Thinking beyond Afghanistan – the future prospects of crisis management

Finnish Defence Forces International Centre

Edited by Rauli Lepistö

Finnish Defence Forces International Centre

FINCENT Publication Series 1:2012

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FINCENT PUBLICATION SERIES 1:2012

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EDITED BY RAULI LEPISTÖ

FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES INTERNATIONAL CENTRE
TUUSULA 2012

Rauli Lepistö (ed.): Thinking beyond Afghanistan – the future prospects of crisis management

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FINCENT Publication Series 1:2012

Cover design: Harri Larinen
Layout: Heidi Paananen/TKKK

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ISBN 978–951–25–2379–5
ISBN 978–951–25–2380–1 (PDF)
ISSN 1797–8629

Printed in Finland
Juvenes Print Oy
Tampere
2012

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Preface

Jukka Tuononen

Crises fluctuate and new crises emerge constantly. Peace is fragile in many places and both man-made humanitarian disasters and disasters that are caused by nature will keep on occupying crisis management professionals. As our global environment changes, the response that worked yesterday may be obsolete tomorrow. The approach that works in the Middle East may be counterproductive in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, crisis management experts must constantly reassess their approach to crisis, and stay vigilant regarding what may take place in the future.

In the last two decades, conflicts have dramatically changed. In the past, clear frontlines were more easily indentified. Now wars are increasingly fought inside communities, and frontlines are more a thin red line than clearly marked zones of control. Civilians suffer increasingly more in conflicts and the humanitarian toll and suffering reach intolerable levels ever more rapidly. At the same time, the international community's capability and willingness to intervene has increased. Crisis management has adapted to this, and operations have become more complex and response times shorter. Operations where peacekeepers have a clear role to stand between conflicting parties and oversee the execution of the terms of a cease fire are more of an exception than a rule. These kinds of operations still have their place in our crisis management toolkit, but, as we have observed, peacekeepers have in many places been forced to take a more proactive approach to the conflict, and by doing so they may have become active parties of those conflicts themselves. Finland has not been isolated from this development as we have seen in Afghanistan where peacekeepers have been forced to engage with hostile elements on several occasions.

Crisis management has also become more nuanced. Civilian crisis management experts now go into the operation areas almost hand in hand with the armed crisis management elements. *Comprehensive Approach, Security Sector Reform, Integrated Crisis Management*, these are all terms increasingly used in the context of crisis management, which not that long ago was known as simply "peacekeeping". This does not imply that in the past civilian experts would have been excluded from conflict management. Old civilian crisis management veterans will often describe their duties as being quite similar to those conducted by present civilian crisis management experts. They performed their duties under a different umbrella, such as democracy or nation building. Nonetheless, what has changed is that civilian crisis management has become more organised, and it is now a solid part of crisis management instead of *ad hoc* arrangements. For example FINCENT cooperates very closely with Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC) by organising joint trainings and seminars, and conducting research together. *Centre of Expertise of Comprehensive Crisis Management*, a joint training programme run by FINCENT and CMC, has been active since 2008. A similar kind of increased importance of military civilian cooperation can be observed across Europe; the comprehensive approach to crisis management is an EU-wide concept. NATO has also

embraced this concept, and it now plans its activities in close cooperation with various representatives of the civilian sector.

Crisis management is not always related to war and conflict. As the militaries across the world have the best logistical resources available, these resources are used in humanitarian operations, either directly by delivering aid to the suffering populace, or less directly by providing security to humanitarian organisations who provide the aid on the ground. Finland has also gained experience from this. For example, one of the potential tasks of an EU Battlegroup is to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid, and they are trained accordingly. Finland also took part in the EU Atalanta Operation (with the Pohjanmaa vessel) where its main duty was to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid into Somalia. Military crisis management's more humanitarian role is also emphasized in more traditional settings. For example, the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) Operation's mission mandate includes the provision that the peacekeepers must secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to its destination.

Presently Europe is going through a financial crisis, which has led to demands to cut public expenditure. The Finnish Defence Forces are no exception to this, and consequently they are going through one of the largest reorganisation in their history. The available resources must be used wisely, and cooperation with partner countries will become more important. Pooling and sharing of resources has benefited Finnish crisis management. Finland has been in the frontline in developing the interoperability of military crisis management by participating in EU Battlegroups and more recently in the Force reserve pool of NATO Reaction Forces.

The future prospects of crisis management are challenging, but at the moment there are also many positive ongoing developments. New regional actors, such as the African Union, are increasing in importance, which is a welcome development. Technological changes, in information technology in particular, are developing at such great speed that the consequences are yet unknown. In future, cyber attacks may become a very important issue for crisis management. At the same time, information technology will open up new possibilities. Social media, for example, has diminished the ability of oppressive governments to hide the truth, which gives more leverage to the international community to manage these crises. The future may be unpredictable but one thing is certain: crises will not disappear from the world.

This publication is FINCENT's fifth annual publication. The theme is to discuss the future of crisis management. It is always an issue of upmost importance, but now this importance is perhaps highlighted even more. This is because Finland will withdraw its main military crisis management elements from Afghanistan already in 2014. Finland will remain in Afghanistan, but the nature of our participation will change significantly. The focus will shift to the mentoring and advising of the Afghan Security Forces, which will eventually take responsibility for the security of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been perhaps the most demanding crisis management operation that Finland has ever sent its troops to. Therefore, the transformation in our approach in Afghanistan will be a significant

milestone. Participation in this operation will inevitably leave a permanent mark in the culture of Finnish crisis management. What that mark is, is something that this publication wants to reflect on. With these words, I urge you to read this publication, and I hope that it will give you interesting reading moments and food for thought. I would also like to use this opportunity to most sincerely thank all the authors who have contributed to this publication. Your work has been invaluable.

Lieutenant Colonel

Jukka Tuononen

Commandant FINCENT

Introduction

Rauli Lepistö

Unless some dramatic changes will take place in Finnish foreign policy, Finland will withdraw its main military crisis management elements from Afghanistan in 2014. This will mark another milestone in the history of Finnish crisis management, which started in Suez in 1956. Even though the term crisis management has a ring of acuteness about it, long-term planning is needed, and to plan ahead, some analytical tools are required. This may mean picturing different scenarios, looking back and thinking about lessons learned, or opening those basic values and national interests that guide our activities to discussion. This year, the theme of the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre's (FINCENT) annual publication is the future of crisis management. Planning is already underway but the public debate, however, has not yet taken off on a scale as it perhaps should have. This publication hopes to contribute to this much-needed discussion. It wants to provide a platform for crisis management experts where they can give their views about issues such as what may happen in the future, what lessons have we learned and must keep on remembering, what values and interests guide our work, what resources we have, and how we need to develop them. The writers are academic researchers, public servants, military officers, and civilian crisis management experts. The journal is divided into four sections.

The first section discusses the changing of the strategic environment. The section begins with a very timely discussion by Charly Salonius Pasternak where he considers what options Finland will have in Afghanistan in the near future. Regarding Afghanistan, he also asks what are the values that guide our actions. Are they purely about national interest, or are our actions guided by a genuine sense of responsibility as one the most well off nations on the globe? He then moves on to a more general discussion, and looks at Finland's military crisis management options in the future while considering some of the potential changes that may occur in the strategic environment. Oskari Eronen continues this discussion by giving a wide overall picture of what will be the main global issues that will impact crisis management. He discusses the changes and challenges that the cyber age and the changing dynamics of world economics will introduce. He also writes about the re-emergence of the strategic importance of the high seas in connection to future crisis management. Furthermore, he discusses the impact of urbanisation on global welfare, and whether political ideas and ongoing developments towards an increasingly multi-polar world will cause conflict. He finishes by analysing whether the current international crisis management organisations are up to their task in front of these changes and challenges. Tommi Koivula continues along the same lines, and puts a particular focus on European NATO and EU countries. He gives a sharp analysis regarding the dynamics that these countries are presently going through, and what they will perhaps go through in the future. He discusses the impact of the current austerity measures to which crisis management is not immune. In addition, he asks whether the European crisis management system is receiving competition in the form of sub-regional coalitions of like-minded countries who share interests and, or by other increasingly powerful global powers.

The second section focuses on the United Nations and the European Union. Touko Piiparinen opens this chapter by discussing the UN and the challenges that its conflict

management will face in the future. He writes about the possible directions that the UN peacekeeping system may move towards in the future. The options vary from deploying small and mobile operations to relying increasingly on regional actors, such as the African Union. The article is followed by that of Rauli Lepistö's, who will ask what role the UN had in Syria when it deployed the United Nations Supervision Mission to Syria, and what role it may have in Syria in future regarding the management of this bloody conflict. The article relies strongly on a first-hand account of the current situation in Syria as the author had the opportunity of interviewing a UN military observer who had recently returned from Syria. Moving on from the UN, Pete Piirainen discusses the European Union's crisis management mechanism and its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). He reminds us that in a relatively short time, the EU has managed to develop its crisis management capabilities to a level where it can make a difference if it commits itself. He continues to remind us by saying that crisis management is only one part of the EU's CSDP. The article argues that in order to become a more credible and noticeable military actor, especially through crisis management, the member states need to stay committed to the EU. Rasmus Hindren's article goes into more detail about the EU's crisis management capabilities. He writes about rapid reaction forces with a particular focus on EU Battlegroups. His article discusses the benefits generated by Battlegroups, in particular with regard to interoperability between national armies. The European rapid reaction capability may increase in importance significantly due to the unwillingness of European countries to engage in large and costly operations. Interestingly, he also points out that the current financial crisis is forcing EU countries towards more efficient cooperation when developing their crisis management capability.

The third section focuses on military crisis management. After the 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan, it is very much possible that the UN will regain its significance in Finnish military crisis management. After a long commitment to NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, it is good to remind ourselves that the United Nations work differently from NATO. Lieutenant Colonel Matti Lampinen's article serves exactly this need. His article explains the practicalities and challenges that he experienced when Finland decided to contribute a contingent to the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) mission in Lebanon. He finishes by offering some very valuable lessons learned, which are of good value to any officer who may work with the UN crisis management system during his or her career. Following Lampinen, Major Mikael Salo discusses the structural change that the Finnish Defence Forces is going through, and how it reflects on Finland's capabilities to participate in international cooperation. After summarising the Finnish Defence Force's crisis management capabilities and channels for international cooperation, he reminds us that even though the main duty of the Defence Forces is to defend Finland, it does not mean that international cooperation or participation in international crisis management would hinder our national defence.

Continuing on the theme of structural change and the changes it initiates in crisis management capabilities, Major Niko Pihamaa writes about the need to create a new model for producing situational awareness to serve Finland's crisis management needs better. He suggests a new model that is more straightforward and streamlined. In this model, the crisis management troops would have their own operational command that would host different Service branches. Together, they would produce situational awareness and analysis for the needs of the command, both the national and the operational, that he suggests be set up.

The fourth section gathers views from civilian crisis management experts. Tanja Viikki discusses the Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the light of her recent research and experiences from Afghanistan. She discusses the theoretical framework of SSR and then sheds light on some of the challenges that SSR faces in Afghanistan. Her article provides some valuable lessons learned and suggestions for future work, with special emphasis on the reality on the ground. Maaria Ylänkö discusses gender values and how they are introduced into a different culture. She presents her thoughts through the context of her own experiences from the Democratic Republic of Congo, and builds an interesting bridge from those experiences to the evolution of Finland's gender policy: How much historical and cultural baggage do we carry with us when we go abroad and try to explain to the local beneficiaries how important gender is? This same question could be asked in any context when we introduce our own values into a different cultural setting. In the final article of this publication, Antti Häikiö asks at what point crisis management should no longer be called "crisis management". He cites examples from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo where the international community has been managing crises for 17 years in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 13 years in Kosovo. His article discusses the need to move towards normalcy when recovering from a crisis. He argues that the local views are not heard loud enough which prolongs the international presence in countries which are recovering from a conflict. He states that as soon as possible, soldiers should stay in their barracks and let the civilian experts to do their share, and civilian crisis management experts should also hand-over responsibility to the locals and stand back as soon as the time is right.

I hope you will enjoy these articles as much as I have enjoyed working with the writers. It has been FINCENT's goal to gather opinions from as wide a variety of professionals who work with crisis management issues as possible. No limits or taboos have been set, as is apparent in the content of these articles. One of the key objectives of this publication is to contribute to the initiation of a wider public discussion on what is the future of crisis management.

Please note that the arguments presented in the articles are those of the individual contributors and that they do not necessarily comply with those of the institutions they represent.

SECTION ONE – Emerging Strategic Environment

Crisis management and Afghanistan – what's next for Finland?

Charly Salonius-Palsternak

Abstract

Finland's decade-long participation in operations in Afghanistan has had a broader impact on Finland's peacekeeping and crisis management engagement; Finland's approach to international operations has changed as a result of participating in ISAF. Especially in recent years, Finland's participation has been guided by domestic politics and needs of national defence development, not by needs in Afghanistan or requests by ISAF. Partially this is explained by a lack of a long-term vision for engaging in crisis management. This long-term vision could emerge as a byproduct of Finland considering how it wants to continue participating in the UN, EU and NATO operations in Afghanistan in the latter half of this decade. Depending on balance between values, interests and 'neutrality', the four potential future approaches would see Finland focusing on *Counterinsurgency management*, *Petersberg-minus & mediation*, *Flow Security Management* or *Peacekeeping 3.0*. A direct decision on one of these approaches is unlikely, but Finland's mode of participation in Afghanistan will provide some indication of what the future holds.

Lede in

In 2006 Finland's crisis management efforts were focused on participating in the European Union Battle Groups and contributing to the United Nations' revitalized UNIFIL operation, while at the same time continuing efforts in the Balkans. Afghanistan seemed almost an after-thought. Few had the foresight to recognize how much Finland's experiences in Afghanistan would change during the following six years, and how it would shape the development of Finland's crisis management efforts. While Finland's participation via military units will decrease, experiences in Afghanistan will continue to reverberate through all crisis management related decisions for the remainder of this decade. As current operations change in shape and new ones emerge, it remains for the political decision makers to judge how national and international interests and values guide participation.

How Afghanistan has already impacted Finnish participation in international operations

For a number of reasons, it is appropriate to look at Finnish involvement in Afghanistan when seeking to divine what future Finnish peacekeeping and crisis management efforts may consist of in the latter half of this decade. First, Finland's contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and more recently the European Union Police mission (EUPOL) have dominated thinking and the development of crisis management efforts in recent years. Secondly, participating in ISAF has significantly expanded our notion of

what crisis management operations are and require (especially politically), and caused more debate about participation than any other operation. Thirdly, it has contributed more to the development of the Finnish Defence Forces than other international operations. Fourthly, participation has redefined Finland's role as a major crisis management actor, NATO. Fifthly, what Finland decides to do in Afghanistan will impact how much money is left over for participation in other operations. For these and other reasons, experiences in Afghanistan will have a major impact on what crisis management operations will be undertaken in the second half of this decade, and what kinds of operations Finland may participate in.

Finland's participation in Afghanistan 2002-present[1]

Finland's participation in Afghanistan can be divided into five phases, with the fifth phase beginning to be implemented in late-2012. Finland's initial contribution from 2002 to 2004 consisted primarily of fifty soldiers, whose job was to improve civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in Kabul. Development Assistance increased to approximately €6.5 million annually during this time. Participation was not seen as being different from what similar CIMIC units were doing in Kosovo as a part of the NATO-led KFOR operation. As such, it fit into the Finnish concept of peacekeeping that had developed over decades; participation in the operation was not politicized in any meaningful/significant? way. In 2004, participation increased to nearly 80 soldiers in total, with about a quarter of them located in northern Afghanistan.

The second phase from 2004 to the end of 2007 saw the focus of Finland's participation shift to northern Afghanistan. It roughly corresponds to, and received its initial impulse for change from the expansion of ISAF's areas of responsibility during this time. Initially Finland was a part of a Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), but moved to a Swedish-led PRT, as Finnish soldiers focused on patrolling in small six-person Mobile Observation Teams (MOTs). During this period, development assistance increased to over € eight million per year.

The third period of Finland's participation, from the end of 2007 through 2009 saw the dawn of a more comprehensive and focused approach. The number of soldiers was increased to more than 140, with a temporary increase to over 200 as forces were temporarily strengthened for the 2009 elections in Afghanistan. Towards the end of this period, Finland began to participate in small Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), though only about a third of the promised thirty mentors actually deployed to Afghanistan. Finland also played an important role in the establishment of the European Union's EUPOL mission and began participating in it, initially with eight individuals. Development assistance also increased, to over € 10 million annually; a major part of this assistance was funneled through international organizations.

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[1] Finland's participation has been covered in some detail in three briefing papers published by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs: Charly Salonius-Pasternak, *Kriisinhallinnan rajamailla – Kansanedustajat varauksellisia Afganistanin operation nykytilasta*, FIIA Briefing Paper 64, October 2010; Charly Salonius-Pasternak, *On aika päättää –Suomen vaihtoehdot Afganistanissa 2012-2015*, FIIA Briefing Paper 89, November 2011; Charly Salonius-Pasternak, *The beginning of the end? The future of international engagement in Northern Afghanistan*, FIIA Briefing paper 101, April 2012; and, in the book Statebuilding in Afghanistan – Multinational contributions to reconstruction, Nik Hynek and Péter Marton (eds), chapter 9, "Finland's ISAF experience: rewarding, challenging and on the edges of the politically feasible" . This section is based on these texts.

The temporary increase in the number of soldiers to over 200 provides a good example of how Finland sought to concretely benefit from the changing nature of the ISAF operation while most politicians and officials continued to insist that the operation was no different from other peacekeeping or crisis management operations. According to the official government report to the Finnish Parliament, the additional soldiers consisted of a civil-military cooperation unit, a protection platoon and a national support element. This was not untrue. However, the fact that approximately half the soldiers were Finnish reservists who had recently completed their conscript training and the other half were Finnish Special Forces soldiers was of more significance. The deployment allowed for both to be evaluated, providing information and experiences that have proven valuable in developing different aspects of the Finnish military.

The fourth phase of Finland's participation occurred from 2010 through early 2012. It saw the merging of Finland's model of comprehensive approach with the ISAF Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. Finland's contribution to ISAF was increased to a maximum of 195 soldiers, with the clear and specific maximum limit being indicative of the politicization of Finland's participation profile. The increase in soldiers was deemed necessary by both the government and the military, because more traditional military units (platoons and squads) were needed for partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); with operations and patrols with local police and the military being the primary task of the Finnish forces. Participation in EUPOL was tripled to 35, and development assistance increased to over €11 million annually.

The fifth phase of Finland's participation, the final two years of the ISAF-mission, is fundamentally about withdrawal and transition. By early 2013, the size of Finland's military contribution will be below 150. Changes beyond this have not been discussed in public, and even in private there is considerable concern over delays in decision making on the shape of Finland's contribution in 2013 and 2014.

During this time there is a possibility that for domestic political reasons, casualty avoidance will become extreme and new initiatives or operational approaches are unlikely to be taken (beyond tactical lessons learned efforts). If such a casualty avoidance approach became apparent, insurgents would be likely to pounce on the perceived "weakness" of units adopting such a passive approach. From a broader perspective, causing more military casualties (either through direct or blue-on-green attacks) also serves to strengthen insurgents perceived negotiation positions, whether for local or country-wide peace agreements. Additionally, local non-combatants and police could understandably reconsider their support for the Afghan government, in a situation where violence is increasing and international forces are seen avoiding engagement.

Concurrently, contributions to civilian crisis management efforts will be maintained at current levels (security allowing), while an increasing percentage of the total contribution will come in the form of development assistance in its various guises.

Seeking to divine how Finland's participation in Afghanistan may affect its crisis management efforts as a whole, it is important to understand that during the past few years, the shape

of Finland's contribution has been driven by a desire to gain as much as possible from a national defence point of view. Ultimately, Finland's participation has been guided by domestic politics and needs of national defence development, not by needs in Afghanistan or requests by ISAF. This is likely to continue, though it does not and should not have to,.

Finland's contribution in Afghanistan 2014–2020

Finland's contribution to aid Afghanistan in the second half of this decade will be closely tied to larger plans and approaches agreed to in international organizations and multilateral fora. In theory Finland could seek to influence the shape of the follow-on operations currently being planned by both the EU and NATO, but in practice Finland is not very active in such efforts. Partially this is due to a lack of Finns in the relevant planning bodies within the EU, and non-membership in NATO. Rather, Finland seeks to find out as much as possible about future operations and then make a decision on the shape of its participation either after or in conjunction with other actors.

While Finland's specific contribution following the end of the ISAF operation in 2014 is still unclear, Finland has committed to participating in the ISAF follow-on operation. The broad outlines of Finland's approach are included in Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen's government program, as well as in public documents issued by the Finnish Parliament. The central concept is a shift from a predominantly military contribution to one focusing on development assistance and civilian crisis management, with the possibility of a small military element for training and education purposes.

In numerical terms this is likely to mean more than a 50% increase in development and humanitarian assistance funds, to over €30 million[2] and refocusing, but still keeping, civilian crisis management efforts at current levels (around thirty). Mentoring and limited training have been mentioned as acceptable tasks for the military, but the number of soldiers is unlikely to be more than a few dozen. The bulk of the development aid will be channeled through international organizations and NGOs, but with a focus on northern Afghanistan. The civilian crisis management efforts are likely to be focused on some component of rule-of-law, possibly focusing on helping to develop the border police force. The small group of soldiers is likely to be distributed across different tasks, from staff positions to mentoring Afghan military officers.

This approach makes sense if one places Afghanistan and particularly ISAF in a broader context of how Finnish decision makers see crisis management and the reasons why Finland participates in such operations. However, it fails to consider what Finland's strengths are and lamentably makes it clear that Finnish decision makers focus more on national interests and perspectives, than on Afghan needs. It also demonstrates a lack of vision beyond the desire to strengthen the international institutions through which Finland would participate.

Finland should not be afraid of seeking its own path, and focusing on one or two areas of specific cooperation. Bilateral agreements to develop primary and secondary education in

[2] Page 15, Valtioneuvoston selonteko eduskunnalle Afganistanin tilanteesta ja Suomen kokonaistuesta Afganistanille, mukaan lukien osallistumisesta sotilaalliseen kriisinhallintaan, VNS 2/2011.

a given region could prove more valuable for Afghans, than a spread-out effort channeled through international organizations. This approach would require domestic work to more tightly 'join' together crisis management and development assistance budgets. Given political will it could be implemented relatively quickly, with Afghanistan being used as a test case.

Finland could also seek a leading role in developing the Afghan army towards a more financially sustainable model: conscription. Afghanistan has previously had a conscription system and the creation of such a system finds support at all political levels (though opponents also exist at all levels). Together with a country such as Turkey, Finland should be exploring how it could take a leading role in helping Afghanistan develop a conscript-based army. The current insurgency does not allow the development of a legitimate conscript army, and NATO has too much interest vested in not seeing its volunteer system scrapped. However, the insurgency will not last forever, and an all-volunteer military is far too costly for Afghanistan to maintain. What Afghanistan needs is a hybrid military, which would consist of a professional air force and a conscript-based army. Finland and other countries with experience of developing, maintaining and improving effective conscript militaries should join forces to support Afghans in this endeavor.

Afghanistan reframes Finland's contribution to future crisis management operations

Finland's participation in Afghanistan is based on the concept of a comprehensive approach, including military, civilian and development assistance components. It is likely that Finland's crisis management efforts as a whole will continue to see these three components being included. The balance between these three components is what ultimately determines Finland's overall crisis management profile. As is the case with all countries that contribute to different international operations, participation decisions and profiles are made based on a range of factors. For Finland in Afghanistan, the differing contributions over time suggest that politicians have at least implicitly evaluated Finland's participation based on a few general parameters.

The history of Finland's participation in Afghanistan suggests a novel way of framing Finland's participation in Afghanistan during the second half of the decade, as well as in crisis management operations in general. The framework is fundamentally a visualization of the answers to two questions, which should contribute an answer to the ultimate question: *why does Finland participate in crisis management?* The two questions have to do with the fundamental motivations and the fundamental approach to/of an operation. The first considers Finland's (and the operation's) position *vis à vis* other actors in the area: *Should Finland be an active participant and take sides in the conflict, at the expense of an 'opponent', or should Finland seek to be seen as a neutral actor?* The first question already has serious implications for the type of units Finland would need to deploy in a military operation. The second question has to do with the fundamental motivation for participation: *Does Finland participate (and mold its participation) primarily to secure its interests or to advance broader values?* This too has implication for the type of contribution Finland would consider, and considerably expands the types of contributions Finland should include in its 'crisis management portfolio'.

Placed on a continuum, the answers to these questions give rise to four different categories of operations, each with its own requirements and potential benefits in terms of participation. These four types are described below.



Counterinsurgency crisis management

Choosing to privilege one side over another in a conflict and making participation decisions based on a desire to advance values, or be seen as doing so, gives rise to one of the four types of operations. This type of operation could be labeled counterinsurgency or COIN Management. Success in this kind of operation suggests the need for a strong local partner, and broad support from all surrounding states (to deny insurgents easy safe havens across national borders).

Having chosen a side also has implications for the exit strategy. Basically, an exit is acceptable only when your side has prevailed in the conflict. Domestically this has a number of implications, and places heavy demands on politicians in terms of making arguments and defending participation during the testing times in an operation, which almost inevitably surface at some point.

For Finland, continually participating in these kinds of operations would be challenging. Though Finland strongly believes in a range of values, such as human rights, democracy, equality of the sexes etc., its political history and culture does not make it attractive to advance these values at gunpoint. Finland's concrete experiences in Afghanistan suggest that Finland can successfully contribute to operations in this category. However, polling of the general population as well as Finnish parliamentarians suggests that support for participation in Afghanistan with military units is very limited. Participation in police and border-guard training is, however, supported by a majority. Despite this, it is unlikely that Finland would make these types of operations the basis of its crisis management efforts.

'Flow Security Management' and 'Protecting Global Commons'

Finland is dependent on the free flow of goods and services, either physically over the world's oceans or through its digital domain. It shares this fundamental need with many other countries. Actors that want to unduly restrict these flows or prevent the free use of commons space threaten Finnish economy and society. Taking these realities into account gives rise to a second type of operation, in which Finnish military and civilian actors could participate: Flow Security Management.

Decisions on participating in Flow Security Management operations would primarily be guided by interests (in contrast to the values focus of counterinsurgency). These interests could be narrowly defined national ones, such as keeping specific commercial sea-lanes open. Interests could also be defined more broadly, making it possible to contribute to, for example, keeping food-aid deliveries safe.

Finland has already participated in one operation of this type: Operation Atalanta, off the African Horn. The objective of participation was to protect food-aid ships, enabling the World Food Program to continue its aid programs in Somalia. A secondary, but important objective was to act as a deterrent to minor disturbances in trade flows caused by increasingly aggressive pirates – many of whom had seen their potential livelihoods (fishing) disappear as a result of actions by citizens of EU member states who now participate in the Atalanta operation.

Directing Finnish soldiers and civilians to primarily participate in flow security management operations would be a departure from Finnish crisis management policy, because it would place interests (frequently economic) at the top of the list of reasons for participation in operations. Primarily participating in flow security operations would, however, reduce the need to integrate crisis management and development assistance efforts, which would be welcomed by some in the development aid spheres.

Mediating & Petersberg Minus

Rejecting the notion that Finland should actively choose sides in international conflicts, and placing a kind of 'neutrality' alongside a loose set of values as the touchstones of its crisis management efforts would lead to another approach. This would result in Finland focusing on mediating conflicts and preparing the capabilities to take on a sub-set of the EU's Petersberg tasks.[3]

Under this approach Finland would only participate in civilian crisis management operations, possibly tying them and development assistance/cooperation efforts more closely together. This would be a departure from Finland's current approach, which aims to support the EU's crisis management efforts across the board, including the EU's standing Battle Groups.

[3] The Petersberg Tasks comprise a list of different types of (primarily military) missions or operations which the EU, operating under the Common Security and Defence Policy, can engage in. As enumerated in the Treaty of Lisbon, they are: humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks; post-conflict stabilisation tasks.

A focus on civilian crisis management efforts and mediation would require a significant increase (domestically) in the availability of police, border guards, judges, prosecutors, and other professional advisors. The costs of such an increase could be covered by moving the military's crisis management budget to the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for developing the capabilities for participating in civilian crisis management. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs would also need to establish a separate mediation unit, though consideration should be given to the possibility that mediation would officially be undertaken by non-governmental organizations funded by the ministry; former president Martti Ahtisaari's office being one example of such an organization.

No longer participating in military operations would have a number of negative consequences for the Finnish military as well as foreign policy as a whole. The military would lose opportunities to work on interoperability, demonstrate its capabilities to others, and ultimately opportunities to test whether new capabilities perform as expected. Withdrawing from all military operations would also impact Finland politically, as peacekeeping in its various forms has been viewed as an important component of Finnish foreign policy. To lessen the negative impacts of completely eschewing military operations, Finland could participate in select operations that conform to 'traditional' peacekeeping operations. Focusing participation in such 'traditional peacekeeping operations' is frequently brought up in the Finnish Parliament. However, it conveniently ignores the fact that almost no such operations exist anymore. Furthermore, focusing on such 'traditional operations' would not match with the military's needs in terms of developing national defence capabilities.

Peacekeeping 3.0

Asserting a strong desire to not take sides in a conflict, while emphasizing the dominance of interests in the calculus on participating in international operations would give rise to 'Peacekeeping 3.0' and usher in a new era of Finnish participation in international operations.

Decisions on participation and the type of contribution Finland would make in the Peacekeeping 3.0 era would be based on a set of criteria which emphasize Finnish political, economic and security interests, and a desire to not participate in operations where Finnish soldiers would have to choose sides.

Finland would participate in operations in regions/countries where an armistice or peace agreement is in force. The comprehensive approach concept would be strengthened, by mandating that each decision to participate in an operation also includes a decision to significantly increase development cooperation/assistance to the country in question. Focusing on a single issue, such as education, forestry management or waste disposal, would increase the impact of Finland's efforts. Military contributions would consist of units that would benefit from gaining experience *vis à vis* their national defence mission. Civilian crisis management contributions would focus on the uniformed, police and border guards.

Counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan – the last of its kind for Finland?

Had Finnish politicians known how dramatically the operation in Afghanistan would change it is unlikely that they would have joined ISAF in early 2002. The military has adjusted relatively well, in terms of training, equipment and doctrine. It has also embraced the use of Afghanistan as a proving ground for the development of capabilities useful for national defence. From a military performance point of view, Finland's participation has met expectations. Politically ISAF has proven challenging, and with a few exceptions, political decision makers have proven not to be up to the task of explaining the operation to the public or of reforming the way participation decisions are made when changes in the field have demanded it.

Like NATO, Finland is unlikely to jump into another operation that obviously requires a counterinsurgency approach. This does not mean it will not find itself in such an operation, but actively launching an operation that would require a counterinsurgency strategy seems extremely unlikely. This implies that counterinsurgency management is not likely to form the basis of Finland's future approach. At the moment, simply focusing on mediation and only participating in a sub-set of the Petersberg tasks would have too many political and military drawbacks for it to become the foundation of Finland's new approach. In addition to the drawbacks mentioned above, it would probably force Finland to discontinue participation in the EU Battle Groups (EUBG) and the NATO Response Force (NRF); weakening institutions that it considers important would be a notable change in Finnish foreign policy. Portions of the Petersberg minus & mediation approach could be adopted, particularly in situations where Finland feels it is necessary to participate, but there is a desire to limit exposure and justify minimal participation.

Finland's future approach to crisis management operations is likely to be either a kind of reimagined peacekeeping or a thinly disguised Flow Security Management approach. That they represent opposite ends of the spectrum, in terms of the values-interests and neutral-active participant dichotomies is ultimately only a reflection of the dilemma facing Finnish politicians: a decision on the guiding principles of Finland's foreign policy must be made, and they must then be reflected in (among other things) Finland's approach to crisis management. History suggests that an explicit decision on this is unlikely to be made. Rather, over the second half of this decade, individual participation decisions will begin to confirm which approach is actually preferred by policy makers in Finland.

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Discourses on future contexts of crisis management

Oskari Eronen

Abstract

This article explores the evolving global system from various perspectives, as this evolution is likely to shape the nature of conflicts as well as their management in the next 5–15 years. Firstly, technological changes bring the concrete opportunities and threats of the information age ever more to the security political agenda. Secondly, the transformation of the world economy and the rise of new powers highlights the importance of international trade, and the security of sea routes in particular. Thirdly, despite the emerging prospect of economic boom in Africa and other impoverished regions, rapid population growth and other imbalances concentrate in developing cities, which will in turn become origins of new social and political conflicts. Fourthly, the article asks whether ideologies have the potential to change the strategic conflict environment. Fifthly, the article briefly discusses the role of key international organisations in managing these intertwined transformations and ensuing new conflicts.

Technology: the great opportunities and threats of the cyber age

Information and communication technology (ICT) has become an integral part of the everyday life of citizens, businesses and bureaucracies. While the technological revolution has generated a tremendous rise in living standards, we have grown ever more dependent on the smooth flow of information. Accidental or intentional dysfunctions in the cyber sphere could cause severe instabilities in our societies.

Cyber security has surfaced as one of the hot topics over the past few years. This may partly be attributed to a series of cyber news about hackings into governmental and commercial systems, data leakages, cyber attacks observed during the Georgian conflict in 2008, as well as worms allegedly designed to slow down Iran's uranium processing[1]. It is no surprise then that the US Department of Defense has acknowledged "cyberspace as an operational domain, like land, air, sea, and space"[2]. It also forms an important part of the agenda for the NATO Headquarters' new Emerging Security Challenge Division[3]. The quest to determine cyber policies, doctrines and techniques is ongoing in many countries across the world. Finland, too, has commenced the drafting of a national strategy for cyber security.

While cyber has made its way to the security policy agenda, it is now branded as a threat, as one that calls for counteraction. Measures typically focus on the core of state machinery, i.e. the monopolies of violence and jurisdiction, with defence often in the lead. This comes in remarkable contrast to the public image of the ICT age: free communication coupled with

[1] Most famously the Stuxnet and most recently the hilarious AC/DC virus (see F-Secure 2012)
[2] US Department of Defense 2011
[3] NATO 2010a

business-oriented solutions, both of which acknowledge no borders. Cyber tends to escape states' attempts to define it, rather like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole[4].

The flavour of national defence brings about tough questions over attribution of acts and the applicable regulatory framework: is it at all possible technically and legally to try to determine the origin and agent of a cyber attack?[5] What constitutes a cyber attack, and how is it different from a cyber crime? Is an act of cyber terrorism a crime or a military attack, and why? What is the difference between cyber defence and cyber offence? Does the Law of War apply, and, depending on the answer, what are the implications for the UN Charter and role of the Security Council (*jus ad bellum*) or the International Humanitarian Law (*jus in bello*)?

Answers to these fundamental questions could bear an enormous impact on the future of crisis management. Firstly, it is a viable scenario that organised cyber crime, cyber terrorism, or a military cyber attack may, in the "ripe" political circumstances, give the impetus to launch a military counteroperation in a country supportive of such acts – with or without a mandate from the UN Security Council. The setting resembles the earlier case of Islamist terrorism. This presents a political dilemma that calls for the amplification and strengthening of the multilateral system of conventions and negotiated settlement of disputes.

Secondly, it can be foreseen the all crisis management operations – be they military or civilian in nature – will increasingly become targets of sophisticated hacking, leakages, and other cyber attacks. This challenge requires a build-up of capabilities to resist cyber threats in operational theatres. The same naturally applies to the 'host nation', i.e. the country in crisis, which often lacks even the basic human and technical infrastructure to provide ICT services – not to mention the capacity to tackle cyber threats.

Beyond potential threats, ICT opens great opportunities for resolving conflicts and engaging in peacebuilding. Communication, after all, is likely the most important condition of peace. It is thought to facilitate development, democracy, and human rights. For example, large parts of Africa have succeeded in an impressive technological leap in mobile coverage and services. Many services are domestically innovated, like those for mobile money transfers that invigorate especially rural markets.[6]

The positive theory of communication seemed to be corroborated in the series of events starting from the Iranian presidential elections in 2009 that led to the public uprisings in Arab countries. A surge of articles and books has been printed about the importance of social media and citizen journalism as a catalyst for the 'Arab Spring'. News from Syria are another case in point: rebels as well as citizens provide the outside world with photos and reports, using mobile networks and the internet. Al Jazeera, western intelligence agencies, and foreign activists are claimed to provide rebels with satellite phones and other means of communication.

Another interesting example can be found from Russia, where in July 2012 the public grew anxious about the officials' seemingly slow response to devastating floods in Krasnodar. Citizens from the area utilised social media first for sharing information on the situation on

[4] Aaltola, Sipilä and Vuorisalo 2011, 12
[5] Aaltola, Sipilä and Vuorisalo 2011, 25–26, 28–29
[6] BBC 2011; Sarrazin 2011

the ground and blaming the officials. Later on, individuals and charities across Russia used social media to channel private donations to Krasnodar.[7]

Technical possibilities abound. For instance the following features could help to build peace and reconstruct war-torn countries:

- Open source applications where a software's source code is freely accessible. In regions where human capital, i.e. education, is in short supply, could volunteers be given the possibility to improve software used in public services?
- Crowdsourcing: the outsourcing of tasks to a group of people. This could mean using volunteers from the public to solve problems or give their opinion on chosen topics. The earlier example of the Krasnodar floods involved crowdsourcing.
- Open data: datasets are made available in raw (large statistical databases and data series, for instance), or in assembled unities, like free maps. In crisis areas, numerous new statistics and other datasets are typically collected to support reconstruction. Free maps and open demographic data would be a great asset for NGOs planning development projects. Free maps could also be openly enhanced with user-inserted additional layers of information, in Wiki-style (meaning that anyone can add and modify information). Free-access Wiki maps could show mine fields or other information on security, or pinpoint a humanitarian situation. One such application is Ushahidi, which was originally created for mapping electoral violence in Kenya in 2008. It has since been used in various African countries as well as in emergencies in Haiti, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States. Ushahidi does not necessarily depend on user web access: incoming reports and outgoing alerts can be operated by SMS.[8]
- Identification and profiles: authentication of actual personal data or a virtual identity. These could assist social and political networking in cyber space, thus contributing to a vivid civil society and political participation. Authentication over the internet may be used in public services and elections.
- Localisation/navigation: specification of one's geographic location. Free applications such as Google Latitude, where one's own and friends' locations are shared, could be used to maintain a situational picture of an organisation.
- Augmented reality: boosting physical reality with technical features. One example is the use of real-time user reviews, available at any time on smart phones, to make consumer or user decisions. Other examples of augmented reality include tailored advertisements, or alerts, via mobile phones, that are based on user profile and localisation.
- Geosocial networking: social networking that uses geographic services and capabilities to enable additional social dynamics. Identification, profiles, localisation and augmented realities could be applied for the mobilisation of social and political activities.

The ideas above hinge on two crucial preconditions, both of which are scarcely available in crisis areas: an up-to-date technical infrastructure with wide national coverage, and an educational level that create the conditions for sufficient numbers of local customers as well as local developers in ICT. Unfortunately, countries suffering and recovering from conflicts are characterised by low levels of education and flight of human capital, a destroyed and dilapidated infrastructure, and scarcity of capital for investments.

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[7] Gessen 2012

[8] Sarrazin 2011, 24–25

Positive opportunities emphasise all sorts of networking, self-organisation, an enhanced sense of communality and activism as civic virtues. These expectations, however, represent the gravest threat to the idea of technology serving for peace and development. ICT technology, as all other generations of innovation in human history, may well become a tool for repression and violence. The ideology of openness and networking could make it easier than ever for repressive regimes or militants to identify and track down civil activists. This is the flip side of the events in Iran and the Arab Spring: ICT provides an effective means of control[9].

What does this new technological and information environment mean for crisis management? In general, operations ought to be prepared to cope with the rapidly evolving information scene that is interlinked with local and international politics and power. But can operations become an actor themselves? How to support constructive technical and social innovation? How to share more relevant and achievable information with the other organisations and people operating in the same situation?

Capital: world economic transformation and the return of the seas

In economic terms, the world is now changing more than at the end of World War II or the end of the Cold War. The primary motors of growth are East and Southeast Asian countries together with India and parts of Latin America. China and India, the most populous countries in the world, have generated 4–11% average annual growth since the early 1990s. The Chinese economy has grown twenty-fold since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's policy of opening.[10] It is the world's second biggest and, following the current projection, will bypass the United States in the late 2010s. Internationally, China plays several roles: it is a giant consumer of energy and raw materials, but also a colossal investor, lender, and owner. No journal on foreign affairs with any sense of worth has failed to dedicate a special issue on China's activities in Africa, exploring political ramifications. Chinese efforts are not limited to Africa, but cover also Central Asia and South America, as well as the old 'West'. India is only a few steps behind.

Several regional powers are catching up with China and India fast. Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and Indonesia are forerunners of economic dynamism. Russia is a sizable economy, but suffers from its high dependency on the export of natural resources, the slow transformation of industries, and corruption. Regional boomers are beacons of growth in their neighbourhoods. After settling internal and subregional conflicts deriving from the colonial era, several Southern and Eastern African countries have enjoyed prolonged social stability and are drawing foreign investments. The positive trajectory in countries like Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia is based not only on natural resources, but fertile political conditions domestically, and on the successful integration into the world economy through foreign investment and exports11. As production costs in China will inescapably soar due to rising wages, these new zones of growth will gain higher ground.

[9] See for example Morozov 2009. Evgeny Morozov became a prominent figure in the internet debate after publishing in 2011 his polemic book *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*.

[10] Worldbank 2012

[11] Ernst & Young 2012, 22–23, 48–51

It is precisely international trade that boosts the world economy. Between 1990 and 2008, trade has grown twice over world gross production and it covered 23% of total production in 2011[12]. The share will reach 40% in 2040 on the current path. According to the standard theory of economics, trade will lead countries to intensified specialisation and to an international division of labour, which will make them ever more dependent on each other. A common follow-on assumption is that trade will also increase political interdependence and that it leads people to favour cooperation over confrontation. This argument is not new. Its origins are in the thinking of such radiant philosophers as Baron de Montesquieu, Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant[13]. Kant, for instance, argues that:

> [Nature] unites nations whom the principle of a cosmopolitan right would not have secured against violence and war. And this union she brings about through an appeal to their mutual interests. The commercial spirit cannot co-exist with war, and sooner or later it takes possession of every nation. For, of all the forces which lie at the command of a state, the power of money is probably the most reliable. Hence states find themselves compelled – not, it is true, exactly from motives of morality to further the noble end of peace and to avert war, by means of mediation, wherever it threatens to break out, just as if they had made a permanent league for this purpose.

On the other hand, one could point out that rising powers will come to compete over the same limited natural resources as the old ones, thus planting the potential seeds of future conflicts. The world consumption of energy and minerals seems to be growing endlessly. Following the current projection of consumption and without major leaps in technology, the odds for confrontations will increase.

Where could those confrontations take place? One of the obvious answers are trade routes that are used to transport raw materials and manufactured goods. Even if the importance of railway landlines may increase, in particular in Eurasia, the main gateways remain at sea. The easy flow of trade through sea routes is just as important to national economies as are the free streams of information in cyber space. The interdependent world relies on 'flow security'[14].

From the security point of view, key areas along the sea routes are geographic choking points, such as the Panama Channel, the Suez Channel – Red Sea – Gulf of Aden line, the Hormuz Strait, the Malacca Strait and the Makassar Strait in Southeast Asia, and the Arctic Sea (the Northeast Passage and the Northwest Passage that are predicted to become more wide due to the climate change). These routes have always been of interest to great powers, but their relative weight may now be on the increase. One such reaffirmation was the new US 2012 military strategy, which notes the global dependence "on the free flow of goods", re-emphasises the importance of the control of the seas, and reshuffles the balance of US forces towards the Pacific[15]. These changes come with a notion of scaling up against the build-up of the Chinese navy, though both governments underline their peaceful intentions and the defensive nature of their forces.

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[12] WTO 2011; CIA 2012

[13] Eronen 2005, 110-118; Kant 1917 [1795], 157

[14] Aaltola, Sipilä and Vuorisalo 2011, 18–21

[15] US Department of Defense 2012

In addition to the long-term strategic aspect, some of the key routes have gained acute security interest. Piracy is back and causes troubles around the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea, and in Southeast Asia. Antipiracy has already been adopted as a crisis management task. Both the EU and NATO run naval operations on the Somali coast to fend off pirates from attacking humanitarian and commercial ships. While the main task of the EU Atalanta operation is to protect shipments of the World Food Programme (WFP) to Somalia, there is little doubt that the West is there to defend international trade too. No wonder that also China, Russia, and India have sent war vessels to the area.

While the media's attention tends to focus on pirates and their tiny boats, it is clear that the threat derives from much wider political and societal problems on shore. Weak or bad governance, and the lack of the rule of law and development nurture piracy. Together they call for an international comprehensive approach to solve the root causes of instability. A crisis management effort in such circumstances could increasingly consist of not only operational units (like vessels, helicopters, and boarding teams) but of trainers and mentors who support the build-up of a local, possibly subregional, capacity in maritime security. In July 2012, the EU launched a new operation, EUCAP Nestor, to that end in the Horn of Africa. Finland would have advanced knowhow to offer in this sector, based on our national concepts, smooth multiagency cooperation, and skilful personnel.

Welfare: cities are critical for sustainable development

The great transformation of the world economy will not leave developing countries untouched. Those who have been able to set conducive conditions will enjoy economic growth, which ought to lead to increased welfare.

Developing countries will also struggle with serious instabilities. Despite the steady long-term trend, market prices of energy, natural resources and agricultural products will continue to fluctuate heavily, causing periods of overheating and consequent challenges in domestic supply and pricing, and potentials for food crisis. Climate change and environmental degradation pose additional problem, such as loss of arable land. Competition over clean water may trigger conflict. These trends are aggravated by uncontrolled population growth and migration in its various forms.

Cities are growing at record pace. The global rural populations will cease growing at the end the current decade, whereas the number of city dwellers will increase by 3.1 billion by 2050. The urban population will then be over 6 billion, representing nearly 70% of the global population. The fastest growth takes place amongst the poorest countries, where also conflicts spark. While public attention often focuses on giant metropolises, small and middle-sized cities are actually the prime engines of urban expansion.[16]

Developmental instabilities are crystallised in cities. Demand for housing, work, water, food, and energy in cities is gigantic – and constantly on the rise. Services and key infrastructure, such as traffic systems, electricity grips, and sewers, are strained. As the balance between rural and urban populations shifts, one of the question marks will be sufficient food supply:

[16] Taipale 2012, xii–xiii

urban industrialisation requires more efficient food production and a sophistication of the service sector.

On the one hand, the opportunities ahead seem huge – that is really why millions of people choose to move to cities. Urban areas present key hubs of the international flows of information and trade. On the other hand, urbanisation bears catastrophic risks. Some of the developing countries are better equipped to manage demographic, economic, and social transformation than others. It is a fair assumption that expectations for a better life will rise among the urban populace, as does in general the capacity to mobilise around a common sentiment of discontent. City dwellers will eventually demand delivery against promises made – in particular the hundreds of millions of unemployed youngsters.

Crises will more and more be nested in cities. They could start from dysfunctions in public services, food shortages, or environmental hazards, and become politicised to resonate with the wider social setting. Old definitions of conflict become blurred in contemporary cities, where human security is undermined by organised crime, narcotics, human trafficking, and small arms. City conflicts merge with social boundaries and make use of zones of underdevelopment, as, for instance, the *favelas* (slums) of Rio de Janeiro. City conflicts are mostly characterised by low intensity, but death tolls can sometimes be even higher than in better known civil wars[17]. It should be noted that urban conflict dynamics may become exploited by not only irregular actors, but also more conventional forces like neighbouring states or transnational terrorists.

Future welfare in cities calls for sustainable development in all its three dimensions: economic, environmental, and social. Crisis management should be done in advance: a functioning infrastructure and services, good governance, human rights, and the rule of law are efficient means of conflict prevention. The World Development Report 2011 puts work, security, and experience of justice to the core of successful development in post-conflict and fragile states[18]. Lack of these core elements of human security certainly rank among the principal root causes of the Arab Spring. The same deficits are witnessed in the Saharan area, the Arabian Peninsula, Iran, Pakistan, and Central Asia – the 'zone of instability'. Several oil and gas-rich states in these regions are now showing lower or stagnant GDP per capita figures than in the 1980s or the early 1990s, which is a sign of deep inequalities[19].

Those participating in the planning and conduct of crisis management ought to understand at least the basics of failures of sustainable development that underpin political and violent conflicts. A contextual understanding is crucial, even if most interventions to alleviate the situation lie outside the tasking of crisis management operations. A wider picture is needed for the 'Comprehensive Approach' to work.

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[17] Death toll of the Mexican drug war is counted to be 47 515 people between December 2006 and September 2011 (Cave 2012). In Afghanistan civilian deaths total 12 793 for years 2007–2011, while the coalition suffered 2325 fatalities in the same period (Rogers and Sedghi 2012; iCasualties 2012). Figures for the Afghan government forces and the insurgents are unknown, but will likely reach between 10 000 and 20 000 in 2007–2011.

[18] Worldbank 2011

[19] There are typically wide gaps in statistics concerning these countries. From the Middle East and North Africa region, scattered income distribution data (Gini coefficients or cumulative quintile or decimal shares) is available only for Algeria, Iran and Iraq (Worldbank 2012; UNU-WIDER 2008). Lack of information on income inequalities seems symptomatic.

The prevalence of cities in future conflicts should make planners ask questions such as: what are the likely tasks for operations in urban environments; what capabilities are needed; do we have the knowledge, skills and suitable tools for operating in cities specifically; are our tactics up to the tasks in developing cities? An urban environment calls for more specialised skills. Many of the tasks focus on policing and justice: police intelligence, formed police units, riot control, counternarcotics, policing against organised crime, counterterrorism, investigative prosecutors, judges etc. It may also be noted that migration in broad terms heads towards coastlines – another argument in favour of multiagency maritime elements in the future.

We could even question whether westerners are up to the task at all. The old generation of peacekeeping operations focused solely on borders, whereas the more recent crisis management assignments have mostly tried to stabilise the countryside that is under the power of factional leaders, or ward off opposing parties and spoilers from cities. The inner realities of cities have not been taken to the core of the business. The best candidates for working in conflict cities may be police officers or social and health officials from Latin America, who have gained relevant experience by operating in their local *favelas*. Or, do we need to experience immigrant riots in Finnish cities too?

Ideas: political ideologies, religions and terrorism

Transformational phases in the economy, politics, and technology have historically engendered a wave of new ideas, novel ways to see the emerging realities. So, how have ideologies reacted, do we have a paradigm shift at hand?

Perhaps the most visible ideological movement in the recent past consists of the splintered groupings around the driving idea of 'jihadism'. The ideological and operational basis for Islamist terrorism was laid already in the 1980s, and it rose to the global scene finally in the late 1990s and early 2000s by a series of vicious attacks on multiple continents. The Islamist terrorist threat in the West is continuous, making its adherents strategic players, even if they have failed to mobilise wider social or political support in Muslim countries. Their importance as "the official enemy" will decline should they not be able to launch another spectacular attack. The shock effect in the West and ensuing political ramifications are even then unlikely to reach the proportions attained in 2001, unless jihadists really get their hands (and fingers) on weapons of mass destruction. It is probable that jihadist organisations see information and trade as attractive targets due to the crucial role these flows play in the functioning of western societies and the present world order.

Islamist terrorism and the countering of it will provide fewer grounds for new, large crisis management operations such as those seen in Afghanistan. Counterterrorism will be conducted increasingly through smaller special operations, and essentially by training and mentoring local national forces.

Yet, this does not mean that terrorism would disappear from operational theatres. Terrorism may well spill over to new crisis areas, as the transnational networks of jihadists have the ability to use the general instability caused by either natural disasters or local conflicts to

their advantage rapidly. They have acquired a sophisticated way of spreading their message and mobilising new recruits through the internet, attempting to create a 'virtual ummah', a community of true believers. Terrorist campaigns and insurgencies last some 10–40 years, so countering them requires nerves and stamina. The international community has collected a wealth of experience from Afghanistan and Iraq. How resistant are the EU or Finland to attacks against not only military personnel, but also civilian experts? This unpleasant but possible risk has not been publicly discussed so far.

Beyond Islamist extremism, there seem to be few potent ideologies or religious movements turning against the global power structures on a large scale. China and other rising powers play according to the established rules of the international game: market economy and growing trade it is. Saudi Arabia is characterised internally by strict theological governance, but its foreign policy is in the hands of Saudi princes and follows a realist path with an outlook for regional power. Iran and North Korea are ostensibly ideology-driven states, but it is difficult to determine their position in the conditions of international pariah.

The most potential ideological trend to alter the strategic environment for crisis management could actually come from the West. In a prolonged economic slump, nationalism and a culturally inward-looking atmosphere could turn against active multilateralism and undermine support for peace operations.

Rules: multilateralism and the changing world order

We are heading towards an increasingly multipolar world. The unipolar moment, with the United States as the sole superpower, and suggestions of the 'End of History', seems now to have lasted only a split second. How will problems between the old and new great powers be managed: through dialogue, competition, or confrontation? What is the future of multilateral decision making? Answers to these questions will bear a crucial impact on the future of crisis management, and security policy in general.

The aspiration to determine and control key global flows will be one of the themes around which great power competition will take place in the future. As noted above, cyber space and the seas are becoming increasingly important for the welfare of contemporary societies. Both are included as 'domains' in the novel conceptualisation called 'Access to the Global Commons' (AGC). Other domains include air and space. Commons are resources that are owned in common or shared among users. AGC is given a long paragraph in the new US defence strategy (whereas Russia gets one sentence). The US Department of Defense has commenced a two-year research programme (Multinational Experiment 7, MNE7) on AGC together with NATO and nearly 20 countries, including Finland, to probe the future security environment in these domains and to innovate tools for their management[20].

The AGC concept could be seen as an attempt to manage complex transformations in the world order. It is important for the West to ensure that essential economic, technological, and security spheres continue to be codified and controlled according to its standards. AGC is thus an extension of the 'global standardisation hegemony' of the West. AGC also prepares

[20] Aaltola, Sipilä and Vuorisalo 2011, 30, 35–38

common strategic and operational ground for likeminded countries to act together in these re-securitised domains, where great powers will operate on their own anyway[21]. The US defence strategy declares that

> [T]he United States will continue to lead global efforts *with capable allies and partners* to assure access to and use of the global commons, *both by strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities.*[22]

What will be the role of small countries? How can conflicts of flow security be resolved? The case for AGC may be well argued in the overall security policy, but should it be translated into crisis management at all? Unharmed access to the global commons is particularly critical for small, trade-oriented open societies like Finland. Small countries prefer naturally the system of international treaties, multilateral negotiations and cooperation over one-sided action. If flow (in)securities lead to crisis management, activities should be guided by strong international mandates and legitimacy, and not become issues of contention between great powers.

Crisis management organisations – a cohort of limping seekers?

How apt are the key international organisations in navigating their crisis management role in changing conditions? In western countries, people are fatigued by the prolonged wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They question the political grounds and economic costs of large land operations. Then again, humanitarian sentiments among western electorates are prone to rapid reactions to televised catastrophes. There is still life after Afghanistan. Transition in Kabul could release new energies that can be channelled more evenly to different regions and organisations.

The United Nations, its Charter and the Security Council lie still at the core of international peace and security. The council's real ability to act depends on cooperation between the Permanent Five. A prolonged political impasse can derail the council's role in managing conflicts, which is a considerable risk in the case of the Syrian civil war. Despite constant calls for reform, the council's structure and decision making are unlikely to change soon.

Some progress has been made in the UN peacekeeping system through the renewed supply system, as well as integrated operations and delivering as 'One UN' on the ground. From this practical point of view, UN operations may well be more appealing to westerners than previously. The western countries' interest in participating in UN operations could also be rising as massive contributions to NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan diminish – though certainly not on the same scale. Motivation could be mostly political, but military arguments are plausible too. UN operations critically lack military mobility and robust manoeuvring capabilities, and they operate in increasingly difficult environments like Eastern DRC or South Sudan. UN operations would offer militarily motivating opportunities to test and develop tactical assets.

[21] Aaltola, Sipilä and Vuorisalo 2011, 40–42
[22] US Department of Defense 2012 (emphasis by OE)

The UN Secretariat wishes to see even competition over certain capabilities and locations: obviously some tasks are more appealing than others for western countries. Finland will have difficulties choosing freely by itself, as it cannot deploy a full-size battalion independently anymore with the current level of funding. A possible joint Nordic contribution to a UN operation seems a distant option, as long consensus on a "suitable operation" is not found/ reached.

The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been developed largely in response to events in the Western Balkans. Progress in building up policies, structures and capabilities has been rapid. After this formative phase, the EU should learn to apply its crisis management tools strategically also outside the immediate European neighbourhood (the main factor of the EU's success in the Balkans has proved to be its wide set of foreign policy tools, and most importantly the prospect of EU membership). The EU has frequently deployed to Africa, as well as Georgia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Aceh and the Middle East, but has lacked a strategic and comprehensive approach that would combine the various diplomatic, security, and development tools available to the union and its members. A long list of small operations and missions has spread the EU flag widely but undermined operational effectiveness.

The lack of coherence was supposed to be remedied by the Lisbon Treaty, which introduced the new position of Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and led to the establishment of the European External Action Service. The new structures and the list of operations are repeatedly cited as evidence of the strengthening of the CSDP. But the EU is still short on foreign political vision and lacks the actual will to work for common objectives. Furthermore, the economic crisis erodes political confidence and risks undermining achievements made so far. Institutionalist faith should perhaps be replaced by pragmatic functionalism: policies should lead to results, not merely institutions.

The EU wishes to see itself primarily as a civilian power that prefers multilateral solutions, a normative power emanating the universal values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. It has, however, challenges in applying these principles into practice, as has become evident in the cases of Libya and Syria. In the former, Germany abstained from the Security Council vote on intervention – a campaign led by the two other leading European powers, France and the UK, and the United States. The EU also proved incapable of assuming the lead responsibility for the Libyan operation, or for any supportive military action on the planning table for that matter. In the latter, the union has appeared similarly powerless on the political front.

The EU has for sometime looked to Africa as its future crisis management region. Credentials are limited at best. To succeed, the EU would need to overcome its lack of coordinated presence in the Security Council, decide on its policy vis-à-vis Chinese, Russian and Indian activities in Africa, and determine where it stands between normative power and accusations of neocolonialism.

NATO is seeking its path after the massive operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Zeal for far-away operations will be in short supply for a while. The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept

strikes a balance between defence of its members and crisis management[23]. Secretary General Rasmussen has called for a global role for NATO, but emphasis is more on security political cooperation than operational means[24]. NATO builds joint ventures actively through structures like the Mediterranean Dialogue and partnerships with Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Instead of wide-scale operations, the Alliance will more likely deploy limited missions to assist in defence reforms and training, and in the equipping of local forces. Internally, it is putting more emphasis on emerging cyber, energy security, and critical sea route threats.

Once the burden of Afghanistan has been digested, political interest in crisis management operations will eventually rise. It could once again be attached to the question of what is the *raison d'être* of NATO. In the short term, the air operation in Libya was an unexpected relief showing that NATO can make a difference, but not get stuck with the crisis. The experience, on the other hand, once again underscored the fact that NATO cannot by itself create a comprehensive approach to conflict management, even though it is highly capable of serving the military part to a bigger whole.

Other regional organisations are likely to step up their role in resolving crises. The African Union has established its political structures for common action and runs two crucial operations: the hybrid operation UNAMID with the UN in Darfur, and the UN-supplied AMISOM in Somalia. The AU is in the process of building up the African Standby Force, which is divided into five subregional commands. Also other organisations are probing their way to become operational actors. In December 2011, the Arab League launched its first monitoring mission in Syria. ASEAN in Southeast Asia could well be the next one to develop a permanent capability for civilian crisis management and/or unarmed military observers. In an optimistic scenario, a coalition consisting of several, mutually supplementary crisis management organisations could be assembled to manage an emerging crisis together. Will it be Syria?

[23] NATO 2010b
[24] NATO 2012

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Time to re-write the grand narrative?
Prospects and tendencies in European crisis management 2014–2020

Tommi Koivula

Abstract

This article tackles the dynamics affecting the European EU and NATO countries' crisis management approach from the next five years' perspective. Three issue-areas will be highlighted: the ongoing economic crisis and the way it is likely to affect European ability and willingness to exercise foreign operations; the re-nationalization tendencies of crisis management within Europe and finally the emergence of non-western crisis management players in the field. Put together, these developments suggest that the next few years will most likely see the European countries as different actors in international crisis management than they are today, both in terms of their internal dynamism as well as their international weight.

Tradition of western dominance

Military and civilian crisis management have been among the key instruments of the international community in the promotion of peace and security since the end of the Cold War. In addition to this, they have with some justification, been seen as tools for western countries in promoting their perception of international security. The main conceptual innovations of crisis management such as discourses of *nation-building*, *humanitarian intervention*, and *comprehensive approach,* just to name a few, have been developed predominantly in western literature and western think tanks. Influential western political documents such as the European Security Strategy or the various NATO strategic concepts have cemented these ideas into political practices.

However, many indicators suggest that the next few years to come will most likely see the West as a different actor in international crisis management than it is today, both in terms of its internal dynamics as well as its international role. Overall, it seems that the west is likely to be less willing and less capable to set the agenda for international crisis management in the same way as it has during the past decades.

This article seeks to tackle this phenomenon by focusing on the dynamics affecting particularly the European EU and NATO countries' crisis management approach with the next five years' perspective. To be more precise, three separate but interrelated issue areas will be highlighted. The first is the ongoing economic crisis and the way it is likely to affect European ability and willingness to exercise crisis management during the next few years. Secondly, the focus will turn to the institutional setting of crisis management as the position of the EU and NATO may be challenged by smaller intra-EU and NATO coalitions in the years ahead. Finally, the emergence of non-western crisis management players is also tackled as they appear to take bolder steps into the field. This is likely to affect the extent to which the western countries will be able to define their agenda and content.

Era of austerity

Since 2008, the United States and Europe have undergone an economic crisis, the effects of which have and will continue to have a substantial impact throughout the world in the coming years.

Even though the international media's main attention has mostly focused on the day-to-day unfolding of the economic turbulence, a more important and long-term side of the issue is the debt crisis' longer-term and strategic consequences. From a European perspective, one can argue that the European Union's role as an anchor of stability among its member states has been weakened and this situation is likely to continue also in the coming years. The trend is being enhanced by various politico-social developments related to economic crisis, such as intra-European power shifts, political fragmentation, renationalisation dynamics, and declining public trust.

The consequences of these developments can be seen in foreign and security policy, where the European countries' clout is shrinking because of the lack of cohesion, money, and political will. While Europe is likely to be resilient enough to avoid collapse, it faces years of austerity in more than just economic terms. The debt crisis has also left its mark on European defence. In many European countries, the armed forces were already underfunded well before the recent fiscal straits. However, the dramatic new cuts being decided in numerous capitals since 2008, coupled with the lack of coordination in reducing national military capabilities, suggest that Europe may be reaching a tipping point as far as the credibility of its defence and military crisis management capacities are concerned.

This deepening lack of resources at European level is contrasted by inefficient national level practices whereby the 27 EU defence ministers and their bureaucratic apparatuses currently spend approximately 200 billion Euros a year and manage approximately 1.7 million soldiers but cannot make 10 percent of these forces available for active deployment. The inability of EU Member States to better coordinate their defence policies and budgetary cycles results in missed opportunities to make up for growing capability shortfalls and live up to their international military commitments.

To be fair, it should be noted that there is a plethora of initiatives, bodies and agencies in the EU and NATO frameworks, but with only limited record of delivery on crisis management capabilities. There are headline goals, concepts, plans and mechanisms that can only provide a rudimentary answer to the question "What forces for what operations". The existing institutions have worked on creating a shared perception of the problems and needs and we can even talk about an emerging European security culture.[1] Member states have certainly engaged in developing collective military capabilities at European level but they still recognise severe capability shortfalls. This is predominantly a question of political will, where individual states fail to commit themselves beyond the level that supports their national capability needs. In addition, particularly the EU- level actors, i.e. in the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), still remain disjointed in the effort to create a system that generates a "bigger bang for the Euro".[2]

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[1] For more discussion on the EU security culture, see Biava – Drent – Herd 2011.
[2] Mölling - Brune 2011, 10.

The lessening appeal of the EU and NATO

While the economic crisis has received most international attention during the recent years, one can also note more subtle transformations in the European geopolitical constellation, which will most likely have an effect in future peace operations. Key among these from the point of view of this article is the institutional aspect of the EU and NATO as crisis management players in post-2014.

Even as both of these organizations will most likely remain significant actors in crisis management, both seem to have a lessening appeal to their member states as the institutional frameworks for out-of-area operations. Instead, different coalitions of like-minded states within the EU and NATO seem to assume a more prominent role.

The EU's capacity to implement a common foreign policy and defend collective European interests in an increasingly non-western world has been further diminished. Its inability to come up with a strategic response to the monumental changes that have occurred in Southern Mediterranean countries since the beginning of 2011 speaks volumes in this regard. With its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) receiving less attention and fewer resources, and with cohesion and trust among member states decreasing, any positive effect that was achieved with the Lisbon Treaty has largely been undone. There are tendencies indicating that foreign policy is being renationalised in crisis-driven Europe, which bodes ill for the EU's ability to project stability to its neighbourhood and play a global role commensurate with its economic weight.[3]

Overall, it seems that the EU's inability to act has been due to member states' lack of political will and the lacking vision of end-state. Essentially, the EU has not had a cohesive vision of what its missions should accomplish, or where and how the accomplishment should take place. This of course requires that relevant political issues of how, where and when the EU's military capacity should be put to use have to be settled. In a wider sense it seems that the European Union is quite often unable to deliver the foreign and security policies expected due to a lack of decision-making procedures capable of overcoming dissent.

As already discussed earlier in this article, the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy experienced some dynamic first years, marked by the setting up of institutions, the forging of a security strategy, and the launch of about two dozen crisis management operations (even though mostly small and civilian in nature). But since then it has gradually lost some of its steam.

Simultaneously, NATO has been consumed by the dragging operation in Afghanistan and it is still involved in a prolonged exit operation. Also NATO's problems run deeper than just the hardships of a single operation. In 2009, the then US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, raised the issue of intra-alliance discrepancy relating to the public agenda warning that, exasperated by Europe's failures of political will and the gaps in defence funding needed

[3] Möckli 2012, 37. Characteristically, since 2009 the EU has launched only one small military training mission (EUTM Somalia) and two small civilian crisis management operations (EUCAP Sahel, Niger, EUCAP Nestor) and the EU battlegroups remain unused. For more on completed and ongoing EU operations, see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations.aspx?lang=en

to keep the alliance alive, the new post-cold war generation of leaders in America could abandon NATO and 60 years of security guarantees to Europe.[4]

In fact, Gates and others after him have suggested that NATO had degenerated into a "two-tiered" alliance of those willing to wage war and those only interested in "talking" and peacekeeping. This view is especially held by representatives of the US. Parallel to the above, developments in the EU and the lack of strategic consensus within NATO, as reflected in the split over Libya between Germany on the one side and Britain and France on the other, have also become a major liability for the alliance. With regard to NATO, there is no concrete agreement on EU-NATO relations and the role and purpose of the EU member states' Common Security and Defence Policy.

So, in this fundamental sense, the problem is more the weakening European defence capabilities and lacking willingness to contribute to military capabilities than the particular shortcomings of the EU or NATO as such. The EU and NATO are increasingly seen as heavy-moving organizations that are less able to make necessary moves swiftly and as large and heterogeneous entities need a substantial amount of mediation and negotiation to function at least moderately well. Consequently, attention, and perhaps gradually power as well, is shifting away from these institutions and back to member states and smaller groupings within these institutions.

Thus, we are witnessing a surge in the numbers of intra-coalition groups of defence and security related states. The most well-known example of 'Coalitions of the Willing' was of course the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Even today, bilateral defence relations with the US are of paramount importance for many European countries such as Denmark, Poland, and the Baltic states, to the extent that these and other countries have willingly followed the American lead into several US-led operations abroad. Other groups have followed or are in the process of following, some being still in embryonic stages. These modes of cooperation are likely to become a tool for at least some European military powers' future foreign operations, and in this respect a possible competitor or alternative to the EU and NATO as the institutional framework.

To begin with, in November 2010 the French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron signed treaties to improve bilateral cooperation on defence and security matters. Characteristically, these agreements emerged from convergent strategic agendas, similar security threats and shared economic incentives - indicating that EU or NATO frameworks did not suit these two major countries' interests in an optimal way. The two sides' political willingness and military capacity to act together was demonstrated shortly after in the Libyan crisis, even though the experience also highlighted severe shortcomings in European defence capabilities.

A second example is the Weimar group: On July 5 2011, Poland, France, and Germany signed an agreement in Brussels to put together a unit of 1,700 soldiers, called the Weimar Combat Group, that ought to be ready to deploy in crisis zones starting in 2013. Initial reports indicate that Poland will command the group, providing the core combat troops and a mechanised battalion, while Germany will provide logistical support and France will

[4] Gates' speech, see http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581

contribute medical support. The operational command centre will be located in Mont Valerien near Paris.

The announcement of Poland in May 2011 that it would be forming a new European Union Battle Group together with Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic – collectively known as the Visegrád Group – is a third European development in the same direction: an endeavour of many governments to form small, willing and capable defence groups within the larger institutional frameworks of the EU and NATO. We should not count out other groupings, including Nordic defence cooperation, which may also play a part in shaping the European crisis management landscape in coming years.

For the most part, these recent alignments have not yet led to concrete crisis management operations or to any determined efforts to build the necessary structures to conduct them. It is also questionable whether such will emerge in the years to come. However, these institutional developments suggest that political like-mindedness is likely to play a more decisive role in future considerations on foreign operations. These ongoing strategic re-alignments reflect a bigger underlying trend where a more narrowly and specifically defined conceptualization of national interest seems likely to have a more visible role in the contemporary political climate in Europe during the next few years. This will have an effect on relevant crisis management questions such as where, with whom, and for what purposes.[5]

Characteristically, in their still ongoing naval operations in the Gulf of Aden both the EU and NATO seem to have a keener interest in keeping the economically relevant sea passage open, than engaging in the hard and prolonged effort to tackle the root causes of piracy in Somalia. Likewise, factors of direct national interest, such as European energy stability or the fear of a refugee flow may help to better explain why Libya was chosen as the target for western-led intervention while Syria was not.

New players and contested narratives

It has already been stated that ever since the end of the Cold War, we have been used to seeing the western powers as the leading players and initiators in crisis management, with organizations such as the EU and NATO playing a central role.

Put together, western innovations and the ensuing EU and NATO crisis management operations have contributed to a grand narrative of stabilisation and state-building accepted in most western capitals at least. Thus, crisis management has involved significant international security forces acting as platforms for democratisation processes and the utilisation of development aid to build up state structures and stop post-conflict countries from returning to violence.

However, the grand narrative of state-building is now breaking down for at least three reasons. Firstly, experience from cases such as Iraq, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo has bred pessimism about whether states can be built at all. Overall,

[5] Another more societal and subtle element related to these developments is the overall aging of European populations. Its effects are difficult to estimate, but it is also likely to lead to a more politically reserved climate when it comes to various international engagements by western powers.

the past experience seems to indicate that the efforts to do so have either been too small-scale and modest or too complicated and open-ended to be achievable within a reasonable timetable and at reasonable cost. Secondly, as discussed above, the financial crisis has placed constraints on western organisations' ability to sustain large-scale operations even if there were a willingness to do so. Thirdly, growing political differences between states and organisations (such as EU–AU splits over how to deal with Côte d'Ivoire and Libya in 2011) and within them (as in the recent UN Security Council inertia regarding Syria) may place limits on what large-scale missions will be able to achieve in future.[6]

Simultaneously, the world goes increasingly multi-polar also in crisis management. New players such as China, the African Union, Arab League and Japan seem to take bolder steps into the field. Constrained by economic difficulties, European governments are in fact increasingly reliant on these countries and organisations and on the United Nations to pay attention to crises in their unstable periphery, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. Although the European countries have been building up their own security structures over the decades, they may now find it more cost-effective and politically expedient to prioritise helping these other actors manage looming threats.[7]

From the European perspective it is in many respects helpful that new players assume a more central role in peace operations and these new actors' increased commitment to international stability, conflict resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction should be greeted with satisfaction. However, the new actors are also inclined to bring their own agendas and ideological emphases into play as well, raising partially problematic questions regarding the guiding ethos and practical arrangements of their foreign operations.

For instance, the traditional view of state sovereignty and non-interference will continue to be the most important concern for many of these 'new' policymakers. They often remain cautious towards the use of peacekeepers and the broader issue of intervention by the international community. In cases such as Syria, Zimbabwe and Myanmar, China for instance has resisted calls from human rights advocacy groups and some western governments to pursue intervention based on humanitarian justifications.[8]

In short, these new crisis management players will judge the world at least partially according to a different logic than western countries. They will continue to review interventions on a case-by-case basis. There will be limits to their participation, and it is unlikely that China for instance will offer active support to international intervention when the international community is divided and the intended host government is opposed. This has partly been influenced by the Libyan intervention, which has led to more determined resistance to the overall logic of humanitarian intervention.[9] They will also engage in operations with

[6] Gowan 2012, 3.

[7] This is not to claim that European interests are no longer threatened: Syria, Libya, Mali, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen among others are likely to present a new generation of civil wars and humanitarian crises emerging along Europe's southern flank with potentially wide-ranging consequences.

[8] It should be noted, however, that in 1999 China accepted a UN-sanctioned humanitarian justification for using force in East Timor. It also subsequently dispatched a civilian police contingent to support the mission there. Likewise, in 2003, in response to growing instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Zhang Yishan, argued that the UN should intervene in conflict areas earlier, faster and more forcefully. Gill – Huang 2009, 6.

[9] For example, during the past 20 years, China's participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations has dramatically expanded. As of December 2008, China was the fourteenth largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, providing more troops, police and observers to UN operations than three other permanent members of the UN Security Council:

different background and experience – a factor which may harm or perhaps occasionally facilitate some of their efforts.

While the instruments of crisis management have been more or less the same in recent years and decades, the new players' entrance is likely to lead to a re-evaluation of the motives for these operations – their goals and the purposes for which they take place.[10]

Sunset – or a new dawn?

In conclusion, a number of manifest and subtle processes related to economic, political and social factors seem to shape the supply and role of European crisis management for the coming years. In many respects, its outlook may well be less European and less western.

In the previous pages it has been suggested that western countries will need to adapt to increasingly complex and austere security environments. Future missions are likely to be deployed in conditions complicated by at least three factors – continued financial constraints; gradual alienation of individual countries from pan-European institutional frameworks such as the EU and NATO, and a proliferation of organisational presences of non-western background, many of them authorised by entities with limited experience of crisis management.

Overall, in common to all these developments is that they reflect some sort of intervention fatigue among the western countries, whether financial or more profound in nature. It seems that with all these hardships, we have in some respects, come to the end of an era of crisis management – one could also argue for an emerging discursive turn in the field.

Even though the above pages may have painted the future prospects of European crisis management with rather bleak colours, it would perhaps be more justified to talk about shades of gray with potentially positive and potentially problematic prospects in each of these three developments.

To begin with, even the ongoing economic crisis may have a positive effect. Even though there are those who predict a gradual 'demilitarisation' of Europe, in the case of defence it seems just conceivable that the debt crisis may actually have the positive effect of pushing states towards more 'pooling and sharing' or 'smart defence'. This would eventually lead to a better utilization of the EU countries' military and other assets, which are still enormous on a global scale. That way, the debt crisis could actually become a catalyst for more defence cooperation, a development which would have effects also on European crisis management capabilities (if not necessarily willingness).

Then again, the institutional fragmentation of the EU and NATO may lead to more determined and agile operations when conceived and run by smaller groups of countries with

Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Nearly three-quarters of China's contributions are concentrated in Africa, reflecting the current focus of UN peacekeeping operations. See Gill – Huang 2009.

[10] Caplan gives nation-building three distinct but related meanings: 1.) the creation of a common consciousness or common identity among a people; 2.) the establishment or the strengthening of governmental or administrative structures within a state or territory; 3.) the post-war rehabilitation of states and territories. Caplan 2005, 31.

a more unified vision of their shared goals and interests. On the other hand, questions also come to the fore regarding for instance issues relating to legitimacy: particularly small states have been natural supporters of multilateral approaches. Are these groupings as legitimate actors as the 'genuine' regional security players?

Regarding to the emergence of new non-western actors, it is possible that over time their approaches will gradually counterbalance western influence and more actively shape the norms and overall discourse guiding crisis management operations. Following this, we may face a wide-ranging debate on the following very fundamental questions: What will the appropriate venues and tools for crisis management operations be? What are the goals and purposes? Will the western countries and organizations be seen as welcome and legitimate partners in the first place? Whose truth will be prevalent? Painful and cumbersome as some of these questions may be, they will surely lead us to search for a solid basis in dealing with tomorrow's crises.

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

SECTION TWO – International Organisations and Crisis Management

Future Challenges of UN Conflict Management

Touko Piiparinen

Abstract

The UN is moving away from massive peacekeeping operations towards more nimble and agile operations. The UN is also seeking to increase cooperation with regional organisations, as evidenced by the case of Somalia, where the UN works closely with the African Union. The UN also aims to strengthen its state-building capabilities. Because of the UN's engagement in state-building in weak, fragile, and failed states, the relative importance of civilian expertise has become accentuated, but it cannot substitute military peacekeeping. The aim of the UN is to depart from traditional peacekeeping premised on template missions, which apply universal solutions to manage conflicts and to transit society from authoritarianism to democracy, towards operations that could better take into account the particular requirements of local security environments.

Section 1: Trajectory of UN peacekeeping contributions since the 1990s to the present and beyond

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of UN peacekeepers deployed in the field has experienced two peaks. In the early 1990s, it increased seven-fold within a year, from 11,000 at the beginning of 1992 to approximately 82,000 in 1993.[1] A seven-fold increase in the number of deployed troops in just a year would be unsustainable to the command and control mechanisms of any peacekeeping organisation, and the UN was no different. Most worryingly, however, it created excessive expectations about the UN's capacity to manage complex conflicts around the world that other organisations were reluctant to get involved in. UN member states pushed the UN to deploy lightly armed peacekeepers to conflict zones where they could not match heavily armed, belligerent parties. Infamous cases include the deployment of UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) in the Western Balkans,[2] which the UN Secretariat initially objected – for a good reason, as it later turned out.

The second peak in the number of UN peacekeepers was witnessed in the first decade of the 21st century, reaching the all-time high of over 99,000 in 2010. However, in contrast to the first overstretch of the 1990s, the second wave has been much more gradual, and hence more manageable for the UN peacekeeping system as a whole. Yet, it has created severe systemic challenges. As the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) summarises, '[O]ver the course of 2010, peacekeeping operations, especially the UN's, were under tremendous operational, political, and financial pressure to scale down.'[3] The current overstretch of UN peacekeeping has been similar to the 1990s overstrain in that both developments have led to the deployment of PKOs to evermore challenging security environments. This, in turn, has been in a direct positive correlation with the possibility that peace operations will be

1 Evans 1993, 124.
2 Economides and Taylor 1996, 59–93.
3 CIC 2010, 4.

forced to apply increasingly coercive means to protect civilians, to implement their mandate, and to defend themselves, as evidenced by the case of UNOCI (United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire) operations in early 2011. UNOCI was confronted by continuous and fierce assaults by forces commanded by the then Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo, but showed remarkable resilience and was eventually successful in protecting civilians – and in protecting its own troops.[4]

The number of troops and civilian police deployed in UN peace operations is expected to decline gradually in the coming years. During the past three years, the total number of troops and civilian police has remained relatively stable, remaining at around 100,000. During the past year, it has witnessed a slight decrease which is expected to continue during the next years. Experts on UN peacekeeping do not foresee a steep decline,[5] akin to one experienced in the mid-1990s, which was largely caused by the devastating failures of blue helmets to protect civilians in the Western Balkans and in Rwanda. The ongoing decline in the number of UN peacekeepers is partly explained by factors pertaining to the UN peacekeeping system itself, including the systemic overburdening described above, and by factors relating to the external realm, notably the protracted global financial crisis. However, there is also another factor that underlies the decline in the number of UN peacekeepers, namely the paradigm shift from massive 'template' missions to smaller, more agile and mobile designer operations. That paradigm shift will be discussed in more detail in the next two sections.

Section 2: Future scenarios of UN peacekeeping

For the most part the on-going and gradual decline in the number of UN peacekeepers seems to take place by choice, rather than by necessity. The UN itself is actively seeking alternatives to massive peace operations deployed during the first decade of the 21st century, some of which were composed of more than 10,000 troops, such as those operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur, Liberia, and Haiti. These missions have been relatively slow to deploy, which has proved detrimental to conflict prevention and early recovery. Moreover, the sheer massiveness of these operations has often created over-expectations of their capacity to bring failed, weak, and fragile states to their feet.

One alternative is to deploy smaller and more mobile peace operations. 'Nimbleness'[6] has recently emerged as the key concept of both military and civilian crisis management in the UN. It is indicative that during the recent years the missions deployed by the UN Security Council have been smaller compared to large-scale operations deployed before 2008. However, the UN's aim to dispatch more mobile and rapid forces is countered by the prevalence of a chronic problem impeding UN peacekeeping, namely the lack of helicopters, surveillance technology, and trained rapid reaction forces that would actually enable that mobility. One illustrative example is provided by the incapacity of UNMISS (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan) and UNISFA (United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei)[7] to prevent communal violence and the escalation of the

[4] Bellamy and Williams 2011, 843.

[5] Gowan 2012.

[6] See for example United Nations 2011.

[7] UNISFA is a relatively small (around 4,000 troops as of June 2012) peacekeeping force deployed to the Abyei region, composed of mainly African and Latin American troops.

conflict between the North and South Sudan in April 2012. They also proved unable to prevent the interethnic violence in Pibor a few months earlier. Hence, the willingness for increased mobility has not been matched by the actual materiel capacities of the UN.

Another option to transform UN peacekeeping is the increased synchronisation of UN peacekeeping with other international, regional and sub-regional organisations. In this regard, an interesting example is the division of labour between conflict management actors in Somalia, where international and regional organisations have successfully combined their forces, and unique capacities to manage the crisis. AMISOM, a peacekeeping force deployed by the African Union, has during the past year managed to defend and enlarge the authority of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government. Two UN operations have provided logistical support to AMISOM and coordinated political functions of conflict management. The EU, on its part, has trained Somali security forces in Uganda and tackled the piracy problem, along with NATO, Russian, and Chinese warships.[8]

In the 'Somalia model' described above, international organisations combine their forces to manage a crisis within a loose framework that defines the division of labour, without, however, developing any deeply integrated cooperation mechanism. Cooperation may also entail more integrated interoperability arrangements, akin to the UN-AU hybrid operation UNAMID (The African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur) established in 2007. The Somalia and Darfur cases may show the way for future UN peacekeeping, given that all organisations operating in the field of global conflict management, including the UN, need to look for optimal burden-sharing arrangements. That is not only because of materiel constraints emanating from the global financial crisis, but also because of a normative fact: the global responsibility for conflict management cannot be allocated to any one single organisation, as evidenced by lessons learned from the excessive political expectations and requirements directed at UN peacekeeping in the early 1990s.

The third scenario involves the increased deployment of Special Political Missions (SPMs), which actually go beyond peacekeeping to crisis management. To apply the European terminology of crisis management here, SPMs represent *civilian* crisis management. As opposed to peacekeeping operations, SPMs are composed of mainly civilians and relatively small in size, with a few dozen or hundred experts per mission. SPMs conduct a wide variety of functions, including early warning, fact finding, preventive diplomacy, peace mediation, and peacebuilding.[9] Some UN officials tend to regard SPMs as a substitute to peacekeeping, as they provide a nimbler, more mobile and cost-effective tool to manage crises compared to large-scale military peacekeeping operations.[10]

SPMs provide an interesting option for Finnish crisis management as well. Finland has been a major contributor to civilian crisis management, but mainly in the EU context, overlooking SPMs as a key emerging instrument of civilian crisis management in the UN system. In fact, SPMs represent the 'soft security' approach of Nordic countries in general. Swedish professionals have already worked in leadership positions in two SPMs deployed

[8] Gowan 2012.

[9] Gowan 2011a.

[10] In addition to this functional advantage, another reason for the rise of SPMs is the personal initiative of the current Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Under Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe, whose explicit aim has been to give more weight to preventive diplomacy in UN conflict management – one of the core functions of SPMs – and to make the UN Department of Political Affairs that manages SPMs operational.

by the UN, namely those operating in Burundi and Afghanistan, while Finland has not yet managed to attain (or, to be more precise, has not attempted to attain) a leadership position in recently deployed SPMs.

Given the specialisation of Nordic countries in civilian crisis management, SPMs could provide one solution for raising Finland's profile in UN crisis management. Its significance is accentuated by the fact that although Finland's contributions to traditional UN peacekeeping has significantly decreased since the Cold War, Finland has not thus far been able to find alternative ways of contributing to UN conflict management. This would be politically desirable (or necessary) for Finland as it is campaigning for a seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (let alone Finland's possible membership). Finland, nor any other Nordic state for that matter, is expected to reclaim the status of 'great power' in UN peacekeeping in terms of the number of infantry troops contributed to UN peace operations, as was during the Cold War. Presently, South Asian and African countries such as Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Nigeria provide the bulk of troops in UN peacekeeping. Instead, Nordic countries could concentrate on providing specialised assets to UN peace operations, which, in fact, constitute the most crucial 'critical gap' in UN peacekeeping. In terms of SPMs, these could include Rule of Law, mediation and gender experts. In terms of peacekeeping, these could include engineering units, field hospitals, communications specialists, and rapid reaction forces.

Section 3: Transformation of UN peacekeeping functions

During the Cold War, the UN used to perform functionally limited peacekeeping tasks, such as the observation of the implementation of peace accords and patrolling state borders. Since the 1980s, peacekeeping has shifted from limited functions to full-fledged state-building operations. The great majority of U -mandated peacekeeping operations deployed since 2001 have been authorised to undertake security sector reform (SSR) and justice sector reform (JSR) in target states. These reforms involve a variety of tasks, such as restructuring security agencies; vetting, training and mentoring SSR and JSR personnel; modernising corrections systems; redrafting legal frameworks; and rebuilding courthouses, police stations, and military barracks.[11] Because of the UN's engagement in state-building in weak, fragile, and failed states, the relative importance of civilians compared to soldiers working for peace operations has become accentuated.

That development is expected to be only intensified in the future. The importance of civilian expertise in UN peace operations will be further increased, as already indicated by the rising importance of mediation in peacekeeping operations. Richard Gowan notes that mediation is increasingly applied in peacekeeping operations: 'Even where large peace operations are deployed, as in Sudan, there has been a greater emphasis on mediation and preventive diplomacy instead of military means.'[12] Another significant transformation of peacekeeping relates to the shift from pre-fixed 'template' missions to context specific missions. Such a development has been a long time coming, as evidenced by the report of the previous UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. The guidelines for the Integrated Mission

[11] Sherman, Tortolani and Parker 2010, 12.
[12] Gowan 2011b, 3.

Planning Process (IMPP) approved by Annan on 13 June 2006 emphasise context-driven peacekeeping. The aim of the UN is to depart from traditional peacekeeping premised on template missions, which applied universal solutions to manage conflicts and to transit society from authoritarianism to democracy, towards operations that could better take into account the *particular* requirements of local security environments.

The universal requirement for the protection of civilians is also expected to be accentuated in UN peacekeeping – as well as the related quarrel on budgetary issues between Western states (the main financiers of UN peacekeeping) and countries representing the global South (the main troop-contributing countries). During the last sessions of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping (C–34), Western governments have routinely brought up the universal requirement of all peace operations to implement the protection of civilians. The main troop-contributing countries of the global South in the C–34 have responded to the Western governments by calling for more capacities (financial resources, *matérielle* and specialised assets) from the global North to be able to fulfil the requirement of protecting civilians.

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Syria and United Nations conflict management – Reflections from the field

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Abstract

This article is based on an interview with Lieutenant Colonel Rolf Kullberg (retired from active duty). The article offers a telling narrative of the challenges the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria faced when deployed in Syria. The interview also discusses the UN's existing conflict management mechanisms and how they were applied in Syria, and also the UN's potential role in the future, when weapons eventually have been silenced.

Introduction

The conflict in Syria has turned out to be one of the bloodiest to have emerged in connection with the Arab Spring. The conflict that started in March 2011 has claimed the lives of several thousands, and tens of thousands have been forced to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, and even more are internally displaced. The media has shown us images where entire city blocks have been turned into rubble and reports from the ever increasing escalation of the conflict occupy the news daily. The conflict in Syria poses an immense challenge for the international community to manage the crisis. Not only because of the suffering in Syria, but also because the conflict is threatening to spill over into neighbouring Lebanon and Turkey. The international community has been slow to respond to this crisis, but concerning those efforts the United Nations has been at the centre of them. Before the UN Security Council could reach any viable agreement about the course of action, the conflict had been going on for over a year. Finally, on April 14th 2012 the Security Council passed resolution 2042[1], which approved the deployment of 30 UN military observers to Syria. This was an advance team for a larger group of 300 military observers. On April 21st 2012, resolution 2043[2] authorised deployment to Syria for a period of 90 days and effectively established a United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS). Earlier, in February, Kofi Annan had been appointed Joint Special Envoy for Syria of the United Nations and League of Arab States. Mr. Annan presented a *Six Point Plan*[3] for ending the violence in Syria. The plan emphasised finding a Syrian-led political solution to the crisis, ending armed violence by all parties involved, providing humanitarian assistance to those who had been affected by the violence, releasing arbitrarily detained persons, ensuring freedom of movement of the media and allowing people to demonstrate freely as guaranteed by Syrian law. The Security Council gave the UNSMIS operation the mandate to monitor the cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and monitor and support the full implementation of the Envoy's Six Point Plan. As we know now, the operation did not manage to end the violence in Syria. This article presents one first hand experience from the field, which sheds some light on the

[1] UNSCR 2042, available from: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10609.doc.htm
[2] UNSCR 2043, available from: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10618.doc.htm
[3] Special Envoy Kofi Annan's Six Point Plan is available from: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unsmis/background.shtml

background and why the operation did not reach its objectives. I interviewed[4] Rolf Kullberg, the senior ranking officer of the Finnish military observer group that recently returned from Syria after the mission came to be considered too dangerous to be continued any longer. The interview presents the kind of circumstances the UNSMIS operation had to start its work under, and what obstacles the operation faced while active in Syria. It also discusses the possible role of the UN in post-conflict Syria.

The interview – Experiences from Syria and some reflections based on that experience

Some criticism has emerged regarding the UN's actions in Syria. In some connections it has been claimed that UNSMIS was more of a symbolic mission that tried to show that the UN was doing something, instead of being an operation with a credible chance for success. Then on the other hand, it has also been considered to represent an example of a new kind of approach to conflict management, where smaller, more nimble and efficient units can be sent quickly to put out the fire, if possible. A comparison has been made to UN response in the border area between Sudan and South Sudan, where the UN sent a small contingent to stop the escalation of border disputes between these two countries. Elsewhere, the UN is running operations that have been quite comprehensive in their approach. The UN is not in the country just to secure peace. At the same time it is assisting the host country to rebuild the foundations of their entire society. Liberia for instance is one example of this. How does UNSMIS fit into these parameters?

The UN's present concept is based on the so called "multi-dimensional integrated mission concept", where three different components work with the same mandate. In addition to a military dimension it includes also civilian and police dimensions. Regarding UNSMIS, this approach was applied in principle, but the police component was not present. Concerning the speed: Not so long time ago, the UN had a system known as the "Stand-By High Readiness Brigade". Troop contributing countries contributed to a common pool containing certain units and materiel. The concept was initiated by Denmark at the end of the 1990s. It was used a few times, for instance in the Ethiopia Eritrea border. The aim was to have a rapidly deployable contingent that was able to initiate the operation, build up the command and lay the foundations for the arrival of the rest of the troops. [5] Currently there is are no such a unit available, but the UN still has in place so called "United Nations stand by arrangements system" (pool of forces) in order to facilitate the rapid availability of troops for a mission to be established.

However regarding Syria, the resolution that allowed us to go in was quite limited, allowing only a small and unarmed operation. It was the only resolution that the Security Council was able to reach. I would describe the resolution as the "mother of all compromises". When a resolution of some sort was finally reached, the UN did not want to waste any time. Once an opportunity came to do something, action was taken in the fastest manner possible. It took only a few days for the first six officers to arrive in Syria and start patrolling. I would not, however, consider the operation a standard rapid reaction operation. UNSMIS should be seen as more of an answer to cries of help, than something that could be considered a transformed approach to a crisis.

[4] Date of the interview 17 October 2012. Note from the author: the answers of the interviewee are italicized.

[5] Lieutenant colonel Kullberg refers to *Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations – SHIRBRIG*. Brigade was closed down in June 30th 2009.

In principle the UN aims to execute its operations in a way where, before anyone is deployed to the area, it is visited by so called technical teams that investigate and analyse the geographical circumstances, existing infrastructure that could support the operation and the security situation. In addition to this all of the most essential materiel, such as communication materiel, is obtained and transported to the area well before the start of the operation. With UNSMIS these procedures went in exactly the opposite way. The people went first and material came afterwards.[6]

Kofi Annan was appointed the Joint Special Envoy for Syria of the United Nations and League of Arab States. He introduced a plan for Syria, known as the Six Point Plan. It has been argued that Annan's plan did not have any real chance of success. As the plan was also a cornerstone of the UNSMIS mandate, one could also ask whether UNSMIS had a real chance of success?

From the onset I felt that the chances for success were very limited. When referring to Annan's Six-Point Plan, it was based on the principle that the solution to the crisis must come from inside of Syria, from the Syrians themselves. This never took place, even though the political dialogue stated otherwise. When reflecting on our work, our mandate included monitoring the ending of all hostilities. However, there was not a single moment when some kind of armed activity was not taking place, even though a ceasefire was officially announced.

The second part of our mandate was indeed to support the complete execution of Annan's Six-Point Plan. Personally, I think that the plan was too ambitious because it was based on the principle that it all starts with the Syrians' themselves. The locals kept asking, even though this plan exists, what happens if we follow this plan? The question was: "Where is the peace plan?" They kept asking; if they end the hostilities, what will happen next and what will the UN do?

Well, there was no peace plan. In the early stages of the operation, when we reached the parties of the conflict we managed to make some progress. We managed to negotiate local ceasefires so that the fighting parties could evacuate their wounded, or we managed to get road blocks removed or check points placed inside the cities dismantled. This was at the very beginning. After the massacre in al Houla and the following UN investigation, the UN itself became a target.[7]

In retrospect, have you had time to analyse what could have been done otherwise or what else would have been needed for the mission to have been successful?

If I had the answer to that I would be negotiating peace in Syria instead of Brahimi[8]*. The situation was extremely challenging. For instance when considering the opposition. What opposition? What is the opposition? It was impossible to say what it was, because it was so shattered. There were many groupings that all had their own agenda and did not respect the authority of the Free Syrian Army, a government of sorts of the opposition that resided abroad. These groupings did not care about or respect it. There were former military commanders and foreign bandit groups whose only agenda was to benefit from the chaos. Then there were also many groups that only wanted to get*

[6] Kullberg 2012

[7] Ibid.

[8] Joint Special Envoy for Syria of the United Nations and League of Arab States, Kofi Annan resigned when his mandate expired on August 31st 2012. Algerian diplomat Lahdar Brahimi replaced Annan as Special Envoy.

rid of Assad, and nothing else mattered besides that. There was also an awful lot of geographical variation. The opposition was clearly missing a common thread.[9]

In your opinion, will the UN ever have a role in Syria, or should there be another approach instead of working through the UN?

When the situation hopefully calms down at some point and weapons are silenced, one of the major questions for the countries in the region, and also globally, is that what kind of regime will emerge as a consequence of this conflict and how credible will it be? This is something that the UN could have a role in. A future UN approach in Syria could be something that would resemble its approach in Kosovo. The UN could organise temporary governance and lift the country to its feet. This would give the UN a definite role in Syria, but then we would not talk about a peacekeeping operation, but more of a state building operation. The society suffering from the conflict would be assisted back on track. Militarily the UN has no role anymore. Humanitarian intervention for example would require something quite different than what the UN is capable of.

Who would then be the armed authority? If a peacekeeping operation is excluded from the option?

Maintaining law and order would be the responsibility of the UN police in cooperation with the local police, which would be rebuilt at the same time. Again, I would consider Kosovo a good example of this, where the UN was in charge of training the local police. Soldiers would still have a role after the conflict has calmed down. The role would be different and smaller number-wise. Soldiers are needed as a sort of liaison officers. Eventually the armed forces must also be rebuilt. There are, however, many options as to how this would be done. What exactly the right approach is, is still an open question. Keep in mind that Annan already quit the job, and Brahimi's first public announcement was to state that he has accepted a duty that seems nearly impossible.[10]

Considering more immediate options, what do you think about creating humanitarian spaces or no-fly or no-drive zones? Would the UN have any role in these options? Or should there be some other authority that could protect the people with a credible force so that another Srebrenica could not take place?

When put bluntly, the problem of the UN is not in the quantity but rather the quality. Obtaining enough troops numerically has never been the issue in terms of force projection. However, all the special knowhow and special materiel such as helicopters or other aircraft, is possessed by only certain countries. Most of these countries are members of some defence alliance or some other organisation. The UN on the other hand, has a chronic shortage of everything that requires highly trained personnel or expensive materiel.[11]

Looking back on Syria, if the UN approach would go in more of a direction of small and nimble units, would you still consider this kind of approach to have potential even though the mission in Syria was not a success?

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[9] Kullberg 2012
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.

It absolutely has potential. For my opinion, the stand-by high readiness force structure proved to be quite a workable concept. But the UN of course faces the ever-present dilemma, that in the end it all depends on the troop contributing countries. If these countries are not ready to send their troops to operations, for varying reasons, the missing troops need to be obtained from somewhere else. This is because no country has permanently committed itself to sending peacekeepers to UN operations. Each time, the decision on participation is made separately. So as such the concept could not serve as a "fire department".[12]

The Security Council is another possible obstacle. Approval for operations must be received from the Security Council before any action can be taken when working through the UN. How would you see this fitting into the rapid response concept? Is there a risk that it would be a subject of constant compromise? If this is the case, should the responsibility be carried by some other organisation that is less prone to compromise?

As long as the world works according to the mechanisms that we have at present, there is not much we can do about this. As you said, it is completely up to the Security Council, and as long as the permanent five have their veto, it takes only one of them to block any resolution. This is what we witnessed in the case of Syria. Representing oneself through some other organisation depends on the existing crisis management doctrines that countries have. Finland for example operated for a long time without such a doctrine. It is only fairly recently, that we have clearly defined through which channels we seek our role and represent ourselves in international crisis management. I refer to my previous notion, that in the end it is all about the countries themselves how they act.

I have personally always been very pro-UN. I refer to the fact that what else do we have to deal with these kinds of crisis, on a truly global scale? We have regional organisations that have some capacity to act. The UN has embraced the greater participation of organisations such as the European Union and African Union as a part of its own doctrine. But still, the UN remains the sole global organisation. The UN is criticised as inefficient or at times even bad. But we should ask who it is that is represented in the UN? Well, it is the member states.[13]

Indeed, the blue helmets do appear to be an easy target for criticism.

That was the case in Syria. At first we were welcomed. People were curious about us and very emotional. Pictures of missing people were shown to us and stories told about missing husbands and sons. Sometimes wounded children were literally carried to our laps. People were asking us to do something. After a few weeks the UN came to the conclusion that there was nothing concrete that could be done. People got frustrated and even furious, because nothing concrete happened. In our defence, I can say that we did everything we could with the tools that were given us. At least we managed to tell the world what was happening in Syria, which was something that was missing as there were no humanitarian organisations present except for the local Red Crescent. [14]

[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.

Concluding Remarks

The UNSMIS operation in Syria had some initial success. Local ceasefires and dismantling of road blocks were concrete successes that were achieved on the ground and were felt by the local populace. The observers also had another very important function. They were the eyes of the global community regarding what was really happening in Syria. The observers were able to offer some objectivity in a conflict that has quickly spread to be a battle also in the media, where the old axiom "in war the first victim is always the truth" has once again proven its wisdom. During the operation, observers put videos about their work in Syria online and provided a steady flow of information about the events in Syria - at a time when humanitarian organisations, excluding the local Red Crescent, had to acknowledge that the conditions in Syria were too unsafe for them to operate. This value manifested itself at latest in connection with the *al Houla* massacre, when a UN investigation put the blame on pro-government forces. It was an incident that for the first time truly revealed the true nature and methods of the Assad regime in this conflict for the international community.

The UNSMIS operation may have also offered some other valuable lessons for the UN itself. The operation was executed very rapidly. Although the operation did not fit the UN's existing rapid reaction concepts, it still forms a precedent for an operation that was launched only in a few days after being given a green light. The UNSMIS operation was also an example of how the UN is ready to take big risks, in its task in managing global conflicts, giving an example of how the UN can lead with an example despite all its deficiencies. It only requires committed member states to do so.

The foreseen options for the evolution of the conflict do not hold much optimism within them. There are fears of emerging sectarian violence and regional escalation. Syria's sizeable chemical weapons arsenal causes major concern. The ruling regime may turn these weapons against their own citizens or the weapons could be at risk of getting into the hands of extremists. Foreign powers are increasingly getting involved in the conflict, and Syria may also be used as a stage for proxy war between competing interests in the region and at global level. The conflict also has the potential to spread further into neighbouring countries. Parts of Lebanon have already experienced some clashes between groups that support different conflicting parties in Syria, and the relations between Turkey and Syria have become strained due to violent incidents in their border area. This points to a direction, where finding a Syrian solution to this crisis is becoming impossible, as so many competing foreign interests are involved. This puts the international community at the centre of events. The UN will have a role in this conflict. What this role will be is up to the member states to decide.

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CSDP operations promoting the EU as a global actor

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Abstract

The European Union is a relatively young actor in the field of crisis management. Ten years of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has witnessed more autonomous CSDP operations than was envisaged at the time the structures were set up.

EU operations must be seen in the context of the EU's external action. CSDP is one tool in the wider "EU external action tool box". From operation to operation, the EU has learnt how to use this tool better. Still, there is room for improvement. Despite the current economic crisis, the development of CSDP will continue with the EU's future role as global actor in mind.

Introduction

Compared to the United Nations (UN) or NATO, the European Union (EU) is still a newcomer in the field of crisis management. Still, in less than ten years, the EU has launched 24 crisis management operations and civilian missions. As organisations, the UN, NATO, and EU are different, and the differences are visible in their crisis management actions. The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its military operations and civilian missions are closely linked to the goals of wider EU external action. This link is gradually growing stronger. When analysing the successes and failures of CSDP, this factor should be kept in mind. In other words, one should not compare the EU's CSDP with NATO, as this is misleading. The "D" in CSDP does not stand for collective defence.

At the moment, the two main challenges for Europe are the economic crisis and changes in the European security environment. Both factors will continue to influence the development of CSDP. The economic crisis has had one obvious effect: defence budgets have been cut in most European countries. This calls for increased cooperation, as European countries do not have the luxury of developing or sustaining military capabilities on a purely national basis. The changes in the European security environment have been less dramatic since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, it seems clear that Europeans must take more responsibility for their own security, as the interest of the United States is shifting from Europe to Asia. Again, this calls for more cooperation, as no single European country is capable of tackling today's complex security threats alone.

In the light of these developments, this article looks at the European Union as a crisis management actor. Sometimes progress – or the lack of it – is measured in what has not taken place. However, this article focuses on the steps taken on the military side. By taking a look at the past CSDP operations, we can identify some of the lessons identified and see how they have developed over the years. Another important factor in the development of CSDP are the institutional steps taken along the way.

Lessons Learned from CSDP military operations

In 1999, the European Council (Cologne and Helsinki) decided that the EU should have the capacity for autonomous crisis management action. At the time, the general feeling was that NATO should still remain the key actor in crisis management, or that the EU should at least rely on NATO capabilities in possible crisis management operations. No autonomous EU action was envisaged. However, reality has been somewhat different. The EU now has experience from five autonomous CSDP military operations (EUFOR Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR Chad/RCA, EUNAVFOR Atalanta, and EUTM Somalia). Only two operations have relied on NATO structures (Operation Concordia and EUFOR Althea).

It is true that CSDP military operations have been limited in size and intensity in comparison to NATO operations, such as KFOR in Kosovo and ISAF in Afghanistan. In a way, CSDP military operations can be seen as test cases for whether EU member states have the appetite to develop and contribute to CSDP. At the same time, we can see gradual progress from operation to operation, and the EU has learnt how to link CSDP military operation into comprehensive external action better.

The first autonomous CSDP military operation was EUFOR RD Congo in 2006. Before the launch of the operation, the EU crisis management structures had only been tested in table top exercises. Therefore, the operation was an important step. EUFOR RD Congo was deployed to support the UN's MONUC mission during the Congolese elections. Even though limited in size and time, the operation proved to member states and EU as an organisations that the EU is capable of conducting such operations autonomously. At the same time, the EU was able to support the UN in a concrete manner, which was politically important.

The next CSDP military operation was EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2008–2009). In comparison to the previous operation, EUFOR Tchad/RCA was a more demanding operational test. The operation was also part of a wider EU action to tackle the crisis in Darfur, which was at risk of spilling over to the neighbouring countries. In Chad and the Central African Republic, the EU was able to further develop cooperation with the UN. To facilitate humanitarian assistance in the field, EUFOR troops coordinated their deployment and actions closely with the civilian UN and EU organisations. At the end of the mandate, EU-UN cooperation continued closely when the EU handed the operation over to the UN. Some of the troop contributing nations even continued in the UN-led MINURCAT mission. In hindsight, EUFOR Tchad/RCA could have also provided an opportunity to test EU battlegroups for the first time. This, however, was still "a bridge too far", and, after a lengthy force generation, a more traditional CSDP military operation was deployed.

The latest development in the chain of CSDP operations has been EU action in the Horn of Africa. In 2007, the EU became more and more concerned about the continuing impact of piracy off the coast of Somalia. As a response, the EU launched EUNAVFOR Atalanta in 2008. Its aim, amongst others, was to protect World Food Programme (WFP) shipping that provided food aid to Somalia. As the first EU maritime operation, EUNAVFOR provided once again a good test case for the EU structures and member states' willingness to support wider EU action. From the beginning it was clear that the only way to have a lasting effect on piracy was more comprehensive action. For example, EUNAVFOR had to work together with civilians in order to ensure cooperation with the shipping industry. Cooperation with civilian organisations was also needed to ensure that the suspected pirates could be tried and convicted in the region.

New CSDP action was also planned to complement EUNAVFOR and other EU actions. EUTM Somali, the EU's first military training mission, was launched in 2010. The aim of the mission is to support Uganda and the African Union (AU) in giving basic training for the Somali security forces. Together with the AU's AMISOM mission in Somalia, the Somali security forces have been able to bring stability to Mogadishu and Somalia. It is of course clear that the two CSDP operation are only one part of a wider international and EU effort to stabilise the country. What should be noted, however, is that never before have the CSDP efforts been so well planned as a part of a wider multifaceted approach. One tool that has supported such cohesion is the EU's Strategic Framework document for the Horn of Africa region.

Institutional developments

In addition to the lessons learned from past operations, wider institutional developments also affect how CSDP evolves. Because of member states' differing views on EU integration, these two factors do not always pull in the same direction.

The Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009. It brought two important reforms to the EU's external action: an enhanced role for the High Representative, and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS). However, as often is with organisational changes, the implementation of these reforms has turned much of the attention in Brussels inwards instead of enhancing the EU's external action as some may have hoped. Merging personnel from the member states, the Council Secretariat and the European Commission into the EEAS has not been an easy task. Limited financial resources have also slowed down the start up of the EEAS. At the same time, HR Ashton has been forced to go ahead with her job with machinery that is only half done. In order to achieve the goals set in the Lisbon treaty, member states must act proactively and support the implementation process.

Underneath the wider external action umbrella, progress has been made in the reform of the CSDP structures. One example is the creation of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) in 2009. One of the most important aims of the reform was to enhance the EU's capability to plan CSDP civilian mission and military operations at the political and strategic level. The creation of the CMPD helps advance planning and the early phases of the planning process for new

operations. Having a permanent body helps accrue the institutional memory. The same mistakes are not repeated, and procedures can more easily be improved. Planners also need to understand how the EU and its structures work. This in-depth understanding can only come from years of experience.

Finding a consensus on how to enhance the EU's capability to plan and conduct military operations at the military-strategic level has proven to be much more difficult. Arguments have often been drawn from each member state's own approach to EU integration, not from operational needs. It is clear that the current ad hoc structures cannot provide the professionalism needed to plan and conduct the complex and comprehensive operations of the future. The compromises made in 1999 do not reflect today's realities. As described earlier, the EU has already conducted seven military operations out of which five have been autonomous. In future, the EU needs a permanent and autonomous capability to plan and conduct civilian mission and military operations that are linked more closely to the EU's external action.

Future operations

Each crisis is different, so finding a one-size-fits-all solution is impossible. International organisations must adapt their tools for each crisis scenario. Past experience has shown that best results can be achieved if a comprehensive set of tools is put into use.

This requires better cooperation and coordination between the key international organisations because usually they operate together. EU-NATO cooperation is closer on the field than in Brussels, but the underlying political difficulties must be solved if cooperation is to be taken deeper. The EU-UN link has been strong in all CSDP military operations, and sometimes a CSDP military operation can be the fastest and most efficient way for EU member states to support the UN. Therefore, work is underway to strengthen this link further based on the experiences gained in Chad. Out of the three partnerships, the EU-AU relation is perhaps the least developed so far. However, the case of Somalia has shown how both organisations can benefit from cooperation. The EU will continue to assist the AU to build African crisis management capabilities. It is likely that demand for this kind of support will grow in the future, as the AU is more willing to take a bigger role in solving African crises.

For the EU to be ready for the next crisis, more needs to be done to set up permanent structures for advance planning and the actual command and control of CSDP operations. Cooperation between civilian and military CSDP structures is not enough. CSDP action must be put into the context of wider EU action. This complicated task cannot be done properly by personnel who on an ad hoc basis work in structures they are not familiar with. In the long run, one permanent structure would save resources if all the different operations would be run from the same location. Currently the EU has to establish a complete new structure for each operation.

Comprehensive action does not mean that the military elements have lost their value. Therefore, the military side of the CSDP must continue to be developed. Despite the declining budgets and fatigue caused by the large-scale operations of the last decade,

member states must be ready for new military operations. EU battlegroups (EU BG) have been an important tool for member states in the transformation of their armed forces. In addition, BGs play an important role in supporting interoperability between participating states. However, in the long run, this is not enough. More has to be done so that the BGs can be used in the future if the need arises. For example, it should be completely clear to all member states how the common costs of a battlegroup operation are divided. A rapid reaction operation can be costly, and this burden should not fall only on the three to five member states who are acting on behalf of the whole union.

In addition to more traditional military operations, there might be more demand for other kinds of military action. The EU Somalia training mission can be seen as an example of this new trend. In future, the EU can be asked to support regional countries and organisations in their efforts to solve regional problems.

Conclusions

In a relatively short time, the EU has been able to develop a crisis management capability to complement its external action. Crisis management operations are only one part of this package together with diplomacy, common foreign and security policy, foreign trade, and development cooperation. Development of CSDP has taken place with this external action in mind. Therefore, of member states political will to act as a united EU has set the limits for external. At the same time it has set the limits for CSDP operations and wider development of CSDP.

Sixty years of European defence cooperation has not lead to a single European military force. Based on this experience, it is not realistic to expect this from the EU or CSDP either. However, one aspect that has changed during those sixty years is Europe's place in the world. This development has been further strengthened by the current economic crisis and the rise of emerging powers. Due to this development, many see the EU's role declining and some have even questioned the future of EU integration. Despite these challenges, there is no turning back. If the European states want to influence world politics in the future, they must act together and coherently. The 'nationalisation' of foreign policy will lead to the gradual decline of Europe.

EU Battlegroups and the future of rapid reaction

Rasmus Hindrén

Abstract

The growth of rapid reaction capabilities for crisis management is linked to the changing nature of crisis management itself. The changes have prompted a re-evaluation of the modes of cooperation and the capabilities necessary for tackling modern crises. This article outlines the short history of rapid reaction capabilities as a reply to those changes, some of the challenges facing them, and charts a course for the future.

Rapid reaction capabilities are a work in progress, developed in the interplay between different national and international actors. The issues also touch on the overall defence reforms and the need to adapt to the changing environment. Some questions remain. If rapid reaction capabilities are used inefficiently or not at all, it could trigger a backlash and questions about wasted resources, making it harder to sustain the commitment of those involved. These concerns notwithstanding, all the main arguments point to a growing importance of rapid reaction capabilities.

Interoperability is a crucial factor in crisis management, but it is also increasingly desirable because of the trend towards closer cooperation in the field of defence. Interoperability has a technical element, but consists also of joint training and established patterns for cooperation. This article argues that rapid reaction capabilities have the potential to actualise these different aspects of interoperability. A further impetus to develop rapid reaction capabilities stems from the financial pressure felt by defence establishments, forcing countries to cooperate more closely and spend smarter. Finally, large-scale crisis management operations are winding down and the appetite for new operations is dwindling. This could conceivably leave rapid response and the processes associated with it as the key drivers for interoperability. Several organisations have rapid reaction capabilities at their disposal or are currently developing them. The most important actors from the Finnish point of view are the EU and NATO. This article takes a closer look at EU Battlegroups, the experiences Finland has gained from participating in them, and what they can tell us about the future of rapid reaction, crisis management, and defence cooperation on the whole.

Introduction

The growth of rapid reaction (sometimes referred to as rapid response) capabilities for crisis management is linked to the changing nature of crisis management itself. The shift during the last twenty years from a more traditional version of peacekeeping to peace enforcement and crisis management prompted a re-evaluation of the capabilities that are necessary for tackling modern crises.

This article highlights the development of rapid reaction capabilities, portrays some of the challenges facing them, and charts a course for the future. It takes into account the changes in the overall global strategic environment and the trend towards the growing importance of rapid reaction capabilities. By exploring these trends and wider processes, the aim is to tackle not just the immediate issue of the nature and role of rapid response, but also the changing facets of crisis management and cooperation on defence issues in Europe and beyond.

The definition of rapid reaction capabilities, and by implication the angle of the article, rests on two main assumptions: that they are first and foremost to be used in crisis management and second, that crisis management operations are executed on a multilateral basis. While some countries have the means to launch operations on their own and sometimes do so, the main vehicles for crisis management are major international organisations, most notably the UN, EU, NATO and the African Union (AU).

From the multilateral nature of crisis management follows the requirement for interoperability of forces. This has become necessary, or at least desirable, in any case because of the growing interdependence and the trend towards closer cooperation in the field of defence, especially in Europe. Experiences from crisis management operations have only punctuated this need. The logical response is to make sure that the forces operating together in a given conflict situation are fully interoperable and form a coherent package. In other words, there is a need for both technical interoperability and a common understanding of what it means to work as a part of a multinational unit. Assuring technical interoperability is a long-term process and in most European countries applies to more or less all the forces, not just those taking part in international crisis management.

The rapid reaction capabilities take on an additional element in their joint training. The preparation and training period, taking up to three years, includes joint exercises that are instrumental in building a coherent whole beyond merely technical interoperability. Live exercises tend to be the most visible manifestation of this process, but the tabletop exercises and continuous joint planning also have a role to play.

The EU Battlegroup, for instance, could be characterised as a package. The term underlines the tightness and coherence of the unit that is achieved by joint training, but it also refers to their self-sufficient nature. These Battlegroups are able to operate autonomously for a given time period in a hostile environment. They have access to strategic airlift and other key enablers. The package can be tailored to suit the requirements of a given crisis situation, but in essence it is a ready-made unit capable by definition of rapid deployment. The attachment of niche capabilities marks another break from the more classical type of peacekeeping, which was heavy on infantry but usually short of enablers such as strategic or tactical lift, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Communication and Information Systems (CIS). The battlegroup structure enables not only a rapid, but also a coherent deployment. Finally the package allows for enhanced security and sustainability through advance planning and access to ISR and CIS capabilities in the theatre of operation.

Different actors in the field / The many forms of rapid reaction capabilities

There are several international or supranational organisations that have rapid reaction capabilities at their disposal or are in the process of developing them. Yet it is worth pointing out that the phenomenon itself is a relatively new one in the multilateral sphere. The NATO Response Force (NRF) declared full operational capability (FOC) in November 2006 with the EU Battlegroups following suit in January 2007. The Battlegroups and the NRF are conceptually largely similar, but there are several differences between them. The NRF, which had its concept revised in 2009, is considerably larger in size and has a role to play in all kinds of crisis management tasks that NATO might undertake, including territorial defence if necessary.

Besides EU Battlegroups and the NRF, the UN, the AU and several sub-regional organisations in Africa have also been developing their own capabilities. The progress in the UN has been somewhat stalled, partly due to its ongoing operational engagements around the world. The dynamism and enthusiasm to develop rapid response capabilities has been perhaps clearest in Africa. Donors (including Finland in East Africa) have been aiding the process both financially and with technical expertise, but much work remains to be done.

The NRF stands out in that it has actually been deployed on several occasions, albeit to non-combat operations. Elements of the NRF helped, for instance, to protect the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens and were deployed to support the Afghan presidential elections in September 2004. The NRF has also been used in disaster relief. Just as importantly, the NRF has an extensive exercise programme, instrumental in developing the interoperability of the forces. Lately the NRF exercises have become more closely linked to the NATO evaluation programmes.

The main focus in this article is on the EU Battlegroups. They are examined as EU instruments but also, to the extent possible, as representing the evolution, challenges and possibilities of the rapid reaction capabilities in general. The main reasons for focusing on the Battlegroups instead of NRF can be listed here. First, Finland has participated in four different Battlegroups since 2007 allowing for a comprehensive set of lessons identified. Moreover, as a member state, Finland has been able to follow the evolution of the Battlegroup concept, and is currently involved in the drafting of the new approach to Battlegroups. While Finland does also participate in the NRF, there is less visibility as to the way it works.

The short history of EU Battlegroups

The initial ideas for battlegroups were floated at the European Council summit in December 1999 in Helsinki. The European Council produced the Headline Goal 2003 and specified the need for a rapid response capability that members should provide in small forces at high readiness. The EU's first crisis management operation, Artemis, in 2003 showed that the EU is capable of rapid reaction and the deployment of forces on a short time scale. Its success provided a template for the future rapid reaction deployments. In 2004, a generic

Battlegroup concept was approved and the next year the first Battlegroups were pledged with associated niche capabilities. As mentioned earlier, the first Battlegroups reached full operational capability in 2007.

The decision to launch a Battlegroup operation is taken by the Council of the European Union and requires the consensus of all 27 member states. The Battlegroups are intended to be deployed on the ground within 5–10 days of the decision, and they must be sustainable for at least 30 days, which could be extended to 120 days, if resupplied. They are designed to deal with the so-called Petersberg tasks (military tasks of a humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking nature). A Battlegroup is considered to be the smallest self-sufficient military unit that can be deployed and sustained in a theatre of operation. It is composed of a battalion-sized force, approximately 1,500 troops, plus command and support services. The groups rotate every six months so that two are ready for deployment at all times. The bigger and more capable member states can contribute their own Battlegroups, while smaller members create common groups. Each group has a framework nation with operational command.

The concept has remained untouched and member states have generally been supportive of the Battlegroups – despite the growing frustration experienced in recent years. This frustration has mostly stemmed from the fact that battlegroups have never been deployed as a whole (while parts of them have been made use of in other operations). Recently, a new challenge has appeared, namely the unwillingness of member states to come up with enough offers to fill the gaps in the Battlegroup roster. The first gap in the roster was during the first semester of 2012, when only one Battlegroup was on standby. Both semesters in 2013 have gaps that are currently unfilled and it is highly likely that they will remain unfilled. The gaps do not wholly negate the Battlegroup concept, but they constitute a deviation from the stated level of ambition. Practically speaking, it is highly unlikely that the two groups on standby would need to be deployed at the same time. Nevertheless, the situation entails risks. In the end, the risk and the price to pay are mostly political, resulting in a dent in the credibility of the EU as a global security political actor. Most of all it should be a wake-up call prompting a discussion on the future of the Battlegroups.

Role and validity of EU Battlegroups

Filling the gaps in the roster and increasing the usability of the Battlegroups is a crucial task in the short to medium term. However, we should also look further in the future and try to come up with a clear plan and a renewed rationale for generating and, when the time comes, using the capabilities at our disposal.

The work should start with a look at the changing political and strategic environment. The EU is still searching for its global role and struggling to establish its External Action Service (EEAS), the establishment which was decided on in the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force in 2009. As part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the union, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has also been in a state of stagnation. It has suffered from a lack of leadership and strategic thinking. On the plus side, the member

states are committed to developing the CSDP and unanimous in their resolve to strengthen EU's global role. This means there is a readiness *in principle* to use all the instruments at the EU's disposal, including Battlegroups. More specifically, the EU's level of ambition for Battlegroups remains unchanged. The level of ambition has been enshrined in the framework documents, most notably in the revised Headline Goals and the Battlegroup concept itself. Setting a target and a commitment at political level is relatively easy. Reaching FOC was the first step in achieving the target. The real trick is maintaining the commitment and coming up with the necessary resources year after year. This has proved rather difficult with the political pressures and overall fatigue resulting from the non-use of the Battlegroups. The result is a certain disillusionment and loss of sense of purpose at both political and operative levels, making it harder to uphold the interest of the relevant actors. If, as is the case now, there is additionally a hostile financial climate to deal with, the challenges are amplified.

The way to overcome these challenges is threefold. First, the political momentum for maintaining and improving the Battlegroups must be upheld. This is crucial because in the end the deployment of battlegroups is a question of political will. The reason the Battlegroups were not deployed to Chad in 2008 or the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2009 is not because they were unsuitable to the tasks, but because the 27 member states could not find the necessary consensus.

Second, we need to keep improving the flexibility and usability of the battlegroups. This is an ongoing process with modest results so far, but the aim is for the EU's defence ministers to decide on a new conceptual approach already in November 2012. This new approach is set to introduce some technical changes, including a more modular approach to constructing a battlegroup, but also a wider and more strategic perspective in filling the roster. These suggested changes warrant a closer look and will be revisited later in the text.

Thirdly, we need to enhance the rationale for maintaining and deploying the battlegroups by clarifying the EU's strategy for external action in general, and for its crisis management tools in particular. Yet the rationale does not come from deployment only. The generation of battlegroups and their joint exercises is a multilateral effort, acting as a mechanism for increasing the interoperability of European forces. In several countries it acts as a tool for transformation. Making the battlegroup roster more predictable by introducing recurring formations and standby periods opens up opportunities to exploit this possibility for increasing interoperability in an even more structured and comprehensive way.

Sharing the burden

Virtually all EU countries are committed to contributing to the Battlegroups. For the bigger and more capable states, this means acting as a framework nation on a more or less regular basis. For the smaller states, it means contributing to formations that have an identified framework nation. Additionally each country (bar Denmark) pays its share of the common costs, which are defined in the council decision concerning the financing of EU's military crisis operations (the so-called Athena decision).

Yet there is room for improvement in the system. Even though most countries carry their fair share of the burden, there is some amount of free-riding. The gaps in the standby roster testify to this. It is the main driver behind the latest efforts by the External Action Service and the member states to mitigate the shortfalls.

The key is to solidify the roster and agree on the rotation of Battlegroups. Most likely the system will not become watertight, because the member states do not want to give unconditional warrants of their contributions in the longer future. They want to retain an element of voluntariness. This notion is especially visible now during the time of economic hardship. The details will be sorted out later this year, but it seems clear that a more structured and long-term mechanism for filling the standby roster is in the interest of sound military planning and the majority of member states willing to improve the strategic utility of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

The easiest way of achieving a more equal burden-sharing is by increasing common funding. Currently, the common funding is used for specific functions that benefit the whole operation, such as operational headquarters. The biggest costs of deploying and sustaining the Battlegroup are born by the contributing states on a costs-lie-where-they-fall basis. Increased common funding would make deployment a lot easier by making the associated costs clearer and equally distributed. It would also help advance planning, for instance by making it easier to enter into advance contracts to ensure the availability of certain enablers (such as strategic lift and real life support) where necessary. Additionally, it would ensure the necessary buy-in and political commitment of all the member states. Unfortunately, the efforts to improve common funding are opposed by a few member states for a mix of economic and political reasons.

Will these improvements take place? Probably not as such, but then again progress in the EU always tends to be incremental. So will we see a Battlegroup deployed in the coming years? It is extremely difficult to say, but the current process might take some of the urgency away from the issue of deployment. That would probably be a good thing because the deployment could then be made for the right reasons and not for salvaging a moribund concept.

Finland in the EU Battlegroups

Having looked at the way Battlegroups came to being and how they are organised at the EU level, it is worth examining the same issue from a national point of view. Starting from the political-strategic level, the first thing worth noting is the strong support given by Finland to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. The policy has been consistent since the inception of the CSDP, allowing Finland to play a constructive role in developing some of the key elements of the policy. It has also meant a strong commitment to the Battlegroup concept. This has been noted in all the key national framework documents and is expected to be confirmed yet again in the White Paper on security and defence policy due to be released by the end of this year.

Finland has now experience from three different Battlegroups. That experience, including the lessons identified at different levels, gives a good opportunity to look at the basic principles for the Finnish participation.

Thus far, Finland has relied on a system based on recruiting the whole Finnish contingent in advance and keeping them on the payroll during the final preparations and training, and then through the actual standby period. It has been an effective way of ensuring the commitment of the personnel, some of whom are permanently employed by the Finnish Defence Forces while others are from the Reserve and have civilian day jobs. There have been some challenges as well, including the high costs and cumbersome bureaucracy associated with the system.

In the near future, options to improve the national system will be explored, partly because of increasing financial pressures. A perfectly balanced solution might not be easy to find, but the principles for organising the rapid response capabilities should be clarified in the process. Resource implications matter, but a coherent and forward-looking policy must be based on more than just that.

Principles to guide future work

The principles should take into account the fact that international defence cooperation is becoming the norm instead of an exception. Multinational formations are becoming more frequent and should be built on a more solid basis, for instance by using recurrent formations for generating the standby battlegroups.

Multinational solutions must be pursued because of the dire economic situation that negatively affects the defence capabilities of all European states, but also because it allows for a smarter use of existing and sometimes diminishing capabilities. It also reflects the ongoing integration and growing interdependence among our reference groups. For the Finnish Defence Forces, this means integrating the international cooperation even more fully in the planning and capability development processes.

The planning – and subsequent implementation – should be based on a strategy spanning several decades into the future. This gives strategic planners room to manoeuvre and helps to prevent any surprises emanating from changes in governmental policy. It should also be helpful in letting the culture of cooperation take root.

Following the logic of these principles, we can deduce another principle: interoperability must be a goal everywhere all the time. Until now the major part of this work has been done in actual operations, most notably ISAF. With ISAF winding down in the coming years and with a considerably diminished appetite for large-scale crisis management operations for the international organisations, rapid response becomes the key driver for interoperability. The Battlegroups or the NRF are not necessarily deployed in actual operations, but the benefits of participating and cooperating are there to be harvested nonetheless. The lull in operational tempo might not last for long, but in the meanwhile we need to integrate, interoperate, and

be prepared. Looking ahead to 2020, developing rapid response and participating in standby forces looks to be the most practical way of achieving this.

Conclusions

The EU Battlegroups are representative of rapid reaction capabilities in general, both in their good and bad characteristics. They suffer from intermittent lapses in political commitment, which may result in systemic problems, and they have not yet shown their full potential in operative action. On the other hand, they are an example of multilateral cooperation that can be beneficial to all participants. They can drive forward the transformation of the defence forces and help in creating spearhead capabilities. Financially speaking, their value for money has sometimes been and can still be questioned. Yet in the longer term, and especially through more permanent cooperation, they can be an example of smarter defence spending and capability development.

The coming years will very likely see an incremental growth in the importance of rapid reaction capabilities. Paradoxically, it does not necessarily mean that they will be used effectively or, indeed, at all. Instead it will be the result of wider changes in the strategic environment. To recap the main points raised earlier, these wider changes will be: the financial crisis, deepening defence cooperation, and a wariness towards large-scale crisis management operations. The effect of the financial crisis is for the most part indirect and it can be understood as a driver behind the two other trends.

The financial crisis has nudged multilateral defence cooperation forward. Cooperation is not a new thing, but it is increasingly necessary and is gaining political momentum, especially in Europe. There are inherent risks in this process, given the traditional role of defence policy in most societies. The process should be manageable and coherent, which requires some basic rules for the cooperation but also some prime examples. In this, the rapid reaction capabilities have another role to play.

Fiscal concerns are also one of the reasons behind the current trend of scaling down major military crisis management operations. The trend has so far been accompanied by a diminishing appetite for new operations. If there are no operations, rapid reaction formations and their training might become key drivers for interoperability and serve as examples of forces capable of tackling the crises of the 21st century.

SECTION THREE – Military Crisis Management

Participating in a UN peacekeeping operation

Matti Lampinen

Abstract

The article reviews the experiences that were gathered during Finland's participation in the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) operation in Lebanon. The article discusses the most important procedures prior to and during the operation. The narrative is presented through the UN procedures that must be followed when participating in a UN operation. Finally, the article discusses the procedures that will lead to a high-quality outcome. The discussion is mainly limited to the Defence Command and general staff level, but it will also refer to issues that might be of equal interest to individual Services.

1 Standing point, starting point

1.1 Standing point

When Finland participates in a crisis management mission, its participation is always based on a decision made by the President of the Republic of Finland. In each case, the Defence Forces carry out this decision using the capabilities that are best fitted for the task at hand. Prior to the mission that this article discusses, Finland had participated in a UN mission between 2006 and 2007 when it sent a pioneer company to the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) mission. Since 2007 the main focus in military crisis management has been on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan. This has changed the Finnish military crisis management culture in many ways. The environment and operational procedures are different in the NATO operation in Afghanistan when compared, for example, to an UN mission, such as UNIFIL.

When considering the upper levels of operations, the greatest differences occurred with the procedures when the decision about deployment was being made, and when the principles of reimbursement were agreed upon. Participating in a UN operation requires very detailed agreements with the UN. Sending troops to a NATO operation is a more flexible procedure. For example, in a NATO mission the unit structures and their capabilities can be shaped to be different in a shorter time span.

Another significant difference is the division of costs and how they are shared between the parties involved. In a UN operation, the troop contributing country will receive reimbursements based on the number of troops, equipment, and services that the country will provide. The reimbursement is determined according to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). In addition to more general issues, the MoU describes all the matters that impact on the amount of reimbursement. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland is responsible for preparation of the MoU, but the Finnish Defence Forces have a significant role when the content of the MoU is being drafted. This is true in particular with regard to the issues that

fall under the UN reimbursement principles. From a combat technical point of view, UN and NATO operations do not vary significantly. Of course, in an UN operation the ruling circumstances must be taken into consideration, as in UN operation peacekeepers seldom engage with hostile elements. This particular aspect causes some slight differences when operating in the field.

In the spring of 2012, the decision to participate in a UN operation forced us to remind ourselves about the issues that must be considered when participating in a UN operation. The purpose of this article is to bring up some of the experiences that Finland encountered when it decided to deploy an infantry company to a UNIFIL operation in Lebanon as part of an Irish battalion. The purpose is not to go into great detail, but rather bring up some of the most central issues that were important during the process, in particular from the point of view of the general staff. This article does not discuss the establishing, equipping, or training of the Finnish contingency, nor does it discuss the operational activities of the Finnish contingency. These aspects have been left out because they have been executed in the same manner as they would have been executed when participating in any other operation. The final section of this article sums up the most central lessons learned during the process.

1.2 The starting point

In early 2011, the UN requested Ireland participate in the UNIFIL operation with a mechanised battalion with a maximum strength of 500 soldiers. The battalion was to be deployed to the northeastern corner of the area of responsibility to execute the tasks of the UNIFIL operation. The UN Security Council Resolution 1701 defines these tasks as follows:

- Supervise ending of all hostilities.
- Give support to the Lebanon's Armed Forces'(ALF) relocation to southern Lebanon.
- Coordinate activities between the Government of Lebanon (GoL) and Israel, and by this ensure that humanitarian aid will reach its destination and that dislocated people can safely return to their homes.
- Assist the ALF in being the sole organised armed force and the sole authority to carry weapons (excluding UNIFIL) in the area between the River Litani and Blue line[1].

Ireland heard the call, and decided to deploy a battalion with a strength of 440 soldiers to southern Lebanon. During this process it was suggested that Finland would contribute a contingency as part of this battalion.

In 16 December 2011, the President of Finland decided that Finland would participate in the UNIFIL operation with an infantry company strengthened with some support elements. The maximum troop strength was set to be 200 soldiers. This participation started in May 2012 and the main force arrived to the area of operation on 18 May 2012.

The battalion (Irishbatt) is deployed in the Sector West, which also holds battalions from Malaysia, Ghana, Italy, and South Korea. Required support and command elements are also stationed in this sector. The mission of the Iris-Finnish battalion is the following:

[1] The Blue Line is a border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel published by the United Nations on 7 June 2000 for the purposes of determining whether Israel had fully withdrawn from Lebanon.

"IAW UNSCR 1701, Irishbatt monitors the cessation of hostilities within its assigned sector paying particular attention to the Blue Line and sensitive areas. Irishbatt, in the conduct of its operations, assists the GoL, and the LAF, to extend the full authority of GoL, iot maintain a SASE and assist in the creation of the required conditions to hand over the security responsibility in the south of Lebanon to the LAF".[2]

The image below describes the Irishbatt's area of responsibility in the spring of 2012.

Area of responsibility of Irisbatt

2. Procedures prior the achievement of operational capability

In retrospect, it can be said that planning must start early, at latest roughly a year and a half before the start of the operation. The processes that are significant to participation are described below.

On 24 October 2010, Finland received an official letter from the UN that welcomed Ireland to participate in the UNIFIL operation with a mechanised infantry battalion and a maximum troop strength of 500 soldiers. The deployment was to take effect in the first half of 2011. In the same letter, the secretary invited Finland to be part of the Irish battalion.

[2] Quote from *Irishbatt Concept of Operations*

On 21 December 2011, Finland informed the UN that it would participate in the UNIFIL operation as part of the already deployed Irishbatt with an infantry company of 200 soldiers maximum.

On 30 March 2012, Finland received an official announcement from the UN where it was given a status of Troop Contribution Country (TCC). In the same letter, Finnish participation with an infantry company was approved. Finland was to join the Irish mechanised infantry battalion. The same letter included a request from Finland to provide a detailed deployment plan. The letter also requested Ireland to provide a withdrawal plan. The deadline for these plans was set for 13 April 2012.

On 12 April 2012, Finland sent its reply regarding the plan for deployment. The plan described the schedule for transporting personnel and materiel, and for reaching operational readiness. According to the plan, partial operational capability was set to be reached by 18 May, and full operational capability on 1 June. The exact number of peacekeepers was set to be 177. Finland also announced that it will deploy the troops into the area according to the procedures defined in the Letter of Assistance (LoA). This meant that Finland would execute the deployment independently and that it would present a proposal for reimbursement to the UN. The UN then would compare the proposal to its own calculations and present an amount that would be reimbursed.

Between 17 and 18 April, the Finnish delegation took part in the MoU negotiations in the UN. In connection to this, it is good to tell more about these negotiations, as they were vital in the process. In the first meeting between Finland, Ireland, and the UN, it was agreed that the actual MoU negotiation would be held after an understanding had been reached about the equipment that would be compensated to Finland, and what equipment Ireland would reciprocally withdraw. From the onset, equipment should match by quantity. In the same connection, Finland presented its situation regarding the deployment. At that moment, the materiel was being shipped, and the training of the personnel was ongoing. The UN representatives proposed that the costs associated with the deployment would not be accepted in the reimbursement agreement, because the deployment was considered a “battalion rotation” regarding one company.

It should be noted that the composition of the unit must be based on the *force requirements* formulated to serve the UN’s, and in particular Ireland’s, needs regarding its mechanised battalion. At this point, the official signatures to confirm this were still missing. However, as a result of the negotiations, the situational awareness was clarified from behalf of both parties.

Next in turn was a video conference with the UNFIL Headquarters. The conference aimed to reach an understanding regarding the deployment plan and the materiel that would be brought along from Finland to the area of operation. One particular topic was the “excess” national materiel that Finland was planning to bring along. The UNFIL HQ thought this materiel would potentially strain UNIFIL’s supply system. As a result of the conference, both parties brought their situational awareness to the same level regarding the situation in Lebanon. On UNIFIL’s behalf it was stated that all the support activities required by the deployment would be followed through in good understanding with Finland.

Finally the actual MoU negotiations were set to start. During these negotiations Finland was able to present the most important materiel that it would want to include in the terms of reference of the reimbursement agreement.

In addition to the conferences and MoU negotiations, the Army of the Finnish Defence Forces organised several meetings with Ireland during 2012. These meetings were about the execution of the mission, MoU negotiations, and other technical arrangements. In addition, a reconnaissance and preparation mission was undertaken during which the head of the operation and other key personnel from UNIFIL were met by Finnish representatives.

3. Procedures during the operational activity

During the actual operational stage, the UN goes through different inspections that have an effect on the amount of reimbursements. These inspections define the basis for compensation for each participating country.

The inspections go in the following order. When a contingent has arrived and achieved its full operational readiness, it will go through an *arrival inspection*, where the personnel and materiel declared in the MoU are compared to the reality on the ground. After arrival, the contingent will also be subjected to an *operational readiness* inspection that checks that the equipment is fully operational.

In this particular case, the Finnish Army Command inspected the full operative readiness of the Finnish contingency. The national inspection was followed by a UN inspection regarding operative readiness. After these two inspections, the contingency must inform the UN about the condition of its operative materiel on a monthly basis. Based on this information, the UN will reimburse the troop contributing country.

When the contingent is being relieved from its duty, it will go through a *repatriation inspection*. This is when final confirmation is given regarding what materiel (from the most crucial parts) will be repatriated.

4. Lessons learned

The planning for the operation must start well ahead before the scheduled start of the mission. In this case, it started about a year and half before participation.

If the participation is done jointly with another state, the aim should be that both of these states execute the operation together from the very beginning. Alternatively, Finland should aim to reach the status of leading nation. In this case, Finland joined in half way, and this caused complications along the way.

An active approach should be adopted in the planning process. The first priority should be to contact the UN, which can provide information on exactly what kind of unit UNIFIL would require at the moment. This information forms the groundwork on which to start

building participation, after which negotiations with the leading nation (in this case Ireland) can really begin. Communication with the leading nation should start as early as possible. This paves the way for a common understanding between all the parties involved (in this case Finland, Ireland, and the UN). After the lines of communication have been established, the materiel and personnel requirements must be determined according to the *force requirements* provided by the UN and the leading nation.

After the UN has provided the *Troop Contributing Country* confirmation, MoU negotiations must be initiated. This is where the schedule for deployment is agreed upon together with the operational HQ of UNIFIL.

Deployment should be prepared according to anticipated needs. Nonetheless, the guidelines given by the UN must be taken into consideration. In this case, the preparations were made in an excellent manner. However the start of the deployment process was based on a verbal acceptance of the plans by the UN. This happened because time did not allow for waiting of the official written decision.

In the MoU negotiations it is good to have representatives from the Defence Command, Army Command (detailed knowledge regarding the preparations), Pori Brigade (knowledge regarding the UN reimbursement procedures), and from logistics. The members of the delegation must have prior experience from UN operations, and the commander of the delegation must, at minimum, hold the rank of lieutenant colonel.

The image below gives an example that sums up the necessary procedures when participating in an UN operation. It presents the actions taken by the Defence and Army Commands, and the other participating country, Ireland. This example is based on the assumption that full operational readiness will be reached in December 2012.

SCHEDULE FOR EXECUTION AND PROCEDURES – An example



Every operation will give additional knowledge for the defence of Finland. Naturally, the soldiers involved in the operation will expand their set of skills. Furthermore, more knowledge is acquired about the equipment that is used in the operation. This information can be used to further develop the actual materiel itself, or expand the number of uses a particular materiel may have.

When participating in a crisis management operation, the planning must also take into consideration the *comprehensive approach*. This means that the needs of both civilian and military crisis management are taken into consideration. On a theoretical level, this ought to be a relatively uncomplicated task. However, once dealing at the national level of preparing for a crisis management operation, combining the civilian and military approaches is often challenging because both sectors have their own objectives. So, as desirable as the comprehensive approach would be at a national level, it is precisely at the national level that it is hardest to put into practice. A study into the effectiveness of the comprehensive approach is currently being carried out, and it is hoped that this study will enhance the comprehensive approach at a national level.

International cooperation and crisis management operations strengthen national capability development

Mikael Salo

Abstract

Finland has improved its military capability development by integrating NATO interoperability standards, the European Union's (EU) pooling and sharing initiatives, the European Defence Agency's (EDA) research and development programs, Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) programs, and the training and evaluation of national crisis management units into a coherent national plan. National capability programs, international cooperation on capability development, and the actual use of forces in crisis management operations constitute an entity that is assessed as a whole in the national planning and decision making processes.

This article (a) depicts the structure of the Joint Capability Development Program, (b) describes the rationale of international military cooperation, and (c) points out purposes for developing capabilities for the national crisis management pool of units. In basic terms, interconnections of these three features are as follows: (a) the national capability development program utilizes the lessons learned in international operations and the products of international cooperation among NATO, EU, and Nordic states, (b) international military cooperation produces practical solutions for its two "clients": national capability development programs and international crisis management operations, and finally, (c) the standards for training and evaluating the units that are selected for the national crisis management pool of forces constitute standards and the end state for the capability development.

Introduction

The Government Security and Defence Policy Reports and strategies of the Ministry of Defence formulate guidelines for the development of the Finnish Defence Forces in the future. Coherent political guidelines and a carefully conducted strategic planning process enable the Finnish Defence Forces to build up a significant defence capability despite short-term changes in resources.

In the foreseeable future, there will be a need to retain broad and versatile defence capabilities for national and international purposes. Defence capabilities are developed in a manner that enables their flexible use in the execution of all Defence Forces' tasks: national defence, support given to other governmental authorities, and participation in international crisis management operations. The fundamental goal is to ensure the development of key capabilities to make it unbeneficial for an aggressor to use military force against Finland and, if necessary, to force back an armed attack. At the same time, developed capabilities ensure the fulfilment of the other tasks of the Defence Forces.

Finland has faced financial challenges that also affect the defence budget in the coming years. The cuts to the defence budget affect both the level of operational activities and the development of military capabilities. Operating costs are balanced until 2015 by regulating field training for conscripts, refresher exercises for reservists, Air Force flight hours and Navy training days at sea according to the financial situation. Some of the acquisition programs have been postponed and reductions in resources also influence the number of international activities.

Currently, one of the most important challenges for the Defence Forces is to bring their size, activities and tasks into balance with funding. The Defence Forces will proactively solve the problem by conducting a structural reform by the year of 2015. The reform will ensure that the Defence Forces are able to fulfil their tasks, to maintain efficient general conscription, and to develop Finland's military defence capabilities into the 2020s on the basis of national defence.

General conscription will continue to form the personnel basis also in the future. The strong willingness to take part in national defence, the functional conscription system, and the high percentage of males who fulfil their compulsory military service produce a wide pool of motivated people and let the Defence Forces select the most skilled individuals for the tasks. Conscription also supports participation in international crisis management operations by creating a pool of reservists with a wide range of civilian skills.

Joint capability development program directs the capability development of the Defence Forces

The long-term development of the Finnish Defence Forces is a controlled process that is assessed every four years. Strategic planning weighs up national and international security threats, available and required national and military capabilities, and the future resources of the Defence Forces. As a result, the Joint Capability Development Program of the Finnish Defence Forces provides an analysis and a plan for a long-term development in national military capabilities.

The Joint Capability Development Program formulates the key capabilities and their development for the next twelve years. It presents a strategy for the main acquisition programs and projects and highlights their possible consequences. In addition, the program takes into account the international development in military technology and operational concepts for fulfilling the requirements of interoperability between strategic partners.

In the program, the development priorities for the three Services are allocated in four-year implementation sequences: during 2013–2016 the main focus will be on the development of the Army’s territorial forces, during 2017–2020 on the Army’s manoeuvre forces, and during 2020–2024 on maritime defence. The document consists of detailed plans for land, maritime, air, and joint capabilities.

Land Defence. The Finnish Army is responsible for the land defence of the country and the conduct of land force operations associated with international crisis management. During

the next eight years, the focus of materiel development is on the Army's territorial and manoeuvre forces in order to improve their tactics and modular structures and to procure firepower, mobility, and protection. In addition, the Army updates intelligence and command systems and procures replacements for anti-personal mines and outdated capabilities. In all, the program maintains the operational capability of the forces for the next decade and develops high-quality, deployable, interoperable operational forces.

Picture 1: The Army develops the firepower, mobility, and protection for to be used on land.

The Army may contribute to an international crisis management operation by setting up a mechanized infantry battalion, a combat engineer unit, a Field HUMINT team, a deployable CBRN laboratory, and an EOD/IEDD detachment. In addition, the Army is responsible for training the majority of joint capability units that are planned for crisis management operations such as a transport helicopter detachment and a special operations task group. As a relatively new area of capabilities, the Defence Forces educate and deploy observers, advisors, and instructors for conflict prevention, peace process support and post-conflict management in order to support to local security structures and authorities in conflict areas. In principle, the above mentioned units are capable of participating in any type of crisis management operation.

Maritime Defence. The Navy sustains and develops capabilities of surveillance, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and anti-surface warfare (ASUW) that are capable in archipelago and open sea conditions as well as in crisis management operations. The Navy enhances capabilities to protect sea lines of communication by obtaining three new minehunter vessels (Katanpää class), improving C4I systems, procuring mine warfare capabilities, and developing mobile

coastal defence forces to full operational capability. In all, the focus of maritime defence will be on the development of capabilities to protect Finnish shipping routes. In terms of international operations, the possible contributions by the Navy are a light anti-surface warfare vessel (e.g. Minelayer Pohjanmaa) or command ship task unit, an amphibious task unit, a navy boarding team, and a coastal minehunter.

Picture 2: The Navy protects the sea lines of communication.

Air Defence. The Air Force protects and defends national airspace through continuous air surveillance and maintenance of air defence capabilities. In addition, the Air Force supports joint warfare by developing precision air-to-ground capabilities. The on-going or forthcoming improvements focus on the development of air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities in the course of the F/A-18 fighters' second mid-life update project. The mid-life update improves the fleet's situational awareness, short-range interceptor capability and multinational interoperability. In addition, air defence is developed in terms of air surveillance, airbase logistics, aircraft maintenance, medical, damage repair, and CBRN capabilities. In addition to this, one of the largest procurement projects will be conducted to develop the ground-based air defence. For international crisis management tasks, the Air Force is ready to deploy a F/A-18 Hornet squadron.

Picture 3: The jet training aircraft (Hawk) fleet is just being upgraded, enabling its continued use for the next 15 to 20 years.

Joint Capabilities. Finland's future defence is built on a balanced development of the whole defence system, where all services (Army, Navy and Air Force) as well as our joint capabilities (C^4, ISTAR, Joint Effects, Logistics) constitute a functional system. The combination of all these capabilities comprises an operational tool for future requirements. In terms of capabilities, the focus will be more on developing systems that are capable of joint effect-based operations.

Joint C4ISR provides common information management, information services and operational data storage as well as integrates reconnaissance and surveillance sensors and C4 systems. The joint system connects sensors, weapon systems and decision making processes to support network-enabled defence. A nationwide communication, reconnaissance and intelligence network improves effectiveness through joint data transfer, processing, and information management and serves as the basis for a future interagency system for all Finnish security authorities. In order to support the command of the Defence Forces' troops, the program emphasizes the development of mobile, integrated and deployable command and control capabilities. Even some of the tactical communication systems created are interoperable in order to support their use in international operations. Interoperability is further improved through exercises and training with international partners.

The Defence Forces develop a flexible logistics system that is capable of supporting all services of the Finnish Defence Forces in all situations. The development of logistics produces modular, deployable and sustainable national support assets and systems that can be integrated into multinational formations, for example in crisis management operations. The procurement program consists of a wide range of capabilities and assets, such as plans for transportation vehicles, maintenance, ammunition, supply chain management, logistics situational awareness, medical cooperation, host nation support, and local contracts for services. In addition, the program concludes the NH-90 procurement in order to reach full operational capability for the helicopter battalion. On the other hand, the Joint Effects program increases the effective engagement range of the existing Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), procures precision ammunition for the artillery, and develops the Air Force's air-to-ground capabilities, and improves the capabilities of the Special Forces.

International cooperation is one of the key venues to develop defence capabilities

National operational capabilities are further developed in projects of the European Defence Agency (EDA), through Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), and in the NATO Partnership for Peace program. In the future, Finnish defence capabilities will be more closely integrated with the capability requirements of NATO, the EU and NORDEFCO in order to optimize cost-efficiency and interoperability and to synchronize efforts with EU and Nordic initiatives for pooling and sharing.

Finland protects its national interests through international cooperation and active participation in strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union, through Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and the NATO Partnership for Peace program. In the future, Finnish defence capabilities will be more closely integrated with EU and NORDEFCO requirements in order to optimize cost-efficiency and interoperability and to synchronize efforts with the EU and Nordic initiatives for pooling and sharing.

European Union. Finland actively contributes to capability development for the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Practical examples of military capability development include pooling and sharing initiatives and programs and projects of the European Defence Agency (EDA). Finland has taken part in e.g. the EDA's ESSOR (European Secure Software Radio) and multinational COALWNW (Coalition Wideband Networking Waveform) programs. As lead nation, Finland has successfully contributed to the Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) project. Such practical contributions concretely demonstrate national commitment to do one's share for European solidarity and security.

Nordic Defence Cooperation. According to the Government Security and Defence Policy Report of 2009, the promotion of security and stability in Northern Europe is a key goal of Finland's security and defence policy. This is why Finland emphasizes the importance of bilateral and multinational military cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic countries. Because Nordic countries have much in common in terms of capability requirements and practical solutions, military cooperation has the potential to produce better capabilities in a more cost-effective way.

The cooperation within NORDEFCO is aimed at a comprehensive, enhanced and long-term approach to develop Members' national defence systems and their ability to act jointly. Cooperation focuses on increasing the quality and operational effectiveness of the armed forces, finding cost-effective, common or shared solutions to acquire capabilities for the national armed forces, and improving interoperability within existing standards.

Military cooperation within the framework of NORDEFCO is a pragmatic approach that aims to join forces in research, development, shared production, common maintenance, and quality assurance in order to enhance national defence capabilities. As an example, the following practical achievements are obtained within Nordic cooperation:

- combined joint Nordic exercises and common plans for their execution,

- a mechanism to follow up on capability studies and to analyze capability gaps within the armed forces,
- utilization of common procurement possibilities and materiel development,
- common Nordic courses and exercises,
- strategic studies, for example on international trends, and common concepts,
- comparative screening of national acquisition plans and cooperation,
- shared naval studies and projects with sufficient exercises,
- cross-border training between air forces,
- shared air surveillance,
- established Nordic cooperation on veteran issues,
- a Centre for Gender in Military Operations, and
- cooperation in crisis management operations and their planning.

An exchange of experience regarding military doctrines and concepts and the main findings and studies conducted within the NORDEFCO framework facilitate military strategic planning nationally and among the Nordic countries. In addition, cooperation in training and exercises organized through the Combined Joint Nordic Exercise plan and an exchange of students and instructors between Nordic countries tells of the strength of educational cooperation between the NORDEFCO countries.

NATO Partnership Program. Finland has participated in international peace and security cooperation through the NATO's Partnership for Peace program for almost two decades. In addition, the Defence Forces have successfully contributed to several NATO missions and exercises. the Defence Forces use NATO's Planning and Review Process (PARP) and Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) to enhance the quality and operational effectiveness of the crisis management pool of forces. The Partnership Goals agreed in PARP are matched with national capability development in order to ensure the cost-effectiveness of training and acquisition of new capabilities based on the same principles and standards.

In addition to cooperation with above mentioned organizations, Finland has bilateral arrangements with other countries, such as a Foreign Military Sale (FMS) contract with the United States Government. In general, bilateral contracts enable strategic partnership through shared training, acquisition programs, and shared experiences in operations significantly benefit the development of the Defence Forces.

National crisis management pool of forces – Versatile, deployable, and interoperable capabilities

The Finnish Defence Forces develop high-quality crisis management capabilities for EU, NATO, UN and OSCE-led operations. By doing so, Finland is able to (a) fulfil its responsibilities as a western nation by taking part in international burden sharing for securing peace and human rights globally, (b) show readiness and willingness to provide mutual assistance to its partners, (c) support the development of national defence capabilities and their interoperability, and (d) train its military cadre and reservists to handle demanding operational planning and tasks. In all, the participation and its preparations contribute to the development of national defence capabilities.

A vast majority (95%) of Finnish defence expenditure is used for national defence, and less than five percent is used for international activities. The interoperable capabilities are further improved for use in different crisis management operations abroad.

Picture 4: The Finnish Defence Forces develops one set of capabilities for all its tasks

The national pool of forces for crisis management tasks consists of capabilities of all three Services. All selected units undergo a NATO evaluation process, under the OCC Evaluation and Feedback programme. For example, the F/A-18 fighter squadron, CBRN laboratory, SOF unit, light anti-surface warfare vessel, and a boarding team have already been successfully evaluated at NATO Evaluation Level (NEL) 2. This means that the units have been evaluated in accordance with NATO evaluation programmes (CREVAL, TACEVAL, MAREVAL or SOFEVAL).

Finland participates in several programs that support the deployment of the selected forces. For example, the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) program, the Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) and the Air Transport & Air Refuelling Exchange of Services (ATARES) initiative facilitates logistic capabilities for crisis management operations. The Finnish Movement Coordination Centre (FINMCC) coordinates transportation operations and the shared use of assets with other nations and conducts Receipt, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) arrangements.

All things considered, there are potential benefits in designating the units available for the national crisis management pool: (a) it clarifies strategic decision making by defining the available capabilities in forthcoming operations in the four year period, (b) it secures a long-lasting capability development in order to make sure that the selected units are procured, trained, and evaluated accordingly before deployment, (c) it makes cooperation more

straightforward when also the partners are aware of the capabilities that Finland is able to offer for multinational operations.

Conclusions

Finland develops its military capabilities in order to provide a more rapid and effective response to any conflict. The integration of the strategic Joint Capability Development Program, capability cooperation with partners, and the selected capabilities in the crisis management pool provide operationally effective and straightforward direction and force structure for the development of the Defence Forces. As a result, Finland produces a single set of modular, deployable, and interoperable forces capable of national defence as well as of multinational operations. Correspondingly, Finland receives valuable lessons learned information and experiences from international cooperation and missions that are then incorporated in national development work.

Nationally, the cornerstones of future defence are a strong national defence will, effective conscription system, high-quality personnel, a close connection to and cooperation with society and reservists, as well as international cooperation with partners. Being able to defend Finland requires a balanced defence system where land, maritime and air defence and joint capabilities produce a sufficient national capacity for preventing the emergence of crisis situations and their escalation to the use of armed forces. Defence capabilities are built on national premises and are tailored for the conditions of Finland. At the same time, selected parts of the operational forces are developed to be more flexible with a higher degree of availability for national and international operations.

The reform of the Defence Forces ensures that Finland is capable of developing its defence towards a balanced defence system in the future. The aim of the reform is to build a structure that better meets the demands of our future tasks and resources. During the next years, the Finnish Defence Forces adjust their operational functions and acquisition programs to the challenging resource situation in order to support a functioning process for the reform.

One of the main achievements in the last strategic planning process cycle is the integration of national defence capability planning, the requirements of crisis management operations, the capability requirements of our selected NATO Partnership Goals, and the development programs of NORDEFCO. Such integration supports comprehensive planning for developing military capabilities. In the planning process, materiel, financial, and personnel resources for crisis management operations are secured in several ways. The Joint Capability Development Program integrates national programs and international cooperation within a coherent structure. The defence budget has allocated a relatively fixed sum for international crisis management operations that is spared from possible budget cuts. Finally, the national crisis management pool assigns the necessary forces and capabilities for the procurement, training, and evaluation process in order to assure their systematic long-term development.

International capability development has made notable progress during the last decade. However, there are still some national and international challenges to overcome before common development and pooling and sharing are standard procedures among EU members

and NATO PfP states. The European states seem to continue to focus on developing their own core military capabilities. Preconditions for pooling and sharing are trust between states and willingness to share the development responsibilities and resources in order to be more effective together. Currently, this not the state of the issue – member states persistently sustain their national approaches to capability development without sharing their capabilities. Moreover, the member states are reluctant to begin common procurement projects based on the same standards. Perhaps this is partly due to national military industry, the interests of which are also supported through the capability development process, and the fact that because of competition every nation is bound to support its own industry. In addition, NATO and the EU have many similar programs and objectives in which prolonged participation becomes time-consuming and ineffective for the members. There should be more pragmatic solutions for creating a system where these two organizations do not compete but rather complement one another, and where, for example, European NATO members and non-NATO members have a clear and shared vision of how their cooperation will benefit each other.

Similarly, there are some national obstacles for effective international cooperation. First of all, the national pool of units should be utilized more effectively. A selected, produced, trained, and evaluated unit should be also deployed as an intact unit to an operation. There should be two or more options for how each unit is assigned to a crisis management operation and one of them should be executed during the four year period when the unit is in the pool. Such continuity from development to operations would make both planning and decision-making processes more effective. Moreover, there are details in every phase of the development process that could be improved. For example, sustained crisis management funding and better terms of service contracts and benefits would upgrade the current resources and recruitment policies that ultimately affect the quality and number of crisis management units.

In the end, there are several positive reasons why international defence cooperation supports the capacity and credibility of the Finnish Defence Forces. In practice, international cooperation allows the Finnish Defence Forces to develop its capabilities with partners and to deploy units to international operations with greater effect. Logistics training and exercises in operations create the capacity to provide international assistance. Through cross-border training, the Air Force develops its capabilities efficiently on a regular basis. International defence materiel cooperation guarantees military security of supply and the availability of tested, up-to-date materiel with low life cycle costs. As a result, cooperating states can unite their limited economic resources for the purpose of cost-effective acquisition. International cooperation involves exercises together, common planning of acquisition initiatives, and development of system commonalities between nations that support the development of high-quality units. Moreover, participation in crisis management operations provide military personnel with necessary experiences of planning, training, and conducting demanding operations and offer the Defence Forces valuable lessons learned information that is then utilized for developing the national defence system.

Producing situational awareness for crisis management operations in a changing operational environment

Niko Pihamaa

Abstract

This article discusses the procedures and models based on which situational awareness is produced for military crisis management operations. It aims to probe those principles that allow situational awareness to be produced in the operation in order to form the basis for decision making at national level. The article seeks to present a new model for procedures. The model is a multi-faceted system where people, information systems, information, regulations and orders are dependent on each other. To develop this, a dialogue is required with the community that produces the situational awareness. Disruptions and interferences in the present system must also be located. It has been observed that that commanding crisis management troops in challenging conditions is made more challenging by the additional pressure caused by requests for information from the command at home. The model that the article presents is streamlined and transparent. It enables the open, rapid and more accurate flow of information to the home country. The new model removes the overlaps and focuses on knowhow and personnel resources. By developing this model, the ever greater challenges faced in communicating information can be met.

Decisions are made based on situational awareness

Finland participates in international crisis management in demanding conditions and security concerns are challenging. Changes in the operational environment create challenges for the command at national level. Based on situational awareness, the decision makers form a picture of the situation at hand, and simultaneously form an understanding of the overall direction of the operation.



Image 1. We need information to support national decision making.

The decision making at national level must be initiated and maintained with the help of situational awareness. This is a challenge that faces not only the Defence Forces, but also crisis management comprehensively. For this reason, many different government authorities have understood the importance of situational awareness. The general principle is that when crises are managed, decision makers must receive the best possible overall picture in the shortest time possible, so that decisions can be made. For reaching wider, national level situational awareness, common evaluation criteria are needed. Situational awareness is created from parts that are: short description of the overall situation, the most central parties in the crisis and their backgrounds, an estimate of the impact of the crisis at national and international level, key external parties, how the situation is handled at international level, the interests and objectives of the international community and Finland and finally the means available for affecting or limiting the situation. The above mentioned aspects are related to the observation of the evolution of the operation. In addition to this information, the Defence Forces and civilian crisis management components require situational awareness, which must provide an almost a real time situational image of the events that are taking place in the operation area.

Does the current model answer to the needs produced by changes in the operational environment?

Working in a multicultural community and the constant changes that take place in the operational environment create challenges for the command of the operation at national level. The rapidly changing security situation draws the attention of the media to the operations. This race with the media has caused pressure to speed up the flow of information also inside the Defence Forces. It has also led to a situation where the high command of the Defence Forces have the need for knowledge of even the smallest abnormalities that take place in the operation area.

The content of information is also connected to the control of information. Present operations have introduced a new element to crisis management where the parties of the conflict aim to influence outside observers through the media, and through this the support peacekeepers enjoy at home. The objective is to make the citizens of the troop contributing country demand that the peacekeepers are withdrawn from the conflict area. Cooperation with the media and situational awareness have become more important for domestic authorities and decision makers when managing crises.

Image 2. Multicultural community and changes in the operational environment create challenges for the national command in the home country.

It should then be asked: what information is relevant for decision making? At the same time as the amount of available information grows, our personal and professional survival depends largely on our ability to handle information. This evolution must become visible also within the organisation of the Defence Forces. Jussi T. Koski, who has a PhD in pedagogy and is an expert on creativity, innovation management and development, has observed a phenomenon that is found in particular among people who handle large quantities of information. Koski argues that if information does not become structured, it will only result in employees who are seemingly educated and well informed about current events. However, with these individuals, the information received does not appear to structure itself properly, and consequently their real expertise remains fairly shallow. Constantly staying on top of things weakens their thinking and makes them produce easy intellectual solutions, causing numbness of the mind.[1]

The model that has served the Defence Forces well up until now, is no longer capable of handing the rapid changes in the operational environment. This is because modern situational awareness has a special feature where there is a need for exact detailed information all the way to the level of the highest command. Tactical level information about the wounding of a peacekeeper for example, may lead to a decision where the whole unit is withdrawn from the area affected by the crisis. In war we are accustomed to facing casualties, but in a crisis management operation the threshold for pain is different. At national level, it has also

[1] Koski, Jussi T.: *Infoähky ja muita kirjoituksia oppimisesta, organisaatiosta ja tietoyhteiskunnasta,* Gummerus, Jyväskylä, 1998, p. 14.

become very relevant to be informed about the prevailing security situation. The security situation has an impact at national level regarding whether to withdraw or how to equip the troops. It also has an effect on the actions taken to improve security.

International model for producing situational awareness

In most NATO countries, such as Belgium, Norway and the United Kingdom, situational awareness is produced in the crisis management operation and forwarded directly to operational headquarters. The operational HQ is split into different sectors that are in charge of the execution and planning of the operation.

In Belgium for example, the operational command is under the Belgian defence command. The operational command is divided into sectors responsible for operations, training, requirements, evaluation and support. The operational command is in charge of the national command within the crisis management operation. In addition the operational command provides guidance for the Services, in order for them to be able to produce units capable of meeting the force requirements. The Services do not have separate operational centres. The Belgian Air Force forms an exception, as they have kept the unit conducting the duties of an operational centre in their organisation. The Belgians are mostly content with this arrangement. Their national defence is primarily dependent on NATO. The Belgians' view is that the outcome will be the same whether their troops are trained at home or abroad. Their airplanes will fly and ships sail in any case. Training abroad consumes more money and resources, but their thinking is based on the notion that troops need to train and conduct drills in any case. The primary duty of the armed forces is to work for the interests of the military alliance. National defence comes only third in their priorities. Through the ISAF operation[2] in Afghanistan, the Belgians have improved their situational awareness production processes. They have improved their product so that it would meet the demands of their high command in the changing environment. The process produces timely information about the ongoing events, and also analyses of the events regarding how they may effect the operations. Every two or three months they produce and present a SWOT analysis[3] to the high command, which predicts how the operation will evolve in the near future. Every six months, a more comprehensive report is produced regarding the evolution of the operation. The biggest challenge that the Belgians have observed relates to the coordination of the tactics, techniques and procedures that take place in demanding conditions. Logistical disruptions and lacking language skills may also add to the challenges.

Norway's organisation is similar to Belgium's. The Norwegians transfer a unit that has been trained by one of its own Services under the joint operational command when an operation begins. This includes operations at home and abroad. Domestic operations include mostly guarding of the coastline, as army exercises do not belong under this command. Correspondingly, in Denmark, the air defence's on call system is under NATO command.

[2] ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) is a multinational operation in Afghanistan led by NATO and mandated by the UN. Its task is to support the country's interim government by creating stability and security in Afghanistan.

[3] The SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) is a four-field method developed by Albert Humphrey that is used for creating strategy and in recognising, evaluating and developing learning or problems. It is a useful and simple tool for planning the activities, plans and projects of a business.

Events in the operations are reported directly to the operational command, from where the information is relayed to the strategic command, supply services and the troop producer, and so on. The operational command is also in charge of supplying information internally and for the public, for example if a soldier is killed or seriously injured. All the Services are represented in the operational command, along with a liaison officer from the special forces. Each has their respective Service's systems at their disposal according to the desk principle. From this collation of separate situation reports created by the liaison officers, an overall image is produced for the high command.

Most European countries use this kind of model for the production of situational awareness in a crisis management operation. For its part, NATO membership has encouraged countries to adopt this model, but constant competition for resources has also played its part. NATO has many constantly ongoing demanding operations, which means that the member states have gotten used to a situation where the process must work efficiently. The preparations for all the operations are made with a great care, and all operations have their own tailor-made training modules. Simplicity, and the ability to focus personnel resources are some of the advantages of a streamlined organisation. An organisation produces information rapidly, sending it where it is needed, so that decision makers' situational awareness is sufficient for decision making.

How does the production of situational awareness develop?

In his book, *Limitless World*, Harvard University economics professor Robert Reich, states that a key issue in production, in the contemporary and future world, is to produce *added value* instead of *quantity*. According to Reich the most crucial parts in production are: [4]

1. The ability to see things and ideas by connecting the acquired added values.
2. The ability to make the customer understand his/her needs and how these can be met with the services that are available.
3. The ability to connect *problem recognisers* and *problem solvers*. So-called *strategic brokers* have the ability to spot the right talent and capability to solve certain problems. Problem recognisers, problem solvers and strategic brokers are the three groups that can introduce added value.

If these principles were followed, it would be sensible for crisis management troops to send their information to one place where representatives from several different sections are gathered. The model could be refined by placing soldiers and civilians under the same command. These representatives would have long-term vision and the ability to connect information that they receive. The model must also enable delegating decision making authority and responsibility. The principle of this model is the centralisation of strategic decision making and decentralisation of tactical and operational level decision making, keeping in mind that creating the strategies of an organisation is a profound and participatory process. The short chain of command would enable this.

It must be kept in mind that the decentralisation of decision making in an organisation is genuine only when the lower levels of the hierarchy, to which the authority to make

[4] Koski (1999), p. 134.

decisions has been delegated, are not subject to a right of veto of the upper levels. The ability of the lower levels to make the right decision should be genuinely trusted. This is highlighted especially in a crisis management organisation, where the commanders on the ground have a better understanding of the prevailing circumstances than the command at the national level. Having to continuously ask for approval from superiors to conduct operations destroys creative action in the field.

Developing this model is a challenge that could be described with the help of Andrian Cussin's *cognitive path theory*. According to this theory, people learn to control terrain by moving in it, creating paths. Paths are external, material and internal representations. When the amount of repeatedly used paths and their crossroads grows, a relatively stable network of pathways emerges. When the network has become stable, the person begins to consider the network as just another landmark. The process does not end with the stabilisation of the network, but stabilisation leads to the strengthening of the network. When the actual terrain experiences changes, the stable network starts to limit the person's navigation in the changing terrain. People become dependent on the pathways, and do not easily stray away from them in order to find new routes. Creating new pathways requires the destabilisation, shocking or opening up of the network. The network is an entity of mutual, stable and relatively well established connections between the operational systems, which function on the ground or in the multi-organisational field, and which is anchored into the real material infrastructure. The existence of the network should not be taken for granted, it is a challenging achievement, and should be actively supported and maintained. A community works in a network that is formed by conflicting models, which introduce unpredictable outcomes. Hence, defining the network requires the separation of different models and the conflicts between them. From a theoretical point of view, stabilising and maintaining the network is not the only interesting aspect. Destabilising, shocking and crumbling are issues of equal interest. It can be thought that official and stabilised network connections form the visible material in a multi-organisational structure. On the other hand, those elements that are building new networks and crumbling the old ones form the structure's invisible underworld. [5]

This theoretical approach does not imply that a community is incapable of making a permanent change. It rather implies that an opportunity for further development exists.

Future challenges

I interviewed about 15 Finnish and 10 foreign professionals who work with situational awareness. Based on the interviews the greatest challenges they observed are connected to the management of information. This observation poses a question. How is it possible to produce a model that produces relevant information and simultaneously produces added value by generating content, while it simultaneously climbs towards the top of the pyramid, all the way to the generals' situational briefings? When developing a model, it should not be understood as something that leans on old structures and organisations, or that it could try to control uncertainty with the help of them. By leaving the old structures out of the development process, the challenges that take place in the operational environment, and

[5] Engeström, Y. & Ahonen, H.: *On the materiality of social capital: An activity-theoretical exploration.* 2001, Engeström (2004), p. 85.

that are inseparably local and global by nature, could be met better in the future. A workable model could be discovered through a significant increase in projects and organisations that envision future structures and require good situational awareness. When constructing a new model, the duties, organisational structures, employees and final products must be taken into consideration. Situational awareness should not only give tools for picturing the present situation, but also to give tools for seeing further ahead as to how the operation will evolve. When designing new crisis management capabilities, the needs of the design process should be acquired through situational awareness. The adopted perspective must question the reliance on budget cuts alone and highlight the need to invest in the production and utilisation of information within the organisation.

The observational data:

Information needs:

1. Event Awareness
2. Reports, which contain information about events
3. Analysis of how the events affect ongoing operations

Greatest challenges in the production of information:

1. Accuracy of data
2. The speed of accessing the information
3. Information management
4. Joint operational picture (How to present the situation and what is the situation right now?)
5. Cooperation and information sharing (Who needs this information?)



Image 3: The model's challenges are linked to the management of information.

The answer to the challenges could be found in a more simplistic organisational structure than the present one. In the new model, a so-called *operational command* would be placed directly under the Finnish Defence Forces Defence Command. Its task would be commanding crisis management operations at national level. In addition it would provide guidance for the Services in order for them to be able to produce units that meet the force requirements. In this model the different Services would not have separate operational centres. The information production process would produce information on current events and also deeper analysis, directly for the operational command. When an operation begins, the crisis management contingent would move under the operational command, regardless of their Service.



Image 4: The straightforward model

This model should not be looked at against a static operational horizon, but rather as a multi dimensional model with cutting and crossing in-depth relations. The model could be refined further when the operational environment changes, in which case it would provide support for the mission and for the specific objectives of the organisation. The model is meant to be implemented both home and abroad. The objective of this new model is to decrease the need for less timely information required by the national command that is presently produced by the troops operating in challenging conditions.

Authority should be delegated and bureaucracy cut off, as far as possible. Sending a national support cell to the area of operation would facilitate this. Its task would be to collate and forward situational awareness, and analyse the need to further develop the troops on the ground. By this we would improve our ability to handle and analyse information already in the operation area, starting with the lowest levels. This has always been our strength compared to many other countries that pack up a large amount of information to be sent to their home countries. Sending large quantities of information to one's home country inevitably causes challenges in the management of information. Limiting the flow of information is central here: what information is needed, how often is the information needed and what are the required information sources – no one is capable of following through everything. In the new model the situational image is sent quickly to those who need it. Delays in decision making lead to problems when managing crises. As an old Chinese proverb wisely states: ”Many a false step is made by standing still”.

The model must be kept as simple as possible and the information must be accurate and clearly expressed. This ensures that information arrives as quickly as possible in the place where it is then refined. The refined information serves the needs of the command. A short chain of command makes it possible to respond more rapidly. Because all of the most central decisions are often made at the level of Defence Command and Ministry of Defence, the general staff that is commanding the operation at the national level should be placed directly under the Defence Command, following the international example. At the same time, a more streamlined model would ensure a more rapid and accurate flow of information. A centred model would require less staff, and also less personnel standing by "24/7". In the present model, the Services are committed to forwarding information. We do not have

enough personnel and knowhow to serve many different levels of operation. A multi-level chain of information collection causes confusion and overlapping of duties. By streamlining the model, our already limited personnel resources would be centralised, which would brings us savings, which is something that will become even more important in the future.

Image 5: The author familiarising himself with the production of situational awareness in Mazar-e- Sharif.

Conclusions

As long as the present organisational structure remains, the most natural option is to continue to gather information through the individual commands of the Services. The challenge is that we lack personnel specialised in crisis management, not to mention analysis and information management. Correcting these issues within the framework of the present budget cuts is challenging. In the future we must, in any case, have a clearly defined structure, process, content production and tools to produce situational awareness for the needs of comprehensive crisis management – not only for the sake of creating a good situational image, but also from the point of view of national command.

Creating a new model is possible in the near future. The purpose of the structural reorganisation of the Finnish Defence Forces is to return to the fundamental question: What are the duties of the Defence Forces? Participating in crisis management missions will be one of them. Crisis management will require an efficient organisation and sufficient situational awareness. Prerequisites for comprehensive crisis management must be created as such that

they serve their purpose. Quality of information and productivity are nonetheless essential: operational success depends on the qualities and control of the available information. Without sufficient situational awareness, no one is able to make the right decisions. Executing new visions requires that the present activities are destabilised, shocked and opened up. At the end of the chain are the decision makers, who are supposed to form conceptions of the surrounding world and connect different factors. Without acknowledging and recognising creativity nothing new will be born. Is now the time for creativity?

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SECTION FOUR – Civilian Crisis Management

Security Sector Reform (SSR) – reflections in Afghanistan and options in Finland

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Abstract

The objective and focus in this article is to look at security sector reform (SSR) from different angles. How is the concept understood? Often it is translated simply to "reforming the security sector" without further contemplating what is actually meant with security, security sector, and reform in relation to SSR. What are the norms behind the concept and the appropriate method for the reform? Afghanistan is an example where a huge number of different international actors and organisations are involved in something that is often referred as SSR. However, strictly from the SSR perspective, the approach in Afghanistan has been rather far from what is desired, based vastly on technical aspects and neglecting the political dimensions as well as the principles such as local ownership and comprehensiveness of the reform. Finally, at the end of the article, the focus is turned on Finland. What should be taken into consideration when thinking about the Finnish comprehensive crisis management participation from the SSR perspective? What added value could SSR bring, also to the operational level?

This article is based on the broader research carried out in 2011 that focused on evaluating the Finnish SSR expertise in Afghanistan[1]. For the research the interviews were conducted both in Finland and Afghanistan[2].

In this article, the objective and focus is to look at security sector reform (SSR) firstly from a conceptual perspective, then consider it in terms of the situation in Afghanistan, and finally to contemplate whether Finland could and should be more involved in SSR type of activities under the framework of comprehensive crisis management – and what this would mean in practice.

SSR – from concept to practice

People working in international conflict and post-conflict related fields know that at certain times certain concepts emerge and create excitement and debate among the policy makers and practitioners. In time, the concepts may well fade away and the content inside the concept develop under new or similar terms and expressions. This is also the case with SSR, which is commonly considered to be a hazy construction with a number of different understandings and related concepts. Ideas such as human security, rule of law, security system reform, and good governance are all directly linked or included to SSR thinking,

[1] The research was funded by MATINE (The Finnish Scientific Advisory Board for Defence) and the conclusions are available on MATINE's website: http://www.defmin.fi/files/2005/CMC_FINCENT_MATINE_Summary_Report_2011.pdf

[2] The main target group for the research included currently deployed Finnish civilian crisis management and military experts in Afghanistan and governmental official involved in strategic planning. The secondary target group was composed of civil servants working in Brussels (different positions), international experts working in relation SSR in Afghanistan, Afghan civil servants, and Afghan civil society actors.

only with different nuances and emphases. In order to clarify the comprehension of SSR, this narrative here is at the same time an attempt to explain the content behind the concept – what is in fact being discussed when one uses the words “security sector reform” – and an attempt to introduce the hands-on side of the concept. SSR, when grasped properly and profoundly, provides an excellent and practical basis for comprehensiveness in crisis management.

The SSR concept emerged from the then new post-Cold War thinking on security in the 1990s when there was a paradigm shift from state-centred to people-centred security. During the Cold War, the manner *in which* the *security sector* of the recipient country was governed was not taken into account, but in the 1990’s, the growing awareness of the inseparable link between *development* and *security* started changing attitudes and enhancing the *human security* perspective and the *governance* of the security sector[3].

Actually, it was namely in development circles that SSR started to grow. A good starting point for opening up SSR is through the definition made by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) that has become a common reference point in the SSR field[4]. The OECD DAC has built up its broadly quoted and acknowledged SSR policy on the grounds of the work of the former UK Secretary of State for Development Clare Short[5].

The OECD DAC understanding of security is consistent with the broad notion of human security, and SSR is used to describe the transformation of the “security system” – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions working together to manage and operate the security sector in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.[6] According to the OECD DAC, international actors should focus on supporting partner countries, usually recovering from conflict, to achieve four overarching objectives:

1) Establishment of effective governance, oversight, and accountability in the security system,
2) Improved delivery of security and justice services,
3) Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process
4) Sustainability of justice and security service delivery.[7]

In addition to the OECD DAC work on SSR, during recent years many scholars, policy makers, and organisations have further set up and refined the norms and principles for SSR. The Swiss-based International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) summarises the SSR nicely to one approach (local ownership), two objectives (effectiveness and accountability),

[3] UNDP’s *Human Development Report* (1994) is considered a milestone publication. It argued that human security requires attention to both *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want*. Later divisions have emerged over the scope of the protection and over the appropriate mechanisms for responding to these threats. See also Sedra, (2010)(2), 3

[4] Two key documents are *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice* (Paris: OECD, 2005) and *The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice* (Paris: OECD, 2007).

[5] See e.g. Ball (2010). Further, based on the OECD DAC principles, among others, *the United Nations in the Secretary General’s report (2007)* proposed ten basic guiding principles for the UN in SSR, and the European Union has prepared its own SSR-documentation, culminating in the *Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform* (2006).

[6] DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: *Security System Reform and Governance* (2005)

[7] OECD Handbook on Security System Reform. Supporting Security and Justice (2007)

and three dimensions (political sensitivity, holistic nature, and technical complexity)[8]. The SSR Resource Center[9], on the other hand, in its publication *Security Sector Reform 101: Understanding the Concept, Charting Trends and Identifying Challenges* lists several key norms and principles for the SSR model: people-centred, the primacy of the rule of law, transparency, democratic accountability and oversight, whole of government coordination, operational effectiveness, coordination, sequencing and integrated policy responses, civilianization, civil society engagement, a political process, ownership, gender, sustainability, long-term and context specific[10]. In short, SSR can be perceived as a guiding and normative concept, but it is also a practical and programmatic implementation tool for those who plan and conduct SSR assessments, evaluations, and programming in a partner country.

SSR in Afghanistan

Even if SSR thinking has rapidly grown in the international development and security communities in the past fifteen years, there continues to be a poor record of implementation. As Mark Sedra writes: "While the model's normative framework has been well developed and has been the subject of rich policy and scholarly debate, scant attention has been dedicated to reform contexts, development referred to as a 'conceptual-contextual' divide[11]". The challenge facing SSR is bridging the gap between policy and practice, and translating its ambitious principles into effective programmes[12].

Afghanistan is an example where the conceptual understanding of SSR is rather fluctuating and it has not been successfully materialised at the contextual level. SSR is used in Afghanistan, for instance, in relation to *inteqal* (transition)[13]. Moreover, the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL), the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A), ISAF and various bi-lateral donors operating in the military, police, or justice sectors habitually associate their activities with SSR. Yet none of them clearly define and contemplate what doing SSR actually means from their perspective.

According to Jane Chanaa, SSR has four dimensions: *political, institutional, economic, and societal*. The political dimension focuses on ensuring civilian governance and democratic civilian control of the security sector. The institutional dimension refers to reforming; technical capacity-building and professionalisation within the security institutions. Whereas, the economic dimension focuses on the security sector's consumption of resources, stressing the long-term sustainability of reforms. Finally, the societal dimension concentrates on a crucial role of the civil society in the security functions of the state[14]. When reflecting on Chanaa's definition of Afghanistan, SSR there has immensely and largely concentrated on the institutional dimension, whereas the political and societal dimensions have been much disregarded. Moreover, the economic dimension has grown so incredibly fast that the

[8] See http://issat.dcaf.ch/Home/SSR-Overview/Principles
[9] See http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/
[10] Sedra (2) (2010), 6–8
[11] Sedra (2) (2010), 3
[12] Sedra (1) (2010), 17
[13] It was decided in the Conference on Afghanistan in London (January 2010) to start developing a plan for phased transition, inteqal, to Afghan security lead. In July 2010 in the Kabul Conference the plan was endorsed. According to the NATO the transition does not signify ISAF's withdrawal from Afghanistan, but a gradual shift to a supporting role as Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) capabilities develop. The first phase of transition started in July 2011.
[14] Chanaa (2002), 27–30, See also Sedra (2) (2010), 5

Government of Afghanistan will continue to need post-2014 external financial assistance in order to pay salaries to its approximately 300 000 ANSF troops that have been trained with international support over the past ten years.

In regards to all the dimensions of SSR, a commonly agreed and implementable joint security and justice strategy and vision is practically non-existent[15] in Afghanistan. Nowhere is it defined clearly whether, for example, the objective of the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) is to concentrate on law and order functions or counter-insurgency, and therefore there is obscurity on what should be the required skills, sets, tactics, and equipment. As suggested by Sherman, the focus on the security dimensions of counter-insurgency has come at the expense of the governance aspects of policing – i.e., the role of the police in supporting an effective justice system.[16] Moreover, SSR is fundamentally a governance project. It means that the focus should not only be on the technical reform of the security and justice institutions and building the capacity of the of civil servants dealing with security and justice affairs, but on developing the expectations and capacities of the population to demand effective and accountable security governance as well – a largely neglected part of SSR in Afghanistan. Quoting an international expert on Afghanistan, "*RoL and SSR are both largely political areas where you need also technical expertise. So far the focus has been on technical side and not making e.g. accountability demands for the Afghan Government. Human rights and violation prevention approach when mentoring should also be adopted - if there are human rights violations in the police force, you actually deal with them*"[17].

The human security principle, vital in conducting SSR, has remained rather inconsequential and intangible during the reform process in Afghanistan. This becomes clear when listening to the experiences of Afghan citizens encountering the Afghan and international security forces. An Afghan civil society actor in Kabul described the Afghan security and justice providers as follows: "*Police and justice sectors have a huge task to deal with the past and the present, they should build a just society for the people, but so far both sectors have failed, for example, last year an MP, Mullah Darakheil, shot three people after traffic accident and was given impunity by President Karzai. He is still in the parliament. There exists the culture of impunity in Afghanistan. Police can't simply work in the culture of impunity. Before police can do their work justice has to be brought in the sufficient level"*[18]. *Also the recent OXFAM report suggests that while the international military personnel are preparing for withdrawal in 2014, there are serious concerns regarding the professionalism and accountability of* the security forces they will leave behind. According to OXFAM, human rights organisations have documented a series of alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian law on the part of the national security forces, including night raids carried out without adequate precautions to protect civilians, the recruitment and sexual abuse of children, mistreatment during detention, and the killing and abuse of civilians by local police seen by many communities as criminal gangs.[19]

[15] Afghanistan National Development Strategy, ANDS, (2008–2013) mentions security, governance, rule of law and human rights as key goals which were renewed and strengthened in the Kabul Conference in 2010 (by Priority Implementation Plans). Moreover, related to ANDS, in March 2010 the Ministry of Interior launched the Afghan National Police Strategy (ANPS) for the period of 2010–2015 and the National Justice Sector Strategy is from 2008. However, so far these strategic documents haven't suggested concrete ways of achieving the goals or offered integrated way to approach the security and justice sectors. It is also assumed as given that Afghan Government is both capable and willing to implement the strategies.

[16] Sherman (2009), 5, See also Wilder (2007), 43

[17] Interview in Finland, June 2010

[18] Interviews in Kabul, July 2011

[19] Barber (2011), 2

Furthermore, international organisations have largely neglected the justice sector in the reform efforts, and the attention has been heavily concentrated on the armed forces and the police. Thus it has been challenging to close the gap. Consequently, there are few effective or legitimate governmental institutions through which to deliver security and justice to the population. Citizen engagement with the state is frequently marked by corrupt and predatory officials that undermine the entire justice system[20]. One Afghan civil society actor described the justice sector as *rule of money*[21]. "*Your pockets have to be full of money when you go to these institutions*", commented another[22]. With minimal legitimate state presence in most of Afghanistan, local communities rely on old customary systems.

Afghanistan is a very challenging operation environment and one can question whether the past and current efforts in the security and justice sectors can even be linked to SSR (as defined in the first chapter). As a matter of fact, it is very valid to ask whether SSR is even possible in the current circumstances, where the ongoing conflict, reconstruction efforts, and reforms go hand in hand. Mark Sedra in his article lists the preconditions for SSR, and one of them is the minimum level of security: "SSR cannot be implemented in a security vacuum; it is a long-term process intended to address the structural causes of insecurity, not a means to confront immediate security threats[23]". A UN official interviewed in Kabul said that in his opinion the Afghan security forces had to be militarised, but the direction in policing is, and should be, towards community policing[24]. This reflection is understandable and convincing when looking at the current security challenges in Afghanistan, but whether you can call this SSR is tricky. Moreover, how feasible it is to "civilise" a once militarised police force, especially in the Afghan context? As commented by an Afghan civil society actor, "*Police is not in the service for the people and bad behavior has further changed people's opinion of ANP that has adopted very violent approach that they also apply to the normal people. People see police more dangerous than thieves*[25]".

When examining the current ongoing security sector-related efforts in Afghanistan, the lack of a clear, locally-owned, and holistic strategy – inclusive of all the SSR dimensions listed above by Chanaa – and a lack of effective coordination between the Afghan Government and various international and bi-lateral actors is making the reform rather floating and unfeasible. Another challenge with SSR is that one actor can seldom carry out alone all dimensions of the reform and therefore common and solid standards as well as effective and systematic coordination and cooperation is obligatory for success and achievements in SSR. As emphasised by one international interlocutor, "*if we do SSR, we should be very clear what the minimum standards we want to achieve are and that we don't change the opinion of those minimum standards*[26]".

[20] See http://www.ssrnetwork.net/ssrbulletin/afghanista.php#jake
[21] Interviews in Kabul, July 2011
[22] Interviews in Kabul, July 2011
[23] Sedra (2) (2010), 8
[24] Interviews in Kabul, July 2011
[25] Interviews in Kabul, July 2011
[26] Interview in Finland, June 2011

The Police Chief of the Municipality of Qaisar from the County of Faryab

Finland and SSR

In Finland, SSR has been on the national agenda at least since the Finnish EU Presidency in 2006 when one of the key EU SSR documents, *Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform,* was prepared with the active involvement of Finland.[27] However, since then the national discussion has mostly concentrated on *comprehensive crisis management*. In November 2009, Finland's *Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy* (CCMS) was published. In the document, the linkage between the comprehensive crisis management and SSR-type of activities is stated:

The focus of Finnish civilian crisis management participation is already on the training, mentoring and support measures related to SSR and rule of law development. For example, Finland makes a marked contribution to the EU's rule of law mission in Kosovo, aimed at building up the country's police, judicial, border management and customs system. By combining instruments of civilian crisis management and development cooperation Finland supports, among other things, the development of civilian police in Afghanistan and the Palestinian Territories. [28]

As pointed out earlier, the big challenge with SSR has been putting the norms and principles to practice and including them in the programme. Smaller nations, such as Finland, often think that it is not reasonable to have their own, bilateral, SSR-related activities – and

[27] See Siivola 2010, 28.
[28] Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy (2009), 37–38

correctly so, as the examples from Afghanistan show that the huge number of bilateral actors (in addition to the multinational), with their different agendas and mandates, have made the coordination practically impossible. In the worst cases, this creates competition and overlapping activities. As mentioned in the Finnish Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy (CCMS), the Finnish SSR contribution (e.g. through training, mentoring, and support measures) is issued mainly through multilateral organisations, namely through European Union civilian crisis management operations under the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy): "Finland fosters a European Union that is a major contributor to international security and an efficient comprehensive crisis management actor[29]".

However, other ways to see Finland's SSR participation have been acknowledged. For example, as pointed out in the CCMS, *by combining instruments of civilian crisis management and development cooperation*[30]. In Afghanistan, Finland manages the *police-prosecutor cooperation -project* which is funded from the Finnish development budget and mainstreamed with the activities of the EUPOL Afghanistan (European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan). This is a good example of how Finland is able to deliver its specific expertise in the important SSR sector, hold the strings of the project, and make sure that the project activities support and do not overlap with EUPOL activities or any other international cooperation effort trying to achieve the same aims in Afghanistan.

Finland has expertise in many SSR-related sectors. Tunisia, among others, has recently shown interest in the Finnish policing and police education. Finnish know-how in integrated border management is already world renowned, Finland has widely recognised expertise in gender and human rights issues, and so on. To start with and move forward, Finnish policy makers under the comprehensive crisis management structure should clearly identify the SSR-related areas that Finland already has expertise in and interest for further development. The planning of projects and programmes should include experts from various sectors in order to ensure the idea of comprehensiveness in SSR: the development of a project should take place in a team rather than by a person representing possibly only one aspect of SSR. Moreover, the developers should familiarise themselves with the context where the project is going to take place – map out the conflict and analyse the stake-holders; assess the current security structures and key actors in the host country; the role of civil society; identify other international actors and projects already present in the host country; ensure the local ownership and sustainability of the project; conduct continuous evaluations of the activities during the project; pay attention to the complex and instable operating environment, etc.

Finally, when it comes to the implementation, here as well the available options should be examined and the best possible option used depending on the context. A CSDP-operation, as is the case with the police-prosecutor cooperation project in Afghanistan, could be one platform used for implementation. The most important, however, is to make sure that the activities are planned and implemented together with the host country, with its legitimate government and the people. The host government has to have enough capacity and be committed to participate in the reform, have real ownership of the process.

[29] Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy (2009),17
[30] Ibid, 37

When it comes to Finland's participation in multilateral, security sector-related missions by seconding experts, there are also some other areas to be considered from the SSR perspective. The experts need to know more about the structure and mandate, the main objectives, the aims and tasks of the mission they are going to be deployed to. Ideally pre-deployment training could focus on creating a comprehensive picture of the operational area (who are the other actors, both national and international) and motivating the experts to be sensitive to and aware of the issues that are not necessarily directly linked to their own personal tasks, but which can have an impact on their work (e.g. cultural, political, and financial aspects) and which are an integral part of the task as a whole (e.g. human rights and gender aspects, civil society involvement). It is important that the cross cutting issues such as gender and human rights are mainstreamed into SSR activities. Teamwork is essential: respecting and understanding that in order to perform one's own duties successfully, colleagues with their own field of expertise are the most valuable.

Conclusion

A genuine, people-centred SSR approach could become a useful framework in Afghanistan with the emphasis, for example, on the political aspects of security as well as the importance of good governance, rule of law, and civilian oversight of the security sector. They all have been more or less neglected by past reformers.

Moreover, the Afghan Government has to become accountable in the process, take the lead, and be a neutral and responsible actor. Poor governance, in addition to the immediate security threats, is one of the main obstacles for the successful and sustainable security sector reform in Afghanistan. Security is not likely to improve unless Afghanistan has a functional government and governance at the central, regional, and local levels. Donors and international organisations, on the other hand, must give the lead to the Afghans, also with regard to the security sector transition by 2014. Donors should not abandon Afghanistan but, on the contrary, enhance assistance in the years before and beyond 2014. This support should be condition-based and consistently so, founded on a clear and implementable strategy. Those involved in security sector work, both national and international, should be committed and engage in open cooperation.

Consequently, all international actors involved should understand the wider context of the reform and true comprehensiveness; to not work with blinkers on, but think carefully about every own step and action, and ask whether it is feasible and supports the common goals. Even if the concepts and principles, also related to SSR, such as coordination, local ownership, civil society involvement, and gender mainstreaming, are already widely acknowledged both among the practitioners and policy makers, it is time to move from acknowledgement to true action. Donors also need not to rush, but commit to a long-term and sustainable SSR reform. Quick impact type of activities could be finally put on side.

The SSR discussion in Finland should continue by clarifying the concept and developing a common SSR understanding among the ministries involved in comprehensive crisis management. Linked to this, also the comprehensiveness, what is meant by it, needs clarification. The SSR approach gives an example of comprehensiveness, especially in

relation to civilian crisis management. There isn't civilian crisis management and SSR. Rather: civilian crisis management is (principally) SSR. To enhance comprehensiveness and start moving from strategy to implementation, SSR can offer a concrete and practical tool. Moreover, a joint financial mechanism, also discussed in the CCMS, should be considered as a way to improve inter-ministerial cooperation and comprehensiveness.

When it comes to the experts working in SSR-related fields, the expertise itself also requires re-evaluation, and this must be reflected in recruitment and training. First of all, it has to be understood that individual experts do not really do comprehensive SSR. Instead, they concentrate on their specific sectors (such as police, border, justice, gender, human rights). Consequently, from the SSR point of view, it is crucial to understand the interconnectedness of all sectors both internally in one's own organisation and with regards to other external actors. Every expert sent to Afghanistan, for instance, must understand the wholeness and comprehensiveness of the activities and how their own contribution supports the wider context.

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Conveying values in crisis management

Maaria Ylänkö

Abstract

At first glance, promoting women has been very much on the national agenda in the domain of crisis management in Finland: the proportion of women deployed by secondment to civilian crisis management operations has already reached 40%. Finland was also one of the first countries to launch its own national plan on implementing UNSCR1325 Women, Peace an Security in 2008, and a new updated National Plan UNSCR1325 for 2012–2016 came out in May 2012. In this way, women are active, visible and present in the Finnish contribution to crisis management operations and there even exists a national framework and guidelines on ”Gender issues”. In the field in crisis management operations, however, the work is being done by human individuals. From that perspective, there is actually no consensus regarding any Finnish national baggage on Gender values. This might not indicate a lack of yet another handbook or toolbox on Gender, but the right time for a discussion.

Introduction

The growth of the crisis management sector has opened new horizons for inter-cultural work. Sometimes within its rhetoric, Democracy, Gender and Human Rights are perceived and handled as exports: as operating systems to be installed, a modern technology to be transferred, or something of the like. Yet any work containing advocacy requires an understanding of how environments differ. Peace, war and post conflict settings represent very different environments.

Within the international community, Finland has developed an active profile in contributing to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 *Women, Peace and Security*. However, within its national borders the consensus on Finnish values regarding the equality of the sexes is rather vague. Some realities are paradoxical even after altogether almost 60 years of peace and security. Hence, within Finnish crisis management it might be useful to revert to the crisis managed, namely the times of conflict in Finland.

Peace-to-wartime crossing

Madame! Madame! I have a question, since you are a Finn... The Congolese trainees, especially officers like those becoming inspectors in the internal inspection of the Congolese National Police, were active in their participation to the courses and in asking questions: *–”Madame, I saw on TV yesterday that a party named “The Finns” has won the parliamentary elections in Finland. So, Madame, if they call themselves The Finns, who are then the excluded no-more Finns? How does this definition match with democracy and the rights of the minorities in your country?”*

The Democratic Republic of Congo, which hosts the largest UN mandate ever launched since 1999, has been unstable during all of its 52 years of existence after its independence. In the recent years it has become notorious because of the wave of sexual violence against women used as a weapon of war. Constructing careful answers to surprising questions like the one above was one glimpse of the reality of being a Gender and Human Rights Expert for EUPOL and EUSEC RD Congo. In the operation plan, we as EU representatives were contributing to the fight against sexual violence. This meant, in practice, sometimes being asked one's opinion on the rape accusations of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the then leader of the International Monetary Fund. Luckily, at a certain point I found I could cut short the discussion by snapping that I ignore the case since I am not a French citizen. After such sessions of friendly fire, the courses could continue with the respective themes of the day.

In implementing the Rule of Law, there is a certain amount of tension related to the confrontation of expectations that is sometimes referred as the ”clash of cultures”. I believe, nonetheless, that the rapid expansion of the information flow via the internet and satellite channels across the distances, across the vast areas ravaged by war and poverty, should be taken as an equally important issue. Many partners in operations nowadays are no longer dependent on information provided by the foreign trainers and foreign mission experts. They have heard, they have eventually read and seen the realities and news about the partner countries via various channels. This aspect – the view from a war setting towards a peace setting – has by and large been quite ignored in crisis management.

Furthermore, the prolongation of the duration of crisis management mandates and the inclusion of different kinds of civilian crisis management expertise – Human Rights, Gender, Child Protection, Anti-Sexual Violence, and eventually long term development projects such as hospitals, prisons, training centers and training programs, have brought in a new kind of problematics relating to cultural adjustment. In practice civilian crisis management today more and more resembles what was previously understood to be Development Cooperation.

Yet ”Gender”, for instance, among the most problematic concepts, can never be a project in the sense that women have always existed in all societies and all cultures, and it is impossible to build a new woman like we can build a new hospital. Indeed, when the first UN Security Council Resolution1325 *Women, Peace an Security* was launched in the year 2000, the scope of action was in the protection of women and children as civilians within a society shaken by a war, as well as in the empowerment of victimized women in order to prevent their marginalization. Thereafter, there has been several new UN resolutions with the same theme of women and children; resolutions against the use of sexual violence in armed conflicts. Enforcing, confirming and specifying the targets or the initial UNSCR 1325.[1]

Via these resolutions, ”Gender” (a term that refers to social roles culturally attributed to biological sex) has become a trivial component of international post conflict intervention to an extent that UNSCR 1325 has sometimes become confused with advocacy of Women's Rights. In this ”spin off” of UNSCR 1325, as stated by Brigitte Holzner, the war and peacetime settings have sometimes gone astray.[2] As there are more and more actors, programs and objectives for ”Gender mainstreaming” (again meaning the trivialization of Gender),

[1] UNSCR 1820,1888 and 1889.

[2] Holzner 2010.

and more women working in crisis management operations as civilians and also as military personnel, an illusion of the transferability of ”Gender” has arisen. On a general scale this same problematic concerns also other values, such as democracy, that are embedded in crisis management.

Undoubtedly, we don’t represent ourselves in the field, but everything we are supposed to implement in international operations is written in some conventions or resolutions or agreements, and it is also limited by what is called a mandate. Still, our input in the field stems from somewhere, and we are sent, or ”seconded” from somewhere.

In other words, national influence cannot be avoided, even though crisis management missions do not recognize international conventions and resolutions as values. At the same time, financial or human resources invested by member states in crisis management do reflect the local values of the country of origin. In this regard, Finland has made a choice to invest considerably in the theme of Gender, which also makes sense when this choice is contrasted with its country profile on the domain of equality of the sexes. Only an indisputable know how, be it material or immaterial, can be delivered further.

The internal contradiction of this policy arises from two sources: firstly, certain paradoxes in the renowned equality of the sexes in Finland, and secondly, from the above mentioned confusion of the initial purpose of UNSCR 1325 paying attention to women and children living in the middle of a conflict and/or its aftermath. Nowadays armed conflicts are mostly civil wars.

In the field of Development studies, there has been a lot of discussion on the questions of the transferability of technology and cultural values in development co-operation. Local cultural values including local Gender rules are included in pre-deployment briefings. What is barely mentioned is the prevalent confusion regarding peace and conflict time environments. In this regard, Finland could actually benefit from some elements of its past experiences, namely the Finnish Civil War and the lessons learned from it.

Finland among the top leaders on the equality of the sexes

Finland was among the pioneers to launch its own national action plan for implementing UNSCR1325 *Women, Peace an Security* in 2008. A new updated version came out in May 2012. It gives specific guidelines and includes themes such as Research, Reporting and Communications. Also wider and interconnected themes such as Women and Green Economy and Women and Climate Change are included.

The proportion of Finnish women deployed by secondment to civilian crisis management operations has already reached 40%, which contributes to the UN target of reaching a 20% female representation among police officers serving in all UN operations. As a point of comparison, the corresponding general percentage of women deployed to a mission in the EU is 16 %. Modules of Gender training are nowadays included in civilian crisis management core courses organized in Finland. Gender aspects are also treated in the pre-deployment briefing.

Moreover, Finland has a reputation of being a leader in women's rights, and not without reason. Initially, universal suffrage including women's right to vote was achieved as early as in 1906 in Finland, second in the world after Australia, but this was during an era when Finland-to-be was still an autonomous Grand Principality of the Russian Empire. In 1919 women gained the right to enter into a contract without the authorization of their husband. This custom is a common and widespread relic stemming from patrilineal households in medieval Europe and it is questionable whether it was ever extensively in use in Finland, at least among the peasantry. Curiously enough, the same paragraphs on the authorization of the husband also exists in the Congolese Family Code which is now under revision in the law reforms. Initially, it stems from Belgian colonial legislation.

In general, there was not that much ”struggle” in obtaining women's rights in Finnish history, but this is not to say that path was easy. But unlike in Great Britain and the US, legal advancement in Finland has not been associated with a feminist movement. Rather, the advancement was based on the equal role that women had traditionally played in the agrarian division of labor.[3] The bourgeois class in which women could stay home and be idle had always been modest in size in Finland. Instead, the labor of women had been very much needed, first on the fields, and then in the factories.

One could even claim that there has always existed a certain pragmatic undertone in the attitude towards the question on womens' status in Finland: in an environment where the division of work is not very stratified, it is practical to be equal. Conversely, being very controlled or suppressed is complicated. Many of my Finnish colleagues who have worked as Gender Experts talk about this Finnish *just do it* pragmatism that they have discovered in themselves as a part of their Finnish cultural heritage during their mission.

Other Nordic countries, especially Sweden and Norway, share the common feature where the civil society has amalgamated with the State and its function of providing welfare. The Anglo-Saxon juxtaposition in which the feminist movement challenged the State or the Regime and approached it from an opponent position, has been absent.

Back to conflict: lessons learned from the Finnish Civil War

A Civil War took place in Finland very soon after Lenin and the Bolshevik regime approved the independence of Finland in 1917. On the scale of State development in Western Europe, the Finnish Civil War 1917–1918 actually took place very late, only the Spanish Civil War in 1936–1939 represents a later case. The Finnish Civil War was also partly pacified with foreign output and foreign intervention: first, the men at the core of the winning side in the Civil War had obtained a military training in Germany. Second, the end of the Civil War was aided by the intervention of German infantry troops. This pattern of war resembles many of the African internal conflicts of our time.

According to research that has been conducted and finally published in 2004, the total of civil war deaths during the conflict years and post-conflict era with prisoners suffering in camps has been specified at 39,550 between 1914–22.[4] From the point of view of UNSCR

[3] Julkunen 2010 78.
[4] War Victims in Finland 1914–22.

1325, *Women, Peace and Security,* how would this have looked? All elements of conflict continuity from the predecessor generation to the successor generation were in place. The widows and the offspring of the victorious side, the Whites, were better off in pension benefits. However, no such pensions could be paid to the widows of the side that had lost, the Reds, because they were considered to be ”rebels”.

This division of the victims of the war evoked discussion in Parliament, however. Some attempts were made to separate the ”orphans” of the Reds from their mothers in order to transfer these children to White families, but these plans were never realized as massive operations. The Red widows could not get any support for themselves, but eventually, a clear policy was made that their children could be entitled to aid. Allocations for the poor rose steadily in the Governmental budget in the years thereafter. Also two major child protection organizations emerged to take care of the orphaned children of the Reds, or other unfortunates, namely the Mannerheim League of Child Welfare and Save the Children. In addition, several other actors, such as religious organizations, were active. Also labor movement organizations played a part, but with less resources.[5]

The treatment of the widows of the Reds and their children would not be morally accepted by the standards of today. Nonetheless, there was a common understanding and agreement in both the sides of the conflict, that the children of the side that lost should be regarded as innocent, and there should be governmental social action to improve their living conditions.

Unsolved discrepancies

As elsewhere in Europe, during the years 1939–1945 and in the post-war period, women took more active roles in society while their husbands were serving on the frontlines. In that sense, the latest war in Western Europe did not lead to a marginalization of women as described in UNSCR 1325, but it was rather a catalyst of womens' empowerment. In Finland as elsewhere in Scandinavia, a modelling of a Welfare State took place.

The first Equality Act in Finland came into force as late as 1987: prior to that, however, the Government had implemented strategies aiming at obtaining equality.[6] A Gender-tuned version of equality has been very much on the national agenda after joining the EU. This ”Gender” and ”Gender mainstreaming” approach represents a more individualistic and human rights-oriented approach than the Scandinavian pattern of thought. A second reformed Equality Act appeared and came into force in February 2004.

Nonetheless, there are still discrepancies in the applied equality of the sexes in Finland. The differences in income between the sexes have never been abolished. According to the statistics, womens' average salary income in 2009 was 82% of that of men. Yet it is difficult to demonstrate particular cases where a woman has been paid less for the very same job than a man has. Women and men also tend work in different branches, and the professions occupied by women are not as remunerated as those occupied by men. [7]

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[5] Kytölinna 2008.
[6] Julkunen 2010, 120.
[7] Julkunen 2010, 151.

In the end, with the standards of today, something valid can also be concluded about violence against women and gender-based violence in Finland. Studies on victimization from 1998 to 2007 by the National Research Institute of Legal Policy provide consistent trends: in domestic violence, women are victims more often than men. Outside the home, however, the probability of a woman becoming the victim of an unknown assaulter is the same as that of men.[8] Concerning violence in close relationships, there are other studies: in one of them conducted in 1998, altogether 22 % of Finnish women declared having experienced violence at some moment in their present or previous relationships, and 9% reported having experienced violence in their close relationship during the year of the conducted survey.[9]

Discussion

The current Finnish National Action Plan 2012-2016 mentions *coordination*, *coherence of actions* and *reporting* as challenges in the implementation of UNSCR 1325. As a target country, the Democratic Republic of Congo – where the author of this text worked for the EU for 2 years – has been very modestly invested in by a number of Finnish experts.

Therefore, I have evoked a rather general topic on values embedded and beyond. Going on a mission requires keeping clear in mind the aims and ideas of the mandate in question. The principles of UNSCR Women, Peace and Security are introduced to every Finnish expert leaving for a crisis management mission. Yet in the field, the work is always conducted by human individuals. From that perspective, it is legitimate to discuss what kind of a Gender baggage the Finnish participants in crisis management missions carry with them from home and from their own history. This question is very much asked on an individual scale during Gender training but not on a national scale. There is an essential lack of a message at national level on the motives regarding why the emphasis of the UNSCR 1325 specifically, been included in the government program; what were the reasons and justifications during the process of selection, and even if it was democratic.

I believe that in the field in the target countries, the need to justify the motives and values even beyond UN resolutions and mandates will become more and more topical at member state level in the future as media and the internet keep spreading to ever wider audiences. This means that even ordinary people see news from the "west" – such as the mass shooting on Utoya in Norway – as much in real time as anywhere in non-crisis States. Also western reality TV programs on trivial everyday health and social problems such as weight problems and teenage pregnancies, are known and followed in the target countries. The domestic crises of the donor countries are also being followed. There is hardly any mention of this aspect in the pre-deployment training, but by essence, the communicative approach of missions is standoffish, and this may appear as old fashioned in the eyes of the locals. As a point of comparison, in the private sector the actors invest a lot in strategies of rapid "crisis communication" in the field of social corporate responsibility.

Finally, the current spin-off of the UNSCR 1325 has created problems of juxtaposition of elements taken from different periods of time. The western concept of Gender equality cannot be detached from its context of welfare, peace and security. The latter two have been

[8] Julkunen 2010, 128.
[9] Julkunen 2010, 182.

the pillars that have enabled things such as communal daycare or maternity leave to exist and to function. In that regard, the lessons learned from crisis management should actually stem from the conflict history of the member states themselves. At least in the African target countries, one such applicable lesson that perfectly matches the UNSCR 1325 could be the social policy that was taken towards the widows of the losing side after the Civil War in Finland, with all the errors that could be corrected – indeed, the lessons are not only success stories.

All in all, as any investment of resources made, the recently increased inclusion of the transversal themes of Human Rights and Gender in civilian crisis management missions will most probably come under general evaluation in the future. Fidelity to UN Declarations and Resolutions should not be regarded as a limit to discussion, but as a source of inspiration.

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Can or should crisis management be replaced – how and what with? – The Future of Civilian Crisis Management

Antti Häikiö

Abstract

The international community has been managing crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo for more than a decade now, and the operations they run are still being called as crisis management operations. During these processes the international community has often failed to take the local views into their consideration or properly understand the local particularities, which has perhaps delayed the transformation from conflict stage to other development and towards normalcy. This article discusses about the importance of returning back to normalcy. This process could be better achieved if there would be a clear understanding about the comprehensive approach in crisis management in all the levels where it is applied. Too often the civil and military elements in crisis management conduct tasks that are mixing or overlapping with each others, which causes confusion in the process of normalization. This confusion could be in most parts avoided if the actor's own understanding from their mandate would be better, the local views would be heard properly and the mix of instruments being used would be larger than it is presently. Crisis management should aim to find its exit, when other available tools are applied to support the transition to local ownership in the societal development of a post-conflict society.

Introduction

All missions have their stories that transfer to memories and experiences, or even become myths and legends. The lessons that these stories offer are often valuable and can easily be translated for further study and use. In September 2012, I was lecturing on comprehensive crisis management in a monthly event of the local Peacekeepers' Association in Tampere. My lecture led to some very interesting discussions with the audience that was mainly comprised of veterans in their seventies. Some of them had been on their first UN mission 50 years ago in Cyprus, the current holder of the EU presidency.

I learnt a lot by listening to their stories about what peacekeeping was like back then. I learnt how they participated to local weddings and funerals, how they transported water and food to remote villages, and how they gave medical care to local people. Sometimes they had to use force and exchange fire with armed groups. Actually all the elements of the current concept of crisis management were already then present. An elderly UN veteran shared his thought with me by saying, "wars were more fair back then", and he agreed with my point that "conflicts are more complex now". Our shared problem remained; how to prove this with facts?

I understood that modern concepts, such as *cultural awareness, local ownership, the comprehensive approach, civil-military cooperation, 'winning hearts and minds',* were all already present in the activities of peacekeepers of the early missions. That raised a relevant question: What else – besides words and vocabulary – has developed during this fairly recent conceptual development in the world of international crisis management?

Bosnia and Herzegovina after 17 years and Kosovo after 13 years since their bloody conflicts both still have international military and civilian operations present on their soil. After all these years, these countries are hosting operations that are still being called *crisis management operations*. More recently, NATO conducted an air campaign in Libya. However, the civilian operations in Libya have not yet properly started. There are other conflicts that require our attention such as Syria, where an international agreement still remains to be seen even though there are already more victims than there ever were in Kosovo. In Kosovo, the conflict led to a military operation of 50 000 troops and an interim civilian administration of 10 000 police officers and other civilians.

The Challenge of "Comprehensive"

International responses in crises and conflicts still lack the systemic and systematic approaches and mechanisms that could properly analyse and describe the ongoing processes. This gap can be observed all the way from the political-strategic level analysis, which takes place in state capitals, or at the organisational headquarter level in the missions' operational planning and decision-making processes – and all the way to tactical and technical aspects in the field. The word *comprehensive* is used in various contexts as a generic term. It is meant to reflect the common understanding that something *more and else* is needed to give a *better* understanding of the problems. A *deeper* analysis and *broader* situational awareness is needed so that *more effective and efficient* action that aims to achieve the goals that are agreed during the (missing systematic) process can be taken.

It is not yet entirely understood that *understanding the comprehensive approach* and actually *implementing* it, (i.e. managing the crisis) are two different things. This is particularly true at the political-strategic level, of which the logical frame rarely applies to the realities in the theatre. In such cases, an understanding of the needs in a more horizontal and holistic manner based on wide knowledge and broad information is lacking. On the other hand, managing the comprehensive approach needs more vertical clarity strengthened with a structured command and guidance throughout the system. The planning process, which includes the drafting of the concept of the operation and the actual operation plan, is the bridge between the comprehensive understanding and comprehensive implementation of a crisis management mission. There are still weaknesses that must be recognised, or are to-be-identified, which makes the understanding and defining of the comprehensive approach from the concept to the actual activities more crucial. An alternative vocabulary has been created in the call for finding a partial solution to this complexity. Terms such as *integrated crisis management* or *integrated rule of law* are often applied. However, they are still not precise enough to clearly share the roles and tasks of e.g. the civil and military, law enforcement and jurisdiction, or security and public safety. Understanding and defining the comprehensive approach becomes even more challenging when the *situation* is part of the process. The

challenge rises when the situation on the map must be kept up to date, while the mid – and longer term development of the entire process have to take place in planned direction at the same time.

Steps top-down and ahead – yes

The EU is a good example of an eager and active player joining and developing in the field of crisis management and development policy. The EU has been an active participant in the crisis management for only ten years. The first mission was a police and rule of law mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003–2012). This means that the EU does not have the history or practice that the UN and NATO have from their previous operations. The EU has, however, recently taken significant steps towards systematic changes. The Treaty of Lisbon[1] has many, not yet well-known, elements which are founding a common ground for the 27 member states' will in the field of foreign, security and defence policies, and also in home and justice affairs. Since the treaty (2009), the former pillars and institutions of the EU have both found and made steps towards the necessary interfaces. These steps are obvious steps to be taken when developing the necessary safety and security policies and the legal framework for the EU's international role and engagement.

The UN Change Management Team (CMT), which has been active since 2011, has an ambitious plan to form and implement a reform agenda that will improve the functions and efficiency of the world organization. Finland will actively participate in the process through the General Assembly and as a member of the Security Council. It will also be active through EU participation in the UN. The work of the CMT will hopefully give further support for the Peace-building Commission in their work for peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.

NATO's new Strategic Concept (2010), which is based on the several serious lessons learned from the past decade (9/11, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia, Afghanistan), also includes new threats, such as terrorism and cyber crime. Along these threats, the civilian aspect of crisis management has gained recognition within NATO. Perhaps contrary to what was expected, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has not evolved to be an organisation actively involved in conflict management. Nonetheless, it still works as a platform for security and safety co-operation. As reconfirmed in the Astana Summit in 2010, the OSCE is keeping the human, politico-military, economic, and environmental dimensions on its agenda. More specifically, the OSCE focuses on human rights, freedom of the media, arms control, and security of local communities.

During the past few years, mainly between 2009–2011, all of the above-mentioned multi-governmental organisations have shown their commitment towards future developments in crisis and conflict management, and in peacekeeping and peace building. How well they will have succeeded will be a good topic for future research and studies.

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[1] The Treaty of Lisbon amends the EU's two core treaties, the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. The latter is renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In addition, several Protocols and Declarations are attached to the Treaty.

Steps bottom-up and ahead – hmm…

The previous chapter described the efforts that had been made for change at the political-strategic level and from top down. The same lessons and needs call for a change also at the local level, from bottom up. Another matter is to define the *local*, which may differ in the capital of a country from what it is in the provinces and rural communities. This has also produced words and vocabulary such as *grass-root, partnership, host nation, local ownership, citizen participation, democratization, enhancing civil society, empowering women,* and *community policing*. This vocabulary has evolved in an attempt to highlight the importance of engaging the local population, which has its interests and expectations with regard to the arrangement of the international intervention. Besides fitting well into the contemporary theoretic paradigms of post-modernity, the vocabulary has more meaning in the local applications. It works towards making the object (of activities) into an active subject (in activities). People are building *their* state, *their* institutions and *their* life in communities, rather than only assisting *our* mission.

This is definitely a ground for understanding the comprehensive approach, and a necessity in the *transition*[2] from war and violence to the normalisation of life and society. It also leads to other necessary questions, such as *who* measures *how* progress is measured. Is it those who are visiting international actors, with their mission mandates and operational objectives? Or is it those whose life conditions are to be improved?

Two good examples from Kosovo illustrate the importance of understanding the local level. Both took place in 2001, two years after the war and start of the international presence. The first one comes from a village with a very mixed ethnic population. The village was in a KFOR (Kosovo Force) Battalion area of responsibility where also the local and UN Administration, UN police, and several other non-governmental organisations were present. Hand-grenades were thrown at the yards of a Roma minority, and improvised explosives and booby-traps were installed to threaten their houses. The first reaction of the international community was to claim that these attacks were symptoms of ethnic violence and discrimination, and that the response should be set accordingly. In this case, the response was to launch ethnic tolerance programmes and increase patrolling. However, the international community slowly learned that only those houses and persons were attacked who had participated in the atrocities during the war. Some of the occupants had been members of paramilitaries and were responsible for the killing of a number of civilians in the neighbouring village. The example illustrates how a better impact could have been obtained by setting up a criminal investigation and prosecution instead of solely relying on ethnic tolerance programmes and increased patrolling. A better analysis of the situation would have been a lot more helpful when planning the response.

The other example is about youth from two neighbouring villages in Kosovo, one village being ethnic Serbian and the other ethnic Albanian. Together the youth from these two ethnically different villages approached the UN civil administration. They had a proposal for a joint youth winter camp in the local skiing resort. During the war the other village

[2] *Author's comment*. Transition: What is transition? A post-conflict progress in accordance with measured steps from the violence to the normalization and towards safety, rule of law, human rights and equality, democracy and economic development relevant to the local population, measured with agreed indicators, transferring the external missions to local institutions and transforming the capacities of external actors to local understanding and performance.

had faced a massacre of 40 people, evidently committed by paramilitary troops that came from outside Kosovo. Both villages used the same road to the main road, which led into town and schools. Due to geography and their home location, they were in daily contact. A youth delegation from both villages visited the municipal office and the UN representatives with their wish and offer. The answer was not perhaps what the youth were hoping for at the moment, but reflects the realities at that particular local level. The answer was: "It is too early for you". I can still see the disappointment that this answer brought onto their faces; this was their first contact with UN representatives and the blue UN flag.

In 2004 Dr Mary Kaldor and her team of high-level experts introduced the *Human Security Doctrine*[3]. The doctrine highlighted the importance of the grass-root, and that the local and human needs were adopted as perspectives into peace-building. When the above examples took place, the human security doctrine did not yet exist. Both the message of the doctrine and the critique that the doctrine has then received can be studied in better light now, as some more evidence has surfaced. However, the alternative message the doctrine was passing, has increased in importance when engaging the local communities and parties, such as women and young people, to be part of the early peace processes, mediation, and reconciliation. In the case of Kosovo, the high-level talks, even if facilitated by the EU in Brussels, have not yet achieved the same as the youth in their surroundings found ten years earlier.

External and Internal Security

High percentage of youth population, combined with high youth unemployment, is undesirable in any environment, whether stable or unstable. The environment becomes particularly troublesome if unemployment is high among young men who, in addition, do not have any future work or study prospects. This simple factor is considered one of the root causes of conflicts. In addition to conflict zones, the countries and environments that struggle with high youth unemployment are the most common countries of origin of asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants in Europe. The statistics of the local economies and those of the European migration authorities, give further evidence which point out to the linkage of conflicts and migration. This challenge is very timely. Recently, the International Labour Organization (ILO) published a report[4] on youth unemployment and the impacts of the euro crisis, studying the prospects of the young jobless 2012 - 2017. The report raises concerns with youth unemployment rates in North Africa and the Middle East, projected to remain the highest in the world, close to 30 per cent. This finding of the report is something that not only crisis management experts and policy makers must observe closely in future, but also other public safety services must have a close eye on it.

Despite the financial crisis in Europe, the budget of the European Union[5] cannot and should not cut the funding for the programmes that are taking place in the European neighbourhood. These programmes are about partnership and EU enlargement in the Western Balkans and the Mediterranean region. These areas remain the region of highest risk, and due to their proximity, they may also pose a potential threat for European states

[3] A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, Barcelona Report, Kaldor et al., 2004
[4] Global Employment Outlook September 2012: Bleak Labour Market Prospects for Youth, ILO September, 2012
[5] EU budget proposal – Multiannual Financial Framework 2014 – 2020

and borders, for example, in the form of organised crime. The member states of the EU have endorsed two separate security strategies. The first is the so-called *European Security Strategy* from 2003,[6] which works within the frame of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The second strategy is known as the *EU's Internal Security Strategy* from 2010[7]. Both of the strategies have clear similarities and strong overlaps concerning the safety and security of Europe. The formulation of the concepts of external and internal security has made practical progress in the interface since. It is clear, that what happens near Europe has a direct impact on the security and safety of Europeans, all the way from national to the local level. Issues such as organised crime, illegal migration, terrorism, and cyber crime are all cross-border matters that need to be managed jointly.

Two permanent committees of the EU, the Political-Security Committee PSC (of the former pillar II, mainly attended by the Ministries for Foreign Affairs) and the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation in Internal Security COSI (of the former pillar III, mainly attended by the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Justice) have held regular joint meetings since 2011. These meetings have also been held at the working group level. What this means is that security and safety issues are now prepared and discussed in a comprehensive way, between relevant national authorities in their own respective international compositions.

The three latest EU civilian crisis management operations, which are under CSDP, are all in Africa. More precisely, these missions are currently taking place in the Sahel/Niger area, in South Sudan, and in the Horn of Africa.[8] All these missions share an objective, which is to tackle interlinked safety and security issues such as organised crime, illegal migration, and terrorism. The main method to fight against these threats is to build local capacities to combat these threats that by their nature are cross-border, inter-continental – even global. Both Eurostat and member state-based statistics about asylum-seekers support these recent CSDP activities. The statistics point out that the countries of origin where the largest share of the asylum seekers originate from are the countries and theatres where CSDP operations are currently taking place.

Next steps with facts and figures

When attempts to improve activities regarding foreign and security policy take place, research and study are not traditionally applied. Consequently this reflects into peace-building and crisis management. The quality and effectiveness of aid and assistance have both been topics of development studies and economics to such a degree that some common and agreed criteria have been created by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)[9] . This is not, however, the case yet in foreign and security policy-based peacekeeping, peace building, or crisis management missions. The current economic and financial crisis has increased the questions by the voters and tax-payers in the crisis management contributing countries. They are asking more questions about what it is that is being achieved and why are these publicly funded international engagements running in the first place. The tone of these questions varies depending on the geographical proximity

[6] also known as "A Secure Europe in a Better World"
[7] also known as "Towards a European Security Model"
[8] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations
[9] OECD Glossary of statistical terms, Official Development Assistance (ODA)

of these missions to national borders. These questions are well justified and they could have been asked earlier, and not just for financial reasons. As I already mentioned, there are missions that are still ongoing after 15 years after the wars that originally created the need for these missions, not to mention those that have made very little progress in the transition.

The national debate goes along the same lines also in the conflict countries where people are more anxious and impatient to ask what the results and outcomes of the international presence have been. Local people are questioning the justification for missions and operations in cases where there are few results with no or little improvement in their daily lives. Police missions are expected to fight crime, and justice missions are expected to bring justice – either by the missions or through their assistance to the local authorities. Having more words or smarter strategic communication does not replace the need for open, transparent, and accountable information with facts and figures. That communication should reach both the public at home *and* all those living in the countries where crisis management operations are taking place.

Bridging security and development

The comprehensive approach bridges the concepts such as diplomacy, security and development. Already during the Dutch EU presidency in 2004 the approach gained prominence among other priorities, such as the EU's wider role in external relations, justice and home affairs, and further EU enlargement. The Dutch presented a comprehensive non-paper in the field of development and security by both civilian and military actors. The Finnish Government introduced its understanding about comprehensive crisis management as a strategy paper[10] in 2009. Furthermore, comprehensiveness was also emphasised in the Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy[11]. In addition to diplomacy, security and development cooperation, Finland sees that civil society and non-governmental organisations have an important role. It also understands the sensitivities introduced by humanitarian aid in relation to other action. Furthermore, the Finnish understanding of comprehensiveness emphasizes that all early actions are critical, and these actions start from preventive measures. Proper analyses from the situation, early warning and peace mediation, should be applied, as they aim to prevent the conflict from escalating in the first place.

[10] Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy, Publications of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 16/2009
[11] Prime Minister's Office Publications 13/2009



Image 1. A single picture can only reflect the elements that in the best case are solved at the lowest level and without larger external engagement – but unfortunately leading to a heavy presence of "others", once the ABC is either less understood, not in place or implemented ineffectively.

The links and interfaces between security and development are obvious, both from the political-strategic discussions and mission perspective of those who operate in the field. Nonetheless, the operational aspects that would provide further clarity and explanation (what, who, how, why) are often ignored or non-existent. The bridge between a military mission, securing the environment, and a development programme, improving the local health services and school systems, is long. It is not clear enough to make division operationally or by tasks according to different players. The international community is still missing the traffic signs that would show the "lanes on the bridge" for those who have reasoned needs to operate over the seen bridge.

The Security Sector Reform (SSR) is understood as a programmatic approach to overcome the current confusion, linking the *understanding of security* and the *understanding of development* in various different forms and activities. So far the Switzerland-based International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT)[12] represents the nearest authority of kind that introduces the concepts and their applications to European states and SSR missions. The *security development* programmes form the "grey zone" of the SSR. The security development projects are concrete programmes, projects, actions, or activities that work in a specified field of expertise. These fields are recognised in the normal activities between the states and also

[12] The International Security Sector Advisory Team, works as part of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

in the activities of the EU who manages its relations with the United States, Russia, Asia, and Africa either through professional exchange and liaison programmes, or development and assistance programs. These are, however, still less-used methods than the traditional transition process in crisis management.

Way ahead: replacing crisis management

A normalisation of society, security-wise, can also be observed on the ground. As we have experienced in post-WWII, war-torn Europe, the normalisation of affairs was not based on the constant presence of armoured vehicles, or men with green uniforms and rifles patrolling the streets of the cities. That lesson should be carried on. The military should not visit the schools and constantly remind the children about their presence, but rather become invisible. A democratic and parliamentarian control of the armed forces must be “visual” in the streets and villages in a way that these elements are *not* seen or heard. The progress in transition is based on changing the colours of the uniform from military green to police officer blue, from rifles to more subtle side-arms, and from armoured vehicles to normal soft skin cars. I have met only few military officers who disagree with me on this. On the contrary, increasingly more of them are calling for clearer steps to be taken in the process of transition.

One good example comes from Kosovo, where the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which defines the roles and responsibilities of the international engagement in Kosovo, does not describe NATO Kosovo Force’s (KFOR) mandate in the field of employment and the rule of law. This may at some stage cause confusion, as, for example, KFOR’s CIMIC-officers (Civil-Military Cooperation) like to describe their current role or activities as being about working with employment and rule of law issues. Perhaps one should simply stick to the tasks as mandated to them, and not step into the fields of the others in order to avoid confusion or overlap. Instead, other means and mechanisms should be created in the run of the operation, if seen, that the operation cannot bring progress. One day the military will also have to learn how to operate as a garrison of the region, with no significant tasks outside of the gates, and as the tactical reserve only available if needed.

After the crisis and crisis management

Finland and Estonia won an open competition of the EU development project in the Instrument for Pre Accession Assistance (IPA) funding[13], which aims to establish an improved training and education program for the Kosovo Academy for Public Safety. The local institution was legally established by national law in December 2011. The aim of the law is simple and practical: to establish a one-roof model of security education that serves the police, border control, customs, emergency management, correctional service, police inspectorate, and probation service. These are all areas that are needed to support the rule of law and the safety of the citizens in the current phase of the Kosovo state-building and European pre-accession. The coming institution, which is founded on international agreement and national legislation, is based on the principles of the European higher

[13] EU Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance

education area, agreed in connection with the 1999 Bologna process, and commonly agreed European best practices in public safety education. These principles establish the common ground for the certification and accreditation of security studies in Europe.[14] Models have been, and still are, few. Therefore, the Finnish Ministry of the Interior identified Estonia as being the best partner in this project. Finland has already had projects under the EU's enlargement programme originating from the time of Estonia's accession to the EU. The achieved results from this cooperation were good and concrete. *The Estonian Academy of the Security Sciences* is the most comprehensive academy in Europe of this sort, and it is also accredited by international evaluators up to the level of master degree. It was indeed the first Estonian facility of a higher education that achieved this kind of accreditation as an institution of higher education. The objective in Kosovo is to achieve the same in the coming future at the level of the bachelor of public safety.

This is a great opportunity for Kosovo to establish a higher education institution in the field of public safety and security. The governance of Kosovo also sees it as such. Policing is not about the police officers marching in the ceremonies, or about special police operations. These are perhaps needed now, but real policing is more about the perception of safety and a rule of law that reflects itself in peoples' ordinary life. It is assessed by the people, who are the very same people who by in large hate corruption, but have no other choice but to seek health-care or a building-licence from the local services and authorities who unfortunately are often corrupt. Bujar as a Kosovar Albanian, and Boban as a Kosovar Serb, should not anymore be asked, if they like to work together. This will give them a chance to refer to the unfortunate history. They should be given the same Schengen catalogue of the Schengen border procedures that do not see the difference in ethnic or political interpretation. The answer lies in the technical procedures that finally overcome politics, and which function as a collection of technical instruments that are designed to handle local problems.

With the help of only 30 high-level experts, the Finnish-Estonian EU project, if able to achieve its aims and goals, will create local capacity, competence, and capabilities to a level that allows the withdrawal of 500 European monitors and advisors to complete other important tasks. These can be either back home in the domestic public safety sector, or elsewhere on more critical international missions. Many of my own experiences come from a CSDP mission, EULEX Kosovo. It has been a unique operation from its planning stage to the programmatic approach[15] and to its executive tasks. In many ways it has been successful and many valuable lessons could be learned from this mission. However, the best practices and lessons learned in one mission are not yet transferred forward to a degree as they should be, to serve other urgent needs and create progress in crisis management in general. Where there are crises, management is always needed.

[14] Security studies is just one educational sector these principles aim to serve.

[15] EULEX MMA, Monitoring-Mentoring-Advising Tracking Mechanism and Programme Reports 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, see more www.eulex-kosovo.eu

Conclusions: replacing crisis management

Once the facts start feeding the understanding, planning, and implementation of the activities that are still being called crisis management, they are interlinked with the other activities working on the ground. Risk and threat assessments will identify the root causes other than true or estimated armed forces, militia, and groups - and see their expressed needs as even demands leading to violent solutions by using force, if there is no other choice available to improve the 'life conditions' of people in their daily lives.

When a crisis or conflict turns into chaos and killing occurs, there are no better peacekeepers or crisis managers than the military. In the aim of protecting civilians, military means must be used to stop the killing, ensure humanitarian aid, and give any other chance for the option of peace. Soon after this has been achieved, based on the indicators that are still missing, other mechanisms should replace the military. It should not matter whether the mission is called peacekeeping or crisis management. Green uniforms and armoured vehicles should give space for others to come in. In the immediate after-math of an armed conflict, many carry guns and openly display them, sometimes even casually, when sitting in a cafeteria. Sometimes weapons are used to kill. In such cases, the killer or killers must be caught. However, after the deliberators are caught, many other questions will soon rise. Where to put him first? In which jail? For how long? Under what legislation? Who will prosecute? What is the relevant court? Who are the judges? How just was the adjudication? How are the conditions in the prisons? These are all questions outside the military mandate. Running these activities or facilities is also out of crisis management. They are questions for the local authorities and the answers should be developed by the local experts.

The need for robust crisis management, showing force and, if necessary, using force, was seen after the failures of traditional peacekeeping in Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The next lessons were identified in early UN and NATO missions in Kosovo, where the cohesion between the players led to the need for more integrated and comprehensive missions with military, police, and other players of peace- and state-building.

The next challenge for being robust and integrated will be based on the exit of the crisis management, the management of the transition, and the arrival of experts after crisis management.

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Some final thoughts

Rauli Lepistö

The world is changing constantly, introducing new challenges. People working within crisis management are often the first ones to observe these changes and the first ones who have to deal with them. How these challenges are met is an issue that requires an active approach. Some times these changes lead to demands that the entire structures that guide crisis management activities be reformed. There is more pressure to use the available tools creatively and more efficiently. Our ways of thinking need to be challenged constantly, and occasionally this will mean going back to the drawing board and thinking about the fundamentals that guide our work. The Finnish Defence Forces (FDF), for example, are in the process of doing this. They have a fundamental duty to defend Finland, but at the same time they need to be capable of responding to a crisis abroad if they are ordered to do so. Because of cuts to the defence budget, the FDF are in the process of working out how they can take care of these duties with smaller resources.

Decision makers also need to think about what guides their decision making. Is it the national interest, or are values a more important tool for guidance than interests? Does there always need to be a compromise between these two? Similarly, individuals working within crisis management need to ask themselves why they are doing the work they are doing. What are the values that guide their work, and how do these values fit into their work? Every now and then they need to stop thinking 'What is their mandate?', and make a personal assessment regarding the purpose of the entire mission. Knowing yourself and your capabilities is essential when thinking about the future, as it gives us the parameters in which we must operate.

Learning from the past is another crucial process. The past offers some valuable analytical tools when imagining what may take place in the future, and many mistakes can be avoided by learning from past mistakes. However, assuming that the past will repeat itself would be a job half done and misleading. When assessing the future, breaking our thinking patterns and taking intellectual risks is a must. The rapidly changing information technology, for example, may change the world in such a way that the implications cannot be seen yet – and the past cannot help us much in this respect.

This publication has been an opportunity to practice this kind of thinking. The authors in this article have put their experience, expertise, imagination and creativity to the test. In this publication, they share with us their thoughts about crisis management in a changing world, about lessons learned, about the needs to further develop our tools, about how we could use our existing resources better. Now it is time for the rest us to follow their lead, and take part in the discussion.

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Finnish Defence Forces International Centre

Thinking beyond Afghanistan – the future prospects of crisis management

The world is changing constantly, introducing new challenges. People working within crisis management are often the first ones to observe these changes and the first ones who have to deal with them. Meeting these challenges requires an active approach. That is why, this year, the theme of the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre's annual publication is the future of crisis management. Planning for the future is already underway. The public debate, however, has not yet taken off on a scale as it perhaps should have. This publication aims to contribute to this discussion. It wants to provide a platform for crisis management experts where they can give their views about issues such as what may happen in the future; what lessons have been learned so far and what must we keep on remembering; what values and interests guide our work; what resources we have and how we should develop them. The authors in this publication have put their experience, expertise, imagination, and creativity under test by sharing their thoughts with us about crisis management in a changing world.

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ISBN 978–951–25–2379–5
ISBN 978–951–25–2380–1 (PDF)
ISSN 1797–8629