Needs of Comprehensiveness

Building Blocks for Finnish Crisis Management

Finnish Defence Forces International Centre

Edited by Oskari Eronen

Finnish Defence Forces
International Centre

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Preface

Fifty-two years ago Finland sent its first soldiers abroad on a peacekeeping operation. Peacekeeping developed slowly until the end of the cold war. Since then both conflicts and the international response to them have been evolving enormously. Despite these changes Finland stays committed to the spirit and regulations of the UN Charter policing crisis management. The United Nations lay the foundations of the international legal and moral framework of action for peace, security and development. The Finnish peacekeeping tradition is based on long experience of UN missions in Africa, the Middle East and Europe.

The international activities of the Finnish Defence Forces have been increasing steadily over the years. According to the current national legislation, international crisis management is defined as one of the three main tasks of the Defence Forces. By developing its capacities to take action on overseas insecurity and crisis Finland discharges its international responsibilities for peace. Crisis management may also be perceived as deterring larger negative impacts of instability from spilling over into Finland (such as organised crime, human trafficking, narcotics, and terrorism).

The European Union and partnership with NATO have become ever more important frameworks for Finland in military crisis management. Nordic cooperation has also proved enormously valuable in creating the capability to operate internationally. Currently, approximately 700 Finns are serving in ten operations on three continents. The biggest national contingents numerically are found in the NATO-led operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, covering about 60% of the total contribution of Finland. Our country also contributes to two EU operations and has participated in the EU high readiness forces for the first half of both 2007 and 2008 (the German-led and the Nordic Battle Groups). The remaining missions are UN operations to which Finland allocates staff officers and military observers, and an OSCE mission to Georgia. All these operations and supplementary international training are covered from an annual budget of one hundred million euros for military crisis management.

The Evolving Nature of Crisis

The variety of operations to which Finland has contributed reflects the diversity of contemporary conflicts very well. A shift has occurred from traditional peacekeeping to more robust crisis management, which started in the 1990s. While traditional UN operations observed a truce between two warring parties by the presence of a neutral force, the newer missions combine a broad set of tasks in environments where multiple crises need to be addressed. As a general rule, sound and effective state machinery, functional public services or a viable private economy cannot be found in present day crisis areas. In addition, conflict zones are plagued with severe human rights violations and humanitarian emergencies.

These contextual factors have increased significantly in the post cold war era and require constant attention of not only the large number of international and non-governmental organisations active in the field, but also of military force. Rule of law, good governance and development have surfaced in the ‘commander’s intents’ across the international theatres.

Working within the Local Society

Reflecting the change in the nature of crisis, international peace support operations necessitate increasing interaction with local people and administration. Working in humane, non-enforcement operations, the Finnish international forces have managed to receive backing from the local communities. Despite the activities of some radical groupings, the Finns have been able to facilitate the local populations of conflict zones gradually taking increasing responsibility of their own security and social development. Good examples can be identified in several operations. As a measure of success, there has been the increased interest of international figures and investors to commence activities in areas covered by Finnish troops. Often the threat levels have been lower in those areas compared with the surrounding ones. In Kosovo Finnish troops have played a significant role in creating a secure environment for the political negotiations to proceed.

Crisis management also involves demining and the disposal of unexploded ordinance, the activities of which allow safe and free movement for other organisations and people. In addition, Finnish troops have supported local populations with various projects in health care, education and security in the Balkans as well as Afghanistan. In the latter, the Finnish contingent has worked in close cooperation with Finnish civilian crisis management personnel and utilised official development aid funds in various projects to support the local people and administration.

The Need to Cooperate

While living in contact with local populations is indispensable in the field of crisis management, it has proven to be at least as crucial to create and maintain cooperative relations between the different international organisations and missions active in a crisis area. In response to the complexity of present day crises, their resolution must be built upon coordinated activities ranging from immediate physical security to reconstruction and rehabilitation. This is a huge task that is unreasonable and impossible for the military to achieve on its own. Military activities and various civilian efforts are a different, but mutually supporting means towards a common goal. They should not be perceived to be in conflict with each other.

The best results are achieved by combining civilian crisis management expertise and military capabilities, supporting the local administration in a conflict zone, and guaranteeing a secure environment for international, national and non-governmental organisations to initiate development. The role of the military clearly includes the immediate stabilisation of the area of responsibility and the creation of a secure environment within that area. However, peace support operations often assume roles and activities that extend beyond the establishing of physical security. This can take place during and immediately after the acute phase of open conflict. As appropriate, primacy should gradually be given to civilian crisis management and independent development stake holders, which take on and continue the work using their own *modus operandi*.



Cycle of conflict and crisis management.

It has been increasingly recognised that the very broad and interrelated challenges in present conflicts require a more coherent approach, which would combine and coordinate the efforts of various sectors to support a peace mission. The definition of roles and the establishment of cooperative systems among the complex blend of figures poses a huge challenge. Attempts by the international community towards a better coherence in a certain crisis area have recently been labelled under the title of 'comprehensive approach'. A national counterpart of the comprehensive approach is called the 'whole-of-government' approach, which seeks to increase coordination and cooperation between state ministries, departments and agencies in planning, leadership and evaluation of crisis management operations.

Finnish crisis management should find its own flavour of 'whole-of-government' conflict resolution and management. This would lead to improved coordination and coherent planning for a selection of policy tools and actors on the ground: military crisis management; civilian crisis management; reconstruction and development; diplomatic representation and diplomatic negotiation efforts. Also, the relationship of the military *vis-à-vis* humanitarian efforts ought to be reviewed within the national framework and in the context of complex emergencies.

Dialogue towards a common understanding in integrated crisis management must include non-governmental organisations and civilian society, not only state institutions. NGOs are most often the 'first in – last out' people on the ground, frequently giving the first warning of an approaching conflict. They maintain close relations with local populations even during the greatest intensity of a crisis and are often in the best position to identify the needs of the local people.

Setting in motion a wider discussion of the Finnish model of integrated crisis management should not imply that the military is taking over tasks from development and humanitarian actors. Conversely, an improved whole-of-government approach may clarify roles, create consensus and increase effectiveness.

The Role of FINCENT

Finnish military crisis management has recently undergone an organisational transformation. The national command of international operations was previously the responsibility of the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT). By the beginning of 2008 these operational tasks were handed over to the Army Headquarters and its subordinate Pori Brigade. The reformed FINCENT, focusing on international courses and training since January 2008, was relocated to Tuusula on the outskirts of Helsinki in June 2008.

FINCENT concentrates on creating the capabilities to participate in international peace support operations. Its activities fit in the frameworks of Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS), the European Union crisis management, the United Nations peacekeeping operations and NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP). The vision of FINCENT is to be a leading centre for military crisis management training in the Nordic countries and Europe.

Comprehensiveness in crisis management may seem a new idea, but it certainly has its own traditions in Finland. Over the years, the total defence concept has laid a solid foundation for effective cooperation across Finnish society in general. As a proof of that spirit, there is a long established history of cooperation between FINCENT and several civilian organisations in the field of training. Finnish state ministries, NGOs, media and other organisations have supplemented FINCENT courses with their expertise on issues such as humanitarian assistance, international law, human rights, governance, rule of law etc.

These best practices should be expanded and new emphasis put on blending fresh experiences from civilian organisations with up-to-date military doctrines in order to nurture the creation of future domestic capabilities in comprehensive crisis management. This necessitates a process of mutual learning and understanding, which will help to clarify mandates; types of activities, styles of work, common attitudes, strengths and weakness of each of the actors involved in the field.

Comprehensiveness is about mindsets. This book presents one possible way to initiate dialogue, compare mindsets and perhaps move towards a Finnish approach. On the other hand, it should be noted that to achieve one single language to cover the whole domain of crisis management may not be feasible – or even preferable, since it would take us eternity to define such a language. What is required is to identify some acceptable common ground for working together. Comprehensiveness is not a goal in itself, but can serve as a powerful means to a prioritised end.

Being aware of its limitations, comprehensiveness as an answer to evolving crises should be streamlined towards training, recruitment and research & development of crisis management. The best resources available must be used through extensive cooperation in Finland. Realities and sensitivities in the field often render visible cooperation a trickier goal to achieve than in our small country where organisational barriers are traditionally low. The constant evolution of international crises should be reflected in training and on operational practices by means of open communication, shared ideas and research. Otherwise there is a serious risk of simply repeating an archaic collection of old memories.

By being passionate about its traditional partnerships, FINCENT seeks to broaden its sphere of cooperation with other figures in crisis management. The active link with the Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Finland in Kuopio has become particularly important, running civilian crisis management training, recruitment and research in Finland. In June 2008 these two organisations launched an initiative to establish a Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management. Its core tasks will be the development of civil-military relations and coordination in crisis management both for the national crisis management capacity building and international missions. The Centre will be based on the shared campus principle, with both organisations continuing as independent governmental institutions. The Centre endeavours to develop common and shared training in crisis management as well as to promote overall understanding of comprehensive crisis management. Its tasks will include research, publishing and seminar activities. In the research sector, FINCENT also attempts to develop its cooperation with the National Defence University as well as other universities and independent academia.

The Integrated Crisis Management training in November 2008 will be the pilot course of the newly established Centre of Expertise. The course in Kuopio will include participants representing the military; civilian experts including police; border and customs officials; as well as the research community; civil society and different NGOs. The aim of the course is to enhance the knowledge of integrated crisis management amongst military and civilian experts. After the course, the participants should have a better understanding of the different aspects and roles of the actors in an integrated approach and to know how to implement it in operational work among those different actors.

Having reorganised its activities and assuming broader tasks in international crisis management training and research, FINCENT wishes to encourage national discussion on comprehensive and 'whole-of-government' approaches to crisis management. This collection of articles is an attempt to stimulate dialogue between various key actors. Only through interaction and debate may a Finnish flavour of comprehensive thinking emerge. What better day to launch this first volume in the new publication series of FINCENT than on 24th October, United Nations day?

Mauri Koskela
Colonel
Commandant FINCENT

Introduction

Oskari Eronen

The conceptual sphere of crisis management is increasingly occupied by the theme of comprehensiveness. Almost every key player engaged in crisis prevention and management or peace-building calls for more 'coordination', 'cooperation', 'coherence' or 'unity of effort'. These conceptual developments match with the experience on the ground; comprehensiveness is seen as a solution to the complexity of the environment. The terms reflect needs and aspirations for improved interaction at all levels: from the 'on the ground' field work to operational or country-level and finally to political strategic vision. Both the multilateral 'comprehensive approach' and its domestic counterpart 'whole-of-government' seek enhanced results by the better use of various instruments and resources in the crisis cycle.[1]

The comprehensive approach has become a topic on the Finnish agenda, *inter alia*, through our membership in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), our active role in the Kosovo process and participation in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Comprehensiveness in crisis management and peace-building were recently discussed in the international Comprehensive Approach Seminar organised in June 2008 in Helsinki by the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Interior.

Clear progress in improving the coherence of efforts has been achieved both in international arenas and in Finland. However, a lot still remains to be done. This book seeks to strengthen Finnish understanding of the meaning and implications of comprehensiveness in crisis management. It is an independent effort to facilitate further dialogue over organisational boundaries. Citing one of the articles, comprehensiveness must be understood very comprehensively.

The contributing writers come from different positions and levels of activity in crisis management, illuminating the phenomenon of comprehensiveness from various standpoints. The articles relate to different phases of the cycle of crisis management and link the Finnish activities with the international frameworks of the comprehensive approach by the EU, the UN, OSCE and NATO.

The first part of the book looks at how different versions of comprehensiveness conceptualised in international agendas have been and should be reflected in the Finnish activities. Olli Ruohomäki underscores the importance of understanding that crises predominantly occur in fragile states, which necessitate specifically tailored and concerted efforts bridging political, security and developmental spheres. Building on well established domestic traditions, comprehensiveness has been made operational in recent Finnish strategy papers as indicated by Helinä Kokkarinen, who also links up national activities with developments in the European Union and other international frameworks. Mari Eteläpää gives an overview of the

[1] An excellent anatomy of concepts of comprehensiveness in Friis, Karsten and Pia Jarmyr (eds.) 2008. Comprehensive Approach: *Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management.* NUPI Report, Security in Practice no. 11. Oslo: NUPI.

key themes of comprehensive thinking along the continuum of an operation from capacity building to analysis, planning, conduct and evaluation stages.

Bearing in mind that crisis management should be viewed with a broad scope; the second part highlights roles that non-governmental (NGO) actors can play in the prevention of a crisis, as well as in the process of creating and maintaining peace and development. NGOs should be seen as key actors in comprehensive crisis management, building on their strengths in empowering societies through individuals, as Anne Palm reminds us. Kalle Liesinen speaks for the resourceful function of civil society organisations as an alternative to strong state-driven diplomacy in support of peace processes.

The third part of the book discusses comprehensive developments in more specific themes of crisis management. Focussing on unity of effort in operations, Rolf Helenius examines the mutual overlapping of humanitarian assistance and crisis management. Gender mainstreaming being a core policy objective of Finland, Sofie From-Emmesberger introduces the national Action Plan to promote UN 1325 in the future. Security sector reform presents a visible example of comprehensiveness, the support of which will demand new, flexible and coordinated mechanisms from Finland, as Heli Siivola indicates. Starting with international experiences in Afghanistan, Oskari Eronen explores possible future structures for the integration of civilian and military crisis management in tactical levels and calls for national preparedness in this area.

The book concludes with an insightful and constructive essay by Ari Kerkkänen, who argues for an intelligent approach in crisis management. This would not only transform working practice and activities according to the needs of comprehensiveness, but also challenge mindsets, perceptions and organisational culture following the concept of 'Human Security'.

The arguments presented in the articles are those of the individual contributors and not necessarily those of the institutions they represent.

Finland within Wider Comprehensive Action

Broader Perspectives: Good International Engagement in Fragile States

Olli Ruohomäki

> *"Wars and illicit economies make strange bedfellows. War's shadows cast widely; and in the areas of poor illumination lives and fortunes are forged and lost"*[1].

The nature of contemporary violent conflicts has changed dramatically in the past few decades[2]. Civil wars with indirect external involvement and intra-state violence have become more typical than inter-state wars. In addition, the nature of modern conflicts has made strict distinction between civil and inter-state wars difficult. Domestic wars and disputes are an important source of inter-state tension and domestic fighting is often combined with external involvement in favour of one of the conflicting parties. Finally, even in domestic wars different regions of countries behave differently. For example, in Indonesia at the turn of the century there were three armed conflicts with more than a thousand casualties (Aceh, Irian Jaya and the Moluccan Islands), while much of the rest of the country remained at peace. In some cases local governance structures remain relatively intact even though the capital city and the central administration have collapsed (Somalia). In some cases mineral-rich areas remain calm due to private security arrangements in which private armies play a decisive role (many of the resource rich areas in the contemporary Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad are examples of such 'pockets of relative stability').

Concerning the causes of war there are two schools of thought[3]. On one hand some researchers examine the motivations and relative deprivation of the initiators of violence and try to explain violence from that perspective. A recent World Bank study suggested that conflicts are more about 'greed' than about 'grievances': conflicting parties are more often seeking economic gains arising from the criminalisation of economies than the improvement of the unjustly deprived status of their group[4]. According to the other school of thought, it is the opportunities that explain conflicts. Regardless of the causes of war it is clear that they tend to occur in states which are fragile.

What are Fragile States?

There is no agreed global list of fragile states. Many states share some aspects of fragility, but some states are much more fragile than others. One way of assessing fragility is to analyse how well a government is capable and willing to deliver core functions of a state to the majority of its people. The most important functions of the state are territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services and the ability to protect and support vulnerable groups.

[1] See Ruohomäki and Kivimäki 2000; Duffield 2001; Collier et al. 2003; Cramer 2006.
[2] Collier and Hoeffler 2004.
[3] Collier et al. 2003.
[4] Cf. DFID 2005, 7.

The World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) scores divide low-income countries into five categories of performance, the lowest two of which are useful proxies for state fragility. This provides a list of 46 fragile states, containing 870 million people or approximately 14 percent of the world's population[5]. It is worth noting that this list is by no means fixed as states move in and out of the category.

From a human security perspective the freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity are clearly lacking in fragile states. Fragile states are most off-track in relation to Millennium Development Goals. People who live in fragile states are more likely to die early or live with chronic illness. The malarial death rate is nearly 13 times higher than elsewhere in the developing world and the proportion of people living with HIV/AIDS is four times higher. People in fragile states are less likely to go to school or to receive essential health care. Over 40 million children in fragile states do not go to school. Nearly half of all children who die before the age of five are born in fragile states. Child mortality is almost two-and-a-half times higher than in other poor countries and maternal mortality is more than two-and-a-half times greater. Fragile states have very weak economic growth. For the past decade or so their GDP per capita has been broadly flat while other developing countries grew at 1.17 % a year in real terms.

A recent study by the Brookings Institution titled *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World* ranks 141 countries according to a number of indicators which include economic, political, security and social welfare issues6. Of the 141 countries listed, 28 are deemed as critically weak. These countries include Somalia, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Burundi, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Angola, Haiti, Burma, Nepal and Nigeria. All of these countries have experienced political violence of some kind in the recent past and some of these countries are still facing violent conflict.

It is clear that there is a strong correlation between fragility and conflict. Furthermore, violent conflict is not only a challenge for fragile states, but the impact of instability can spread beyond national borders, as Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo demonstrate. This can be seen in refugee flows, the spread of HIV/AIDS, arms smuggling and the breakdown of trade. According to research, on average growth is reduced by 0.4 percent a year if a neighbouring country is fragile[7].

Framework for Approaching the Challenges of Fragile States

The changing nature of violent conflicts and the phenomena of fragile states have posed serious challenges to the international community in terms of policy responses. It is clear that engagement with fragile states requires a combination of diplomacy, humanitarian and developmental activities. This often includes a security component in order to protect human life; to promote and support a peaceful solution, together with stabilisation and development. Transitions from civil wars to sustainable peace are complex processes. Success often starts with basic transitions that include moving from warfare to peacekeeping with the aim of ensuring security for a country; from armed forces to public agencies becoming

[5] Rice and Stewart 2008.
[6] Chalmers 2004.
[7] Elbadawi 2008, 1.

responsible for maintaining the rule of law; from military dominated to civil dominated state institutions[8]. Nonetheless, these transitions do require a comprehensive understanding of the situation.

The OECD Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) document *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* from April 2007 sets the framework for understanding comprehensive crisis management and peace-building in fragile states9. The recent EU response to fragile situations, which is based on the work of the OECD DAC, focuses on exploring the links between security and development[10]. The point of departure for a durable exit from poverty and insecurity for the world's fragile states is that the process needs to be driven by national political processes. It is very difficult to impose peace and security from outside. Instead, international actors can facilitate peace processes, early recovery and post-conflict peace-building. However, this is not self-evident.

In the following sections I outline some of the key aspects and lessons learned from international engagement in fragile states.

Context and a Need for a Peace Building Strategy

It is essential for international key personnel to understand the context in each country and develop a shared view of the strategic response that is required. Furthermore the regional dynamics must be taken into account[11]. The crisis in Afghanistan is a good illustration. Without taking into account the roles of Pakistan and Iran it is impossible to stabilise Afghanistan. There is a need to develop an integrated peace building strategy which is sufficiently broad to support a political settlement; the security challenges and the immediate social and economic rehabilitation and development needs. Such a strategy has to be country-specific and built upon an agreed political solution. It should be noted that any peace building strategy needs to include major elements on power-sharing and the management of resources. Such strategies should also create sufficient incentives for all partners to implement them. The UN peace building architecture is a natural driver in this process. It is worth noting that the UN Peacebuilding Commission is a new institution within the UN family which aims to support early recovery processes.

Security and developmental stakeholders need to prioritise resources in support of peace-building. It is of paramount importance to understand that any outside involvement needs to be conflict sensitive and needs to take into account the interests of the various political forces. It must be borne in mind that international interventions can inadvertently create social and political divisions and worsen corruption and abuse. In order to safeguard the principle of causing no harm, international interventions must be based on sound conflict and governance analysis.

[8] OECD 2007a.
[9] EU 2007.
[10] See Pugh and Cooper 2004 for an in-depth analysis of regional dynamics *vis-à-vis* conflict situations in West Africa, Afghanistan and the Balkans.
[11] OECD 2007b.

The Focus on State-Building

International engagement needs to be concerted, sustained and focused on building the relationship between state and society[12]. Firstly, there is a need to support the legitimacy and accountability of states by addressing issues of democratic governance, human rights and civil society engagement. Secondly, there is a need strengthen the capacity of states to fulfil their core functions which include ensuring security and justice, mobilising revenue, establishing an enabling environment for service delivery, strong economic performance and employment generation. It should be highlighted that all stakeholders need a realistic approach to state capacity and quality in the early recovery phase and avoid overburdening the state with over-ambitious expectations. There is a recognised challenge of spreading the peace dividend to marginalised areas of society in order to consolidate peace processes. It must be acknowledged that state-building implies long-term national social processes. Concomitantly institutional designs need to be based on 'tailoring and stitching' from existing local and national resources and available mechanisms[13].

Recognising the Links between Political, Security and Development Objectives

In recent years it has become apparent that any successful international engagement needs to recognise the links between political, security and development objectives. Political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent. It is not possible to achieve success unless all these spheres are taken into account. There should be a balanced approach to addressing the multi-dimensional problems presented by challenges in these various spheres. Failure in one sphere risks failure in all the others.

The 'whole-government' approach (WGA) is an attempt to recognise the links between political, security, economic and social spheres[14]. Basically this means involving departments responsible for security, political and economic affairs as well as those responsible for development and humanitarian assistance. The main justification for a WGA is that it can contribute to the overall objective of long-term development and stability in fragile states at a lower fiscal cost. Furthermore, the risks of any of these objectives being compromised are reduced. In addition, coherent policies and activities may have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the local population with whom international key personnel are wishing to engage. This is turn will assist in eliciting a positive response from the local population.

In February 2008 an OECD DAC expert seminar in Oslo discussed the links between diplomacy, development and integrated planning with the aim of elaborating on some lessons learned in terms of international engagement in fragile states. Some of the points explored included the following areas:

Addressing the issue of a lack of coherence means that the international community must accept that mutual accountability and transparency are important. Local governments and

[12] Ghani 2008.
[13] OECD 2005; OECD 2007c; see Friis and Jarmyr 2008 for an analysis of the concept of comprehensive approach in complex crisis management.
[14] Ambassador Kari Karanko and I represented the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in the seminar.

international donors should aim for a 'compact' approach including a monitoring system. Such a compact should include:

- Full transparency on all donor support to the country including funding through non-governmental channels.
- Avoiding new mechanisms and institutions that undermine state-building objectives.
- Full transparency of the national budget, the use of national resources and the minimum standards of public sector governance that is realistic given the actual situation in the country in question.

Furthermore, international key personnel need to explore mechanisms and procedures for promoting integrated approaches in procedures across ministries and departments. In practical terms the following mechanisms can be put in place:

- Joint inter-ministerial mechanisms in capital cities, relating to specific fragile states. Joint inter-ministerial missions at political and technical levels when visiting fragile states.
- Mixed teams and a presence at national level in embassies or local missions, supported by local training.
- Multilateral institutions, in particular the UN system, need to put into practice agreed principles for greater coherence, including ongoing reforms and integrated missions processes. This should include increased coordination and collaboration between the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions.

Avoiding Exclusion and Promoting Inclusive and Stable Societies

Real or perceived exclusion and marginalisation is associated with violent conflict. International engagement in fragile societies needs to pay special attention to gender equality, social inclusion and human rights. Measures to promote the voice and participation of women, youth, minorities and other excluded groups should form an integral part of any peace-building strategy. These are crucial elements that underpin the relationship between citizen and state and form part of the long-term strategies to prevent fragility. It must be stressed that the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security marks the first time the Security Council addressed the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women, recognised the under-valued and under-utilised contributions women make to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace-building, and stressed the importance of their equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security.

Furthermore it is imperative to spread the peace dividends into marginal and neglected regions within a country. It is often the disaffected populations from these areas that give credence to the agendas of militant groups vying for a share of power. Research points out those fast-growing and rapidly diversifying economies are far more likely than others to experience a durable peace[15].

[15] Adam, Collier and Davies 2008; Sambanis 2008.

Implications for Finland

Finland is a key player in the field of peacekeeping, post war recovery and peace-building. Hence, it is important to keep abreast with the latest thinking in these fields. The OECD Development Assistance Committee's document *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations apply to Finland*, as well as EU responses to fragile situations and the issues outlined in the previous sections.

The key challenge at national level is to ensure that political, security and developmental objectives support each other. Much remains to be done in making the WGA approach work in practice. A foundational step in fostering a culture of cooperation and promoting coherence within government structures is the establishment of an inter-ministerial and inter-departmental taskforce on security and development. This would convene on a regular basis to share information and discuss policy issues on security and development. Participants in the taskforce would include members from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior. These are the key personnel involved in peacekeeping, post war recovery and peace-building.

More emphasis on joint analysis, joint missions and joint training sessions would further enhance the WGA at an operational level. In addition, a pooled funding tool could be developed in which both ODA and non-ODA budget and funding streams would be available to foster integrated planning. This would allow flexibility to support mutually agreed programmes in crisis settings. The UK has created a Stabilisation Unit which brings together the Ministry of Defence, the Department for International Development, the Foreign Office and *inter alia* to manage a joint funding pool. Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands have attempted similar national level coherence initiatives. Most of them involve inter-departmental coordination meetings, some at various levels ranging from ministerial to civil service.

Another idea would be to set up a taskforce around specific issues that warrant in-depth attention across government agencies. For example, Afghanistan figures prominently in Finnish foreign and development policy discussions and it would be useful to set up a working level 'Afghanistan taskforce' composed of representatives of the relevant ministries dealing with Afghanistan to facilitate and enhance better coordination and information sharing.

An Afghan governor discussing security issues with villagers in Samangan province, Afghanistan. Photo Sam Karvonen.

Need for Political Will, Right Priorities, Humility and Patience

Whilst within policy circles key lessons learned from good international engagement in fragile states are accepted, there is still a long way to go in practice. Besides there remain issues that complicate transitions to peace, which have already been referred to in the lack of coherence explored above. These issues also include the lack of political will, lack of right priorities and national ownership, political credibility of local key personnel and lack of patience on behalf of the international communities.

When we consider aid spending versus military spending, it is a sobering fact that the resources used for aid amount to only about seven percent of the resources absorbed by the military worldwide. It has been estimated that the elimination of starvation and malnutrition would require USD 19 billion annually, the prevention of soil erosion USD 24 billion annually, reproductive health for all women USD 12 billion annually, clean water USD 10 billion annually and the elimination of illiteracy USD 5 billion annually. By contrast the Operation Iraqi Freedom has cost well over USD 500 billion since 2003[16].

Despite all the rhetoric to the contrary there are a few positive examples of the international community managing to steer change in the right direction in and for fragile states.[17] This is not to say that the international community has failed altogether in supporting transitions to peace. Instead, the problem is that short-term gains are seldom sustained in the longer

[16] www.costofwar.com, 17.4.2008.
[17] The most successful transition is the case of Cambodia in the 1990s.

term. Most critically, the sustainability of peace and growth hinges primarily on the ability of post-conflict societies to develop institutions for the delivery of the public good. Therefore, it is important to highlight the risks incurred if local political key personnel are unable to make credible promises to a sufficient proportion of the population. If they pursue public policies that benefit a few at the expense of the majority of the public at large, this can result in increasing public tolerance for insurgent movements, which in turn undermines the legitimate transition process[18].

The rationale for engaging with fragile states often differs. While the rationale is often couched in terms of moral imperatives to assist the vulnerable, the real reasons range from counterterrorism and security considerations to securing natural resources for economic gain. The problem is not so much the rationale, but the lack of coherence between security, political and developmental objectives. Unfortunately, this lack of coherence often contributes to failure in achieving stability in the long-term. However, this does not mean that the international community should not continue to try.

It should be noted that while there is a consensus that injecting aid into well-managed economies gives a higher return and better results in terms of aid effectiveness, there is nevertheless a grave danger that a whole host of countries will become portrayed as failure states. This will mean that the financial cost of fixing the problem will be astronomical, as well as the cost in terms of human misery and suffering. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler of Oxford University have estimated that two new civil wars start every year, with an economic cost of approximately USD 128 billion[19].

Finally, the international community needs humility and patience in its approach. Long-term change and movement towards a democratic society come from internal processes and requires political leadership to steer change in the right direction. Some of the internal processes include the rise of middle-class, comprehensive quality education for all, changes in demographic structures, diversification of the economy and exposure to new modes of thinking. At best outside involvement can act as a catalyst for change, but for change to be sustainable it must be home-grown[20].

To conclude, a healthy dose of realism is needed when the international community wishes to intervene in fragile states.

[18] Keefer 2008, 59.
[19] Collier and Hoeffler 2004.
[20] Cf. Ruohomäki 2005.

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Becoming Comprehensive: Finnish and European Developments

Helinä Kokkarinen

Comprehensiveness is the current 'in-word' for today. In the dictionaries 'comprehensiveness' has been defined as *an ability to understand a broad range of topics or completeness over a broad scope.* Generally it has been understood as a way to see issues from several different perspectives. Comprehensiveness also means that we should get information from several different resources to ensure the right approach. Networking and cooperation are a part of comprehensiveness, or better still, tools for achieving comprehensiveness.

Regarding the civilian side in the context of Finnish public administration, what ever the function is, 'comprehensiveness' has traditionally been considered as a part of 'good governance' and as a guarantee for the quality of service. In health care and social services comprehensiveness has already been used for a long time. After all, a human being is an organism where mental and physical processes can not be separated. The Alexander-technique is based on the assumption that a human being is a comprehensive creature and that a small change affects the whole system. In coaching, in the interaction between the coach and the trainee, both the body and the mind should be seen as one whole. A comprehensive/integrated/holistic approach is the guiding principle when developing multicultural interaction between the majority and the minority.

'Comprehensiveness' in Crisis Management?

What do we mean by 'comprehensiveness' in crisis management? I raise this question from the civilian perspective. What are these new concepts and what do we really mean by comprehensiveness within the framework of crisis management? In these concepts the broader perspective is mostly understood as cooperation between civilian and military key personnel. However, the 'civilian perspective' in fact includes several perspectives, of equal number to that of administrative branches in a state structure.

The aim of both civilian and military crisis management is to prevent the initiation or renewal of armed conflicts, and to help societies and/or 'fragile states' to recover from violent conflict. Crisis management furthers the development of the crisis area concerned into a secure and functioning society where permanent peace and just governance prevail. Civilian crisis management and military crisis management use different methods, but they complement each other and are not in competition.

International Frameworks of Comprehensive Crisis Management

Comprehensiveness is also the current 'in-word' for the framework of military and civilian crisis management. The European Union (EU), as well as international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is establishing concepts on

the comprehensive approach for crisis management. This will determine whether, according to their terminologies, it is called the comprehensive, integrated, whole-of-government, or 3D (diplomacy, development and defence) approach. However, the purpose is to find ways for a broader perspective of cooperation within the crisis management context.

It can be said that ever since 1975 the OSCE has promoted a comprehensive approach by its commitments. The starting premise is a broad concept of security in accordance with the OSCE charter which integrates the challenges of several dimensions, which include politico-military, economic, environmental and human. The OSCE traces its origins back to the early 1970s, when the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was created to serve as a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between East and West. Meeting over two years in Helsinki and Geneva, the CSCE reached agreement on the Helsinki Final Act, which was signed on 1st August 1975. The document contained a number of key commitments on politico-military, economic and environmental and human dimensions that became central to the so-called 'Helsinki Process'.

In the UN framework the 'integrated missions' approach is based on the report by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, led by Mr Brahimi. For instance, the Panel recommended new headquarters capacity for information management and strategic analysis; improved mission guidance and leadership; rapid deployment standards and 'on-call' expertise; enhanced headquarters capacity to plan and support peace operations; the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces for mission planning and support and finally, the adapting of peace operations to the modern information system.

It has been said that although integrated missions are intended to improve UN coherence, there is no mechanism to ensure that this translates into an effective and country-specific strategy containing priorities. Nor is there a mechanism to ensure that division of labour and accountability is formulated and implemented. In humanitarian situations the UN Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) is the system of dialogue and interaction. This involves the exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels between military and civilian key personnel, humanitarian organisations, development organisations, or the local civilian population. This then achieves respective objectives, including the protection and promotion of humanitarian principles, the avoidance of competition, the reduction of inconsistency, and when appropriate, the pursuit of common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation.

NATO is currently developing its comprehensive crisis management concept to deal with the challenges of complex crisis management operations. The new approach emphasises the importance of civil-military cooperation and the interdependence between stability and development.

The EU has focused on building up a comprehensive crisis management capability, consisting of both civilian and military elements, which are referred to as civil-military coordination (CMCO). The European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003 states that the

> *"…challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these*

can have an impact of our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first precondition for development"[1].

The High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Secretary-General of the Council of the EU, Javier Solana has considered that "if there is a 'lesson learned' from interventions in crisis areas such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan/Darfur, the Congo and many others, it is the need to enhance our effectiveness through better co-ordination of civil and military crisis management instruments" and that the civil-military co-ordination is "at the heart of effective EU external action"[2].

The main objective of the EU Civilian Headline Goal for 2010 is to ensure that the EU can utilise all available means, both civilian and military resources under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and instruments at the disposal of the European Commission. This includes cooperation in legal and internal matters, in all the crisis management tasks it has taken on in order to be able to respond systematically.

The establishment of Civ-Mil Cell in 2005, within the General Secretariat of the Council, was the first step towards genuine civil-military coordination. The Cell has been located under the EU Military Staff and is being developed with the capacity to rapidly set up an Operations Centre (OpCen) for any particular operation. Its concept has been refined on the basis of the experiences gained from ESDP's development, in particular in the Balkans, and it is meant to be distinct from national and multinational capabilities. Currently the Cell has been operational for three years.

The main challenges for closer cooperation between civilian and military key personnel and for a more comprehensive approach are *chain of command, finance and attitudes*. How can the civilian functions be implemented under military command? For instance in the case of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, the human rights reporting was adapted to the operational reporting system which had been created the military way. This was open to criticism when taking into account the proper human rights reporting developed by the UN. How is it possible for independent judges to work under military command? Or vice versa, how is the military staff able to operate under a civilian command? The financing of civilian missions and military operations is different. From the civilian CFSP budget it is not possible to finance any military operations, and on the military side the ATHENA finance mechanism is only for military operations or military support activities. In case of the civilian EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau), the planning documents could not include any reference to military capabilities or tasks because of this financing system.

However, it is likely that the biggest challenge is completely human in nature – attitudes. On the civilian side it is quite difficult to understand the complexity of the military planning system; for every detail there is a new group for planning, while on the civilian side only few experts are doing all the planning. It gives the impression that instead of cooperating with individuals, you have to cooperate with a whole battalion. There is no 'man-power' on the civilian side to even try to contact all the military groups involved in planning – perhaps so-

[1] European Council 2003.
[2] www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/86615.pdf, 12.8.2008.

called J5 is the most important in the planning phase. Also the focus, both in planning and in the field, varies between the civilian and military perspective. The civilians are the ones who provide the public face for a mission and the ones who are working side by side with the locals. The expertise of individual civilians is the most important, even for the whole success of the mission. Professionalism is – or it should be – the word for today. Both sides, civilian and military, should keep this in mind and focus on their professional tasks. When the professionalism of both sides is mutually respected, cooperation is much, much easier.

When compared with the UN integrated missions approach, the Council Secretariat has developed rapid reaction, watch-keeping and intelligence capacities. It has also made new arrangements regarding the civilian chain of command by establishing Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) directly under the HR/SR in the Secretariat in 2007. So-called civilian response teams (CRT) were created in 2006; nearly 100 experts have been pre-identified and pre-trained, but CRTs have only been used a few times. It is worth mentioning that mission planning task forces have been used ever since the establishment of DGE IX (Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management).

National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management

According to the Government Programme of the Second Cabinet of Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, the Government will promote the readiness of Finland to contribute to international crisis management tasks. It specifically called for the formulation of a national strategy for this and for the expansion of Finland's participation in civilian crisis management missions.[3]

The strategy was formulated by a working group with representatives from the various ministries, NGOs and the Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland). The working group aimed to draw up a strong national strategy and to expand the role of Finland in civilian crisis management internationally. The strategy was designed specifically to develop and strengthen domestic capacity building for civilian crisis management. In addition, the working group made proposals for increasing and improving the effectiveness of cooperation, coordination and interaction between the different parties involved in civilian crisis management.

As guiding values, the national strategy for civilian crisis management calls for cooperativeness, involvement, pro-activity and networking in both the international and domestic environment. According to the strategy, the aim is comprehensive crisis management, striving to get the maximum benefit from resources utilised by avoiding overlapping, yet totally covering the field of interrelated operations. Many other methods are used to influence the situation in target areas in addition to civilian and military crisis management, e.g. diplomacy, trade policy, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. The impact of all these functions must be assessed overall. The basic principle behind this comprehensive approach is that while each operating sector is responsible for its own particular area, the

[3] Government Programme 2007. The national strategy for civilian crisis management was approved by the Government 28.8.2008.

activities of all the different actors are coordinated so as to support the overall effort of the international community, in the interests of achieving lasting peace.

The foundation for planning and implementing domestic capacity building is many-sided and multi-levelled *cooperation,* which demands cooperative capacity and ability from everyone involved. Finland promotes cooperation between many different stakeholders in the international operating environment. Full *involvement* means that all the various actors, administrative branches, NGOs and other stakeholders must be able to contribute to planning and implementing civilian crisis management. *Pro-activity* requires close cooperation between these various stakeholders, and more intensive involvement in the planning, implementation and follow-up of civilian crisis management missions, especially within the EU. Interaction is boosted by the creation of *networks* between the various actors.

Finland has consistently underlined the importance of the principle of a comprehensive approach to crisis management. Work is starting on the formulation of a comprehensive crisis management strategy under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Formulation of Finland's comprehensive crisis management strategy should take account of the principles laid down in the national strategy for civilian crisis management.

Ways to Operationalise Comprehensiveness

According to the strategy, cooperation between competent ministries and authorities must be standardised and intensified. The comprehensive approach demands broader integration and participation of civilian key personnel from various administrative branches and the military, together with civilian personnel involved in military operations, and many stakeholders in civil society.

To safeguard implementation of the strategy and increase the efficiency of civilian crisis management coordination, the working group proposed that there should be close, regular cooperation between the ministries responsible for coordinating civilian crisis management. This regular cooperation should take place equally at the top political and top civil service level.

The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for cooperation and coordination with authorities, NGOs and other stakeholders regarding domestic capacity building for civilian crisis management. With regard to this capacity building, the principle of a comprehensive approach calls for coordinated cooperation between the various administrative branches, efficient and comprehensive exchange of information between the various domestic capacity building stakeholders as well as between domestic authorities and seconded experts in the field, and systematic monitoring. According to the proposals in the strategy, the Ministry of the Interior is setting up an advisory board on civilian crisis management to support the consolidation of domestic capacity building, comprising representatives from various administrative sectors and civilian society.

Civilian crisis management, development cooperation and humanitarian aid often function side by side and have similar, or mutually supporting, aims, but the sectors they cover and their funding are separate. The modes of operation that civilian crisis management and development cooperation take can be very similar, or even identical in issues related to strengthening good governance. Both support the achievement of socially sustainable development.

According to the strategy, domestic capacity building for civilian crisis management can be used to help the defence administration with developing and maintaining military crisis management. This is achieved by supplying training officers, and by cooperating in crisis management research, especially in the field of impact assessments and by intensifying the coordination of recruitment. The areas where the defence administration could possibly support involvement in civilian crisis management would mainly be to help with training, research, materials, logistics and expertise. One possible field for cooperation might be joint situational awareness and reporting on the areas of operations.

Those involved in civilian and military crisis management should also continue to strengthen Finland's national cooperation capacities in missions. This will promote the achievement of the jointly agreed goals of both the civilian and military components.

A Good Example for Planning – the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society

The Finnish strategy for securing the functions vital to society was re-established in 2006. The Governmental resolution on the strategy upholds national sovereignty, the security of society and the livelihood of the population in all security situations. The Resolution takes internationalisation as well as changes in the security environment and structures of society into account.[4]

The Resolution lists and defines the vital functions of the society, determines their desired end-states and assigns strategic tasks to ministries. Each ministry, within its mandate, directs and monitors the implementation of measures relating to securing vital functions and the required development of capabilities. According to the strategy the vital functions of the society are:

- Management of Government affairs.
- International activity.
- National military defence.
- Internal security.
- Functioning of the economy and infrastructure.
- The income security of the population and the capability of the population to function.
- Psychological crisis tolerance.

[4] Government Resolution 2006. See http://www.yett.fi/.

This Finnish strategy takes into account the whole society and the functions which are vital in an unsecured situation. As stated above, the aim of both civilian and military crisis management is to prevent the initiation or renewal of armed conflicts, and to help societies and/or fragile states recovering from violent conflict. We could easily compare the situation of a conflict area with the scenarios laid down in this strategy.

A genuine comprehensive approach should call for cooperation and coordination between all the stakeholders responsible for those functions mentioned in the strategy for securing the functions vital to society. In the EU framework it means:

- Integrated civilian missions, including elements from rule of law, police, civil administration as well as civil protection.
- Close cooperation between the EU in the field.
- Close cooperation with other international stakeholders.
- Specific focus on cooperation with local authorities and organisations.
- Structured coordination of international stakeholders.

As before, we can compare a country in crisis with a human being; it is a comprehensive creature and a small change affects its whole system. By taking into account the whole society and all the functions and especially all the actors – local and international – we can be successful.

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Comprehensive Approach in International Cooperation

Mari Eteläpää

The theme of comprehensive approach has been high on the agenda for crisis management actors for many years and its acute relevance continues to increase. Despite significant progress in the way we act, there still remains a lot to do to enhance our performance further in this respect.

The starting point for understanding the meaning of the comprehensive approach is the continuum of different phases from crisis prevention to crisis management to post-conflict resolution. As crisis situations evolve, different measures are needed at different phases. However, the use of various measures should be taken into account and planned for from the very beginning. This approach is meant to help with addressing a multidimensional and complex crisis in the most efficient manner and to provide an appropriate and coherent answer to the situation in question.

The clear need for a comprehensive approach is underlined by the crises of today, Afghanistan being a case in point. Their complex nature means that the answer can hardly ever be military only. The resources of various stakeholders and sectors are needed to address the current crisis prevention and management challenges. The coordination required to ensure the best possible synergy does not come without effort. In order to succeed, coordination needs to be carried out from the very beginning, from capability development to training, from planning to the conduct of operations, from exit strategy to the evaluation exercise.

Comprehensive Approach by International Actors

The international community promotes the comprehensive approach in many different frameworks in parallel. Each international organisation has its distinct strengths. The choice of a vehicle being used in a particular situation is done on a case by case basis, judging which one of them is most suitable to address the given crisis. Notwithstanding the framework, what are always needed are a comprehensive approach and the simultaneous contribution of various assets. This perspective has clearly been understood in different organisations and it is being taken into account when preparing and carrying out crisis management operations.

The EU is one of the most suitable forums for this approach because it has a range of necessary tools for crisis management at its disposal. The Union has been paying a lot of attention to this challenge for many years and this outlook had clearly been demonstrated by its response to current crises. NATO has also been very active in addressing this theme because there are several situations in which it carries out military crisis management operations, which call for broader action. This has become particularly evident in places like Afghanistan where NATO recently drew

up a comprehensive strategic political-military plan, an excellent current example of the broad scope of a crisis situation.

Various national approaches to crisis management meet in international cooperation. In a certain way, they influence the opportunities for international coordination. The challenge to cooperate in different settings is increased by the distinctive national approaches taken by each country. They influence the circumstances in which cooperation is being implemented. It is useful to exchange views on different national approaches in order to learn from each other and to do things better in order to optimise the common effort in the future.

The Finnish Experience

There is a long tradition in Finland of working in this manner even before it was called a comprehensive approach. The Finnish national approach consists of close inter-ministerial coordination carried out by both strong, close-knit informal and formal contacts. Currently Finland is drawing up a concept for comprehensive crisis management which will define our approach and practical measures in a more conceptual way. The work is led by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and involves the other key stakeholders with regard to crisis management, such as the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice and the Defence Command.

In Finland, the tradition of coordination between different authorities is being applied both during the times of peace and during the times of crises. Each authority has its own role. When every actor is carrying out its own task and working in coordination with others, the optimal outcome is being achieved. Furthermore, we use the same capabilities for both our national needs and international activities. We have been making use of our experience at national level to enhance our delivery of crisis management at an international level.

Comprehensive Approach at Different Levels

Coordination between various authorities starts from capability development. First of all, we need to effectively provide for the necessary capabilities. At the same time, it is important to make sure that unnecessary duplication is avoided. Coordination ensures that maximum benefit is gained from resources that are always scarce. It also contributes to the flexible use of the resources of each nation with the output being maximised. The coordination perspective in capability development facilitates the necessary interoperability. Moreover, it is particularly relevant in regard to training, a great example of which is the close cooperation between the FINCENT and CMC Finland.

Dealing with the crises of today, the comprehensive approach should start early on, at the assessment phase. Different stakeholders need to understand the requirements of a situation in a similar way and draw conclusions for further action together. Different elements are needed at distinct times; their use should be addressed in a common plan which would define the course of action according to the evolution of a situation. The comprehensive approach does not mean that one organisation rules over the others. Each stakeholder is still

independent and free to decide on their own action. In particular, it is important to maintain the necessary flexibility with regards to arrangements. Still, the comprehensive approach is a certain type of force-multiplier where each actor benefits from mutual coordination.

When an operation is being carried out, it is essential to draw all the available information together for the benefit of everyone and ensure situational awareness. Only by doing this will all stakeholders share a common picture and work together with a view to progress. The assessment and benchmarking of progress is yet another activity where all actors have to see eye to eye. This is naturally followed by further stages where an exit strategy needs to be defined and implemented. This requires appropriate arrangements for systematic real time coordination between stakeholders and the willingness to take other actors into account when drawing conclusions and making decisions in view of the activities of each actor. It will be greatly facilitated by shared tools for information exchange and situational awareness.

Close coordination has to cut through all the different levels. It goes without saying that coordinated action in the field requires coordination at policy level. Naturally, it has to cover reporting and lessons learned as well.

So far the comprehensive approach has mainly meant the coordination between different stakeholders and thus different chains of command. In the future there may be development towards a more integrated approach altogether, for instance more integrated civilian-military operations under one chain of command.

Culture of Comprehensive Approach

One of the key factors for the successful implementation of the comprehensive approach is culture. First of all, it is important to understand the working culture of each relevant actor in crisis management and how their culture affects their actions. Secondly, we all need to fundamentally learn the culture of comprehensive approach which is, in a nutshell, that every actor's progress is dependent upon that of the others. To sum it up, every actor's contribution counts, the outcome is greater than the sum of its parts; each stakeholder's progress is a step towards the achievement of a common end state where the objectives of the mission have finally been achieved.

Conclusion

The key elements of implementing a comprehensive approach and in providing an effective response are the culture of cooperation, flexibility in working arrangements and the dissemination and sharing of information by the actors. This does not require unnecessarily complicated arrangements; it merely requires the right attitude and understanding of the benefits of such an approach.

However, there still needs to be further progress towards making comprehensive approach more and more of a reality, but it seems that the relevant actors in crisis management have already made significant progress in the right direction.

Non-State Reflections

NGOs Vital Actors in Comprehensive Crisis Management

Anne Palm

> *"The world must advance the causes of security, development and human rights together, otherwise none will succeed. Humanity will not enjoy security without development, it will not enjoy development without security, and it will not enjoy either without respect for human rights."*
> Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan

Conflicts and crisis are more complex than in the past. The nature of most conflicts has changed from inter-state to intra-state – in other words, wars are being fought within the borders of a state, and quite often between its different groups. Furthermore, conflicts have become crueller: the civilian population has become an object of direct and purposeful cruelty, and civilian fatalities are the vast majority of all casualties.

The conflicts of today are also characterised by weak or failed state structures; huge economic inequalities; forcible displacement and massacres. This development has fundamentally changed the role of the international community in crisis management. Crisis management has changed from traditional peacekeeping to large-scale civilian capacity building operations.

The number of different crisis management organisations has also increased rapidly because of the complexity of contemporary challenges in conflict areas. Delivering aid and supporting reconstruction, and providing security to people require different stakeholders including governments, international organisations, and civil society. Successful crisis management needs enhanced cooperation and the coordination of tasks.

Catriona Gourlay states that

> *" experience on the ground shows that the necessity of multiple actors urgently requires re-thinking in how to intensify inter-agency co-operation in planning and implementation, without which contemporary conflict cannot any longer be transformed into peace and stability. Still policy planning and implementation of projects in the field is often conducted in isolation with each organisation following a narrow mission-centric approach. As a consequence, organisations duplicate their efforts by unknowingly working on the same problems, by planning and making decisions without consulting other organisations and by not having access to updated or even adequate information. This approach causes inefficiency, waste of scarce resources and also leaves staff members vulnerable to security threats".*[1]

Governments, international organisations, and NGOs alike stridently emphasise the importance of crisis management in the contemporary world. Many crisis management operations – both civilian and military – are on-going in different conflict areas. Unfortunately not all of them have been successful. Sloppy planning, competing interests between different governments and/or international organisations as well as inadequate cooperation between

[1] Annan 2005.

them, compounded by disregard for local traditions and interests, jeopardise the positive outcome of these operations.

However, crisis management is a necessity for saving lives and guaranteeing decent living conditions for many people in the conflict areas. For this to succeed, the operations need to be well planned, with clear understanding of the different roles and mandates of various actors, as well as (hopefully) agreed divisions of labour. Good cooperation with the local stakeholders – both governmental and civil society – is extremely important.

Comprehensive Crisis Management?

Various stakeholders seem to understand the concept of 'comprehensive crisis management' differently. Some, especially among civil society organisations, see it as a concept developed to widen the role of the military in crisis management from purely military activities to more civilian and humanitarian activities. It is seen as an agenda set by the military without deep discussions with other actors. Many NGOs, on the other hand, see comprehensive crisis management as a tool to enhance cooperation with other stakeholders in the crisis area, and thus have better chances to solve the conflict and ease the lives of those adversely affected by it.

In crisis management 'comprehensiveness' should indeed be understood *in a very comprehensive* way. It should consist of at least three factors: actors (civilian and military), activities/tools (e.g. monitoring, education, development work) and the timing of the intervention (cycle of crisis: pre-conflict, during the crisis, post-conflict).

In comprehensive crisis management, the range of actors is very broad and can include official state stakeholders (both military and civilian), international organisations and civil society, including NGOs. All are needed and have their own role to play. The scope of the civilian actors is very wide. The term 'civilian' covers among others the police, judges and prosecutors, development workers, human rights activists and the local people. In many cases, these different groups have their own perceptions and ways of taking action, even if they are pursuing the same goal: sustainable peace and stability.

The necessary activities are also diverse. Often crisis management is only seen as direct management of the crisis either by military or civilian means. In comprehensive crisis management the scope of activities should be much wider. Development work, monitoring of human rights, education and building democracy are all good examples of crisis management.

Very often crisis management is seen as an intervention taking place only during or after the conflict. In fact the work done before conflict actually breaks out can also be the management of the crisis. Conflict prevention is undoubtedly the best way to manage crises.

Crisis management is a response to a specific situation in a specific area in a specific time. Successful crisis management operation is always planned according the situation and the context of a given conflict. Conflicts do differ and there cannot be one-size-fits-all solutions.

In comprehensive action, civilian crisis management must be given priority over other crisis management tools. Military crisis management should thus be secondary to civilian action. It lays the foundation for civilian activities and can be used as a last resort to prevent a conflict from escalating to violence if civilian activities have proved unsuccessful. Soldiers should always be the last in and first out when the situation has been stabilised. Unfortunately the reality is a little bit different. In many crisis areas soldiers have to stay much longer than originally planned to secure the environment and, in too many cases, to do work that should be done by the civilians, but who are not capable of doing it for a number of reasons.

Human Security and Crisis Management

The idea of 'Human Security' is old; the essential features of the concept, widely known terms such as the 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want', were already mentioned in the constitutive meeting of the United Nations in 1945. The emergence of the so-called new or contemporary wars in the early 1990's revived the use of the concept as different international stakeholders realised that the need for securing the lives of individuals was greater in these wars than the preservation of state security (e.g. borders, strategic institutions).

Central to human security thinking is the individual human being. Human security is both a theoretical concept of security and a tool in crisis management and peace-building. Human security can not only be promoted by *protecting* the individuals by state policies, but also by *empowering* them to participate in the reconstruction and peace-building of and in their own societies.

The concept of Human Security creates the framework upon which comprehensive crisis management must be built. For comprehensive crisis management, human security offers both a new philosophy for understanding security and a tool to increasing the security of the individuals. The realisations of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' as well as 'freedom to live in dignity' described as the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance in the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan's, report *In Larger Freedom*, are needed if crisis management is to be carried out comprehensively.[2]

While freedom from fear clearly aims to protect people from threats to their physical security, usually under the responsibility of the military, police or border officials, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity relate to the overall (re)construction of the state and society enabling individuals to enjoy social services, human rights and recreation. In comprehensive crisis management, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity are achieved by civilian actors including non-governmental organisations.

[2] Barnes 2006.

Role of Civil Society in Comprehensive Crisis Management

Non-governmental and civil society organisations – both international and local – work in conflict areas. Many of them have been in the area for years and know the local context extremely well. Many also stay in the area after the conflict has been solved and assist the local people to get on with their lives.

Catherine Barnes has said that

> *"Even using the methods of power politics and military intervention, it is extremely difficult to 'impose' peace on those who remain committed to achieving their objectives through violence. Sustainable peace cannot be achieved through the exercise of force alone; effective dialogue must be an integral part of any process aimed at truly resolving the conflict. At some point, those involved need to agree the basic terms and conditions in which they will co-exist. It is not possible to make peace without truly engaging with others across the conflict divide. In many cases, the engagement of large segments of the wider society in peace building processes can give depth and durability to the changes needed to support sustainable peace.*
>
> *One of the greatest strengths civil society bring to working with conflict is their capacity to support changes in how people respond to conflict and to direct attention to the underlying causes that need to be addressed if a sustainable and just peace is to emerge. Furthermore, civil society actors have the potential to play an important role in raising awareness both of the costs of continued conflict and the opportunities and means to seek a way out through constructive engagement with opponents".*[3]

In her survey *Partners Apart: Enhancing Cooperation between Civil Society and EU Civilian Crisis Management in the Framework of ESDP*, the author Catriona Gourlay has noted that for NGOs, some of the principal concerns around cooperation with international crisis management interventions relate to their need to retain their operational independence and impartiality since this is typically a prerequisite for access to local populations. This may preclude deeper cooperation that would effectively place an NGO under a chain of command of an international organisation (e.g. the EU), but upstream engagement in needs assessment or planning or information exchange at the operational level is typically welcomed. In addition, resource constraints favour light modalities for information exchange and point to the importance of linking with established and sustainable forums for NGO dialogue in the field.

Gourlay sees the following as added value for the other stakeholders in engagement of civil society in crisis management:

- Situation assessment and early warning: Better linkage with civil society groups can provide added value in assessing local ground truth.
- Fact-finding missions: Cooperation with civil society groups can benefit the preparation and conduct of fact-finding missions.

[3] Gourlay 2006.

- Strategic planning: External experts with specialist and/or local expertise can provide valuable contributions to pre-planning and mission planning.
- Mission implementation: Cooperation with local actors can help improve mission visibility and sustainability.
- Evaluation and lessons learning: Civil society actors and NGOs can provide a valuable role in surveying local opinion, and providing independent evaluations of the impact of action.
- Training: Non-state actors, whether they are independent training institutes, individual trainers or experts with local knowledge can all play a role in training.
- Recruitment: Cooperation with relevant private or civil society actors can help member states expand their national pools with suitably qualified candidates.

Different actors – state institutions, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and local stakeholders – are needed for undertaking activities that fit into their mandate. In order to achieve the best results in crisis management and peace-building, coordination and cooperation between these actors is highly necessary. What NGOs have to offer, is experience, long-term relationships with the local population and expertise in their own field, which is also needed for future crisis management.

Finland and Comprehensive Crisis Management

Finland has a very long and well respected history in military crisis management in peacekeeping. Currently, Finland has participated in nearly all the EU crisis management operations, both military and civilian.

Finland has been very active in developing the EU civilian crisis management. During the first Finnish EU Presidency in 1999, the Helsinki European Council adopted an Action Plan for non-military crisis management. It also decided to establish the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), a working group to deal with issues related to civilian crisis management.

During the second Finnish EU Presidency in 2006, Finland supported strongly developing the cooperation between civil society and EU civilian crisis management institutions. CIVCOM adopted and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) endorsed *Recommendations for Enhancing Cooperation with Non-Governmental Organisations and Civil Society Organisations in the Framework of EU Civilian Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention* (15741/06). These recommendations were mainly drafted by the Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network KATU, the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and the European Peace building Liaison office (EPLO) together with the Finnish EU Presidency. This is the first time that the European Union adopted policy recommendations for increased cooperation with civil society.

The cooperation and contacts between civil society and state in crisis management issues have been very good in Finland. This spring (2008) the Minister of the Interior appointed a working group to draft a strategy for civilian crisis management for Finland. NGO representatives (KATU and CMI) were also invited to fully participate in the working group. NGO cooperation with the Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Finland has also

been extremely fruitful and active. Civil society contacts have also been developed with the military, in particular with FINCENT. There are many plans for joint training modules, seminars, publications and familiarisation visits.

Many old barriers have been demolished and it is now time for genuine open dialogue and true cooperation. All the different stakeholders have their own role to play in crisis management. We need more cooperation and coordination, but in particular we need to show greater respect for the different points of departure and working methods of the various actors. In the end, it is only the final goal – sustainable peace and stability – that really counts.

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Future Challenges of the Peacemaking Processes

Kalle Liesinen

> Motto: *"Peace can always be improved but the war can only be stopped - in one way or another."*

Scholars, diplomats and officers are capable of endless arguments as to what practical decision should be taken, as well as the second or third courses of action. In the real world any decision – even if it does not suit us – seems to work well providing that it is reasonably logical. You can direct the sequence of activities towards the best outcome and desired impact if only you concentrate your efforts and coordinate your actions. There is only one road that leads to unavoidable disaster in peacemaking processes, but all too often this is the road that is used. Using this road means acting inefficiently, being uncoordinated and trying to achieve all expectations, even if they do not fit into the picture and the timing of the peacemaking process.

It is widely recognised that in the course of time, peace is always the best solution – not only for those suffering in war, but for everybody. This is why states and state-centric organisations have been major engines of conflict resolution. This scope is gradually changing, mainly because of the changing nature of disputes and conflicts. Not only have crises evolved, so has the capability of the international community to provide options between conflict settlement and full stalemates. The international community always loses its efficiency when the balance between short and long-term goals is compromised.

For far too often the international community has acted as a disjointed entity with divergent aspirations. Typically the general power struggle is reflected into a local crisis that could easily be settled if only it were handled in the local context. Positive options are lost to great extent when a local conflict becomes a part of a global game.[1]

The orientation of the international community is the biggest challenge to the future of peacemaking processes. Solving local conflicts is extremely difficult without unanimous international influence. The minimum requirement for an outside key stakeholder should be a neutral attitude. Opposing and harassing generally accepted strategies are always possible, but the others should consider the cost of doing this to be so high that it prevents unnecessary power plays between stakeholders.

Stakeholders in Multidimensionality

The international community is well aware that conflict resolution requires a multidimensional approach. Multinational diplomacy in violent conflicts has a higher probability of success because the collective willpower of the united unanimous international community is stronger than that of any individual nation. Track I diplomacy is still the prevalent form for mediation in inter-state disputes and military crisis management is often a precondition to

[1] The problem to organise field work between the UN and the EU in Kosovo as planned during the late spring 2008 is a current example of this and is also an example of losing the credibility of the international community.

succeed in violent surroundings. These functions are not sufficient on their own in complex situations.

The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) is an organisation that works to strengthen the capacity of the international community in comprehensive crisis management and conflict resolution.[2] This approach seeks the benefits that are gained from creating synergy between different functions such as mediation, civilian and military crisis management, humanitarian aid, and development cooperation. This synergy should be between organisations such as the UN; regional organisations such as the EU or AU; other inter-state organisations as NATO and the huge range of international and non-governmental organisations.



Comprehensive crisis management from the perspective of the international community.

We all need strong ethical values and a vision of a better future for mankind. Such idealism also justifies CMI calling for efficiency and the avoidance of duplication in various functions and organisations. Organisations are tools of the international community; tools are not supposed to hinder the work by creating any conflicts of interest.

The United Nations is and should remain a natural leader in peacemaking activities. It is the only common forum for the international community as one entity. Regional organisations such as the European Union, the African Union and others can be increasingly active in peacemaking. This is a positive development and will strengthen the capacity of the international community to solve conflicts, as well as hopefully engaging much more actively in preventative diplomacy.

In some cases, small nations like Finland have the greatest potential in resolving crises as a 'middleman'. Finnish national interest is pro-peace without the burden of being a global player or former colonial power. Also, strong positions can often reduce the possibilities of successful peace processes. Finland has wisely avoided populist actions in foreign policy. A peace broker can not be a prosecutor at the same time.

[2] See www.CMI.fi.

A conventional state-centric approach is an uneasy opener in many cases of resolving crisis. A huge majority of conflicts are simply internal problems involving ethnic, religious, economic, social, crime related and other complicated dimensions. This fact has had dramatic consequences on the approaches and practices in conflict resolution and peace building. The official stakeholders from the international community may find themselves as helpless outsiders as governments of war-torn societies are often reluctant to 'internationalise' their internal disputes[3]. Sometimes even international humanitarian aid is restricted as happened in Burma/Myanmar after cyclone Nargis in 2008[4].

This has created room for new ideas and new actors in peace processes, most notably in the international peace mediation scene. However, this trend has had the undesired side effect of a short-sighted competition over roles in different peace processes. This unnecessary hindrance exists even if everybody understands that elements of civil society and soft power diplomacy; together with economic benefits and measures of hard power such as military and civilian crisis management have a great potential for synergy.

A successful intervention strategy has to be multi-levelled and needs to combine the official process of mediation and peace making with the possible quasi-official processes promoted by unofficial groups, together with the public peace processes aiming at sustained dialogue and the various activities of civil society. The second challenge in the future of peacemaking processes is how to understand the need of multi-levelled approach inside war torn societies. Peace agreement is not enough – we need healing processes involving the societies from bottom to top.[5]

Opportunities for Soft Power Diplomacy

Becoming involved in mediation too early when the conflict is not yet complete can create further tensions and escalate the situation. If the parties have not yet reached a mutually painful stalemate, then the will for peace does not exist and attempts at conflict management are almost certain to fail. It is only when the parties are ready that peacemaking can be successful.

Soft power diplomacy has often been seen as the only means by which a state or official political organisation indirectly influences other political bodies through culture or ideology. This mechanism does exist, but is seldom under the control of one political will because of extremely complicated influence mechanisms and longer term perspectives. Thus soft power diplomacy is a tool for civil society actors, instead of being a part of official operations.

Private diplomacy organisations – like CMI – are free from the political baggage that their official counterparts carry. Therefore, they can sometimes be more effective in providing networking capabilities among parts of societies that are 'off limits' to most government

[3] This also affected the Aceh negotiations between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Helsinki during 2005–2006.

[4] The very severe cyclonic storm Nargis caused the deadliest natural disaster in the recorded history of Myanmar (earlier known as Burma) on 2 May 2008. Relief efforts were slowed for political reasons as Myanmar's military junta initially resisted aid.

[5] The need to establish dialogue at all levels of society motivated CMI to support two meetings of different Iraqi groups with prominent figures of former successful peace processes in South Africa and Northern Ireland in Helsinki in September 2007 and April 2008.

personnel. Unofficial actors, serving as neutral parties, can help in building bridges within divided societies; unofficial activities are often the only means through which members of opposing parties or factions can safely meet. Soft power diplomacy ensures that participants at grassroots levels are involved in the healing process.

This is how soft power diplomacy can in time create favourable conditions for breakthroughs that can be utilised in more formal procedures. Building mutual confidence between the parties is a process that takes time. The process can thus be initiated well before negotiations. The negotiation table will only properly start with both parties sticking to their commitments and implementing them in a manner that increases trust. Doing this without a previously existing process will be time consuming and further complicate the main talks.

It seems to be a challenge to understand the importance of small civil society organisations working for sustainable peace in parallel to the official peace processes. The supporters of civil society often underestimate the influence of these small measures, whilst at the same time opponents are ready to use megalomaniac preventive measures such as controlling the whole internet in order to prevent direct influence between civil society organisations.

Inclusion

No peace process can succeed without re-establishing trust and making the parties understand the needs of each other. In a centuries-long conflict, one may eventually have reached a point where the parties on both sides have completely lost the understanding of the intentions of the other party. It limits the topics to be negotiated by the parties and means that some matters must be left for the political process that follows the peace agreement. This increases the responsibilities of outside supporters.

Sustainable peace can be achieved only with those groups or individuals who are considered to be legitimate representatives of the parties. If a group has no legitimate leader, there is no point in negotiating until one can be established. Participants at the peace table must be those who have the power to agree and implement agreements and there are certainly not many of them. Those who can threaten a veto and spoil the process must be kept involved and under control. They generally outnumber the peacemakers.

Ordinary people are less likely to accept an agreement that is obtained if they have not been sufficiently involved in the process to understand why the agreement was designed as it was and why it is the best alternative available. We should particularly include women and civil society groups in peace processes and conflict resolution as it may bring some totally new approaches to the process. The sustainable peace needs everybody to guarantee that no seeds for future conflict are left behind.

Open discussion with adequate, understandable and covering information flowing together with free media has proved to be one of the key factors in promoting the peace and neutralising the effect of detractors. Peace-building is a media campaign to a great extent

and too often it has to be started by creating the local media from scratch. Too often this sector is undervalued and insufficiently resourced.[6]

Building a Lasting Process

Maintaining peace and making it long-lasting is a top priority for a post-war society. Unfortunately, what often happens is that it is always too easy to deny, to block and to keep positions than to concede, seek opportunities and aim change through dynamic development. We know that nearly half of conflicts flare up again during the first five vulnerable years of peace. No political solution is final or permanent – but the peace process can be irreversible, if it is adequately supported by the international community. People should feel that with peace they can have a positive future again: freedom to work and to travel, to establish families and to raise children.

The ability of civil society to reach people and to understand everyday life is a powerful force and can be used to maintain peace as a priority. Peace can be woven into the structures of a post-conflict society, if the civil society is involved in the process. People are looking forward to having more opportunities to express themselves freely and to participate more in decision making. They also feel strongly that they should influence their own future.

Everyday economic survival and a just society are the most effective guarantees for a lasting peace. Peace talks need to create the framework where these issues can be effectively addressed after the peace accord. In Aceh the international tsunami aid was blocked and left to build up in harbours and bank accounts because of the war. It was only released in full when the peace treaty was signed half a year after that great catastrophe. Everybody could see, feel and understand the benefits of peace. Aid made the peace process irreversible and demonstrated the effect that immediate and plentiful aid can have.

Supporting the initial years after any peace treaty will also remain a challenge in the future. Sustainable peace requires much more visible grass roots economical input than we would believe. Fortunately economists can prove that investment in future prospects shows good returns also in post war societies.

Putting Agreement into Action

Peace agreements cannot solve all problems. At best, they can be institutional and political frameworks and arrangements that enable parties to continue working together on the issues upon which agreement has been reached. Security sector reforms and a commitment to the cessation of armed conflict are integral to peace pacts. The outcome of peace agreement needs to address economic recovery and strategies for long-term viability. An important part of sustainability depends on the process of truth-seeking and reconciliation at the level of communities and individuals.

[6] Immediate peace support seldom covers major infrastructure improvements. However some of them – like mobile telephone systems and broadcast networks – would be extremely beneficial to all stakeholders – both international and local – from the very beginning of the peace process.

Peacemakers are sometimes concerned about the negative impacts that addressing justice issues might have on peace processes. Transitional justice and dealing with the past has been one of the frequently debated issues during recent years in the context of conflict resolution. And with good reason; justice is a cornerstone of a lasting peace. Firstly to prevent the recurrence of the problem that caused the conflict and secondly to lay the foundations for reconciliation.

It is extremely important to understand the sequence of peace processes in collapsed or fragile states. You need first to have peace, and then you must create the rule of law and functioning administration to be able to address justice issues without being the blood stained tool of vengeance and foreign intruder. Naming war criminals beforehand and without due legal procedure only prolongs the sufferings and conflict. The best way to handle past crimes is a criminal prosecution ending in the passing a verdict of guilt upon the perpetrator by evidence. One of the functions of criminal law is to serve as a collective memory of past injustice. A criminal trial brings past suffering into the public domain. Thus it may enable a victimised community to deal with trauma and, perhaps, to create the conditions of future society.

Addressing justice issues has a positive catalysing role in solving conflicts. However, there is no need to expect that every aspect of justice must be put into practice at the same time. One must understand the difference between justice and vengeance.

The challenge is to see both peace and justice in a continuum of actions, measures, policy steps and achievements through which a nation overcomes conflict and confrontation and builds a future of understanding, decency and due legal order.

All conflicts can be solved if the international community has the shared understanding, comprehensive approach and will to use the necessary means to see the effort through to completion. Conflicts do not end in the signing of a peace agreement. Stability rests on the principle that fundamental social changes are necessary to prevent renewed hostilities. The use of soft power diplomacy and the building up of an active civil society are great resources in determining, facilitating and ensuring the future peace process. Winning the war may be good, but winning the peace is the ultimate goal and must be the first priority.

Applications

Humanitarian Support: the Unsupported Pillar of Present Day Crisis Management?

Rolf Helenius

Present day crisis management as seen since the end of the cold war is mainly involved in stabilising fragile states and supporting failed nation states. A failed nation state may be defined as a state, which because of poor governance, ecological crisis, civil war or a combination of the above has lost its capacity to support its population and/or function as a constructive member of the international community.

In cases where such a failed state becomes a matter of international concern, the United Nations Security Council may come to a resolution mandating an international presence to restore functioning governance in that state. The resolution will prescribe what sort of international presence is needed and what tasks it should perform. These tasks will usually be calling for any one or all three of the following actions: establishment of functioning governance, establishment of a functioning, non-biased rule of law and the establishment of a safe and secure environment. These three functions are generally referred to as the three pillars of crisis management.

In complex crises where such an international effort is needed you will find a society in the throes or aftermath of civil war. Such environments also involve humanitarian suffering calling for immediate aid. The humanitarian suffering must be seen as a symptom of the overall crisis, not as a separate part of it. This means that if only the humanitarian suffering is relieved the crisis will not be resolved and the humanitarian suffering will return as soon as aid diminishes. Therefore the aim is to eliminate the causes of humanitarian suffering in order to eliminate it in the long run. The challenge is that humanitarian suffering must be addressed, but as such does not fall under the direct mandate or jurisdiction of any of the three main pillars of crisis management. Yet failure to address humanitarian suffering will be perceived as a failure of the international overall strategy to resolve the crisis and aid in establishing a functioning nation state.

The Three Pillars

When the UN Security Council comes to a resolution and forms a mandate around it the tasks for the three pillars tend to be easily discernible.

The task of the establishment of a safe and secure environment to make it possible for other international actors to function effectively is given to a military component. At the initial phase this military presence often has had to deal with tasks outside its own pillar until the situation has eased to allow the regular international functionary to take over its task. This task of establishing a safe and secure environment, in a crisis where all parties involved in a conflict have not given their consent, calls for a robust military presence. The military component needs to have the mandate and the capacity to enforce former warring factions to cease fighting. During the initial phase with possibly ongoing hostile acts between the belligerent parties the military component may have to support the population

with humanitarian support where no other alternatives are feasible. This supplying of humanitarian support is outside the military part of the mandate and should be ceased as soon as other viable alternatives can start taking over humanitarian assistance.



Pillars of crisis management.

On the civilian side we may discern two separate pillars. The governance side tasked to assist the host nation in establishing a functioning governance system from the state level down to the provincial and community level. Functioning governance needs the support of the populace. This support is unlikely to be gained from people struggling to survive and lacking basic necessities. Therefore one may deduce that one has to solve the main humanitarian shortfalls before one can expect to have any general support for a new governance structure. The challenge is that the international community can not afford to indefinitely subsidise the populations of crisis stricken states because the dependency caused as a consequence will make the handing over of governance into the hands of the endemic population close to impossible without constant humanitarian support.

The other civilian pillar is rule of law. Rule of law ranges from policing through the judiciary system all the way to the penal system. The rule of law also needs the respect and consent of the local population. Often their trust in the rule of law has been eroded through a previously corrupt system. The challenge of setting up a functioning system starts with setting up of a rule of law system where the officials are not corrupt. This in itself means that the officials who are to implement the rule of law need to receive salaries that are enough to support them and their families. If this challenge is not met the officials may become corrupt just to support their families. A functioning pay system together with training and a functioning organisation should be addressed in time, but it is vital to note that rule of law officials who can not support themselves or their families are a recipe for disaster. On the other hand the whole population needs to be able to support themselves through other means than crime in order to avoid swamping the system. These aspects call for humanitarian assistance and an infrastructure of the society that gives opportunities for legal employment. In effect, humanitarian support should be used as a catalyst for economic development as soon as the need to assuage human suffering is achieved.

The need for humanitarian support to stabilise the situation in a crisis area is evident, there is no one of the pillars solely responsible for humanitarian support. However, it is evident that none of them can fulfil its tasks without humanitarian support. Hence humanitarian support may be seen as a fourth pillar or more correctly as a foundation for the three accepted pillars of crisis management.

The gap of delivering humanitarian support is usually filled by a variety of non-governmental organisations (NGO) and international agencies (IO). Even though there is the challenge of establishing a 'unity of effort' between the leading actors of the three pillars, that can be seen as small in comparison to trying to co-ordinate the efforts of various NGOs and IOs with their own agendas in the field.

The Challenge of Unity of Effort

The integrated functioning of the three pillars is in itself a challenge for most crisis management operations. It may seem that UN led operations are closest to solving the challenge with an organic interdependency between the organisations in charge of the different pillars run by a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). However, even on UN operations, rivalry between the different effort owners often makes unity of effort very difficult to achieve among the main stakeholders. The challenge becomes even larger, when because of the complexity of the crisis and/or the need of resources not available to the UN, one or more of the pillars are mandated out to regional actors such as NATO, the EU, the OSCE or the AU.

In addition to the mandated main actors in a crisis there will always be a large number of other actors trying to achieve their own aims as to how they want to solve what they see as their aim in resolving the crisis. They are the different IOs, governmental organisations (GO), and NGOs. The challenge of aligning and/or coordinating their effort is even more difficult due to their own aims, restrictions and willingness to cooperate.

Efforts to solve the challenge of unity of effort in complex present day crisis response operations have been and are being taken. However, in multi-organisational operations the problem is that no organisation is willing to give a directing right to anybody outside it. Therefore there seem to be compromise solutions where a lead is given to one of the organisations in coordinating the overall effort. For the coordination lead of the overall effort, the organisation with responsibility to assist in establishing good governance is usually chosen. A recent example of establishment of lead agencies with coordination responsibility is UNAMAS receiving the status at the NATO Bucharest summit in spring 2008.

The other challenge of unity of effort lies with the underlying currents of national interest. National interests may be seen from a global viewpoint as forwarding different national strategic interests, down to regional interests of nations bordering the conflict area or being closely aligned with any one of the parties involved in the conflict. At strategic level, these national interests may lead to nations countering international community (IC) efforts to resolve the conflict and favouring courses of actions that further their interests, whilst working within the overall international effort to resolve the crises.

From Humanitarian Support to Economic Development

A satisfied population that can sustain itself through legal means and that supports the government and its judiciary system is the basis of a functioning nation state. It is necessary to achieve the conditions where the labour force can attain employment and through it the capacity to sustain its domestic economic development. Hence one can perceive economic development as the key to the reconstruction of a nation state. Humanitarian support forms the foundation for starting economic development.

During the first stage the task of humanitarian support is to impartially resolve humanitarian suffering and from there on it should assist in preventing humanitarian suffering from recurring. In effect it should lay the foundations for economic development that thereafter should be taken care of by development aid. The risk of humanitarian support is that it may lead to dependency by the local population if it is not distributed in a planned and coordinated way whilst taking the overall aims of the crisis response operation into consideration. Even though the short term aim of humanitarian support is the prevention of human suffering, the long term aim should be the diminishment of a risk of humanitarian suffering through the establishment of economic development.

The challenge is fitting humanitarian support into the framework of crisis management. Humanitarian support should not be the responsibility of any one of the pillars of crisis management by itself since its support is needed by all three alike to be able to succeed in their tasks. Therefore one may see humanitarian support as the foundation upon which all three pillars rest.



Humanitarian support and pillars of crisis management.

This view leads to a new challenge in the coordination of humanitarian support, mainly when its lead should be transferred from one pillar to the next. The correct timing of the movement of coordination of the lead responsibility may vary greatly between different crisis response operations. Taking this into consideration, the logical conclusion is the need for an actor with the overall coordination lead for the different efforts in a crisis response operation.

The Finnish National Effort on a Solution

Finland has more than fifty years of history of involvement in crisis response. In the beginning Finland assisted mainly through support to the United Nations efforts, but later also through other actors in the field of crisis management and humanitarian support. Nationally the division of responsibility lies mainly with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence. Outside the policy level the ministries work through their agencies. Briefly one can state that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is the lead agency in Finnish crisis response, incorporating humanitarian support and development aid; the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for training and deploying personnel for civilian crisis management (mainly working in the pillars for Rule of Law and Good Governance) and the Ministry of Defence is responsible for military crisis management through the Defence Forces.

At the policy level the ministries involved are making an effort to cooperate and put their efforts into the same regions where possible so that they can support the overall effort through the different pillars. To enhance this cooperation in the field the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) is now responsible for giving individual military training and the Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Finland is now responsible for training civilian personnel for crisis management tasks. The aim of this cooperation is to familiarise the personnel designated for crisis management tasks with each others' tasks so that they will find it easier to cooperate in the field over the boundaries of the different pillars. This preparation of personnel is intended to establish unity of effort in integrated crisis management.

On the field of humanitarian support the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has distributed a publication stating the guidelines for Finnish humanitarian assistance and aid. These follow the principles set at the 2003 conference of donor nations. In these guidelines Finland calls for unity of effort by all participating actors to resolve the causes of different forms of crisis ranging from natural disasters to military conflict.[1]

Acknowledgements: I wish to thank Colonel Mauri Koskela and Oskari Eronen for their constructive comments.

[1] Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines 9/28/2007.

Gender and Crisis Management

Sofie From-Emmesberger

> *"Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women as well as of men an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal of mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality."*
> United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) definition of gender mainstreaming, 1997

As stated in the quotation, gender mainstreaming is not only an issue for women, but equally for men as beneficiaries and stakeholders of gender mainstreaming policies. Also crisis management is concerned. Responses to conflicts can be more effective and the ground is better prepared for sustainable peace and security if the whole population is involved. There is an increased international understanding that women's experiences of war provide them with a knowledge base, which can only be taken into account by engaging with women and by involving them in conflict prevention, crisis managament, peace-building and reconstruction. Women serving in operations can reach out to the local female population more easily than men and thereby gain access to valuable information. It is also important that all those involved in operations are made aware of gender issues and understand the gender dimensions of conflicts. This can also ensure responses that are more appropriate to the needs of the local population and contribute to the effectiveness and security of the operation. When advancing a comprehensive approach to crisis management it is therefore important that a gender dimension is fully integrated into all activities and at all levels.

Challenges to the Implementation of Resolution 1325

As a response to the wars in the Balkans and in Rwanda in the 1990's where rape and other forms of sexual violence were used systematically as a method of warfare, it became increasingly understood that specific political action was necessary to address the needs of women during armed conflicts. This process finally led to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 2000. It calls inter alia for "all parties in armed conflicts to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender based violence" and to put an end to impunity. However, the main message of the Resolution is that women should not only be seen as victims, but also – and especially – as a resource when peace and stability are being built.

The commitment of states to the implementation of Resolution 1325 has been confirmed on numerous occasions in the Security Council and in other international forums. The UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1820 on sexual violence in situations of armed conflict on 19th June 2008. This is the most recent manifestation of the determination

of the international community to enhance women's role in crisis management and conflict resolution in general and the fight against sexual violence in armed conflicts in particular.

Although there has been progress in the implementation of the Resolution, the fact is that there is still a lot of work to be done to have a gender perspective integrated into conflict prevention, crisis managament, peace-building, reconstruction and political participation. We are shocked by the fact that this year rape has even been used systematically in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The situation of Afghan women has improved in many ways since the fall of the Taliban in 2001; nevertheless there is still a long way to go before Afghan women get their equal share of development, resources and power. Only this summer the EU has launched its largest civilian crisis management operation ever in Kosovo. However, only less than 10 percent of the selected experts are women, and there are very few women in the highest ranking positions.

Why do we still have a huge task ahead to protect women against violence in conflicts and to increase their participation in national decision making and in crisis management operations? During the Security Council discussion on Resolution 1820 an African state put it rather bluntly: it is not evident that in all states the necessary political will to implement 1325 exists. Tradition and cultural practices can be obstacles to the inclusion of women. Moreover these are issues that also concern western states. In military crisis management the answer can simply be that there are not enough women in the national forces who could be deployed internationally. The Resolution has further been criticised for lacking provisions on monitoring, evaluation and accountability.

Finland's Action on UN Resolution 1325

Finland contributes and wants to continue to contribute to finding answers to these challenges. States have been encouraged to develop national action plans for advancing the implementation of Resolution 1325. The drafting of the Finnish Action Plan on 1325 was not done in a vacuum, as Finland has a long history of advancing women's rights, both nationally and internationally. Finnish women are working and have worked hard for this cause; President Halonen, Elisabeth Rehn, Helvi Sipilä are just few eminent personalities to be mentioned. The drafting of the Action Plan is therefore a continuation of Finland's engagement in the implementation of Resolution 1325.

Led by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the inter-ministerial working group that developed the National Action Plan was guided by the following basic principles:

i. Women should not only be seen as victims, but as capable, and often as the driving force, for building global security.
ii. Women's involvement in crisis management will make operations more effective and secure. In addition to the above mentioned arguments the inclusion of women in crisis management missions can serve as a positive example towards the local population. This also promotes confidence building between the misson and the local community.
iii. Resolution 1325 is not only for and about women; also men are responsible for its implementation.

iv. A comprehensive approach to the implementation of the Resolution is necessary. The goal is to continue to work at different levels and in different forums.

As all relevant ministries including Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior and Justice as well as civil society and academia were involved in the fruitful discussions and in the drafting of the Action Plan one can say that already the process as such has contributed to increased coherence in the crisis management field in Finland. A Follow-up Group will be appointed to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the Action Plan. A Steering Group has already been set up to advise on civilian recruitment, training and research. As all partners involved in the development of the Action Plan will also participate in its implementation, the framework is set for continued dialogue and information sharing between national stakeholders.

The Action Plan is in addition to crisis management also addressing the questions of the prevention of conflicts, peace negotiations and peace building as well as the question of strengthening, protecting and safeguarding the human rights of women and girls. Work will continue in all these areas at three different levels; nationally in Finland, internationally (EU, UN and others) and locally in crisis areas. Here is a brief description of some planned activities in the crisis management field.

Work to Be Done at National Level

The fact that UN peacekeeping missions and crisis management operations of the EU and other regional organisation are dependent on national capabilities makes it crucial that a gender perspective is integrated into the training of national forces and civilian personnel. A gender perspective is already included in the military and civilian crisis management training of Finnish staff. However, training leading to increased gender sensitivity can still be intensified. Special attention will continue to be paid to the importance of understanding local women's rights and needs in conflict situations and especially to the detection, monitoring, reporting and acting upon any gender related security threats.

Finnish peacekeepers decorated with KFOR medals in 2003. Photo Finnish Defence Forces.

During the debate on Resolution 1820 in June 2008, the Secretary General of the UN did call for states to come forward with more female personnel. The aim of Finland is to also increase the recruitment of women to leading positions in crisis management operations. The fact that the number of female recruits to the military service is low – together with the rather slow career development of the military in general – which will affect the likelihood of the armed forces to meet this goal. On the civilian side the increase of recruitment of women should be easier. Finland will also continue to contribute with qualified gender experts for crisis management operations. A list of gender experts will be compiled and will facilitate the selection of candidates to gender advisor positions.

Work in the EU and at International Level

Finland participates in international crisis management cooperation in the framework of, for example, the UN, EU, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe and the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP). The EU has only recently developed both military and civilian crisis management capabilities. Finland has actively promoted the inclusion of a gender perspective into crisis management. During the Finnish EU Presidency in 2006 the EU Council of Ministers declared in its conclusions that gender aspects will be incorporated in all activities of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). To facilitate this task a checklist on mainstreaming gender into the ESDP was developed. A welcome step was the publication of the handbook on human rights and gender mainstreaming in ESDP operations during the Slovenian Presidency in 2008. In order to serve as a useful tool in missions it is important to increasingly adopt this handbook to mission specific needs by making it more concrete.

The EU is implementing these guidelines in its missions. The mission of the EU in Chad/RCA, which has been operational since spring 2008, serves as a good example. The environment in which the EUFOR is operating is prone to sexual and gender based violence. The EU is responding to the complex security threats e.g. through mainstreaming systematically a gender programme into operational planning and in the execution of the operation. This is done *inter alia* by appointing gender focal points in all units in the field, collecting gender-disaggregated data from the area of operations as well as by training and raising awareness among EUFOR troops on the different security rights and needs of women and men.

Lessons from the ground have proved that gender experts need to be involved directly from the beginning in the planning of operations i.e. also in all the different bodies in Brussels (EUMS, CPSS, DGs VIII and IX, Civ-Mil Cell). It would also be important to have a clearly identified point of contact in the EU for the Gender Advisors working in EU missions. High Representative Solana's Personal Representative on Human Rights Dr. Kionka is actively engaged in this work, but the resources put at her disposal are still limited.

One of the three priorities of Finland during the Chairmanship of the OSCE is gender mainstreaming. The OSCE Action plan for the promotion of gender equality provides a basis for gender mainstreaming. The Action Plan calls for gender mainstreaming into all activities of the OSCE.

Work in Crisis Areas

The inclusion of local women and women's organisations into conflict prevention, crisis management, peace negotiations and reconstruction is important in many respects. On the basis of their own experience of being rooted in the local community, women can sense crisis situations and identify the needs and required responses. Over and over again the importance of education must be stressed. Through education women and girls can be aware of their rights and begin to understand and realise their potential.

Finland has worked and will continue to work closely both with domestic and with international NGOs to also address these matters. In implementing Resolution 1325 e.g. through advocacy work and training activities, the role of NGOs can not be overemphasised. Resolution 1325 is itself a case in point, as a group of NGOs played a crucial role in getting this issue onto the Security Council's agenda. Also the role of Finnish NGOs to have a working group established for the development of the Action Plan was important. The so-called 1325 NGO network's contribution to the drafting process of the Action Plan was significant.

It is important to continue to support 1325 related projects with Finnish development aid. An interesting aspect that requires more thorough investigation is the role of local men. As they have a decisive role in changing attitudes in their communities it is only by also involving men that gender policies can succeed. The extension of gender mainstreaming activities to men as well, who have themselves experienced violence, can have positive effects on the situation of local women and on the local community as a whole. There also has to be a readiness to respond to new challenges. One such issue is climate change and its gender effects in which Finland has already started to build its own expertise.

In future years Africa will receive special attention from Finland. The implementation of the EU-African Union Strategy and Action Plan has started. Together with African partners, Finland is also currently planning a national comprehensive programme on crisis management training. The emphasis will be on civilian crisis management. This programme will provide a good framework to also have gender and human rights included.

Focus on the Future

In order to build peace and security it is clear that deeds, not words, count. The Finnish Action Plan will be operationalised as a next step. A comprehensive approach in its implementation will be guaranteed through the establishment of the above mentioned Follow-up Group and Steering Group.

Finland can become a model for other partners in integrating gender training even more firmly into crisis management training. The CMC Finland is already a leading centre for civilian crisis management training. The same goes for military training. The establishment of the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management provides a good opportunity to raise Finland's profile even more. Already the foundation of the Centre makes Finland a frontrunner in civil-military cooperation and training. Building training

models for gender mainstreaming and promoting the understanding of the importance of including a gender dimension into comprehensive crisis management can bring additional value. Those Finnish experts who over the years have gathered valuable 'on the ground expertise' in human rights and gender work should be firmly and systematically integrated into this process. Findings and good practices should be fed into the development of training programmes of *inter alia* the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and the European Group of Training as well as into mission specific training.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is evidently willing to share its own expertise in this field with the Centre. E.g. the gender ambassador and the newly appointed human rights ambassador can contribute to the planning on the basis of their fact finding missions in crisis areas.

In order to meet the challenges of having Resolution 1325 implemented we need to join forces. The best results can be achieved through cooperation and through creating national synergy, with NGOs, EU and international and regional organisations as well as local partners. Appropriate guidance for all partners and stakeholders is a quotation from Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon's statement during the UN Security Council discussion on Women, Peace and Security, on 19th June 2008: "By creating a culture that punishes violence and elevates women to their rightful role, we can lay the foundation for lasting stability, where women are not victims of violence, but agents of peace."

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Security Sector Reform: Towards a Comprehensive Finnish Approach

Heli Siivola

> *"As we increase capabilities in different areas, we should think in terms of wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building."*
> European Security Strategy 2003

While international crisis management can play a crucial role in the stabilisation of conflict areas, the ability of national authorities to provide security for the state and its citizens is a precondition for stability and development in the long term. The nexus between security and development has become widely acknowledged and the establishment of a democratically run, accountable and efficient security sector is increasingly seen as an integral part of post-conflict peace-building and good governance. Progress in security sector reform (SSR) can also form part of the exit strategy for international crisis management actors.

In the past decade, the need to enhance support for SSR has been widely debated in various international forums, including the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)**.** In 2004, the OECD DAC endorsed DAC Guidelines on SSR. The OECD DAC Handbook on SSR subsequently provided guidance on how to operationalise these guidelines. An OECD DAC ministerial statement endorsing the key commitments emerging from the handbook was signed in April 2007[1]. In 2006, the EU adopted an overall policy framework for SSR, bringing together the earlier European Commission Communication and the concept for European Security and Defence Policy support to SSR.[2] The UN currently aims to develop a coherent UN approach to SSR on the basis of a recent report by the UN Secretary-General.

What is meant by Security Sector Reform?

While there is no generally accepted definition of SSR, most stakeholders have taken the broad interpretation of the OECD DAC as a basis. Accordingly, the security sector is seen to include *core security actors* (armed forces, police etc.); *management and oversight bodies* (relevant ministries, parliament etc.); *justice and rule of law institutions* (judiciary, prosecutors, prisons etc.); and *non-statutory security forces* (guerrilla armies, private security actors etc.).[3] As summarised by the UN Secretary General, SSR "has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law".[4] Thus reforms need to address both

[1] OECD 2007. The ministerial statement is included in pages 10–12.
[2] See EU 2006.
[3] OECD 2005, 20-21.
[4] UNSG 2008, 6.

the operational capacity of security actors (effectiveness) and the way they are governed (accountability).[5] SSR thus covers three inter-related challenges:

i. "Developing a clear institutional framework for the provision of security that integrates security and development policy and includes all relevant actors
ii. Strengthening the governance of the security institutions
iii. Building capable and professional security forces that are accountable to civil authorities."[6]

SSR assistance can be carried out both through development cooperation as well as civilian and military crisis management and other forms of security policy cooperation (e.g. NATO Partnership for Peace). Core lessons from previous engagements underline that SSR needs to be a nationally led process based on the specific needs and conditions of the country in question. Donors need to recognise the highly political nature of SSR and adopt a conflict sensitive approach. Moreover, particular attention should be paid to mainstreaming gender perspective in order to ensure an inclusive approach. Furthermore, SSR should be always linked to broader national reform and development agendas. This is essential with regard to the sustainability of reforms over the longer term. Finally, while it is important to ensure adequate resources for capacity building (e.g. infrastructure, training and equipment), at the same time more attention should be paid to the rule of law, governance and civilian oversight, including the role of the civil society and the media.[7]

There has been a tendency of donors to take a piecemeal approach to SSR and implement projects without enough consideration as to how they fit into the overall process.[8] This is apparent, for example, in Afghanistan where a multitude of donors is eager to see progress amid very challenging conditions. While the need for 'quick fixes' is understandable given the circumstances, lack of true Afghan ownership, inadequate coordination among the various donors and between the different but overlapping sectors (e.g. police and rule of law) and the tendency to focus too much on operational capabilities and too little on their governance may turn out to be counter-productive for SSR in the long term.[9]

To ensure overall success, SSR calls for a comprehensive (or 'whole-of-government') approach bringing together security and development actors while respecting their distinct roles.[10] At the same time, we must acknowledge that SSR related actions can take place in very different circumstances and that we are talking about a long process during which the roles of different actors can vary. For instance, in an immediate post-conflict situation the early steps of SSR could be supported by a wider crisis management operation (e.g. one of the tasks of the ISAF operation is to contribute to the development of the Afghan National Army), while in a more stable environment support could take the form of a specific SSR operation (e.g. the EU SSR mission in Guinea Bissau). While development cooperation would play a crucial role in both situations, its possibilities to contribute to SSR are likely to increase in a more stable environment where stronger local ownership could be expected.[11]

[5] OECD 2007, e.g. 10, 22.
[6] OECD 2005, 16.
[7] See e.g. UNSG 2008, 11–12.
[8] OECD 2007, e.g. 13–14, 23.
[9] See e.g. Barley 2008; Ball and van de Goor 2008, 8; OECD 2007, 24–25.
[10] See e.g. OECD 2005, 12–13.
[11] See e.g. OECD 2007, 24–25; EU 2005, 12-13; OECD 2008, 18–19.

Moreover, we must be realistic in that the formulation of a comprehensive SSR strategy is a lengthy process both with regard to the national policies of the partner country in question and the approaches of individual donors and the international community as a whole. Hence, it could be argued that to some extent a piecemeal approach is unavoidable, because the realities on the ground often call for faster solutions. However, more emphasis should be paid to ensuring that the 'quick fixes' contribute to the overall aim of a comprehensive and sustainable SSR process. For instance, it is important that individual stakeholders focusing on specific sectors (e.g. police reform) have an overall understanding of the nature and aims of SSR and acknowledge the linkages between different sectors (e.g. police and prosecutors)[12].

A Quest for a Comprehensive Approach

Despite extensive work done during the past few years by the OECD DAC and the EU, a true whole-of-government approach is only slowly emerging both in international and national forums. While the need for a comprehensive approach is widely acknowledged by both the development and security communities, they still seem to rarely meet around the same table. However, various recent events give grounds for some optimism.

On the EU side, the first joint session of the EU development and defence ministers was held in November 2007. The following Council Conclusions named SSR as one of the priority areas for further work.[13] The OECD, on its part, has been making an effort to broaden the DAC debate on SSR to include its security and defence counterparts. The DAC and NATO secretariats have held their first staff talks, paving the way for further cooperation. In April 2008, a thematic meeting on SSR, organised under the auspices of DAC, brought together representatives of the political, development and defence departments of member states, key international organisations such as the UN and NATO, as well as think tanks and NGOs. The need "to more actively engage with and involve diplomatic and defence communities" is stressed in the Chair's Summary of the meeting.[14]

However, it should be noted that there are also other security counterparts that need to be engaged. For example, in Finland the responsibility for civilian crisis management is divided between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (representing the 'diplomatic community'), responsible for political guidance and the Ministry of the Interior, responsible for developing and maintaining national capabilities for civilian crisis management. Taking into account the crucial role of civilian crisis management (i.e. police advisers, judges, prosecutors, prison personnel, border officers etc.) in SSR related activities, it is essential to also involve stakeholders such as the Ministries of the Interior and Justice. The fact that activities carried out under civilian crisis management and development cooperation to promote good governance and rule of law can be very similar underlines both the need for effective coordination as well as the potential for synergies.

Here we come to the limits of international forums. For logistical reasons it is hard to imagine a joint meeting of the EU foreign, development, defence, interior and justice

[12] OECD 2007, e.g. 23, 42.
[13] EU 2007.
[14] OECD 2008, 14.

ministers. Instead, we must turn our eyes to national level. It is for the nations to ensure that their ministers speak with one voice and represent not only their respective departments, but the government as a whole. This may seem like stating the obvious, but anyone who has worked in a state administration has undoubtedly encountered conflicting interests, and sometimes even rivalries, between different government departments and agencies. Effective cooperation requires compromises on all sides, and the often quoted truth is that **w**hile everyone wants coordination, no one likes to be coordinated.

The conference background paper prepared by the Clingendael Institute for the April 2008 thematic meeting on SSR suggests that the necessary guidance for a whole-of-government approach to SSR could be achieved by the combination of a publicly available national SSR policy, to which all relevant ministries and departments have committed themselves, and wider country-specific support strategies into which also SSR activities would be embedded. Several countries have also created dedicated structures (e.g. the UK's Stabilisation Unit) to promote a whole-of-government approach.[15]

The UK and the Netherlands are considered among the forerunners of SSR. The UK Security Sector Reform Policy Brief in 2003 affirmed the commitment of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence to SSR, although in general it provides more of a background briefing than policy guidelines.[16] The Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs (covering both foreign policy and development cooperation) and Defence have adopted an internal working paper on SSR. The need to broaden its scope to also involve the Ministries of the Interior and Justice has been recognised.[17]

The Swedish policy paper on SSR signed by the State Secretaries for Foreign Affairs, International Development Cooperation, Justice and Defence in December 2007 is of interest. It outlines the leading principles, geographical focus, key definitions, financial aspects as well as planning and coordination structures for the Swedish approach on SSR, though at a rather general level. According to the paper, the Government Offices of Sweden will, *inter alia*, establish a cross-governmental SSR group to coordinate related policy issues and continue to examine the development of flexible financing mechanisms for SSR.18

At a country level, most donors use some sort of country strategies. However, they are rarely based on joint assessments and planning and tend to focus only on one form of support (e.g. development assistance). The challenge is to come up with country-specific policies that are based on a joint assessment of the security and development needs of the country in question and outline a common framework for the planning and implementation of a coordinated response using all available instruments (development assistance, civilian and military crisis management, economic cooperation, diplomatic actions etc.), as necessary. SSR considerations should form an integral part of these overall policies. The UK has piloted whole-of-government approaches for several countries.[19]

[15] Anten et al. 2008, 2–6.
[16] The UK Policy Brief is available at: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/security-sector-brief.pdf, 18.8.2008. See also Ball and van de Goor 2008.
[17] Anten et al. 2008, 2.
[18] Svensk inriktning avseende säkerhetssektorreform (SSR). Available at: http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/10/19/38/985eeddf.pdf, 18.8.2008.
[19] Anten et al. 2008, 3; OECD 2008, 18–19.

In addition to a clear policy vision, donors need to ensure adequate resources for SSR both in terms of funding and expertise.[20] Flexible and predictable funding for SSR is one of the main challenges for a whole-of-government approach. While the OECD DAC underlines the importance of an efficient and accountable security sector, SSR also includes activities that are not eligible for official development assistance (ODA). These are mainly activities that contribute to 'the strengthening of the military or fighting capacity of the armed forces' (e.g. military training support); training of police 'in counter-subversion methods, suppression of political dissidence, or intelligence gathering on political activities' (other police training support is eligible); and 'assistance that contributes to increased capacity on counter-terrorism' Most other SSR-related activities, including for example civilian capacity building and efforts to improve democratic governance and civilian control, qualify as ODA.[21] Comprehensive support to SSR thus requires the coordinated use of different budget lines, both ODA and non-ODA.

As an answer to this challenge, for example the UK (Conflict Prevention Pool and Stabilisation Aid Fund) and the Netherlands (Stability Fund) have established cross-governmental pools that consist of both ODA and non-ODA funds. In the case of the Dutch Stability Fund, capacity for rapid and flexibility support is further enhanced by the fact that issues related to ODA eligibility are not part of the project selection criteria, but will be assessed after decision making. With regard to the UK pools, 70–80 % of the funded activities have to be reportable as ODA.[22] At the international level, the EU Instrument for Stability and the UN Peacebuilding Fund are good examples of mechanisms enabling quick and flexible support in post-conflict situations, including support to SSR.

Regarding human resources, increasing attention is paid to the development of cross-governmental expert pools as well as training on SSR. Timely identification and releasability of the necessary security, governance and development experts is essential. As the releasability of government and military officials is often difficult, it has been stressed that the pools should also include non-government employees (e.g. NGO representatives and consultants). Moreover, efforts should be made to encourage government and military officials to join the pools and to facilitate their release.[23]

Towards a Comprehensive Finnish Approach

Finland has actively supported the development of the EU policy framework for SRR. Moreover, during the Finnish EU Presidency in autumn 2006, further work was pursued on the SSR related field of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), leading to the adoption of the joint EU Concept on DDR approved by both the European Commission and the Council of the EU in December 2006. Having signed up to the policy and operational commitments made within the framework of the EU and the OECD DAC, Finland has a clear obligation to also implement them at national level.

[20] See e.g. OECD 2005, 24–27; OECD 2008, 14–22.
[21] OECD 2007, 238, 250–251.
[22] OECD 2007, 238; Anten et al. 2008, 9–11, 19–20.
[23] Anten et al. 2008, 5, 12–15; OECD 2008, 20–21.

People walking towards a DDR weapons collection site in Liberia in 2004. Photo Finnish Defence Forces.

The concepts of SSR and DDR have been debated within the informal cross-governmental Security and Development Group. A broad consensus exists on the importance of SSR across the relevant government departments, including the Political and Development Departments of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior. However, national SSR policy guidelines that would clearly outline, *inter alia*, the key principles, geographical focus areas and necessary coordination mechanisms for Finnish SSR assistance, as well as address the related resource issues, both human and financial, would facilitate cooperation between different departments and enhance the overall effectiveness of Finnish support.

A good basis exists for developing such guidelines. The Finnish Government Programme (2007) advocates a broad concept of security and underlines the need for broad-based international cooperation as well as well-functioning interagency coordination at national level.[24] Accordingly, both the forthcoming Government report on Security and Defence Policy and Finland's Development Policy Programme (2007) are based on a broad concept of security. The latter emphasises the nexus between security, development and human rights and stresses the need to pay particular attention to societies suffering or recovering from crises.[25] It further underlines that "support for these countries calls for a comprehensive approach and partnership in which military and civilian crisis management on the one hand

[24] Government Programme 2007, 8–9.
[25] Development Policy Programme 2007, 15–16, 34.

and development cooperation and humanitarian assistance on the other are coordinated to achieve the best possible overall effect."[26]

The concept of broad security also guides interagency cooperation on issues related to homeland security, as presented in the Government Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society. This interagency cooperation brings together various national stakeholders, *inter alia*, defence forces, police, fire and rescue, social and health services, customs officials and border guards.27 National experiences from well-established interagency cooperation give a good basis for a comprehensive approach to mentoring and advisory tasks in the context of SSR.

With regard to civilian and military crisis management, various informal configurations have been established between the key ministries to coordinate Finnish crisis management activities. However, there has been a tendency to discuss civilian and military activities in separate configurations, partly advanced by the fact that within the MFA the responsibility for crisis management has been divided between two units. The Unit for Security Policy has been responsible for issues related to military crisis management, in close cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Staff, while the Unit for Civilian Crisis Management has taken care of civilian crisis management activities, in close cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice.

The need to enhance Finland's capacity to participate in international crisis management by intensifying cooperation related to the use of military and civilian capabilities is stressed in the Government Programme.[28] The reorganisation of the MFA, which came into effect on 1st September 2008, contributes to this effort by creating a combined Unit for Security Policy and Crisis Management. This will bring civilian and military crisis management under the same roof and thus help to promote a more comprehensive civil-military approach towards areas of key interest to Finland, such as the Western Balkans and Afghanistan.

At the level of national capacity building, extensive civil-military cooperation already exists between the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) and the Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland). The latter is responsible for civilian crisis management training and recruitment, under the Ministry of the Interior. In May 2008 the two institutions launched an initiative to establish a Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management, which aims to further develop civil-military cooperation and coordination in crisis management both with regard to national capacity building and international crisis management operations. Given the long traditions and high quality of Finnish military training, as well as the fact that CMC Finland is among the forerunners of civilian crisis management training, this enhanced cooperation has a lot of potential both in terms of Finnish SSR assistance and comprehensive crisis management in general.

However, enhanced coordination and cooperation between civilian and military crisis management is only one part of the puzzle. As noted earlier, for effective SSR assistance, it is crucial to ensure coordination between the security and development actors. Within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the key stakeholders thus include the Political Department,

[26] Development Policy Programme 2007, 31.
[27] See Government Resolution 2006.
[28] Government Programme 2007, 9.

the Department for Development Policy and the four regional departments. Though areas of key interest to Finland are frequently discussed in cross-governmental configurations, including the informal Security and Development Group as well as various thematic and regional *ad hoc* meetings, there would be a need to establish clear coordination mechanisms between the different departments and ministries. Moreover, the role of the NGOs should also be recognised.

In August 2008, the Finnish Foreign Minister nominated a cross-governmental working group to examine a comprehensive Finnish approach to crisis management. The working group includes senior representatives from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Political and Development Policy Departments), Prime Minister's Office, Ministry of Defence, Defence Staff, Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Justice. It has been tasked *inter alia* to produce a comprehensive crisis management strategy. While the mandate of the working group is more general, it also provides a good forum for further discussions about the Finnish approach to SSR.

SSR from the Viewpoint of Finnish Crisis Management Participation

Finland's participation in the three ongoing EU SSR operations is currently limited to one person (an adviser on human rights and children in armed conflicts to the EUPOL and EUSEC missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo). However, other Finnish civilian crisis management experts are to a large extent also engaged with SSR related advisory, mentoring and training tasks. The participation of Finnish soldiers, on the other hand, has focused on more traditional crisis management tasks aimed at contributing to a safe and secure environment. There are some exceptions, though, including international training activities such as NORDCAPS Military Observer Courses in the Balkans and the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) courses organised under a Finnish funded ACCORD programme in Africa. Further support to the development of African crisis management capabilities, possibly in cooperation with other Nordic partners, is being planned. However, we are talking about small-scale activities involving a couple of Finnish officers, not dozens.

At the same time, both in Afghanistan and in the Western Balkans, areas of focal interest to Finland, the focus of international engagement is moving increasingly towards the development of local security structures. Of the around 700 Finnish soldiers currently abroad in crisis management tasks, the majority is based in Kosovo (approx. 450 soldiers) and Afghanistan (approx. 100 soldiers). Kosovo and Afghanistan also provide the key challenges with regard to Finnish civilian crisis management participation. Moreover, they are both Finland's development cooperation partners in the category of partner countries recovering from violent crises.

In Kosovo, the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX Kosovo) aims to support the Kosovo authorities in building a sustainable and accountable rule of law system, including functional police, judiciary, customs and correctional services. Finland is preparing to send around 60 civilian experts, *inter alia* police officers, judges, prosecutors, prison offices and border guards, to the operation. This will increase the number of Finnish civilian

experts abroad to approximately 150. Finnish development cooperation in Kosovo aims to complement EU actions.

On the military side, NATO is taking a more prominent role in supporting the development and training of Kosovo security forces (KSF) in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan. Taking into account Finland's overall engagement in Kosovo, including a prominent role in the NATO-led KFOR operation[29], an active involvement in the development of the KSF would be logical. However, it has turned out to be challenging to find military experts for these supporting tasks.

In Afghanistan, the NATO-led ISAF operation is increasingly engaged in the training and mentoring of the Afghan National Army, in particular through the so-called Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs). In February 2008, Finland decided to send 10 OMLT mentors to Afghanistan to support the development of Afghan security forces. While the decision represents an interesting new opening with regard to Finnish crisis management participation, its implementation has been affected by the fact that Finnish OMLT participation is concentrated for the time being at headquarters level in northern Afghanistan.

On the civilian side, Finland is actively involved in the EU Police mission that contributes to Afghan police reform. Finland has currently 9 civilian experts in the mission and aims to double the number as part of the EU decision to double the overall size of the mission. Moreover, the small-scale SSR projects (e.g. crime scene investigation training and improvement of police and prison facilities) conducted by Finnish civilian experts under the auspices of ISAF's Provincial Reconstruction Teams provide a good example of a way to combine the means of crisis management and development cooperation. While in general the projects have been considered a success, lessons identified underline the need to ensure the coordination and sustainability of SSR efforts.

It seems that for the moment Finland could bring added value to international SSR efforts especially through development cooperation and the experience gained in civilian crisis management. Further development of the expert register for civilian crisis management could help to ensure the availability of necessary experts. Management of the pool was recently handed over to the CMC Finland, bringing the whole recruitment and training process closer to the grass-root level. Particular attention should be paid to ensuring necessary development, governance and human rights expertise, both governmental and non-governmental. Moreover, questions related to the releasability of government officials should be addressed. Finland could, for example, play a much bigger role in the fields of border control and customs should more experts become available for international activities.

With regard to military support, questions of releasability are even more pertinent. As noted earlier, Finland has vast experience in military training and could bring added value to SSR efforts through a comprehensive civil-military approach and its experiences gained from international crisis management and national interagency cooperation. However, while the fact that Finnish defence is based on general conscription makes it possible to recruit high-

[29] In August 2008, Finland assumed responsibility as framework nation for the Multinational Task Force Centre (MNTF C) for a period of 12 months. Currently, around 450 Finnish soldiers serve in the operation.

quality personnel for crisis management operations, it also underlines national training needs. The wartime strength of the Finnish Defence Forces is currently around 350 000 soldiers, while the number of permanent personnel is around 16 000 persons of whom only one fifth are officers. Taking into account that every year about 27 000 conscripts are trained and around 35 000 reservists undergo refresher training, difficulties in finding military experts for international advisory, mentoring and training tasks are understandable.[30]

However, the other side of the coin is that SSR related tasks will continue to gain in importance both with regard to international crisis management activities and other forms of security cooperation (e.g. within the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace or the EU-Africa Partnership on Peace and Security). If Finland wants to make a significant contribution to international crisis management and security cooperation in the future, it is essential to enhance the Finnish capacity to participate in advisory, mentoring and training tasks with both civilian and military experts within and outside crisis management operations. Participation in international support activities should be seen as a positive factor both in terms of individual career development and the increased know-how of the sending organisation as a whole. Moreover, attention should be paid to training in order to enhance the overall understanding of SSR. Otherwise we run the risk of losing touch with today's realities.

Needless to say, enhanced support must go hand in hand with increased financial resources. While in principle the budget lines for civilian and military crisis management enable support for a wide range of SSR activities, the existing financial resources are already under pressure with regard to the more traditional crisis management activities. While SSR efforts carried out under civilian crisis management can and should to a large extent be complemented with development assistance, it is particularly important to ensure adequate funding for the non-ODA eligible military aspects of SSR.

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PRT Lessons of Comprehensiveness: the Past and Future of Integrated Field Units

Oskari Eronen

The mission in post-Taliban Afghanistan has introduced a novel concept of joint civilian-military units. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) combine a broad range of resources in order to create conditions for the peaceful development of Afghanistan and its legitimate government. The PRT concept was introduced to Iraq in 2005, but otherwise it has not yet been applied in peace support operations.

The PRTs have become a widely discussed topic in crisis management. While the integration of military and civilian efforts at field level evidently carry added value, the PRTs have also been intensely criticised. This article reviews some of the common arguments about the PRT experiment from the perspectives of integration and comprehensiveness. Starting from the key characteristics of the existing units, it attempts to condense three possible, or emerging, modes of tactical civil-military integration in future crisis management missions. These correspond to different phases along the crisis cycle. Finally, the paper draws some preliminary conclusions for Finnish national capacity building in crisis management.[1]

The PRT Mission in Afghanistan

Even if today the UN-mandated and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) appears to be a strong security actor in Afghanistan, this has not always been the case. It could be said that the PRTs represent the first, soft wave of ISAF presence in Afghanistan. Indeed, the PRTs emerged in 2002–2003 from discussions of how "to spread the 'ISAF effect' without expanding [a strong] ISAF itself"[2]. Though the US-led and a few other units started under coalition Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), all 26 PRTs in Afghanistan now operate within ISAF.

ISAF was established in late 2001 to guarantee a secure environment for the implementation of the settlement agreed in Bonn, Germany, which steered the build-up of a new Afghan state and political system until 2005. In 2005, the PRTs were given a mission to

> *"assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable SSR [Security Sector Reform] and reconstruction efforts"*[3].

The PRTs were expected to facilitate the realisation of the post-Bonn system in provinces by monitoring the security situation, supporting SSR and creating conditions for reconstruction and development to take place. ISAF later categorised PRT activities into three 'lines of operations': security, governance and development. As such, the PRTs are planned to

[1] This article builds extensively on author's research project on the PRTs, commissioned by the Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Finland. Cf. Eronen 2008.
[2] McNerney 2005, 32.
[3] ISAF 2007, B-2-1/2.

'monitor', 'support', 'liaise' and 'facilitate' plenty of things, but not to 'run', 'execute' and 'implement'. Dziedzic and Seidl, US commentators from the field, remind us that the PRTs "are the grease, not the wheel"[4].

Local Results, Comprehensive Criticism

The PRTs have performed reasonably well in supporting the Afghan state-building process in 2003–2005. Post-Bonn projects like national elections (presidential, parliamentary and provincial), the UNDP-led DDR-programme and establishment of local administrations have clearly benefited from the monitoring and support role of the PRTs. The units have formed a balancing deterrent to provinces ruled to a great extent by warlords. However, their positive role in the phase of reconstruction and development is less evident. Critics comment that in achieving a more qualitative progress of good and efficient governance than the mere establishment of structures, the current PRTs may not be very cost-effective.

There exists a difficult structural dilemma in the PRTs as a post-conflict stabilisation tool: while they seem to be reasonably well-equipped for creating conditions for local security and development, their active performance, especially in reconstruction, may end up being counterproductive to wider progress towards a functioning domestic government in Afghanistan. As is so often the case in crisis management and peace-building, once again the problem is lack of local ownership. The PRTs have been charged with getting too directly involved in local development efforts through various projects and funding channels to the Afghan provinces. These have utilised both military and civilian resources.[5]

The PRTs illustrate how comprehensiveness in crisis management is not without its problems. The important Afghanistan mission has undoubtedly formed a primary trigger and a test field for the development of national 'whole-of-government' approaches (WGA). What makes the Afghan case truly special is the innovative concept of bringing WGA to field level. ISAF contributors project their WGA to singular Afghan provinces in lines of security, governance and development – both through and alongside joint civilian-military units, the PRTs. Ironically it is this same provincial WGA focus that places the wider comprehensive approach of the international community in danger.

Misalignment with Afghan needs, priorities and plans is exacerbated by the nature of the PRT network. The laudable flexibility of the concept has translated into an undisciplined variety of national models. Despite a 'command and control' authority over the PRTs, the ISAF Headquarters can only exercise its powers in key military tasks, with the units in reality taking their guidance mostly from western capitals. Led by one ISAF nation, each PRT uniquely interprets its mission in security, governance and development. The widest differences are found in project funds originating from national budgets (military and/or development) to the PRTs. Approximate sums vary between zero and USD 10 million

[4] Dziedzic and Seidl 2005, 8.

[5] Vigorous project activities of some of the units have attracted fierce criticism from the humanitarian agencies and developmental NGOs, who accuse the PRTs of blurring the separation of civilian and military roles. This has been a constant topic of debate since 2003. A case in point by Save the Children 2004.

per unit. How this affects local administrations in the provinces and the Afghan national planning remains a taboo subject among many big donors.[6]

Fairly significant alterations to the concept are required, if the PRT scheme is to be employed elsewhere in future crisis management missions. Better coherence between units and within the entire mission must be achieved[7]. If tactical/field level elements are given tasks and funds in reconstruction and development, this consequently calls for reconsideration of the independent lead nation system. A centrally coordinated trust fund mechanism could also be considered.

Clearer definition of the mission and tasks should be reflected in the name of the units as well. Some of the PRTs in Afghanistan live up to their name as *reconstruction* teams, while others do not. Unclear missions, misleading activities and high expectations of the local people have set the PRTs in unhealthy competition against each other. If the *modus operandi* does not focus on reconstruction, the title should be shifted to 'Stabilisation Team'. Taking into consideration the broad criticism, it is unlikely that 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams' as we now know them will be deployed outside Afghanistan and Iraq.

Experiences in Civil-Military Jointness

The PRTs are generally welcomed in their capacity to integrate a wide range of civilian and military resources. Even Save the Children agrees that the PRTs may provide a positive factor in integrating approaches to security and development and in advancing the concept of human security[8]. Tactical civil-military jointness is the most likely element of the PRTs to be adopted elsewhere.

Again the lead nation approach has an overwhelming impact on the teams. Various national PRT models define the roles and responsibilities of military and civilian components very differently. Organisational structures, internal coordination arrangements and resources available vary greatly. The units have also assumed different forms of leadership. Many follow the orders of a military commander, while some have established dual or a broader civil-military leadership. A few are led by a civilian director.

PRTs are reflections of the domestic situation. Each national label originates from traditions, limitations, opportunities, debates and organisational cultures of the capitals. On one hand, it is certainly true that the creation of the PRTs has stimulated new thinking on interdepartmental coordination and coherence and has thus encouraged the development of more efficient 'whole-of-government' approaches. On the other, the teams epitomise the different stages of 'culture of cooperation' at the home front.

Contrary to expectations, actual civil-military integration within the PRTs remains an understudied topic. The few commentators list a lack of guidance on roles and responsibilities as the main source of friction in PRT internal relations. Piiparinen analyses differences in traditions, mental mindsets and concepts between civilian and military officials. These affect

[6] A recent report on aid effectiveness touching also the PRTs by Waldman 2007.
[7] In the case of Afghanistan, this should include also the UN Assistance Mission (UNAMA).
[8] Save the Children 2004, 35.

the ways of organising the administration of a unit, as well as interaction with the local population. With only loose external and internal guidelines, the PRTs are "left to their own devices" to organise their mission. A clash of mindsets remains possible and harmony is "ensured only by goodwill on the part of the individuals", Piiparinen concludes.[9] US Interagency study is concerned with the finding that "personality played a disproportionate role in determining the direction of PRT activities"[10]. Success is based on *ad hoc* trial and error instead of on well designed organisational processes[11].

Human resources are central to the functioning of the PRTs. Stressful and potentially dangerous conditions together with the strict limitations on everyday life make recruitment challenging. Most of the US civilian representatives have been junior officers or retirees from diplomatic service, Perito records[12]. Another challenge is that Afghans repeatedly prefer military commanders to civilian representatives as their liaison.

A practical factor further complicating civil-military integration is a mismatch between resources. Civilian experts are frequently sent into the field without any administrative, logistical or security assets. Civilians become dependent upon the services of the military component, which makes them vulnerable to overruling military priorities and hinders their opportunities to meet their local counterparts.[13] In addition, discrepancies in funding create internal gaps.

Integrated Leader Group of PRT Meymaneh briefing ISAF Commander in 2007. Photo Finnish Defence Forces.

[9] Piiparinen 2007, 149–155.
[10] US Interagency 2006, 10.
[11] Perito 2005, 11.
[12] Perito 2005, 11–12.
[13] Perito 2005, 11.

Despite these shortcomings, the most important lesson identified in the PRT experiment is jointness between military and civilian instruments. This ties in well with a broader trend of seeking better coherence among various military and civilian assets, methods and efforts in crisis management and peace-building. Noticeably, most of NATO's Concept Development and Experimentation efforts draw from and support the operation in Afghanistan. It is foreseeable that NATO will assume the PRTs as a base tactical model for its version of future integrated crisis management. PRT experiences have also entered into US doctrines of stabilisation and reconstruction operations. Actors like the UN and the EU have their own concepts of civil-military coordination, but have so far not applied integration at tactical levels.

Potential Designs of Integration

The following chapter will explore some possible future scenarios of civil-military integration in the field. The method employed here will be an imaginative and speculative extrapolation based loosely upon international PRT experiences in Afghanistan. Three foreseeable forms are suggested. They vary significantly from each other in:

- Tasks.
- Vicinity to combat/kinetic/enforcement operations.
- Size of components.
- System of leadership and role of civilian experts.
- Funding for projects.
- Mode of project activities.

These variations reflect the different mission types in different stages of the crisis management cycle. Phases of immediate peace-enforcement, stabilisation and transit each require specific capabilities and formations to meet the dynamic crisis context. The categories proposed should not be understood as one-model-fits-all solutions, but more generic types upon which to build.

Careful analysis of the environment is of utmost importance in producing integrated units for the field. Without solid understanding and a clear mission the team will be seriously handicapped by internal struggles over the interpretation of its main effort. Roles and responsibilities between and within components have to be defined and all the functions of the unit must be resourced matched with the particular tasks and roles. These lessons should be learned by policy planners in the capitals and not left to those who are expected to deliver on the ground.

Form A: Embedded CIMIC Entry Force

In this option civilian experts are incorporated to a force that performs combat or peace-enforcement tasks in an area where there are none or very few external actors besides the warring parties and local population. Civilian representatives are attached as advisors to units that arrive in the area right after the actual kinetic operation (from hours to days or

weeks at the most). The model is defined by high mobility and strives for quick impacts in order to set in motion the process of early stabilisation.

A small civilian team, organically positioned within a tactical military formation and under its commander, serves as internal advisors and as liaisons with external actors. This resembles the early PRT forerunners in Afghanistan in 2001–2003, called Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs). These teams were to provide information on humanitarian needs, coordinate aid with military operations and implement small projects. They originally consisted of 10–12 military officers (Civil Affairs, CA, or Civil-Military Cooperation, CIMIC).[14] Later on they were strengthened by USAID and US Department of State representatives in advisory roles.

More specific civilian functions could include political, humanitarian or development advisors. Their focus is immediate to short term in generating the first impact of local political conciliation; the addressing of instant humanitarian needs and the first steps to upgrading local infrastructure. Civilian specialists would thus compliment military resources that go under the title of CIMIC or CA. Unlike in CHLCs, they would be an organic part of the force from the beginning and their expertise would provide the military organisation with an internal quality check in areas such as humanitarian assistance and project management. In this scenario, the military could have dedicated and easily obtainable funds for Quick Impact Projects, the implementation of which the civilian component would advise on and monitor.

Who would adopt these structures? Bearing in mind the security environment, the use of force as needed and active CIMIC activities, an embedded entry force design will be more likely be exercised in NATO operations or by a 'coalition of the willing' than in militarily more traditional UN peace missions. These UN missions have their established forms of civil-military integration at operational level[15]. The idea of attaching civilian advisors to high military mobility has already been tested in Iraq, where the USA has established 13 embedded teams called ePRTs. These refer to small civilian teams working alongside Army brigades and Marine regiments.[16] Based upon experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, the interested nations could include the USA and the UK, and possibly Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark. Many nations would have the technical capacity to establish embedded CIMIC-type civil-military units for entry forces, but may lack the political will to do so.

Finland may have reservations about joining design A. First of all, at the moment the combat-oriented concept of operations of such an entry force may preclude Finnish contribution because of political considerations, even if the legal case to participate in enforcement operations exists. Secondly, the scheme raises serious questions regarding the role of military and civilian actors in a conflict zone – in particular with respect to humanitarian assistance. From the perspective of humanitarian agencies, mixing civilian representatives with a military unit in the high peak of conflict might double the hazard on the 'humanitarian space': first the military assume humanitarian tasks and then enlist civilian specialists to the force. The Nordic countries have traditionally been very cautious of developments of

[14] ISAF 2007, D-2-1.
[15] Cf. de Coning 2007.
[16] US Department of State 2008. More on the ePRTs in Perito 2008.

this kind. Therefore, the embedding and involvement of civilian specialists should not be motivated by an attempt by the military to assume new tasks, but to ensure the quality of the old ones. Thirdly, the need for civilian advisors to provide specific expertise is perhaps less critical in the case of Finland. Our CIMIC-staff consist largely of reservists who have professional backgrounds in educational, health, construction or police work.

A possible framework for Finland to join long standing structures is the EU. It is a plausible scenario that the EU might need to invest civilian capacities into the Battle Group (BG) concept. The BGs could benefit from attached field advisors, especially in complex humanitarian contexts. On the other hand, this would mean marrying together two improbable designs while the EU has not yet met a challenge appropriate enough to deploy a Battle Group.

Form B: Integrated Stabilisation Team

One of the key findings from the recent history of military interventions is that the initial combative entry force should soon be replaced by a second wave of troops with another skills set appropriate for stabilisation and early reconstruction. In the second form of integration, balanced civil-military formations are established to seize the momentum of peace and help set in motion dialogues of conciliation, electoral processes, DDR programmes and SSR at local levels.

With respect to the phase of crisis management, integration in design B translates into equal representation of the unit through dual leadership (civilian head and military commander) or a genuinely integrated board of key representatives. Components would form a civil-military Task Force with various skills and resources that provide both military and various civilian 'manoeuvre capacities' for a common aim. Compared to form A, which is developed for the entry phase, civilian and military components now make equal partners.

On the civilian side, the team should have more weight than in most of the PRTs in Afghanistan. To really be able to launch meaningful and sustainable results-oriented processes in local societies, the civilian component would need not only logistical and staff assets of its own, but also be big enough to reach out from the self-serving and circuitous realities of a military camp. Also clear guidance on internal roles and responsibilities from higher echelons of command is needed. Otherwise a team of three or five civilians will easily end up supplying the endless appetite for bureaucracy in a military headquarters. However, a strong civilian presence must not mean the assumption of all duties from the range of post-conflict activities. The proper focus for an integrated civil-military team is security, which is understood widely, so that it addresses the comprehensive needs and gaps of human security. Human security orientation can furnish the team, for example, with humanitarian, development, agricultural, administrative, political, police, judicial, or penitentiary experts. All of them should receive their own dedicated funds from civilian sources.

The military component would naturally be somewhat bigger than the civilian one. Compared to design A, the military will have to predominantly direct its efforts to core

security issues and cooperation with local security entities. CIMIC would be exercised according to standards endorsed by, for example, NATO, disengaging from lavishly project-oriented national versions of CIMIC. Possible funds could be channelled through the military component as long as civilian expertise in humanitarian and development affairs is always integrated to project selection and management.

Integration of civilian and military assets for a joint stabilisation mission focused on SSR and human security resembles the so-called British model of PRTs in Afghanistan. This concept was designed in 2003–2004 and has subsequently been adjusted by the new lead nations of Sweden and Norway. If any, researchers and commentators tend to rate the UK/Nordic model as being the nearest example to a good PRT. The Integrated Stabilisation Team format would quite naturally suit Finland as it is similar to our contributions in northern Afghanistan since 2004.

Form C: Integrated Reconstruction Team

The scope of military crisis management gradually reduces when moving from stabilisation to reconstruction and development. In this process local actors and external civilian activities should visibly increase their role. In comparison to form B, an integrated team with a reconstruction mission would include a significantly smaller military component.

The *modus operandi* is built on civilian mid to long term activities, and the military are in more of a supportive role. The team is led by a civilian director, bringing together the different branches of the organisation. A military component commander takes instructions from the director in a fashion similar to UN peace operations. The main tasks of the military could be protection of the unit, logistics, situational awareness and communications. The component could perhaps be capable of limited manoeuvring/operations to support the accomplishment of objectives set by the civilian director.

The civilian component could include for example:
- Rule of law. Personnel working to upgrade local capacities in the police and justice system through training and mentoring.
- Local administration. Systems and capacity building in local governance.
- Development. Technical assistance and management/supervision of projects within a given sector.

Each branch should have dedicated funds available for their activities.

Design C has its correspondents in real life too. The US PRT in Panjshir and the Turkish PRT in Vardak are both small civilian-led, reconstruction and governance capacity building focused organisations that are not taking a role in the daily security business. In security, they concentrate on longer term investment in developing the Afghan police forces.

In principle, Finland should have no constraints in joining a team envisaged above.

Civilian-Military Divide

The third scheme of civil-military integration begs the question as to whether integration is needed anymore. If the mission is directed towards reconstruction and development, what are the real benefits of civil-military integration, when compared to its shortcomings? For years civilian and military components have co-formed the UN peace operations, but in those cases integration takes place in the mission headquarters; peacekeeping battalions are not integrated with local UN sub-offices.

It can be assumed that the military are more optimistic about the prospects of integration than their civilian counterparts. Despite logistical burdens, close cooperation with civilian activities brings the information, coordination and coherence of effort that the military always wish for. On the other hand, the heavy responsibility of a military commander for the security of civilian staff can be problematic and should be taken seriously.

From the perspective of civilian crisis management, being integrated to military structures poses several problems. Civilian experts could effectively turn into staff officers in the planning, CIMIC and intelligence sections. Besides overburdening administrative routines, security arrangements seriously hamper possibilities to work together with local counterparts. The comparative advantage of civilian crisis management may be lost. Finally, solving these problems might not 'clear the air'. Sometimes how things look is more important than how they really are. Perceived roles and association with the military can close doors that would otherwise remain open, or diminish the authority of civilian representatives. A difficult controversy seems to exist between the coherence achieved through integration and the benefits of independence.

A key word here is security, in two ways. Firstly, the integration of civilian and military crisis management in the field brings additional value when they work cohesively together to achieve common goals. The bridging factor between components that different in their mindsets, methods and resources should be the human security thinking applied to the given mission. This can be applied most effectively in the stabilisation phase of SSR and early state-building missions, as proposed in the earlier chapter on the Integrated Stabilisation Team concept.

Secondly, it is security considerations of self-protection that draw civilian and military components together. Civilian actors may require direct security support or escorted access to combat-ravaged zones in the early stages of a post-conflict era. Co-location with the military could also be deemed necessary in a prolonged hostile or semi-non-permissive environment, as in many parts of Afghanistan and Iraq. The situation in these countries proves that linear thinking on conflict cycle can sometimes be misleading. Shifting time-spaces continuously develop and collapse as combat, stabilisation and reconstruction take place simultaneously. This naturally makes the work of civilian actors difficult. The US government has tried to solve this dilemma in Iraq by establishing strong, civilian-led PRTs, which concentrate on longer term upgrading of local administrations and development programmes. These units are separated from combat troops and small military components are only responsible for the protection and logistics of the team. The civilian PRTs are a complete antonym of the ePRT concept utilised in support of the combat forces in Iraq. According to Abbaszadeh

et al., the UK is planning for a similar kind of dual unit structure for future integrated missions[17].

Implications for Finland

The need for better coherence through coordination and cooperation is widely acknowledged among various stakeholders in crisis management. Whether this general drive towards comprehensiveness leads to the creation of new integrated field organisations remains to be seen. How should Finland prepare for such operations where integration becomes the everyday reality of not only mission headquarters, but also of assets in the field? This last chapter will briefly elaborate on the issue of national preparedness to contribute, leaving aside issues of planning and leadership at ministry level.

Theoretically, Finland could create a civil-military reserve unit deployable for international missions. However, that would be a very unworkable arrangement with plenty of practical, legal and financial problems. Most of all, a permanent integrated unit of that sort could be a completely useless tool. Like the EU BGs, it might require so specific a crisis that the unit never deploys. It is very unlikely that even the biggest countries involved in Iraq or Afghanistan would plan for permanent integrated formations.

A much more convenient way to prepare for future integrated needs would be to establish civilian and military modules mutually attachable in a tailored way for each mission. These could include (military) planning, CIMIC, information operations, military police, civilian police, justice sector, and humanitarian affairs and development. These semi-independent capabilities would have to be trained and exercised in integration. This is a viable option for those countries in which international operations form a major task for the armed forces.

For the Finnish level of engagement and resources, a third option is perhaps more desirable. Through existing institutions of training and recruitment in crisis management a new emphasis should be given to the creation of civilian-military capacities in personnel. New integrated courses in crisis management for different target groups should be developed. The level of ambition must be augmented. Beyond the standard CIMIC and liaison courses that concentrate on relationships with local populations and NGOs, training could be delivered for integrated middle management. Personnel specifically trained or those with earlier relevant experience should be methodically recruited for key civil-military positions on existing operations. Also, skills created through experience and supported by training should be carefully recorded. Either a joint civil-military registry could be instituted or the existing registries linked and shared more effectively. Overall, attention must be paid to have human resources management that is well planned. Finally and most importantly: we should take the lessons learned from our experiences seriously and conduct research and draw conclusions in order to enable the refining of national policies and structures. In all these tasks, the CMC Finland and FINCENT could have a great role and responsibility together.

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[17] Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 46.

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In Conclusion

On Intelligent Approach in Crisis Management

Ari Kerkkänen

Crisis and conflict management is and remains imperfect. Comprehensiveness in crisis management is sought as one of the responses to remedy imperfection. It is certainly a step in right direction if the concept is transferred from a mere definition into implementation and practical activity that brings about tangible and long-term sustainable results.

Comprehensiveness, whichever way it is defined, is an activity for responding to challenges with a multitude of courses of actions with a variety of all relevant instruments, mechanisms and tools in the context of crisis management, peace-building and conflict prevention. Concepts like cooperation and coordination are closely associated with comprehensiveness.

This article argues that comprehensiveness in crisis management is not primarily about practicalities and guidelines, but on the contrary, it is a way of transformed thinking leading to a deeper understanding of the whole concept. First and foremost it is a mental process without which the transition from a conceptual thinking level into a practical level and conceptualisation do not occur. Without an intelligent approach this level will remain beyond our reach.

The intelligent approach in crisis management is dealt with in this article by giving a few examples of past and present challenges in crisis management as well as articulating a few thoughts of transformation in order to elaborate on the intelligent approach. Human Security is foundational and is the governing framework in this approach. In the end, a practical example of the Finnish way is given by providing a short introduction to the newly established Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management; one of the objectives of which is the transformation of mindsets of crisis management and peacekeeping actors.

Past and Present Challenges for Comprehensiveness

Contemporary crisis management and peace-building activities are, as carried out by the EU[1], the UN[2] and other international agencies, dealing primarily with weak and fragile states. Our conceptual understanding of crisis management is based on missions and operations carried out by these organisations. Concepts of these activities are often inadequate by their nature

[1] The UN endeavours to promote its integrated approach by involving various UN agencies within a given context in an integrated manner, see for example UN DPKO 2008.

[2] Crisis management, as the concept is currently called, rather explicitly implies a capability to manage crisis, to have it successfully under control. Crisis management is understood mostly as termination of violent conflicts and to bring sustainable peace. The very term quite inadequately characterises actions that are needed in order to win peace, the very objective of each and every crisis management activity and mission. Crisis management gives an impression of a perpetual state of crisis that is being somehow managed. It does not contain, by its very meaning, activities related to conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace-building, which all should be regarded as part and parcel of any comprehensive effort to end conflicts. Therefore, this concept is a problematic one, and as itself may direct attention only in managing crisis instead of supporting the achievement of a comprehensive and sustainable development, which includes conflict resolution and a democratic institution building process upon ending the violent phase of the conflict. In other words, crisis management is much, or should be much more, than just managing crisis as the concept implies.

and using only one specific concept such as 'crisis management'[3] as favoured by the EU does not succeed in encapsulating all activities. These activities are an inevitable part and parcel of the wholeness aiming at conflict resolution, support in the state building process and sustainable peace. Therefore comprehensiveness cannot be limited in time only to a phase that can be described as crisis management i.e. a short-term activity by external stakeholders within a longer time span of the whole conflict cycle. Ultimately comprehensiveness within the crisis management phase is by its nature quite distinct from the comprehensiveness in long-term involvement that goes beyond the specific phase of crisis management.

Notable contemporary cases, though distinct and different from each other, are Afghanistan and Kosovo. These countries reflect the nature of contemporary wars and conflicts as they are usually defined. They are multidimensional with the typical characteristics of civil wars. Phenomena such as heavy civilian casualties, corruption, organised crime, breaches in the laws of war, masses of refugees and displaced people, malfunctioning civil administration and the lack of rule of law are found in almost every conflict setting irrespective of the region or parties involved. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that all conflicts have their own individual history and character that has determined the course of that conflict. Also the conditions sustaining conflicts vary. However, it is primarily this complexity that has brought attention to the need for a more comprehensive response to contemporary conflicts in order to alleviate human insecurity and supporting overall peace-building objectives.

The examples given below indicate that the range of stakeholders constituted a similar challenge in the past as they do today. Comprehensive response ultimately means the involvement of a number of stakeholders and organisations. Future security challenges are also a factor in guiding our thinking on crisis management. The response for future challenges requires a long-term strategic crisis management and peace building capacity as well as vision. Perceiving crisis management in a traditional way hinders our capability and capacity to respond to the long-term challenges.

Confusion and Coordination in the British Mandate of Palestine

Though overall governance, patterns and motives were significantly different during the colonial period, many similarities exist between colonial security management and contemporary crisis management. This is important to bear in mind for a variety of reasons. The security administration was coping with many similar challenges in the British Mandate of Palestine, for example, as the international community is facing today in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and to a lesser extent, Kosovo.

In Palestine, it was recognised that the simultaneous usage of different instruments as well as the inclusion of a national capacity ('local ownership' as it is called in the contemporary vernacular) were needed to deal with internal security threats. However, at the same time this comprehensiveness led to a degree of confusion. The coordination of crisis management was undertaken by a Central Security Committee, the mandate of which covered the entire range of security policy matters, which was established to facilitate cooperation in this field between the civil authorities and the security forces. It met weekly, chaired by the High

[3] Charters 1989, 86.

Commissioner, and consisted of the Chief Secretary, the Inspector General of Police – the Head of the Palestine Police Force – the senior officer of GSI (military intelligence) and the Defence Security Officer.[4]

The roles of the Army and the Police became increasingly confused: the Army was called in to deal with the armed bands against which the police were ineffective. The first colonial administration had intended, in creating a multi-ethnic gendarmerie, that Arabs and Jews in Palestine should cooperate in the internal security and defence of the country; but while Arab and Jewish police alike knew the terrain and the people, their loyalties were to their own communities, and the Army therefore took over many of the duties of the Police.[5] Thus the colonial administration was faced with exactly the same challenges of coordination between the military (Army) and the rule of law instruments (Police) in Palestine as contemporary crisis management stakeholders are in Afghanistan and Kosovo. This also includes issues such as biased agendas and loyalties of local partners.

Afghanistan – Incompatibility of Objectives

Afghanistan is perhaps the biggest contemporary challenge in international crisis management and peace-building. A huge and very diverse country consisting of different regions sets a challenge that may be too demanding for current crisis management and peace-building instruments. Afghanistan also provides an example which warns of a situation where conflict responders are charged with different agendas and objectives.

The most comprehensive approach in Afghanistan is carried out by the UN through its different agencies, but mainly under the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)[6]. All UN actions are coordinated by the UN political mission – United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which has a noteworthy emphasis on Human Development and Human Security. They create a prism through which all activities are viewed, analysed and carried out.

The objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and European Union Police Mission for Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) are incompatible. The OEF fights terrorism, the ISAF supports the Afghan Government in creating conditions for stability and EUPOL is a part of the EU commitment advising mainly on rule of law issues. Therefore international stakeholders in Afghanistan are not speaking or acting with only one voice. This creates a huge challenge for comprehensiveness; and may well be one of the reasons for the failure to achieve stated objectives in Afghanistan.

The US has its own more narrowly defined and state security-centred objectives, while the EU is endeavouring with its own EU coordinated approach through the EU Special Representatives Office, EUPOL Police mission and the Commission. The objectives are different, the actors are diverse and though the basic elements of comprehensiveness, in

[4] Shepherd 2000, 189.
[5] The Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007 commissioned by the UNDP and produced in collaboration with the Government of Afghanistan is a serious attempt to address the situation in a comprehensive manner, taking into accounts both national capacity building (local ownership) and international assistance.
[6] Human Rights Watch 2004, 49–50.

theory at least, are in place it is still a far cry from being implemented in a coordinated and cooperative way in practice. This all means an in-built incompatibility with the objectives.

A multitude of actors is not an expression for comprehensiveness. An additional difficulty in the Afghan context is the fact that one of these international operations i.e. the OEF operates in a way that violates international human rights law and international humanitarian law (the laws of war)[7]. The many civilian casualties as result of the ISAF and the OEF are tarnishing the overall international efforts.

Supporting strong, centralised government and authority building in fragile states which are traditionally based on regionalism and loosely connected regional governing patterns may in itself be a violent process of a coercion that aims to restructure traditional societies into something alien and foreign that has no prospect of success in the end. Understanding these parameters is a part of the intelligent approach, the understanding of which is somewhat vague on the part of international stakeholders supporting the central government and state institution building. A notable exception to this is the Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007 approach.

Kosovo – Absence of the Highest Political Consensus

Whereas international activity in Afghanistan is based on the UN Security Council Resolution, the fact that agreement on the Kosovo status was not achieved by the UNSC has created conditions challenging the significantly comprehensive approach in Kosovo. In practise it culminated in the nexus between the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the EU Rule of Law mission (EULEX). The function of all of these missions is based on their own mandates and responsibilities. Clear structures for the coordination of the activities as well as the importance of mission mandates are required, as observed by Jari Mustonen in his study on EU instruments in Bosnia-Herzegovina[8].

There is a foreseen transfer of responsibilities from UNMIK both to the Kosovo institutions themselves as well as the EULEX mission, but in the absence of a unanimous agreement on the status of Kosovo the transfer of competencies have proved to be a difficult one. In contrast to the smooth transfer, interagency competition and rivalry is being seen to hamper the overall objectives of security, stability and development. Last but not least, it is putting international crisis management posture in serious jeopardy.

Under UN Secretary General Mr Ban's plan, the UN is neutral on the question of Kosovo's status. The European Union plays an enhanced operational role in the area of rule of law under a UN 'umbrella' headed by the Secretary-General's Special Representative and in line with the 1999 Security Council Resolution that established UNMIK.[9] This is in contrast to the original plan to have UNMIK withdrawn and EULEX assuming full-fledged responsibility in assisting the local Kosovo authorities. KFOR remains in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and NATO has reiterated that it stands ready

[7] Mustonen 2008, 34.
[8] www.UNMIKonline.org, 23.6.2008. Kosovo plan is a "practical and workable solution", Ban tells the Security Council.
[9] www.nato.int/KFOR/, 22.8.2008.

to play its part in the implementation of future security arrangements. NATO will continue to cooperate closely with the population of Kosovo, the United Nations, the European Union and other international stakeholders wherever appropriate[10].

Besides EULEX, there is the European Union Special Representative and the European Commission. The EUSR provides overall coordination for the EU presence in Kosovo.[11] If all of these are summed up, one can soon find three different comprehensive approaches in Kosovo, one for the UN, one for KFOR and last but not least, one for the EU. Comprehensiveness is in grave danger of turning into interagency rivalry and a becoming a mockery of international efforts. The present-day Kosovo situation underlines the importance of having a solid political mandate for crisis management and peace-building activities, the absence of which results in a situation where the results are not measured.

Reflections on Attitudes to Crisis Management Exercises

Crisis management exercises provide a good opportunity to grasp the present state of thinking and understanding of comprehensiveness. MILEX 08, the European Union's military crisis management exercise[12], was conducted from 19th to 27th June 2008 in Rome and Spain. Throughout the exercise, of which one of the objectives was to create a concept of operations for a large EU military crisis management operation in an unspecified region, the concept of comprehensiveness was expressed, but its meaning and content remained very vague throughout the exercise. It was clearly understood that the conflict setting involved a variety of agencies and instruments, but a tangible concept was missing from the planning process.

This was a strategic level planning exercise, which only underscores the requirement for a deeper understanding of the comprehensive approach. This understanding is a prerequisite for turning the mere concept of comprehensiveness into practical implementation on the ground. The exercise highlighted a limited capability to think in terms of a comprehensive approach by senior military officers. Observations made during the exercise indicated that EU military crisis management, despite being encouraged by basic documents laying the foundation for the exercise to take into account comprehensiveness, finds it difficult to break traditional and routine patterns. These patterns are dictated by what has been learnt in military academies as ways of winning battles and not bringing sustainable peace and development. Of course, we are all products of our up-bringing, education, training and work experience. It is rather difficult to look beyond those constraints and limitations because they are often built in and we are unaware that we possess them.

[10] www.eulex-kosovo.eu/, 22.8.2008.
[11] MILEX 08 Command Post Exercise at the EU Operations HQ in Rome in 19 – 27 June 2008. The author of this article participated in the exercise in capacity of Political Adviser to the Operations Commander.
[12] This is obvious if compared strengths of European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) within the Council Secretariat. The EUMS has some 200 personnel while CPCC has only about 60.

Intelligent Approach to Comprehensiveness

Motives, Objectives and Agendas

The ordinary context for understanding comprehensiveness is to think about it in terms of utilising a variety of tools, stakeholders and mechanisms in crisis management depending upon the situation from the usage of military instruments (NATO, or EU-lead) to the civilian instruments or tools (UN, EU-ESDP or other) separately or in parallel.

It appears from EU crisis management development and planning that the military capability has more emphasis than the civilian aspect of the house.[13] As a matter of fact, the civilian crisis management missions within ESDP, though the first one was launched as late as in the beginning of 2003 (European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina) are significantly more numerous than the EU military missions.

Irrespective of the traditional tendency to think of crisis management in military terms, most of the issues linked to crisis management are not military. This observation was made by Jyri Raitasalo who recently stated that non-military issues are now raised to be dealt with by military means. He posed a rhetorical, but very relevant question as to whether crisis management should be moved away from the security framework into the development policy framework. According to Raitasalo this would call for a new and less security orientated debate on crisis management.[14]

Civilian Crisis Management within Comprehensiveness

Civilian crisis management, if understood according to the priorities agreed by the EU, possesses a wide variety of means to tackle challenges that are endemic in many contemporary conflicts and most often found in the field of the rule of law. Civilian missions have the benefit of agility (smaller in comparison to military missions, with no requirement for heavy equipment and hard-ware), but their real impact, if judged by the civilian missions run so far by the EU, still remains to be seen. Thorough evaluation of these missions is still lacking and must be undertaken for the benefit of future civilian missions.

It appears that a stronger link between the civilian missions and development cooperation must be sought in order to enhance changes for long-term sustainable results. This calls for enhanced civilian-civilian cooperation and coordination within comprehensive thinking. The UN carries out global tasks with civilian participation in peace building missions, often in the same rule of law field as the EU.[15]

As earlier stated, the EU is striving towards a coordinated approach in crisis management with the full spectrum of EU instruments, of which ESDP missions are only a part, in crisis management, development and post-conflict reconstruction. Unfortunately the effectiveness

[13] Raitasalo 2008.
[14] One of these missions is a peace building operation in Afghanistan (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan).
[15] CFSP and ESDP: Promoting Human Security. A Proposal for a Declaration or Protocol. Quoted in Human Security Study Group 2007, 3.

of the EU system is hampered by its complex pillar structure. Close cooperation, untarnished by inter-pillar rivalry, between the pillar structures starting with the early planning phase of interventions should be a requirement. Nowadays there still seems to be more competition than cooperation within the EU system.

Human Security Governance

Human Security is about the basic needs of individuals and communities in times of peril. It is about feeling safe on the street as well as about material survival and the exercise of free will. It recognises that 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' are both essential to people's sense of well being and their willingness to live in peace[16]. Human Security has had various definitions being first invented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and then followed by different schools with a variety of definitions. The Human Security Study Group led by Professor Mary Kaldor at the London School of Economics has developed a Human Security concept adjustable in the European Common Foreign and Security Police Policy in crisis management operations taking place in the framework of European Security and Defence Policy. A set of priorities in Human Security include the primacy of human rights, legitimate political authority, a bottom-up approach, effective multilateralism, an integrated regional approach and a clear, transparent strategic direction.[17] Human Security, especially within the UN framework, has widely been acknowledged and approved. Human Security, together with Human Development, forms the backbone of UN lead reconstruction activities in countries like Afghanistan.[18]

One of the main challenges with the Human Security Concept has been that it has been perceived as a theory instead of something that can be implemented in practice. Currently there is an effort to operationalise it and make it more practical through training.[19] Human Security principles introduced by the LSE Human Security Study Group are very relevant for conceptual thinking of comprehensiveness. First of all, it shifts the focus from state security structures to individuals of which security forms a paramount factor in stabilising society. Individuals who feel secure are much more difficult to mobilise for violent behaviour than individuals who feel vulnerable and desperate, those who feel they have nothing to loose and are therefore easy prey for nationalistic and violent rhetoric. The primacy of human rights is central in the Human Security approach, and this inevitably includes the necessary aspect of protection of people. There is no comprehensiveness in crisis management and peace-building if it fails to protect people.[20] Human Security principles form a comprehensive framework in actual crisis management and if followed in practice, create conditions for long-term and sustainable results. This comprehensiveness could be termed as Human Security Governance, the governance of these principles within all phases of crisis management. It creates a genuinely results-based approach.

[16] Human Security Study Group 2007, 9–10.
[17] UN Commission on Human Security was established in 2001 and it concluded its activities in 2003. Its work is continued by the Advisory Board on Human Security; Human Security Unit (HSU) was established in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in May 2004 (www.humansecuríty-chs.org/, 22.8.2008).
[18] A pilot training *Applying Human Security in Crisis Management* was organised in cooperation between the LSE and Crisis Management Centre Finland in February 2008 in Kuopio, Finland.
[19] Srebrenica and other UN declared safe havens in Bosnia-Herzegovina are warning examples about a fundamental failure by the international community especially in respect to protection.
[20] Egeland 2008, 123.

Role of Technology in Comprehensiveness

There is no doubt that we live in a technology driven era and technology also plays a strong part in the defence and military industry. It also appears that military strategies are under the influence of military technology and industry in their seeking of continuously expanding markets. This ultimately leads to the requirement to procurement new technology. These entrepreneurs involved are also trying to establish a bridge-head in the field of crisis management and naturally, too, for selfish marketing reasons.

Technology may provide assistance in certain situations and circumstances; international aid distributed for tsunami disaster in December 2004 was coordinated through the UN. PricewaterhouseCoopers provided its services *pro bono* with the most effective possible 'enhanced internet based financial tracking system.' This provided the means for donor tracking in the situation where aid was pouring into disaster relief from multiple donor sources.[21]

One interesting example comes from the Kenya crisis in the spring of 2008 where a Kenyan graduate in the US created a web-based open situation awareness and information sharing website called *ushahidi* for tracking events down during the crisis.[22] Technology can provide some means to enhance assistance in crisis response situations, but reliance on technology alone must be avoided due to its vulnerability. This vulnerability is an even bigger risk in regions where conflicts and crises often occur and where the basic requirements for functioning technology like a reliable electricity supply cannot be taken for granted. Excessive reliance on technology is a risk in itself. Commercialisation of crisis management potentially creates more confusion with incompatible tools than coordination, not to mention comprehensiveness. Technology-based crisis management, owing to its vulnerability and unreliability, can potentially increase existing instability in weak and fragmented societies.

Terminology and the Politics of Presentation

Terminology requires a certain level of liberty, crisis management and peace-building. Peacekeeping must be perceived as encompassing similar activities in preventing, stabilising and supporting institution building for societies that are suffering or are in a process of recovery from conflicts. Comprehensiveness involves all actions related to securing stability, such as establishing peace, resuscitating markets, livelihoods, and services and building core state capacity, quoting terminology used for early recovery by the report produced by the New York University Center for International Cooperation.[23]

The terminology we use reflects, though often subconsciously, our mindsets and attitudes. Military crisis management, for example, favours the concept *robust* in order to foster a posture of a rapid, strong and credible method of action. However, it is, less clear how this robustness

[21] A novel invention costing almost nothing except for working hours, and based on existing technology giving free access to anyone interested. The Ushahidi.com is a tool for people who were witnessing acts of violence in Kenya in these post-election times. It provided means for on-time incident reporting results appearing on a map-based view. See website www.ushahidi.com, 15.7.2008.

[22] Chandran et al. 2008, 5, 12.

[23] Anand 2008.

is interpreted in the minds of operational planners and executives. Is it considered that it may lead to a course of action leading to unwanted and unexpected results? Robustness may be an appropriate term in war, but its appropriateness is much vaguer in crisis management. On the other hand, robustness may be considered as an appropriate term if understood as protection of people in line with the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle. However, an example from the MILEX 08 planning exercise shows that this was not how the concept was understood. The military talk about effect-based operations; this language does not suit crisis management, of which the objective must be in winning the peace, not the war. It is more appropriate to speak about the results based method of conducting crisis management as already suggested above. The focus is the ends more than the means, although intelligent means are critical to achieving the desired ends.

The terminology used also reflects something of our underlying attitudes and perceptions, which bring us to the question of representation. What and who do crisis management and peace building stakeholders represent? The EU uses the language of response, and not reflection as it has been observed by Dibyesh Anand.[24] Crisis management uses the colonial administration model and even then everything was justified by moral arguments (doing good, not harm). It is striking to observe the similarity between the colonial administration in the British Mandate of Palestine, for example and in the contemporary security administration of crisis management operations. The military (Army), the police and heads of justice have very similar roles and objectives, irrespective of the difference in overall political setting.

Strongly security orientated crisis management, as implied by the very framework in the European context (Security and Defence Policy) reflects the politicisation of crisis management and the shift in objectives. This national and supra-national (coalition, union) policy is primarily for our own ends with objectives related to security in general, and energy security in particular. Alleviating suffering and misery in the conflict areas itself only comes second after the primary objectives.

Therefore, this security policy, as carried out in crisis management missions, is in danger of leading to a degree of incompatibility with the principles of Human Security. It compels us to also examine ourselves as to whether we are just proxies for these policy objectives? In this context a warning voiced by Eric Hobsbawm must be taken seriously – is the current way of implementing a 'western' style of democracy, also by the means of crisis management, a futile, even 'colonialist' effort?[25] Understanding the problem of fragile states and regions (Afghanistan, Pakistan and beyond, for example) where modern state structures are artificial and do not reflect traditional patterns, values and norms of their society is a profound aspect of the intelligent approach. How to implement state-building projects on the premises and views of the western state models – or is it just neo-colonialism in disguise? Can we talk about purity of motives in crisis management? And how biased is our security threat assessment on which our policy is based?[26] In furthering the intelligent approach we must learn to look at

[24] We cannot turn away from the warning voiced by Eric Hobsbawm who states that "*a planned reordering of the world by the powerful states is underway, of which the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are one part in an effort to create world order by 'spreading democracy'. The rhetoric surrounding this crusade implies that the system is applicable in a standardised (Western) form, that it can succeed everywhere, that it can remedy today's transnational dilemmas, and that it can bring peace rather than sow disorder. It cannot*". (Hobsbawm 2007, 115.)

[25] As reflected in European Security Strategy *A Secure Europe in a Better World* by Council of the European Union in 2003.

[26] FINCENT and CMC Finland 2008.

crisis management from a perspective that is not necessarily the one to which we are used. This must lead us to new perspectives and patterns of thinking that go beyond the ordinary perception of crisis management.

The Finnish Way – the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management

The way of thinking and attitudes forms an intelligent approach to crisis management as this article has argued. Training is one of the tools for transforming mindsets, influencing the ways of thinking and shaping new attitudes, perceptions and courses of actions. Pilot training on Human Security carried out by the London School of Economics and Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Finland served as an example of an attempt to bridge theory and practise, to bring a developing but already existing concept from *lexis* to *praxis,* from the concept into implementation.

There is a serious effort in Finland to expand understanding on comprehensiveness as exemplified by the establishment of The Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management. It is a joint undertaking by the CMC Finland and the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) for joint training as well as research and publishing co-operation. Its core tasks are to enhance the development of civil-military relations and coordination in crisis management both for national crisis management capacity building and international crisis management missions.

The Finnish Centre of Expertise is based on the shared campus principle with the responsibility shared between FINCENT and CMC Finland, both of which will continue functioning in their capacity as independent governmental institutions.

The Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management endeavours to develop common and shared training in crisis management as well as to promote overall understanding of comprehensive crisis management. The Integrated Crisis Management training organised in autumn 2008 will serve as the pilot training of the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management.

The course aims to familiarise participants with the integrated approach of crisis management with specific regards to the interaction of civilian and military stakeholders. The course targets both military and civilian participants (including the NGO sector) with experience of crisis management and peace-building missions. They include those who are currently working in a crisis area or who are prospective participants on future missions.

Conclusions

The intelligent approach to comprehensive crisis management calls for acknowledging the central role of attitudes and the way of thinking without which comprehensiveness (wholeness) as a way of responding remains a largely elusive and hollow rhetoric. What is

called for is the fundamental transformation of mindsets. A narrowly framed mindset is only for compartmentalisation, parochialism and interagency competition and rivalry, which in the end leads to crisis management being trivialised and removed from the real needs on the ground.

The transformation must include that of natural and built-in perceptions and attitudes, otherwise well designed and delineated guidelines and procedures for coordination and cooperation will remain as theory, not practise. Acknowledging that we are prisoners of our traditional way of thinking, our natural constraints in mindsets and bias is an important step in the transformation Therefore debate on comprehensiveness in crisis management culture and peace building must focus on enhancing these transformations. We are more familiar with at looking at the transformation of conflict ridden recipient societies instead of looking at the transformation of our own understanding of crisis management and peace building practises.

After all, comprehensiveness is not a matter of agreements, doctrines, guidelines or technological compatibility, but a way of broader thinking, a matter of perceptions, beliefs, and patterns of behaviour.

Conflicts and crises are never clear-cut cases that can be handled or managed on the basis of certain models. They always differ; both by those conditions that fuel armed conflict as well as the ways and means that conflicts take place. Thus comprehensiveness calls for a tailor-made and analysis based approach from the very beginning i.e. from the first signs of potential conflict in a given area. Comprehensiveness starts at a strategic planning level and if it is not taken into account at that point, it is unlikely to become a tangible reality.

Comprehensiveness cannot be set up or based upon only one formula. This is because it varies depending on the nature of the contextual framework within which comprehensiveness is being undertaken. Long-term support to state building with all necessary development aspects differs quite significantly from short-term crisis management, of which the short-term focus is different from the long-term objectives. Therefore this article argues that there cannot be a doctrine, manual or standards articulating and detailing comprehensiveness, but rather a transformation of thinking which takes comprehensiveness as a matter of principle tailored to the individual on a case by case basis for each crisis and conflict. In other words, an intelligent approach means a thinking-driven and results-based approach in crisis management and peace-building.

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Abstracts

Broader Perspectives: Good International Engagement in Fragile States

Olli Ruohomäki

The changing nature of violent conflicts and the phenomena of fragile states have posed serious challenges to the international community in terms of policy responses. It is clear that engagement in fragile states requires a combination of diplomacy, humanitarian and development activities and often a security component in order to protect human life, and to promote and support a peaceful solution, stabilisation and development. The key aspects and lessons learned for good international engagement in fragile states are mostly accepted within policy circles. Nonetheless, there is still a long way to go at a more practical level.

Becoming Comprehensive: Finnish and European Developments

Helinä Kokkarinen

Comprehensiveness in the crisis management is the word of today. On the civilian side 'comprehensiveness' has traditionally been considered as a part of 'good governance' as well as a guarantee for the quality of services. Comprehensiveness in crisis management should call for cooperation and coordination between all the stakeholders responsible for those functions mentioned in the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society. As guiding values, the Finnish National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management calls for cooperativeness, involvement, pro-activity and networking in both the international and domestic environment. According to the latter document, the aim is comprehensive crisis management, striving to get the maximum benefit from resources utilised by avoiding overlapping and covering the entire field of interrelated operations.

Comprehensive Approach in International Cooperation

Mari Eteläpää

The theme of comprehensive approach has been on the agenda for crisis management actors for many years. The approach is based on the continuum of phases of crisis prevention and management where different instruments are needed at different times. The use of various instruments has to be addressed from the very beginning in order to provide an effective response to the crises of today. Nations have their distinct national traditions, but in general, inter-ministerial coordination is of great importance in ensuring a comprehensive approach. Various international actors have taken this view and are carrying out their actions based on this approach. Coordination has to start from the beginning and it has to take place at different levels. Key elements to a successful comprehensive approach are a culture

of cooperation, flexibility in working arrangements and the dissemination and sharing of information by the stakeholders.

NGOs Vital Actors in Comprehensive Crisis Management

Anne Palm

Different actors – state institutions, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and local stakeholders – are all needed for successful crisis management. In order to achieve the best results in crisis management and peace-building, coordination and cooperation between these stakeholders is highly necessary. What NGOs have to offer are experience, long-term relationships with the local population and expertise in their own field, which is also needed in crisis management in the future. Human security can provide a tool in crisis management and peace-building. Human security can not only be promoted by *protecting* the individuals by state policies, but also by *empowering* them to participate in the reconstruction and peace-building of, and in, their own societies.

Future Challenges of the Peacemaking Processes

Kalle Liesinen

Disunity among the international community is a challenge for the future. Many positive options for crisis prevention and crisis management are lost to a great extent when a local conflict becomes a part of a global game. The writer strongly argues the benefits of implementing the comprehensive approach. Organisations and functions are tools of the international community; tools are not supposed to hinder the work by creating any conflicts of interest. A conventional state-centric approach is sometimes an uneasy opener in many cases of resolving crisis. Small civil society stakeholders working for sustainable peace parallel to the official peace processes have great importance and influence. We should understand the need for the multileveled approach inside war torn societies. Peace agreement is seldom enough – we need healing processes which engage the affected societies from top to bottom.

Humanitarian Support: the Unsupported Pillar of Present Day Crisis Management?

Rolf Helenius

In this article the writer tries to portray the complexity of achieving unity of effort in present day crisis management operations. The article also identifies humanitarian support as a key to restoring functioning failed states in crisis by acting as a foundation for the other three key pillars of crisis management. The main challenge is seen as integrating the efforts of the three pillars (safe and secure environment, rule of law and good governance) and humanitarian support to achieve a lasting solution. This can only be achieved by a mutually accepted lead

agency to coordinate the efforts; the complexity remains when taking into consideration actors that are outside the mandated effort of the international community (NGOs and IOs).

Gender and Crisis Management

Sofie From-Emmesberger

It is important to integrate a gender dimension into the comprehensive approach of crisis management. This promotes the effectiveness and security of operations. Women should not only be seen as victims but also – and especially – as a resource when peace and stability is being built. UN Resolution 1325 is a tool in this process as is the Finnish Action Plan in its implementation. The EU has understood the importance of gender mainstreaming and is including gender programmes into its ESDP missions. The Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management can also build strong competence in the field of gender and crisis management. Finnish gender experts should be firmly and systematically integrated into this work. Findings and good practices should be fed into the development of training programmes of *inter alia* the European Security and Defence College and the European Group of Training.

Security Sector Reform: Towards a Comprehensive Finnish Approach

Heli Siivola

Security sector reform (SSR) has become an integral part of post-conflict peace-building and good governance. The ability of national authorities to provide security for the state and its citizens is a precondition for sustainable development. SSR calls for a comprehensive approach in bringing together security and development stakeholders whilst respecting their distinct roles. Finland's long tradition of international crisis management and development cooperation and national interagency cooperation lays good foundations for comprehensive SSR assistance. Finland should ensure adequate and flexible resources to SSR, *inter alia*, by developing flexible financing mechanisms and by further developing the capacity to participate in advisory, mentoring and training tasks with both civilian and military experts. Development of national policy guidelines for SSR would further facilitate cross-governmental cooperation, enhance the overall effectiveness of Finnish support and strengthen Finland's ability to promote coordination and cooperation in the field. The cross-governmental working group nominated in August 2008 to examine a comprehensive approach to crisis management provides a good forum for discussing the issue further.

PRT Lessons of Comprehensiveness: the Past and Future of Integrated Field Units

Oskari Eronen

Integration of civilian and military crisis management can be seen as one viable remedy to increasing demands for coherent action in complex post-conflict environments. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan and Iraq provide an innovative model of integration at field level. Recognising apparent drawbacks of the PRTs, but also valuing the integrative core of the exercise, three emerging modes of civil-military integration may be observed. These correspond to the varying needs along the cycle of crisis and its management. Finland should start preparing for a future generation of more profoundly integrated missions through enhanced capacity building and human resources management across civil-military boundaries.

On Intelligent Approach in Crisis Management

Ari Kerkkänen

The intelligent approach in crisis management calls for transformed thinking. Today comprehensiveness is the key-word in contemporary crisis management, normally meaning the utilisation of a wide range of instruments for achieving stated ends. Often it is understood and perceived as capability orientated capacity building and deployment of multiple assets as well as coordination guidelines and organisational arrangements. Deeper understanding of concepts such as comprehensiveness is urgently needed, the achievement of which requires intellectual groundwork to be laid down to enhance an objective and non-partisan view of comprehensive crisis management. Human Security Governance must be perceived as a fundamental premise in the intelligent approach, translated into action, in all phases and actions of crisis management and peace-building. Sustainable objectives, and above all human security, are not achieved without the transformed perception of crisis management. Training forms a backbone in striving for this transformation. The Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management is given as an example of the Finnish way to put forward the agenda of comprehensiveness in a practical, tangible and results-orientated manner.

Authors

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Finnish Defence Forces International Centre

Towards Comprehensive Crisis Management

Present day crises are increasingly characterised by multiple and correlated challenges, ranging from violent conflicts to humanitarian emergencies, weak and corrupt governance, poverty and lack of rule of law. Coping with such complex problems calls for better coherence, coordination and cooperation between the instruments of crisis management and peace-building. Finland has also become increasingly engaged in multifaceted support to countries where a comprehensive approach is required.

This collection of articles by a range of crisis management experts surveys the environment of comprehensive challenges as well as action needed. The aim is to facilitate national dialogue on development of crisis management. Linking the Finnish activities to wider international frameworks is expected to advance better conceptual and practical coherence of our efforts. New opportunities and modes of coordination may be found, despite the fact that Finland already enjoys a strong tradition of cooperation across various organisational boundaries.

The book opens the Publication Series of the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) and highlights its renewed role in developing future capacities for Finnish crisis management.

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