational comprehensive approach

exercise worldwide. The exercise aims to train civilian, military and police personnel in planning and conducting a UN-mandated Chapter VII peace operation, based on the comprehensive approach. It focuses on cooperation and coordination within an unstable environment, involving multiple stakeholders - a reflection of the types of challenges existing today in international, hybrid, parallel and coordinated missions, such as those in parts of Africa and Afghanistan.

By participating in such international, multidimensional exercises, ZIF is training civilian experts while simultaneously ensuring that the civilian component in peace operations is not just considered, but actively included in the planning of peace support operations.

### **Cross-Departmental Activities as a National Political Framework**

Germany has gained experience in civilian international peace operations since the early nineties and, over the past two decades, has developed instruments and institutions in the field of civilian crisis management and peacebuilding. The German engagement aspires to enhance its effectiveness through cross-departmental action. Thus, the *Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform*, which primarily addresses practitioners, is embedded within the wider political-strategic framework of an increasingly interlinked crisis management and peacebuilding policy.

Comprehensive action in foreign policy requires stronger internal cohesion. In order to make the governance of this policy field more coherent, several institutional arrangements and instruments have been developed with the aim of ensuring the inclusion of all relevant departments and actors.

To this end, a Sub-Committee on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Management and Comprehensive Action, at the parliamentary level, has been established. At the ministerial level, an Inter-ministerial Civilian Crisis Prevention Steering Group and an Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention have been created as a result of the implementation of the 2004 Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peace Building. The aim was to make peace politics and conflict prevention not only an issue of foreign, security and development policy areas, but also a wider cross-sectional task, involving economic, financial and environmental policymakers. The Action Plan outlines cross-departmental civilian measures and opportunities for action in the field of crisis prevention, civilian conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping. The Steering Group consists of representatives of the Federal Foreign Office, as well as the Federal Ministries of Defence, Interior and Economic Cooperation and Development. They meet every six weeks with the task to pool capacities and coordinate government actions in the field of crisis prevention. The Advisory Board, consisting of economic and political experts and civil society actors, ensures the cooperation of non-governmental actors in civilian crisis prevention. This



board also provides professional advice to the Steering Group. Further methods of enhancing action in the field of conflict management, in line with the comprehensive approach, include deploying liaison and exchange officials and collaborating with planning staff of the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministries of Defence, Interior and Economic Cooperation and Development. In 2012, the planning staff of these ministries jointly developed the policy strategy paper titled, "Interministerial guidelines for coherent Federal Government policy towards fragile states". This paper outlines the establishment of task forces dedicated to certain countries or regions of crisis escalation. These task forces are headed by a representative of the Federal Foreign Office and are staffed with representatives from the participating four ministries and experts from other Federal Ministries, depending on the certain situation or crisis. In order to allow for quick, coordinated action, the task forces will analyse the situation and advise on Germany's future involvement. Given this interministerial pooling of expertise and the formulation of joint advice, the task forces are another way to integrate the comprehensive approach.

While several instruments have already been designed to promote the comprehensive approach, in practice - and especially at the ministerial level - the realisation of such an approach is (too) often dependent on single personalities.

Another purpose for the creation of jointly developed courses is to provide training to middle management. Thus, the *Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform* provides an interface for political decision makers and practitioners, ensuring that these different actors involved in the field of crisis management and peacebuilding are all moving in the same direction.

## **Conclusion: Added Value of the Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform and Future Perspectives**

Experience since 2008 indicates that, through the *Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform*, its members have been able to make a substantial contribution to the implementation of the comprehensive approach, particularly in relation to training activities for international peace operations.

This platform has benefited military, police and civilian participants in many ways. It allows for a more effective and more efficient adaptation of deployed experts, so they better understand the complexities and comprehensive realities of contemporary peace operations. The platform has also significantly contributed to overcoming prejudices, fostering mutual appreciation between the three traditionally separated components of peace operations, and strengthening the respect of each other's organisational philosophies and working cultures.

The platform has also served as an information hub, as well as a space for the creative development of joint training activities. The development of joint training standards has been based on common needs assessments and evaluations, which has also improved the exchange of institutional knowledge and approaches, and has furthered a deepening and widening understanding of the challenges in training civilian, police and military personnel for international peace operations.

Still, there is more to gain from using the *Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform*, and closer cooperation within the national network of military, police and civil training institutions should be fostered in order to further improve the effectiveness and eventual success of peace operations. This work would fully acknowledge that national training institutions should remain flexible and independent - cooperation should not imply the deprivation of individual competences and the scope for independent decision making. After all, military, police and civilians do have to possess different skills and thus, at times, require different training.

Apart from similar approaches in Sweden, Finland, and to a certain degree in Great Britain, Germany's *Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform* is a unique example of cooperation between civilian, police and military training institutions, with the potential to serve as good practice for other countries, or even as an extension to European cooperative practices. Lately, the EU has expressed its resolve to strengthen the comprehensive approach within CSDP missions, stressing the need to implement this concept when building the capacity of its personnel.

Given the complex character of contemporary crisis situations and international responses, there is no alternative but to pursue the comprehensive approach. Qualifying this approach, using frameworks such as that of the *Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform*, is not a luxury but a prerequisite for a coherent response to crisis, and thus a necessity for successful peace operations.

# RAMSI: The Emergence of a Template for Multiagency Crisis Management?

**Lyndon McCauley**

In the Southwest Pacific, the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is renowned as a successful stabilisation operation that trialled new ideas and structures, but the finer points of that mission may be less conspicuous to a European audience. So what makes RAMSI a relatively unique source of guidance for future crisis response operations, and what lessons does it offer for responders to crises the world over?

For a start, RAMSI is the only multinational, nation-building operation to have no involvement from the United States, Europe or the United Nations. Another notable of this mission was its regional backing and investment; RAMSI was in fact an initiative of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the largest economic and social partnership of the Southwest Pacific states. Australia led a collective of fifteen contributing Pacific states, which, along with the invitation of the Solomon Islands' Government, gave RAMSI compelling legitimacy.

The PIF initiative required the Solomon Islands' Parliament to approve legislation (which it did so unanimously) to give effect to a treaty between the Solomons, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Niue, Tonga, Samoa, the Cook Islands, Vanuatu, Nauru, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. This treaty not only entered into international law, but was welcomed by the Secretary-General of the UN.

Another defining feature of RAMSI was that it was a civilian-led mission. A Special Coordinator from Australia's foreign ministry was appointed to lead a mission whose initial plans indicated would take at least ten years—a notably long-term commitment. The civilian leadership represents another stark contrast from Australia's earlier operations in East Timor which were military-led.

Having deployed in 2003, RAMSI still operates today, but its shape, size and function have progressively transformed to address the Solomon Islands of 2014. So what led to the need for RAMSI? How did Australia, with the assistance of fourteen other states, shape this unique operation, and what has it taught those of us seeking to respond better to future crises the world over?<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Australian Civil-Military Centre or the Australian Government.

## **The Solomon Islands and ‘The Tensions’: 1998–2003**

Instability was a defining characteristic of the Solomon Islands long before RAMSI was ever devised. Indeed some commentators referred to the Solomon Islands as an ‘unformed state’ rather than a ‘failed state’ as it had never realised effective governance institutions. Since its independence from Great Britain in 1978, only one government had completed a full term (it was no coincidence that this feat was achieved by Harold Kemakeza’s 2001–2006 government, only after the arrival of RAMSI). The period 1998–2003 (immediately preceding RAMSI) was indeed so tumultuous that it became known as ‘the tensions’.

At the centre of the country’s ethnic tensions was the ongoing divide between Malaitans and those from the main island, Guadalcanal. The continual influx of Malaitans to Guadalcanal (where the national capital, Honiara, is situated) and its greater economic prospects led to land disputes. Guadalcanal locals resented the incursion into their traditional lands and begrudged the Malaitans’ matrilineal inheritance culture, which resulted in progressive transfer of their land to the Malaitans.

Disputes over land eventually resulted in open conflict. Armed militia formed within both ethnic groups in an effort to claim or reclaim lands. The only security force in the Solomons, the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF), was unable to deal with the escalating conflict, not only due to its modest capacity, but also because of endemic corruption within its ranks that further hindered their ability to deal with the violence objectively.

In June 2000, one of the central militia, the Malaitan Eagle Force, and disaffected members of the RSIPF staged a coup, removing the national government by force. Although another government was installed, the country descended further into general lawlessness and violent crime. Compounding the disorder was the level of corruption across state institutions. The Solomon Islands political system was reduced to two ethnic groups and their respective militia seeking to hold sway over the government of the day through corruption and violence.

Hundreds were killed and over 30,000 people were displaced between 1998 and 2003. As appalling as the death toll was, the effects of ‘the tensions’ on the Solomon Islands’ economy were similarly compelling. The national GDP, already withered by the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, contracted by a further 25% between 1998 and 2002 as public services disintegrated and the Solomon Islands lurched towards state failure.

## **Preparing for RAMSI: Planning Mechanisms and Applying Lessons Learned**

Planning for RAMSI was undertaken through an interdepartmental committee (IDC)

that assembled the relevant Australian government departments, as well as their equivalent agencies from other contributing states. This IDC was to ensure that RAMSI officials on the ground received full support, resources and timely policy decisions.

The purpose of the IDC was to provide information via a coordinated, consultative approach, where all Australian government stakeholders were aware of the advice provided to decision makers in Canberra and Honiara. To that end, the IDC became the sole channel for providing advice to government on RAMSI operations; whereas previous operations in East Timor had suffered from inconsistent or contradictory information flowing to decision makers. As the leading agency under the Special Coordinator, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) also maintained its own dedicated, internal task force to support RAMSI through the first six months of operations.

In the years preceding RAMSI, Australia had been part of peacekeeping missions that offered lessons for dealing with the Solomon Islands crisis. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992–93, and the series of UN missions in East Timor—the UN International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) and UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET)—each provided lessons for the Solomon Islands operation.

UNTAC's lessons on the need for a long-term commitment by the international community were certainly heeded by RAMSI's planners. UNTAC officials recalled that a regrettable aspect of the mission was that the first signs of peace were used as a case for downsizing the mission in Cambodia. RAMSI would make no such mistake, making a long-term commitment (initially ten years) a feature of mission planning.

Another lesson realised from Australia's involvement in the Cambodian missions was the need to ensure that decision making in the host nation was undertaken through publicly declared, transparent governance structures. UNTAC officials had wasted time chasing 'empty shells' of departments, while power continued to be exercised in secret through parallel structures not made known to the UN officials. By embedding its own officials in line positions within the Solomon Islands Government, RAMSI ensured that its administrators could oversee, if not advise, critical decision making.

Inter-agency planning for RAMSI benefited from lessons learned in East Timor operations, as well as previous stabilisation efforts in the Solomon Islands. Relevant agencies such as DFAT, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Department of Defence and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) used joint planning processes, rather than briefing government through separate channels (as had been the case in the lead-up to the East Timor operation). In 1999, an interdepartmental

policy group was not implemented until three days prior to INTERFET's deployment to East Timor.

Planning for RAMSI was also afforded considerably more time than in the case of East Timor, where preparations took place during the rapid onset of crisis; the Solomon Islands was more of a 'slow burn' as some commentators describe it. The weeks preceding RAMSI's deployment were used wisely to conduct a series of table-top exercises involving key stakeholders from relevant police forces, militaries and civilian agencies like DFAT and AusAID. These exercises played a key role in forming cooperative relationships prior to deployment and have been credited with early mission successes.

## **RAMSI – The Mission on the Ground**

On 17 July 2003, the Solomon Islands' Parliament unanimously passed legislation enabling the RAMSI mission. On the same day, the government signed agreements with each of the mission's fifteen contributing states. The initial component of RAMSI arrived in Honiara on 24 July.

The mandate for RAMSI was to focus on the three pillars of 'machinery of government', 'law and justice' and 'economic governance'. At the helm of this mission, was an executive leadership comprising a Special Coordinator from DFAT in Australia, a Deputy Special Coordinator from New Zealand and an Assistant Special Coordinator from Fiji. This leadership structure ensured a balanced, regional perspective in RAMSI's operations.

Beneath the executive was a dedicated programme director (an Australian public servant) atop each of the three pillars. Each pillar incorporated staff from AFP, ADF, Treasury, AusAID, the Department of Finance and Administration, the Attorney-General's Department and DFAT. Given the diversity of expertise and number of stakeholders across these three pillars, the role of the Special Coordinator was enormous. Besides integration between the three pillars, the Special Coordinator would also liaise with the Solomon Islands' Government, the PIF and member states, as well as the Australian Government's supporting inter-departmental committee in Canberra. RAMSI's whole-of-government approach, which allowed security, economic and development issues to be addressed simultaneously, was commended by the OECD in 2006 as best practice in integrated missions.




Figure 1 - RAMSI's Cooperation Model

Although a long-term, nation-building mission, RAMSI's immediate focus was to restore security, and the initial mix of personnel accurately reflected that goal. The 2,250 deployed personnel were comprised of approximately 1,800 military, 300 police officers and the remainder were civilians with specialist governance and capacity building skills.

While building RSIPF capacity would be essential to maintaining the rule of law in future, when RAMSI arrived the local police were simply incapable of keeping order. RAMSI's police contingent, known as the Participating Police Force (PPF), was drawn from thirteen contributing states and would conduct 'frontline policing' until security levels stabilised. Policing would be the focal point of RAMSI's security operations. Soldiers were largely for back-up; however, the highly visible presence of the military served to deter criminal activity while assuring contributing states that their police personnel could be protected.

Together, the police and military presence quickly established a secure environment conducive to longer-term development goals. RAMSI's military presence was reduced from 1,800 to 700 within six months, and then further reduced to 400 at the end of the first year. This was in part driven by highly publicised security gains inside RAMSI's first year; a disarmament campaign had removed over 3,700 guns and 300,000 rounds of ammunition from circulation, while more than 3,000 arrests were made (including

key militia leaders) and prosecuted through a rejuvenated judicial system. RAMSI's coordinators and contributing states were also sufficiently flexible that they were able to temporarily boost military and police numbers when violence resurfaced in 2005 and 2006.

Once the security situation stabilised, RAMSI turned its mission focus to bolstering the Solomon Islands' police. RAMSI adopted an innovative approach to capacity-building in this sector by swearing in international police to the local police force. Placement of RAMSI police officers in the RSIPF allowed the direct transfer of knowledge and increased monitoring of capacity-building progress.

Although the security environment took time to stabilise, RAMSI's specialist civilian officials had begun a comprehensive partnering arrangement with the Solomon Islands Ministry of Finance and Treasury within days of arriving in Honiara. Their aim was to immediately stabilise Solomon Islands' public finances and gain control of the national economy.




Figure 2 - RAMSI's three Civilian Pillars



RAMSI gained a better grip on a rapidly disintegrating Solomon Islands' administration by embedding its own officers into line positions within the national government. RAMSI officials occupied key advisory positions not only within Finance and Treasury, but also in crucial monitoring agencies such as the Auditor General office. Critics of this initiative have described such practice as intrusive; however, such placements helped establish functional governance mechanisms and assured the international community that any aid to the Solomon Islands would be subject to sound financial accountability mechanisms. This initiative ensured that international assistance flowed to the Solomon Islands to enable long-term development projects.

As the security environment stabilised, RAMSI adapted to focus on capacity building and governance improvements. Guided by negotiations with the PIF and the Solomon Islands Government in 2009, RAMSI focused on achievement-based milestones, which enabled the gradual withdrawal of foreign personnel from the country. This agreement was known as the Partnership Framework, which essentially reviewed the RAMSI mandate and refocused the mission in light of its achievements over the first six years.

RAMSI today is a police-only mission, although still headed by the civilian Special Coordinator. In 2013, all aid to the Solomon Islands ceased to be channelled through RAMSI and is now provided through traditional bilateral means. The last of RAMSI's military personnel also withdrew in 2013. Capacity-building for the Solomon Islands police force continues; Australia has 109 police officers within the 154-member PPF, while the Commissioner of the RSIPF is still an Australian. In current planning, RAMSI is scheduled to cease operations in 2017.

## **What has RAMSI Taught Us about Crisis Management?**

RAMSI's regional partnering, integrated leadership and coordinated approach have yielded a number of successes and a range of lessons learned for Australian Government agencies, as well as international counterparts. These lessons have, in turn, helped further develop individual agencies, processes and capabilities. Integrated planning processes, interdepartmental coordination groups and joint pre-deployment training have each gone some way to improving partnerships across civilian, police and military components in practice. Such initiatives were in many instances tested for the first time in the Solomon Islands, which has driven the development of numerous whole-of-government processes.

As a largely untried whole-of-government concept at its inception, RAMSI has demonstrated to the Australian Government the strengths and weaknesses of its individual agencies and their interactions at the tactical/operational levels. RAMSI has proved a testing ground for inter-agency cooperation and helped realise greater

effectiveness. The costs of deploying Australian government agencies in response to conflict and disaster are expected to decrease as whole-of-government models—some initiated under RAMSI—develop and mature. Put simply, RAMSI is in part responsible for what might be called a greater ‘culture of collaboration’.

The challenge for RAMSI’s Special Coordinator was truly enormous. The range of stakeholders to liaise with stretches across fifteen states, across different cultures, carrying different skills and reporting through dissimilar governance structures in their respective states. It is in the management of this network that the Special Coordinator holds the keys to RAMSI’s success; a lesson that applies to all such integrated, whole-of-government operations.

Although RAMSI’s size posed significant coordination challenges, its diverse regional make-up gave it strength and, in the eyes of the local population, legitimacy. Melanesian Solomon Islanders could better relate to Papua New Guineans or Fijians than they would Anglo-Saxon Australians or New Zealanders. This regional approach benefited not only the RAMSI operation, but individual states of the Southwest Pacific, whose personnel received invaluable operational and development experience through collaboration with colleagues from states such as New Zealand and Australia. The overall effect of this was to boost regional peacebuilding capability.

These Pacific region partners were confident making their contributions given Australia’s publicly stated, ten year commitment to RAMSI. Such guarantees from RAMSI’s leaders gave confidence to the smaller partner states (and to the Solomon Islands) and stability to operational planners. Australia’s pledge to restore the Solomon Islands also declared its broader commitment to the stability of the Southwest Pacific region. In this way, RAMSI illustrated the advantages of regional approaches to security, as well as the value of leadership in such settings.

Australia’s contribution to RAMSI, while by far the largest, did not owe its success to its overwhelming size. Australia’s relatively small sized government (compared to many developed Western states at least) meant personnel were often familiar with each other, even if they worked across different agencies. Although previously untried inter-agency processes suffered some initial mishaps, the size of the stakeholder community within the Australian Government was small enough that problems could be resolved through existing networks. As one commentator described: “Australia was large enough to deploy people, assets and resources at scale, but small enough that personal connections are ubiquitous and collegial habits maintained.”

The importance of inter-agency relations and coordination were highlighted through many lessons learned in RAMSI. Upon returning from RAMSI, a former ADF force

commander suggested the production of an inter-agency handbook, based on the Solomon Islands' operations, as a way of bolstering joint doctrine development. Publications such as *Same Space – Different Mandates* have partially fulfilled this need by contrasting the diverse skills, methods, training and equipment employed by actors across the civil-military community. The principles outlined in this publication were in many cases revealed by operations under RAMSI.

Australian agencies identified numerous requirements within their own response capabilities through the RAMSI experience. Although the AFP has contributed to UN peacekeeping missions since Cyprus in 1964, the demands of Solomon Islands operations has demonstrated the need for a deployable capability to respond to international crises. Less than a year after RAMSI commenced, the AFP stood-up its International Deployment Group (IDG), providing the Australian Government with a standing capacity to deploy Australian police domestically and internationally to contribute to stability and security operations, UN missions and capacity development missions. Australia is the only nation in the world to hold such an international policing capability.

Other examples of enhanced Australian response capability since the inception of RAMSI are the Australian Civilian Corps (ACC) and improved inter-agency mechanisms such as the Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF). The ACC provides Australian specialists (such as those deployed with RAMSI to stabilise the Solomon Islands finances) to prevent, prepare for, stabilise and recover from disasters and conflict. The IDETF is the senior inter-departmental committee for coordinating international conflict and disaster management, and for monitoring the progress of Australia's support. The IDETF guides the provision of advice to government in the international context, bringing together relevant departments and agencies to identify resources and options, and make recommendations on the appropriate form of crisis response. This mechanism evolved from the IDC utilized in coordinating government support during RAMSI.

## **Conclusion**

The mission to the Solomon Islands was, and remains, a largely successful multinational, civil-military operation. It was, however, by no means perfect. Suggestions that RAMSI is a template for all similar operations should be treated with caution; all crises present their own unique challenges and responders cannot adopt a 'one size fits all' approach. For all the technical expertise RAMSI brought with it to the Solomon Islands, it could do nothing to change the political culture of the country, where corruption is still endemic. Furthermore, the Solomon Islands remains highly dependent on international aid, while its highest earning industry, logging, becomes increasingly unsustainable due to the pursuit of short-term profits.

The utility of RAMSI lies not only in its successes, but in learning lessons from its failures and applying them where appropriate. RAMSI effectively represents an investment in integrated missions, informing the planning and conduct of inter-agency operations today and into the future.

Note: In November 2013 AusAID was absorbed into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

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## List of Acronyms

ACC	Australian Civilian Corps
ADF	Australian Defence Forces
AFP	Department of Defence and the Australian Federal Police
AHDR	Arab Human Development Report
AIZ	Academy for International Cooperation (Academie für Internationale Zusammenarbeit)
AU	African Union
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BPOLAK	German Federal Police Academy (Bundespolizeiakademie)
Bw FüAk	Bundeswehr Command and Staff College
CAMPO	Comprehensive Approach to Multi-Dimensional Peace Operations
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CMCO	Civil Military Coordination
CMC Finland	Crisis Management Centre Finland
DEU/NL Corps	German/Netherlands Corps (NATO High Readiness Forces Headquarters)
DFAT	(Australian) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
EASF	Eastern Africa Standby Force
ENTRi	Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management
ESDC	European Security and Defence College
EU	European Union
FINCENT	Finnish Defence Forces International Centre
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit)
HEAT	Hostile Environment Awareness Training
ICM	Integrated Crisis Management Course
IDC	(Australian) Interdepartmental Committee
IDG	International Deployment Group
IDETF	(Australian) Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force
INTERFET	United Nations International Force in East Timor
ISSAT	International Security Sector Advisory Team
KATU	Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network
MAPEX	Map Exercise (Organized by ZIF)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

## List of Acronyms

OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
PPF	Participating Police Force
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC	Protracted Social Conflict
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
RSIPF	Royal Solomon Islands Police Force
SPLM/A -NORTH	Sudan People`s Liberation Movement/Army -North
UN	United Nations
UN-CIMIC	United Nations Civil-Military Coordination
UN CMCoord	Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination
UNSOC	United Nations Staff Officer Course
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor
US	United States
VIKING	NATO-UN Civil-Military Exercise
ZIF	Center for International Peace Operations (Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze)
ZUMI	Civil and Military Interaction: Peacebuilding in Fragile Contexts, Challenges for International Co-operation

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## Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management

The Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT), formerly known as the UN Training Centre, was founded in 1969 as the first peacekeeping training centre in the world. FINCENT organises courses, seminars and exercises within the framework of the UN, the EU, NATO and NATO/Partnership and the AU.

The Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland) is a governmental institution and a centre of expertise in civilian crisis management. The main tasks of CMC Finland are to train and recruit experts for international civilian crisis management, peacebuilding and civil protection missions as well as conduct research focusing on civilian crisis management. CMC Finland acts as a national head office for all seconded Finnish civilian crisis management professionals.

The Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management was founded jointly by FINCENT and CMC Finland in 2008. The core task of the Finnish Centre of Expertise is to promote understanding of the coordination, as well as comprehensiveness, of crisis management in the context of national crisis management capacity building as well as crisis management and peacebuilding missions. The Finnish Centre of Expertise aims at developing and conducting joint training in crisis management, in addition to its other tasks, which include research, publishing and seminar activities.