



Seminar Publication on Contemporary Peace Operations – From theory to practice

Based on
EAPTC Seminar 2 - 4 May 2017 Helsinki
Articles from the European Peace Training Community



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ISBN 978-951-25-2944-5 (print)
ISBN 978-951-25-2945-2 (PDF)

Puolustusvoimien Kansainvälinen Keskus
Finnish Defence Forces International Centre

Printing: Juvenes Print – Suomen Yliopistopaino Oy
Tampere 2017

Finnish Defence Forces International Centre
FINCENT Publication Series 2/2017

SEMINAR PUBLICATION ON CONTEMPORARY PEACE OPERATIONS – FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

**Based on EAPTC Seminar 2 - 4 May 2017 Helsinki
Articles from the European Peace Training Community**

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Helsinki 2017

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	5
INTRODUCTION	9
BACKGROUND OF MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS	11
Defining ‘peace operations’	11
Evolving nature of peace operations	12
ETHICS IN PEACE OPERATIONS.....	14
What is ethics?	14
Ethical dilemmas in peace operations	16
“‘What is the right thing to do?’	16
Common standards for ethics in peace operations?	17
Ethical dilemmas are context-specific	18
Requirements for ethical behaviour.....	19
What and how to train ethics?	20
Context-specific training.....	20
Fostering communication, common language and group cohesion	21
Towards a curricula for ethics	21
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS.....	23
Protection of civilians in armed conflicts	23
What and for whom?	24
UN approach to protection of civilians	25
Shared responsibility.....	26
Protection from physical violence	26
Considerations as to the military component.....	27
The role and responsibilities of the police component	28
The role as of the civilian component	30
Key challenges	31
A variety of tasks.....	32
Maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the host nation	32
Use of force	34
Fostering sharing of lessons from past missions	36
Fragmented approaches	37
Lack of understanding of conflict dynamics	38
Addressing challenges through training.....	39
Standardized and mandatory training.....	39
Using scenarios to identify training needs	40
Towards a Protection of Civilians training architecture	41

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO EXTERNAL CRISES.....	43
Defining Comprehensive Approach.....	43
Civil-military relations in peace operations	46
Complex relationship.....	46
Civil-military coordination and cooperation.....	47
Not only civil-military interaction	49
Coordination and local ownership.....	49
Considerations related to the implementation of the	
Comprehensive Approach in peace operations.....	50
How to mitigate the key challenges	52
Balancing the competing timelines	53
Joint mission planning	53
Cooperation and information sharing.....	54
Alumni network	55
Towards effective training system	55
Harmonizing structured training.....	55
Joint mission training.....	56
Multiprofessional expertise	56
Research on pedagogy	56
Best practices from training exercises.....	57
Practical suggestions	57
WAY FORWARD	59
Recommendations to training & education approach	59
Proposals for an EAPTC development and strategy	61
REFERENCES.....	63

APPENDIX 1:	
RESEARCH TEAM AND ARTICLES FROM THE RESEARCHERS	67
‘Soft Skills for Peacekeeping and Crisis Management Experts’:	67
Enhancing Protection of civilians in UN peace operations	73
Effectiveness in operational conflict prevention:	
How should we measure it in EU missions and operations?.....	79
Ethics Training and its Relevance to Peace Operations	87
‘When Diversity is the Only Unity’	
– How to Train for a Comprehensive Approach in EU Crisis Management	93

APPENDIX 2:	
PROGRAMME EAPTC 2017 – 5TH ANNUAL MEETING, HELSINKI	100

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The EAPTC Meeting was made possible by distinguished guest speakers addressing current initiatives in their respective organizations and the comprehensive pool of experts from EAPTC partner organizations. We would like to express our gratitude to especially the following individuals who were the stars of the Meeting: Brigadier Giovanni Pietro Barbano, Colonel Michael Uhrig, Colonel Claus Amon, Doctor Annemarie Rodt, Superintendent Olavi Kujanpää, Superintendent Pekka Kokkonen, Ms Victoria Walker, Ms Kirsi Hyttinen, Ambassador Pia Strejnvall, Colonel Petter Lindqvist, Major Adam Åkerfeldt, Professor Reijo E. Heinonen, and Doctor Janne Aalto. The intense, behind-the-scenes work of the event management and background studies were also crucial for the success of the meeting. FINCENT would also like to express its sincere gratitude to CMC Finland and the Police University College, for their valuable support in the developing the Meeting program. In addition, we would also like to express our gratitude to the multinational research group that provided input for this publication. First and foremost, however, this publication was made possible by the enthusiastic work of the participants of the EAPTC Meeting both during and after the seminar. Thank you all!

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Peace operations deployed to date, and prospects for future missions continue to demonstrate that peace operations are subject to constant change. Peace operations and the environment in which they are conducted have evolved significantly since the first deployment. Today's global environment requires the international community to mobilize resources to promote peace and support sustainable stability. In this effort, effective and unprecedented levels of cooperation and coordination are required of military, civilian and police components. Identifying the real training needs is a perpetual challenge when coping with changes.

As pointed out by the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations¹ there is a widening gap between what is asked of UN peace operations today and what and how they are able to deliver. This gap can and must be narrowed to ensure that organizations' peace operations are able to respond effectively and appropriately to challenges to come. As UN peace operations struggle to achieve their objectives, change is required in order for them to adapt to new circumstances and to ensure their increased effectiveness and appropriate use in the future. This complexity has raised up a number of issues, such as the operationalization of protection of civilians, the use of force, working with partners and civil-military synergies, means to prevent abuse and enhance accountability, mission leadership, and use of technology, which have increasingly been brought to the agenda of the peace operations training community. To address the demands of the complex environments, new approaches are required, not only by the UN but by all international peace & security agencies.

In this volatile environment, the competence of personnel deployed is crucial for the effectiveness of peace operations. Among other things, they need to understand their role in the big picture as well as their responsibility for their own actions. The actions of one person have an impact on not only their own organization, but also on the wider international community, and more importantly, the host community. The peace operations training community plays a central role in ensuring that personnel deployed to crisis management operations are equipped with knowledge, skills and an attitude that enables them to perform in their various tasks and roles. Nevertheless, training needs assessments must be based on in-depth research and hence there is an emerging need to strengthen the collaboration between academics and practitioners in the field of peace operations training. After all, training and education are among the key tools needed for operationalizing theory into practice, thereby promoting coherent and responsible actions of individuals and troops around the world.

This report is based on the 5th Annual Meeting of the European Association of Peace Operations Training Centres (EAPTC) held from 2 – 4 May 2017 in Helsinki, Finland, and on relevant research carried out in support of it. The aim of this report is to improve the sharing of information and understanding, and to provide a basis for discussing pragmatic ways and

¹ High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. (2015). *Uniting our strengths for peace – politics, partnership and people*. Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 16th June 2015.

means of operationalizing ambitious concepts into training activities that would ultimately serve the needs of modern peace operations. The report provides an overview of the three topics of the meeting: ethics in peacekeeping, protection of civilians, and comprehensive approach to external crises. These topics are currently being discussed within the peace research and training community from the perspectives of civilian, military and police practitioners, as well as the research and training community itself. Hence, the report outlines the issues that are relevant to the debate on the relevance and effectiveness of modern peace operations.

5th EAPTC Meeting

The Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) hosted the 5th Annual Meeting of the EAPTC on the operationalization of responses to some of the key issues found in contemporary peace operations. The Meeting took place from 2 – 4 May 2017 in Helsinki. The seminar brought together 80 participants from EAPTC member training organizations, research institutes and think tanks from across Europe.

The theme of the 5th EAPTC Meeting was selected to invoke discussion on how the peace training community can effectively integrate the key issues ethics in peacekeeping, protection of civilians and comprehensive approach. Hence the theme: “Addressing the contemporary challenges in multidimensional peace operations – from theory to practice”. The Meeting focused on lessons learned from contemporary peace operations, which can lead training institutions and academia to discover new approaches to meet the needs arising from contemporary crises. An important goal of the Meeting was to identify avenues for future research and training and education programs.

European Association of Peace Operations Training Centres (EAPTC)²

The EAPTC is an open and voluntary association of European centres, institutions, networks, officials and programmes dealing with peace operations and crisis management education, training and research. It is a Regional association in the spirit of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC).

The purpose of the EAPTC is to contribute to the effective and efficient preparation of European individuals, groups and organizations with respect to their engagement in planning and conducting peace and crisis response operations, through cooperative dialogue and actions, as well as through such cooperation with the wider international community within the IAPTC framework. Such cooperation will serve to strengthen and otherwise enhance both European and International peace and crisis response operations.

The principal objectives of the Association are:

1. To strengthen coordination and cooperation amongst interested education and training centres/institutions, networks and interested officials within Europe.
2. To facilitate the exchange of experience, best practices, lessons-identified and education and training initiatives and activities.
3. To facilitate greater cooperative efforts in conducting crisis management education and training, through regular updates and exchanges of information on courses and exercises, and cooperative possibilities.
4. To promote mutual understanding of different institutional and functional perspectives and organizational cultures present among military, police and the range of civilian components in peace and crisis response operations.
5. To promote efficiency in planning and conducting education and training through cooperation, standardisation and harmonization.
6. To share ongoing and planned research information and activity with respect to both peace and crisis response operations and the education and training for peace and crisis response operations.
7. To benefit from exchanges with other like-minded International and Regional Associations, Networks and training centres within the framework of the IAPTC.
8. To share European experience, best practices, lessons identified and education and training initiatives and activities, within the IAPTC membership.

² As stated in the Statutes on the EAPTC website in 2017. Available at: <http://www.eaptc.org/Statutes/statutes.html>.

Finnish Defence Forces International Training Centre

The Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) is a unit subordinate to National Defence University that organizes military crisis management courses for command and expert personnel in UN, NATO and EU led peace operations. FINCENT is an internationally recognized centre of excellence of Finnish military crisis management with traditions that go back 50 years. FINCENT serves as a training centre for courses and training events accordant with UN, NORDEFCO, EU and NATO Partnership for Peace programme procedures. To guarantee the high quality of the training and that the individual needs of the customer organizations are met, the training combines the findings of the latest research with extensive field experience. Additionally, FINCENT is Department Head (DH) for Military Contribution to Peace Support (MC2PS) aiming to enhance interoperability and operational effectiveness among NATO and Partner Nations through Education and Training. As Reference Body for NATO E&T in this specific discipline, FINCENT also ensures adequate response to emerging E&T requirements.

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary peace operations take place in an extensive security environment that has undergone major transformations over the past two decades. The evolution that has taken place is connected to the changing nature of security threats as much as to the concomitant adaptation of policy responses. Consequently, the role and tasks of peacekeepers have evolved along with the environment where they deploy. Most of the conflicts in the post-Cold War world are **intra-state or internal in nature, rather than inter-state**. Inter-state wars were traditionally fought between organized military forces of states. In the more complex internal wars of today, the protagonists are often a diverse set of antagonistic groups including non-state actors, militia and rebel groups whose objective could be for example control over governmental power or territory¹. With the recognition that conflicts are likely to recur in the absence of a long-term effort aimed at sustainable political, economic and social reconstruction, peace operations are increasingly tasked with wide-ranging multi-dimensional mandates involving these elements. The affected state's capacity to provide security for its population and maintain public order is often poor, basic infrastructure is likely to have been destroyed, and large sections of the population may have been displaced. Society may be divided along ethnic, religious and regional lines and grave human rights abuses may have been committed during a conflict, which further complicates efforts to achieve national reconciliation. Consequently, **peace operations are no longer exclusively military-led**. A multiplicity of actors are involved in modern peace operations – NGOs, humanitarian agencies, police, civilian administrators, legal, electoral and constitutional experts, and even private military companies.²

The effectiveness of the peace operations in responding to emerging challenges is dependent on their ability to adapt to the needs on the ground, which requires a wide range of policy tools and responses. Consequently, recent concepts of conflict prevention and peacebuilding have emphasized comprehensive strategies such as 'integrated approach', '**comprehensive approach**', 'whole-government approach' or 'multidimensional approach', that focus on establishing coherence among the different sets of actors involved **at all levels**. These strategies emphasize the importance of effective **cooperation and coordination** between civilian, military and police actors, as well as the local community. Implementation of multi-dimensional mandates in a complex environment has brought up a variety of issues, which also require closer attention from the **peace training community**. As the environments where modern peace operations deploy have become more dangerous, and civilians have become the main victims of the intra-state wars, issues relating to **use of force** have increasingly become a central question in peace training.

Despite the changing nature of the conflicts and operational environment, **the need for individuals to see themselves as key contributors to the process remains unchanged**. Personnel deployed to conflict areas need to understand their role in the big picture as well

1 Prakash, B. S., and Nandini, K. (2005). Issues and Challenges in Modern Peace Operations, *Strategic Analysis*, Jan-Mar 2005.

2. Ibid.

as their responsibility for their own actions. The actions of one person have an impact on not only their own organization, but also on the wider international community, and more importantly, the host community. Consequently, to ensure the coherence between activities of different organizations, nationalities, sectors or components, the personnel deployed need to be equipped with the skills and mind-set to enhance communication among the different sectors, build trust, create and maintain social networks, and align activities with needs on the ground in a coordinated manner.

From the training & education perspective, this means that the training community must identify the competences (knowledge, skills, and attitude) needed to perform the various jobs in the current security environment. The desired performance outcome shall be a result of extensive analysis of the context in which the individuals are to operate, as well as an iterative process of conceptualizing, testing, and validating the preferred actions that shall be encouraged in such an environment. Issues relating to use of force and ability to maintain legitimacy and creditability in the eyes of host nations, have become a central question in relation to the effectiveness of UN peace operations. Thus, the personnel deployed need to be able to understand the nature of potential threats and their role in addressing them. They may also be confronted with **ethical or moral dilemmas** where they need to make tough decisions on whether to use force or not. The inability to protect the vulnerable will have an effect on the peacekeepers' legitimacy and the peace operations' ability to fulfil their mandate.

As a whole, peace operations deployed to date, and prospects for future missions continue to demonstrate that peace operations are subject to constant change. Identifying **the real training needs** is a perpetual challenge when coping with change. A known fact is that the diversity and complexity of multidimensional operational environments in crisis areas is increasing. Therefore, to fully mitigate the challenges on a mission, there is an increasing need to coordinate and enhance the education and training of the peace keeping troops. In addition, there is an emerging need to strengthen the collaboration between academics and practitioners in the field of peace operations training. After all, training and education are among the key tools needed for operationalizing theory into practice, thereby promoting coherent and responsible actions of individuals and troops around the world. So, how can we then make sure that individuals, units and components are well prepared to meet these challenges? And how can we safeguard seamless cooperation between all the actors; civilian, police and military? What are the characteristics of the modern peace operations and what are the implications for the peace operations training?

BACKGROUND OF MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS

In this chapter we will contextualize the environment in which modern peace operations are likely to take place. This will facilitate an understanding of why the topics of ‘ethicality’, ‘protection of civilians’, and ‘comprehensive approach’ have become important issues for the peace training community of today.

Defining ‘peace operations’

Peace operations increasingly operate in highly volatile environments where there is no peace to keep. The context in which international peace operations are conducted is subject to constant change, which includes the definition of ‘peace operation’ itself. ‘Since the first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, crisis response has taken on many different forms. Therefore, you will encounter many different terms and names in this field of work: from peacekeeping to crisis management, from civilian crisis management mission to peace operation. Names and types of missions have established themselves not only in relation to their mandates and functions but also depending on the implementing actor, which might just use a different term for the same type of mission that another organisation deploys. Missions of the European Union (EU) are often referred to as crisis management missions, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions or EU operations (civilian missions and/or military operations), while other organisations such as NATO and AU use the terms UN peacekeeping, peace operations or peace support operations (PSOs).¹

‘Today’s multidimensional peace operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law.’² Hence, rather than limiting our understanding of peace operations to their distinct functions (e.g. peace support, peacekeeping, peace enforcement) peace operations are viewed as ‘one general type of activity that can be used to prevent, limit and manage violent conflict as well as rebuild in its aftermath. Other parts of this international toolkit include conflict prevention, peacebuilding, peace-making, which involve the use of civilian agencies and NGOs in the reconstruction of polities, economies and societies.’³ Since there is no one definition to describe this operation, for the purpose of this publication we will use the **overarching term ‘peace operations’**, which includes ‘multilateral and ad hoc military and police missions, as

1 ENTRi. (2017). What are the different types of missions? Available at: <http://in-control.entriforccm.eu/chapters/chapter-1/different-types-of-missions/>. [Accessed 15.7.2017].

2. UN website. (2017). What is peacekeeping? Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml>. [Accessed 17.7.2017].

3. Bellamy, A.J., Williams, P.D. and Griffin, S. (2010). *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2nd Edition. Cambridge: Polity Press.

well as civilian led political missions⁴. They can refer to UN peace operations and political missions, AU peace operations, EU CSDP missions and operations, NATO missions and OSCE missions and field offices.

Evolving nature of peace operations

Faced with the rising demand for increasingly complex peace operations, the UN has been overstretched and challenged as never before in the past few years. Hence, UN peacekeeping⁵ continues to evolve, both conceptually and operationally, to meet new challenges and political realities.⁶ Now they are more often deployed amidst armed groups that operate in shifting alliances and terrorize the civilian population, frequently with support from government forces or neighbouring states.⁷ While the original UN principles were formulated for settings where there was peace to keep, most UN operations today take place in far more complex and challenging environments. Consequently, the changes in the nature of conflicts - principally from inter-state to internal conflicts - have significantly changed also **the effect of the UN's presence**. A number of peace operations are now deployed in less permissive environments, such as those in South-Sudan, Mali, Central African Republic⁸ and Republic of Congo.

Today most of the operations are increasingly armed with **Chapter VII** mandates and deployed to **Africa**, providing a robust mandate to carry out the various dimensions of the mission and protect civilians. In addition, **safeguarding the security of the mission staff** has become an increasing concern. Alongside the need to provide protection, peace operations are also tasked, among others, to ensure a safe and secure environment and to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Although, the military remains the backbone of most peace operations, the many faces of peacekeeping now include administrators and economists, police officers and legal experts, de-mining personnel and electoral observers, human rights monitors and specialists in civil affairs and governance, humanitarian workers and experts in communications and public information.⁹ The multitude of different threats, combined with a variety of different aid and security actors operating in the same theatre, has emphasized the importance of shared understanding and cooperation for the enhanced effectiveness of international endeavours.

The strategic direction of peace operations will take on great importance in the coming years. As the role and expectations vis-a-vis the international community have evolved, there is also an increasing need to search for new ways to strengthen the capacity to enhance the

4 Global Peace Operations Review. (2015) A monthly newsletter from the Center on International Cooperation, June 2015, ii. Available at: http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/gpor_monthly_newsletter_june_2015.pdf. [Accessed 18.6.2017]. 2. UN website. (2017). What is peacekeeping? Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml>. [Accessed 17.7.2017].

5. The term 'UN Peacekeeping' was coined at the inception of peacekeeping and it is also used when referring to the changing nature of peace operations.

6. This applies also to the operations and missions of other international organizations such as AU, NATO, EU and OSCE.

7. In this context, the effective protection of civilians in conflict areas is often impossible without the use of force.

8. Norvanto, E. (2016). The Central African Republic (CAR) Review. H2020 project, 653371.

9. United Nations Information Services Vienna. (2017), Looking Back/Moving Forward, [online] Available at: <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/60yearsPK/>. [Accessed 20.7.2017].

effectiveness of field operations. Among others, the use of force in peace operations has given rise to an array of different issues - legal, ethical, and operational - which are directly reflected in the way that peace operations are run today. If the UN and regional organizations are to positively contribute to sustainable peace and development in coming years, these issues need to be properly addressed at all levels (political, strategic, and in the field) and throughout the planning and conduct of the peace operations.

Characteristics of Contemporary Peace Operations

- Most of the conflicts in the post-Cold War world are intra-state or internal in nature, rather than inter-state.
- Most UN peacekeepers operate in hostile conflict environments in Africa.
- At the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping was dominated by contingents from Europe. Today the biggest contributions come from Asian and African countries.
- The mandates have transformed from monitoring of ceasefire between two states into 'Complex Peace Operations' aimed at bringing peace between warring parties within the state. Today, peace operations are increasingly tasked to address issues related to sustainable political, economic and social reconstruction with wide-ranging multi-dimensional mandates involving these elements.
- Modern POs (especially in Africa) are increasingly armed with Chapter VII mandates, providing a robust mandate to carry out the various dimensions of the mission and protect civilians.
- Most ongoing conflicts have proved difficult to end, since the protagonists are often a diverse set of antagonistic groups including non-state actors, militias and rebel groups whose objective could be control over governmental power or territory.
- Peace operations cover a wide-spectrum of operations, ranging from traditional monitoring operations, via massive civil-military state-building endeavours, to smaller scale robust enforcement operations.
- A multiplicity of actors are involved in modern POs – NGOs, humanitarian agencies, police, civilian administrators, legal, electoral and constitutional experts, and even private military companies.
- Modern POs are more dangerous than ever before. Consequently the safety and security of peace operations and associated personnel has become an increasingly important issue.

ETHICS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

In recent years, the international community has recognized that discussing ethical issues is fundamental to the success of peace operations. Nevertheless, ethics in the context of peace operations is a complex issue. The operational environment is volatile, and the personnel presents a wide mix of different cultures, professional backgrounds and organizations equipped with their individual moral codes and norms. Despite guidance provided in the form of operation-related code of conduct and principles, the personnel is likely to face situations where tough decisions must be made on-site based on one's own judgement as to what the 'right thing' to do is. **Finding an adequate way of facilitating the internalization of operation-related code of conduct and principles and ethical decision-making, is a challenge also for peace training.** There is no manual or guidebook that would provide the right or wrong answer for every situation the personnel may face on the ground. Being able to define what behaviour or/and decisions are desired when facing unforeseen ethical dilemmas is close to impossible.

The 5th EAPTC Meeting sought to address some of these issues by bringing together the peace training community and a group of scholars to exchange views and propose solutions for peace training and education. As reflected in the summary of discussions, grasping ethics in terms of desired behaviour and training solutions is not easy. Ethical dilemmas that peacekeepers are likely to face may represent a combination of contradictions between their personal and social/professional standard of ethics, and moral dilemmas as to what is perceived good and bad in the different situations. This will require peacekeepers and civilian personnel to increase their skills with regard to judgement, decision-making, communication and action in order to effectively address these moral and ethical dilemmas. The purpose of this chapter is to gain an understanding of the key ideas that emerged from the discussions, and present the suggestions proposed by the Meeting audience.

What is ethics?

The meaning of "ethics" is hard to pinpoint, and the views many people have regarding ethics are shaky. At its simplest, ethics is 'a system of moral principles. They affect how people make decisions and lead their lives. Ethics is concerned with what is good for individuals and society and is also described as moral philosophy'¹.

Examples of ethical and moral dilemmas:

1. How do you live a good life?
2. What are our rights and responsibilities?
3. How does language shape our understanding of right and wrong?
4. What is good and what is bad?

¹ BBC, (2017), Ethics: a general introduction, [online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/introduction/intro_1.shtml. [accessed 10.7.2017].

Based on discussions around the EAPTC Meeting, ethics was viewed from two perspectives. These following definitions will also be used later in this paper.

1. **Social standards of ethics**, which refers to well-founded standards of right and wrong that prescribe what humans ought to do, usually in terms of rights, obligations, benefits to society, fairness, or specific virtues.² This category perceives that the social context (culture etc.) structures these ethical standards, which are manifested in terms of different laws, customs, traditions, value systems or different ethnic and professional groups. Professional ethics fall into this group.
2. **Personal standards of ethics**, which refer to moral principles (moral beliefs and our moral conduct) that govern a person's behaviour or the conducting of an activity. This is an individual's internal compass that goes beyond the social construct of 'good' and 'bad'.

Ethics is a word that is commonly used to describe principles of belief, action and codes of conduct. These sets of principles rule and regulate human actions within a formal or professional context. For example, the law often incorporates ethical standards to which most citizens subscribe.³ Different occupations and organizations have defined their ethical

standards that are to guide the behaviour and actions of the individuals belonging to the group or profession. 'While such principles and codes may have moral undertones or intentions, they may not necessarily be moral and may even be patently immoral. These standards of social ethics 'are regular features of professional discourse; but they do not necessarily advocate or refer to the morality or beliefs of the group or individual.'⁴

Different aspects of ethics in peace operations

- Personal ethics;
- Professional ethics (ethical standards of the organization & profession);
- Values of the individual's own society;
- Values of the society where they are deployed

For the military profession, the importance of ethical conduct is emphasized especially in relation to command and leadership. Deployment to war⁵ distinguishes military leadership from any other type of leadership. As described by Karpinski (2006), such 'ethical behaviour is an inherent duty for leaders with the authority to place soldiers in harm's way'⁶. Commanders, contrary to personal belief and prejudices, must apply ethical principles in when to choose and assign individuals to different tasks. Hence, ethics plays a significant and relevant role in any discussion related to command and leadership in military service.⁷

2 Velasquez, M., Andre, C., Shanks, S.J., and Meyer, M.J. (2015). *What is Ethics?* Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, Available at: <https://www.scu.edu/ethics/ethics-resources/ethical-decision-making/what-is-ethics/>. [Accessed 13.7.2017].

3 Ibid.

4 Bamidele, O. (2013), Ethical Issues in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, Analysis, *University for peace and conflict*.

5. Hostile fire zones, lines of fire, or into harm's way.

6. Karpinski, J.L. (2006), Ethical Behavior and Ethical Challenges in the Complex Security Environment, in Specer, E. J. and Langace-Roy, D. (eds.). *Proceedings from the 7th Canadian Conference on Ethical Leadership*, p. 94.

7 Ibid.

In the context of peace operations, the different organizations, e.g. UN, EU and NATO have defined their own core values, which are further translated into guiding principles and codes of conduct (standard of ethics). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; International human rights treaties; international humanitarian law, UNSRC Mandates, and the basic principles of UN Peacekeeping; (1) impartiality, (2) consent of the parties, and (3) non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, operate as the normative framework for most peace operations. Furthermore, aspects such as integrity, legitimacy, creditability and promotion of national and local ownership, are also seen to be important enablers for achievement of a sustainable peace, and thereby also the founding principles for peace operations' ethical standards.⁸ Consequently, the individuals working in such operations are expected to demonstrate such principles during their service.

Ethical dilemmas in peace operations⁹

The misbehaviour of an individual, and inability to respect the core principles of Human Rights and other guiding principles, can compromise the legitimacy and creditability of the whole operation.

Despite the degree of clarity of code of conduct and the organizational values communicated by the international organizations, much is still left to the individual conscience and sense of social responsibility of individual peace operators fulfilling their tasks and duties in the field. The conduct of peace operations cannot be a matter of routine or a mindless application of received rules and regulations.¹⁰ It is rather a balance between organizational values and individuals' own judgement of the situation. In the end, it is the individual who makes the final decision and acts in a given situation. Hence, operations will always face challenges, either due to the behaviour of individuals or as a result of being confronted by issues that had not been seen as a threat and consequently, had not been given the priority that they deserved. **Such cases may be connected to the use of force and responsibility to protect in the unclear settings, or to the misconduct of peacekeepers and aid workers towards the local population.**¹¹

"What is the right thing to do?"

Regarding the ethicality of the selected course of action, individuals may be confronted with an ethical/moral dilemma. Such events do not refer to situations where a peacekeeper concisely violates the code of conduct for the purpose of harming the organization or other people, such as stealing or sexual exploitation. Peacekeepers are often faced with the so called **harm dilemma**. This dilemma occurs in situations where no matter which course of action is selected, harm or injury will come to others as a direct or indirect consequence of one's

8 UNDPKO, (2008). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, [online], Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf. [Accessed 13.7.2017].

9 The work of the Working groups chaired by Dr Janne Aalto, Col Michael Uhrig, Supt. Olavi Kujanpää and Prof. Reijo E. Heinonen during the 5th EAPTC Meeting has provided important content for this section.

10 Bamidele, O. 2013. Ethical Issues in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, Analysis, *University for peace and conflict*.

11 Based on discussions in the working groups.

actions.¹² As described by Maddison (2006), the following example outlines the real life challenges peacekeepers may face on duty.

“Place yourself in the boots of those officers and soldiers who are guarding checkpoints in either Afghanistan or Iraq when what appear to be children or pregnant women approach and who do not seem to understand the instructions to stop. Do these people just want to travel to the next village or do they have explosives strapped to their bodies and are trying to get closer so that they can detonate the explosives with as much damage done as possible? There is no simple answer to this question but those folks who are ordered to man these checkpoints have to make these types of ethical decisions in an instant.”¹³

In peace operations, individuals can find themselves in circumstances, where **the chain of command and personal values may seem to contradict each other**. Peacekeepers face challenging situations, such as child soldiers, ethnic cleansing, etc., where the normative principles (e.g. law, guidelines) may provide only little assistance in decision-making. In these situations, peacekeepers are often guided by their own personal ethics (moral compass), and hence the outcome of their actions will depend on the individual peacekeepers’ standard of ethics.

The common challenges related to ethics in peace operations, as outlined by the Colonel Uhrig in his keynote speech can be summarized in four questions:

1. What if my personal morality collides with professional ethics?
2. What if I face a harm dilemma and I cannot make the ‘right’ decision?
3. There are professionals from several occupational categories in our team. What if their professional ethics collide with each other’s?
4. What if values of my own society collide with values of local society?

These questions illustrate different aspects of ethical and moral dilemmas, including the contradiction between personal and professional ethics, moral stress caused by cultural differences and the need to respect the ethical standards of the host nation, and the mental stress caused when faced with a harm dilemma.

Common standards for ethics in peace operations?

The operational realities of contemporary peace operations mean that personnel are likely to continue to confront a range of moral and ethical dilemmas during the missions that they are charged to undertake. Due to a number of incidents where the peacekeepers have been reported to exploit locals, or have not been able to prevent violent conflicts from (re)esca-

12. Beauchamp, D. (2002), Defence Ethics Program: Fundamentals of Canadian Defence Ethics, Defence National, p. 18.

13. Maddison, G. (2006). Competing Values: Loyalty to the Chain of Command and Personal Integrity, in Specer, J.E. and Langace-Roy, D. (eds.). Proceedings from the 7th Canadian Conference on Ethical Leadership, p. 91.

lating, the need for strengthening the individuals' capacity to function in complex settings increases. Issues relating to ethical behaviour have also become a concern of the training community. The context of chain of command, and behaviour of leaders when facing ethical dilemmas, has drawn increased interest in the peace operations community. This raises questions such as: How can potential internal contradictions between the personnel deployed to peace operations be mitigated? What can be done to strengthen the ability of peacekeeping personnel to function in such complex situations?

Ethical dilemmas are context-specific

Ethical standards differ across cultures, and therefore a key element of fostering ethicality across mission components is **enhancing understanding of the environment where peace operations take place**. Ethicality is more than simply respect of law and code of conduct. Preparing for operations should include and develop cultural awareness so that participants are conscious of the differences in ethics of countries they are to operate in, which also facilitates finding common ground with the locals. Moreover, continuous risk assessment regarding the operational environment and potential consequences of different actions vis-à-vis the host society and the functionality of the peace operation itself, should be fostered.¹⁴

In order to foster ethicality in peace operations, police, military, and civilian operators should be educated together on ethics, including both social ethics and personal ethics.¹⁵ This integrative training and educational approach should be also be mission-oriented. In other words, it should be especially tailored to deal with that critical issue that will be encountered on that specific operation. Such awareness will certainly promote enhanced awareness of the challenges that personnel will sometimes be confronted with at the time of a decision and following that decision. This knowledge should be integrated into peace training for maximum impact. Once devised, the training **should then be made a requirement** for everyone deployed to peace operations.

Common standards for ethics in peace operations?

As verbalized by the EAPTC Meeting audience, 'ethics is something that comes from inside us humans, and something that we develop through our interactions with our social surroundings, and through our education', among other. Hence, it is questionable if so called common sense of ethicality or common standards of ethics is even feasible. Instead, what could be done is **to foster common understanding of ethics and ethicality among the peacekeepers and other individuals serving in peace operations**.

¹⁴ Keynote speech from Colonel Michael Uhrig on Ethicality in Military Peacekeeping, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Requirements for ethical behaviour

Due to the significant role of decision-making, the ethical behaviour of leaders is crucial in particular when deploying an intervention into a violent conflict. The nature of ethical decisions involves tough choices and opens up leaders to criticism. Most trust and confidence problems can be traced to the ethical climate that exists in an organization or profession.¹⁶ Furthermore, especially in the military organizations, where respect for the chain of command is a central part of the military profession, loyalty towards the Commander can present a challenge for an individual soldier. What if the Commander demonstrates behaviour that contradicts what the troops expect from a Senior Commander? Would they still follow his/her orders in situations where they face moral and ethical dilemmas?

Ethical behaviour

1. Universal values - Human rights (Relativism-Fundamentalism)
2. Moral Duty - professionalism (professional values)
3. Respect - individualism (institutional values - individualism)
4. Aim to do good - Cultures (education, learning - trust)

If we are to provide training in ethics, we need to be able to define what the preferred behaviour is and how to measure it in terms of individuals' on-the-job performance.¹⁷ For example, **the role of the leaders is central in creating the culture of ethics in a mission.** Leadership based on good moral and ethical values begins at the top. To be successful, a leader must be committed to enforcing ethical behaviour. Thus, understanding and clarifying standards of ethical behaviour becomes critical to leadership success.¹⁸ In the context of peace operations, the preferred behaviour of leaders is a mix of respect for universal values such as human rights, professionalism, and respect for diversity, accountability and aiming for good.¹⁹ The EAPTC working group also discussed the fact that humanitarian interventions and peacebuilding require empathy and that defending human rights and democracy requires integrity or living by example in the areas where peacekeepers and civilian personnel operate. This means that individuals deployed to peace operations - whether they are commanders or individual experts, will require increasing skills in judgement, decision-making, communication and action to effectively address these moral and ethical dilemmas.²⁰

In the context of training and exercising, diverse scenarios can support in preparing individuals to make decisions in unforeseen situations. It may not make on-site decision-making easy, but it can foster the individual's ability to be guided by the code of ethics. Although, ethics and ethicality have gained increasing attention within the research community, there is a need to gather more empirical evidence from the field to understand the factual impact

¹⁶ Maddison, G. (2006), p. 90.

¹⁷ Kirkpatrick's model suggests that training effectiveness shall be measured by applying his 4-level evaluation model that seeks to analyse the effects via different levels: (1) Reaction, (2) Learning in terms of skills, knowledge, attitudes, (3) Change in behavior, and (4) Impact on the job

¹⁸ Maddison, G. (2006), p. 93.

¹⁹ Working group work chaired by Professor Reijo E. Heinonen on ethics in Peacekeeping – Considerations to Training and Education, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

²⁰ Maddison, G. (2006), p. 122.

of individual's actions on the ground.²¹ Therefore, **multidisciplinary research programs** are needed in order to better understand the individuals' cognitive processes and consequences of decisions made when confronting a moral or ethical dilemma in a peace operation. In addition, the link between training and research should be promoted in order to divide research findings into implementable training programs. Ethics and ethical leadership training are a necessity for every individual assigned to a position that requires leadership and command responsibilities.

What and how to train ethics?²²

As Colonel Uhrig pointed out in his opening speech, a key issue relating to professionalism and ethical standards that shall be followed in peace operations, especially in relation to soldiers, is that modern peace operations include **a range of different activities that are not all jobs for a soldier**. These activities may include tasks ranging from diplomacy, monitoring, bridge building, and political administration to policing, riot control, management of refugees, and combat operations.²³ Since the roles and responsibilities of different peace actors are more intertwined, there is a need to provide adequate pre-deployment training to not only uniformed personnel, but also to civilians.

Context-specific training

Considering that every conflict is unique and the surrounding culture varies, it is clear that there is no 'one-fits-for-all' training solution for ethics. In order to develop adequate training and education, **the identification of the specific ethical needs of the individual peace operation is necessary**. The ethical dilemmas one may face can differ greatly from one place to another and among the different job descriptions. Understanding some of the common characteristics of each operational environment, be it working in an IDP²⁴ camp in South-Sudan, or patrolling in Mali, can help to mentally prepare personnel for the challenges they may face. For example, roleplay combined with self-reflection discussions afterwards, could be an effective tool for familiarizing peacekeepers and civilian experts with the particular ethical dilemmas that they will face in these operations.

21 Working group work chaired by Professor Reijo E. Heinonen on ethics in Peacekeeping – Considerations to Training and Education, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

22 This section is based on the Working group works chaired by Colonel Michael Uhrig; SUPT Olavi Kujanpää; Doctor Janne Aalto and Professor Reijo E. Heinonen, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

23 For example combat training is no longer enough for the military. Military will be interacting more with the local population, either in providing humanitarian assistance or trying to establish safe and secure environment.

24 IDP stands for Internally displaced person.

Fostering communication, common language and group cohesion

Communication and a common language (terminology and Lingua Franca) at all levels of the chain of command is necessary in order to minimize misunderstanding among personnel. In order to mitigate potential challenges caused by cultural differences and different organizational and professional backgrounds, enhancing the personnel's language, communication and team-working skills is essential. This includes also knowing the common procedures and code of conduct of each peace operation - be it UN, EU, NATO or AU-led. Furthermore, common language among the personnel allows different parties to better understand one another, communicate their own personal morals, as well as rules and procedures, and professional codes inherent to their own cultures and backgrounds.

Group cohesion is a crucial element as signing the Code of Conduct and attending the training would not have the same effect as 'disciplined group behaviour'. Carrying out missions 'ethically' is more than just completing a specific task, it is also how the personnel behave, work as a group, and present themselves to the local population. Hence, understanding the code of conduct is a primary target for all actors and misconduct must be treated equally among the military, civilian and police sectors during the mission. Principles such as integrity, accountability, creditability and respect towards humanity should all be manifested in the behaviour of peacekeepers and civilian experts serving in a peace operation. A culture of ethics (social standard of ethics) can lead to more coherent courses of action among personnel even when facing ethical dilemmas.

In order to foster communication, common language, and common culture among peacekeepers and civilian experts, a united and coherent training program for all military, police and civilian experts could be a way forward. In the end, being able to work together is a key prerequisite for peace operations. Fostering mutual trust and understanding among multi-professional and multinational personnel can also strengthen the adaptation of the common code of conduct and principles, which can potentially help to prevent misconduct among mission personnel. Therefore, **enabling training and exercises where different sectors and cultures are brought together is a most effective tool**. Approaching the issue from the multidisciplinary perspective could also provide a more comprehensive understanding of the issues related to group cohesion and code of conduct within different sectors (civilian, police, military). This knowledge and best practices could be then translated into education programs and training of ethical advisors, who would support the training of personnel during the peace operation.

Towards a curricula for ethics

What kind of ethical knowledge, skills and attitudes we must then have in peace operations? To demonstrate the 'what' and 'how' regarding the training of ethics for more effective peace operations, the following table summarizes the key ideas of the 5th EAPTC Meeting audience.

Theme	What to train	How to train
Code of ethics in peace operations	(1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, UNSRC mandates, and the basic principles of UN peacekeeping; (2) Operation-specific Code of Conduct; (3) Moral dilemmas; (4) Rules and procedures relating to misconduct such as sexual exploitation.	(1) Lectures, external mission reviews; (2) Lectures, by example, mobile education and training teams; (3) Training simulations (e.g. staging situations without the training audience knowing it in order to force them to align actions with beliefs. Facilitate questioning of one's belief systems and foster self-reflection. (4) Lectures, external mission reviews.
Diversity & cultural sensitivity	(1) Cultural compass -> how to navigate in different cultures; (2) Understanding the key concepts of religions and cultures; how they interact and reflect the dynamics of a society.	(1) Lectures, training simulations, training in multi-cultural teams; (2) Lectures, scenarios that highlight the different value systems and their manifestations in different societies.
Cultural awareness	(1) Everyday logic and morality of a local population, including the shorter and long-term horizon. (2) Cultural, and historical understanding of the local population: (3) Social, political and economic understanding of the conflict dynamics.	(1) Discussing with local population for the purpose of understanding the value system; identifying moral and ethical composition training, advising, mentoring (activity) at every level. (2) Lectures, training simulations, using locals to explain the cultural dynamics. (3) Lectures, using cultural interpretations to explain the dynamics, mobile education and training teams.
Leadership	(1) Professionalism (2) Leading by example (3) Chain of Command (4) Critical thinking (5) Decision-making skills (6) Communication skills (7) Coping strategies when facing ethical/ moral dilemmas	(1) (All): Lectures; (2) Leadership advisory scenarios where individuals are forced to make tough decisions; (3) Take people out of their comfort zones; (4) Mentoring; (5) Facilitate questioning of one's belief systems and foster self-reflection.
Negotiation and Communication	(1) Negotiation techniques (2) Principles of effective communication (3) Public speaking skills (4) Do's and don'ts in social situations	(1) Lectures; (2) Training simulations in order to practice clear messaging, trust-building, negotiation techniques; (3) Training simulations in different scenarios, where individuals are to find common ground with those they are talking to in order to bridge possible rifts.
Language skills	(1) Working language of the peace operation (2) Basics of local language	(1) Long-term language education and in-job language training; (2) Intensive language training course
Teamwork	(1) Team-building techniques; (2) Group behaviour; (3) Communication skills; (4) Roles and responsibilities; (5) Procedures and processes.	(1) Lectures, (2) In-job training and mentoring; (3) Training simulations in multidisciplinary teams.
Self-management	(1) Mental preparation for possible ethical & moral dilemma situations. (2) Having the right attitude and perception of issues.	(1) Training simulations (e.g. staging situations without the training audience knowing it, in order to force them to align actions with beliefs. (2) Facilitate questioning of one's belief systems and foster self-reflection.
Problem-solving or critical thinking abilities	(1) Having the skill to apply your knowledge in practice. (2) Having a good imaginative capacity in order to be able to better understand new ideas.	(1) Blended learning; (2) Training simulations to facilitate complex problem-solving team work. (3) Take people out of their comfort zones.

Table 1. Curricula for ethics

PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

'A key characteristic of current operational environments is that civilians are being deliberately targeted by armed actors'¹.

A key characteristic of current operational environments is that **civilians are being deliberately targeted by armed actors**. Normally the host government is first and foremost responsible for providing protection to its population from such threats. However, when it fails to fulfil this task, the international community plays an increasingly important role in providing protection to the population at risk. Hence, protecting civilians has emerged as a central purpose of many contemporary peace operations. However, it is no longer simply about avoiding civilian casualties or assisting the delivery of humanitarian aid. The military is increasingly expected to protect civilians from perpetrators who deliberately target them and who are responsible for the vast majority of deaths. Nevertheless, protecting civilians is not just the responsibility of the uniformed forces, yet it is a job shared between the mission and partners from the humanitarian community, local government and a spectrum of different foreign aid and security providers. Despite differing tactics and priorities, as well as the cultural difficulty that some humanitarian actors have in accepting a military role in protection strategies, both military and humanitarian actors increasingly recognize each other as having important contributions to make to sustainable peace and security.

Nevertheless, ongoing peace operations have increasingly demonstrated the inherent challenges in fulfilling protection tasks. Some of the key challenges relate to matching protection mandates with committed resources and a wider political approach. Closing the gap between what is expected from peace operations in relation to protection tasks, and what they can deliver, demands improvements across several dimensions. Some of them need to be addressed at the political level, and there are also a range of issues that relate to individuals' competence to operate in such threat scenarios. Consequently, issues such as use of force, leadership, communication, and coordination among other actors, increasingly need to be addressed by the peace operations training. The audience of the 5th EAPTC Meeting sought to tackle some of these issues by sharing best practices and ideas relating to the operationalization of the protection of civilians into actionable solutions for more effective peace operations.

Protection of civilians in armed conflicts

Consensus is forming around the importance of protecting civilians not only because of the humanitarian obligation to shelter endangered population from the effects of armed conflict. It is essential also because it is critical to the perceived success of peace operations and

¹ Kjeksrud, S., Beadle, A.W. and Lindqvist, P.H.F. (2016). Protecting Civilians from Violence: A Threat-Based Approach to Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations. (Kjeller/Oslo: A joint publication of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and the Norwegian Defence International Center (NODEFIC)).

therefore the peace community's ability to work credibly in the field of peace and security. As peace operations have grown in number, frequency, size and mandate, 'the UN has made increasingly concerted efforts to put civilian protection at the heart of these operations'². Out of 16 contemporary peace operations, 11 are mandated specifically to protect civilians. The 'protection of civilians' mandate in United Nations peace operations fulfils a critical role in realizing broader protection objectives, which have in recent years become an important focus of peace building, international relations and international law.

What and for whom?

The concepts of the 'protection of civilians' developed by the humanitarian, human rights and peacekeeping communities have evolved somewhat separately, resulting in disparate understandings of the associated normative bases, substance and responsibilities. One of the most commonly used definitions in peace operations originates from the UN, which defines protection as 'all necessary means, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government'³. **In the context of physical protection**, it shall be stressed that protection of civilians is much more than avoiding collateral damage,⁴ although collateral damage⁵ or casualties caused by mines and explosive remnants of war (EWRs) will also require special attention in some contexts. Furthermore, beyond violations, peace operations also need to track all casualties resulting from lawful actions by peacekeepers, State security forces, and non-State armed groups.⁶

There are **legal, political, and operational** aspects of protecting civilians as well as accompanying challenges. First, the protection of the civilian population in times of conflict is based on an essential principle of international humanitarian law (IHL). According to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, civilians and all persons not taking part in combat may under no circumstances be the object of attack and must be spared and protected. In fact, another key concept that requires clarification is 'civilian'. According to UN definition (Ref. 2015.07) a civilian is 'any person who is not or is no longer directly participating in hostilities or other acts of violence shall be considered a civilian, unless he or she is a member of armed forces or groups'⁷. Understanding who is civilian is central for planning and conducting protection activities, since the threatening actors are not always armed. Nevertheless, according to UN guidelines, in case of doubt as to whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered a civilian.

2 See for example: Permanent Representation of Georgia to the UN organizations, (2017), Statement by the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations at the UN Security Council open debate on "Protection of civilians in armed conflict". [online], Accessed at: http://www.un.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=595&info_id=36962. [16.6.2017].

3 United Nations, (2015), Policy on The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping (2015. 07)

4 Keynote speech by Colonel Petter Lindqvist on Protection of Civilians – Considerations to Military Component, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017

5 Incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian property not part of an authorized target.

6 Harston, J. (2016). Protection of Civilians. (Williamsburg: 2016, Peace Operations Training Institute).

7 United Nations, (2015), Policy on The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping (2015. 07).

UN approach to protection of civilians

Protection of civilians has become a central purpose, not only for the UN peace operations but also regional organizations such as the EU⁸ and NATO⁹, which have also developed policies and guidelines to operationalize civilian protection into the core of their peace support and crisis management activities. In comparison to the EU and NATO, the UN has elaborated a more comprehensive doctrinal framework, and in its Operational Concept, has identified three tiers, in which the military, the police and civilian components are involved:

1. Tier I, in which the Protection of Civilians is to be achieved through dialogue and engagement within political processes;
2. Tier II, in which the Protection of Civilians is ensured through the provision of protection from any form of physical violence, and;
3. Tier III, in which the mission strives to create a protective environment conducive to the Protection of Civilians and to the respect of fundamental human rights and freedoms.¹⁰

Physical protection does not only include eliminating threats, but also reducing civilian vulnerabilities. Protection can be achieved in a variety of ways, for example by reducing the number of attacks against civilians, by facilitating everyday civilian life through area security, by reducing the presence of small arms, by removing illegal checkpoints, or by assisting humanitarian actors in their protection efforts. However, if the military efforts to protect civilians from physical violence fail, other civilian protection efforts are likely to fail too.

‘The practical expectations of the use of force to protect civilians must be clear, and an overarching framework is needed to facilitate the spectrum of actors working in a complementary way towards the common objectives of the broader protection agenda¹¹.’ As described by Kjeksrud et al. (2016) ‘there is no inherent hierarchy or sequencing among the tiers, and **action under all three tiers should emphasize prevention and pre-emption, as well as the primacy of the host-state’s responsibility to protect civilians.** All mission components have a role to play in each of the tiers.¹² While **engagement within a political process** is a task of the civilian component, **protection from physical violence**, is a primary task for the military forces, and it is also a pre-condition for other means of protection.

8 The EU adopted the Guidelines on the protection of civilians in EU-led crisis management operations (doc. 40805/03). The document imposes to adopt all appropriate steps, in co-operation with the UN and other International Organizations, to help create a safe and secure environment for civilians endangered by a conflict in which there is a EU-led operation; and to facilitate safe and unhindered access by humanitarian personnel to civilians, namely to ensure assistance to Internal Displaced Persons, refugees, and to the most vulnerable groups.

9 NATO’s approach to the protection of civilians is based on legal, moral and political imperatives, which were outlined by Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016. For more information about the approach visit: NATO website (2017), NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians, [online], Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133945.htm?selectedLocale=en. [Accessed 7.7.2017].

10 United Nations, (2015), Policy on The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping (2015. 07).

11 Willmot, H. and Sheeran, S. (2015). The protection of civilians mandate in UN peacekeeping operations: reconciling protection concepts and practices. *ICRC website*, [online]. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/international-review/article/protection-civilians-mandate-un-peace-keeping-operations-reconciling>. [Accessed 8.7.2017].

12 Kjeksrud, S., Beadle, A.W. and Lindqvist, P.H.F. (2016). Protecting Civilians from Violence: A Threat-Based Approach to Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations. (Kjeller/Oslo: A joint publication of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and the Norwegian Defence International Center (NODEFIC)).

Shared responsibility

The Host State's government always has the primary responsibility for protecting the civilian population within its borders. This protection should come from State security (military, police, and gendarmerie) and judicial structures. Nevertheless, in the case that the Host government fails to provide protection to civilians, peace operations with Protection of Civilian (PoC) mandates are authorized to support or supplement the protection efforts of Host State institutions. To effectively address the complex challenges, protection of civilians is **a mandated task that requires concerted action from all mission components.** The military and police components, along with civilian components such as civil affairs, human rights, political affairs, and others, have specific tasks regarding civilian protection.¹³ While the civilian component has the primary responsibility for the Tier I activities through the civil affairs section and human rights monitoring and reporting, the military and police component are, by nature, focused on Tier II, in particular thanks to the activities ensured by Peacekeepers and Formed Police Units. But it would be incorrect not to consider the mutually reinforcing efforts of the different components, as well as the impact that ensuring law and order and public safety and security has on the political process, and on the overall respect of human rights.¹⁴ They all contribute to building a protective environment for the civilians (Tier III).

In fact, the UN's whole-of-mission concept or 'comprehensive approach'¹⁵ to PoC requires coordinated approaches among the different components that need to be reflected in the structure and operations of UN peace operations, starting with their PoC strategies. Such strategies will need to clarify the PoC role and responsibilities of all mission components and ensure coherence of effort in light of the deployment area's identified risks.¹⁶ For this reason, while protection is a core element of the concept of international policing and peacekeeping, in a peace operations context it requires the police and military component to closely align its efforts with the mission's overall protection of civilians' strategy.¹⁷ Protection of civilians is an outcome, not an activity. That is also why it is an element of all peace operations and activities – be they civilian or military.

Protection from physical violence

As outlined in the previous chapter, protection of civilians from physical violence (Tier II) concerns primarily the military actors and the police forces (Formed Police Unit). Nevertheless, civilians also play a role in relation to protection tasks. In this chapter we will briefly outline some of the key elements related to different aspects of physical protection in the context of training protection of civilians. The descriptions that follow are based on keynote speeches and discussions during the EAPTC Meeting.

13 Harston, J. (2016). *Protection of Civilians*, (Williamsburg: Peace Operations Training Institute), p. 19.

14 Keynote speech of Giovanni Pietro Barbano on Protection of Civilians – Considerations to Police component, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017

15. This concept is discussed more in depth in chapter 5.

16 von Einsiedel, S. (2015). *Non-Military Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations: Experiences and Lessons*, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, Occasional Paper 3, May 2015.

17 Keynote speech of Giovanni Pietro Barbano on Protection of Civilians – Considerations to Police component, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

Considerations as to the military component ¹⁸

Today, civilians in conflict are targeted and attacked as a part of the strategy of the perpetrators of violence. Knowing the nature of the threat is therefore essential. Different threats will require different responses, ranging from offensive actions to no action at all. The challenge is to protect civilians from threats of **physical violence** without causing more harm in doing so. This is also why effectiveness in protecting civilians can be enhanced without jeopardizing the principles of peacekeeping in UN peace operations. That said, in cases where the host nation is a part of the threat to its own population, protection of civilians becomes a challenge that first and foremost must be handled **at the political level (Tier I)**, and not left for the mission to become the scape-goat.

Protection from physical violence may include:

- Seizing arms
- Military and police presence
- Military and police engagement
- Patrolling and monitoring hotspots
- Providing route security/freedom of movement
- Establishing physical defensive positions
- Public order management
- Joint protection teams
- Visible exercises
- Early warning measures
- Evacuations

There is wide agreement within the international community that the planning of peace operations, particularly in terms of protection of civilians, should be improved. As the key task of the military is to protect civilians from physical violence, planning for PoC activities is about understanding the relationship between the perpetrators¹⁹ and those threatened (civilian population). **Protection is achieved by affecting the intention and capabilities of a threat actor.** Although the peace operation's own forces must also prepare to defend themselves against perpetrators of violence against civilians, the key goal of military protection is to **match the perpetrators' ability to threaten civilians.** The ability to **apply adequate force in order to protect civilians** remains a prerequisite for lasting peace, in UN peace operations as well as any others. This demands an improved ability to understand the nature of threats against civilians. This will also vary depending on the rationale and strategies of the perpetrators.

Information strategies also play a role in modern peace operations. Even increased effectiveness in conducting basic tasks of a military component will have a deterring effect on a perpetrator who attacks civilians. Perceptions become reality through **strategic communication.** The ability to convey messages reflecting the capacity and ability of a military force will have immediate effect on target audiences aiming at attacking civilians.

How to distinguish civilians from combatants? In many operational environments, it is almost impossible to distinguish between civilians and armed elements. Sometimes perpetrators become victims, and victims become perpetrators. Hence, the ability to define scena-

¹⁸ This section is based on the Keynote speech from Colonel Petter Lindqvist on Protection of Civilians – Considerations to Military component, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

¹⁹ Perpetrators of violence against civilians may include elements of national and international security forces, non-State armed groups, criminals, and other civilians (e.g. inter-communal violence).

rios to guide the protectors will be instrumental in ‘**doing the right thing**’, e.g. protecting without causing more harm in doing so. This is also why UN peace operations” on autopilot” may jeopardize their own objectives. Understanding the threat, and knowing how the threat against civilians can be reduced without causing more harm, is paramount.

There is no one size-fits-all-solution

Multi-dimensional conflicts with a wide spectrum of actors involved cannot be approached with a one-size-fits-all solution where CONOPS²⁰ and other framework documents prescribe the use of military assets and force without analysing the nature of threats. Why are civilians being attacked? What happens if the attackers succeed? How can military forces be used to protect them? Passively protecting civilians by establishing PoC sites and IDP camps may be the only immediate solution – but with a persisting threat, peace cannot be restored. Protecting civilians from the threat of physical violence means affecting the capabilities and intentions of the perpetrators of the violence. **This is the job of the military component in today’s peace operations.**

The role and responsibilities of the police component²¹

Eleven of the current 16 UN missions, the most numerous in terms of uniformed personnel, have a clear PoC mandate and all of them include **Formed Police Units (FPU)** as robust police assets mandated, inter alia, to protect civilians. Both FPU and individual police experts (e.g. UNPOL) help to establish and maintain law and order through executive mandate. In missions with **an executive mandate**, police shall be directly responsible for physical protection of civilians (Tier II) against imminent threats, e.g. through force projection and/or high visibility and increased patrolling. More often, this will involve providing **operational support** to protection provided by host State police (Tier III), such as advice on planning and conducting operations and investigations into incidents, or training host State police to perform key protection functions, such as providing security in camps for internally displaced persons. And indeed, crime prevention and repression, and protection of communities are the innate task of the police, both in domestic and international engagement.

Suitable tool for modern peace operations

²⁰ Concept of operations.

²¹ This section is based on the Keynote speech of Giovanni Pietro Barbano on Protection of Civilians – Considerations to Police component, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

The intra-State nature of conflicts and civil wars requires now more than ever a **community-based approach**, an attitude inherent in all police that usually makes them the most suitable tool in reaching out to local communities, understanding their needs, and taking preventive measures, especially those aimed at strengthening relations between communities and the host State police in order to improve early warning and rapid response for their protection.

Roles and Responsibilities of the police component (examples):

- Protection of UN personnel and facilities, including individually deployed unarmed UNPOL
- Patrolling, confidence-building, investigations, arrests, detentions, seizures, confiscations
- Public order, operational support, regulated through DUF (Detention and the Use of Force)
- Training of local police
- Protection of civilians and vulnerable communities
- Presence in IDP camps, if assigned

Key considerations as to the police component

‘Maintain legitimacy and creditability in the eyes of the host nation’

Promotion, protection and respect for human rights must be incorporated into every aspect of the work of police components deployed to missions. Not only shall the international police officers promote, protect and respect human rights in the exercise of their duties, but they must also act as role models to their Host State counterparts and be prepared to raise issues of human rights if confronted with violations.

‘Only deploy personnel who demonstrate integrity, respect, and good code of conduct’

Personnel must always behave in a principled and accountable manner, in accordance with international human rights standards and zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse. These standards must also be incorporated into how, and on what basis, police provide advice to Host State police, and shall be central to evaluations of police components’ effectiveness, and shall be included in the competencies required for the selection of international police personnel. Peace operations shall neither select nor deploy any individual who has been involved in violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.

Police components shall minimize environmental impact in their deployment areas in order to ensure good relations with the local community, as well as protect the Mission’s reputation. Furthermore, international police officers shall adopt appropriate behaviour around cultural, religious and historical sites of importance to the host State population. In addition to working closely with host State police, protection of civilians requires particularly close co-ordination between the police, military and other components.

‘Take measures against misconduct’

International police must vigorously oppose and combat any form of corruption involving the mission personnel or contractors, or the Host State police or other law enforcement or governmental agencies. If a police officer develops a reasonable suspicion that acts of sexual exploitation and abuse or corruption have occurred, he/she shall immediately report these suspicions along the mission chain of command.

Gender analysis and gender equality

When defining and implementing support activities and when identifying security needs, the police component must pay special attention to gender and other group-specific considerations, especially in relation to vulnerable and marginalized groups. Gender considerations must be incorporated into key aspects of police peace operations, such as planning, management, budgeting and capacity development programmes. Accordingly, non-discriminatory and adequate representation of qualified women shall be promoted within the Host State police, as well as work to ensure that women in the Host State police are provided equal capacity and career development opportunities. Police components shall prioritize supporting the Host State in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence, preventing any and all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse and supporting the specific needs and protection of the victims.

The role as of the civilian component

Civilian peace operations (such as civilian crisis management missions and political missions) and civilian mission components have shown that they can provide crucial protection functions, and protection is also the ultimate objective of human rights field-work. Civilian components, such as the UN civilian sector, EU civilian crisis management missions, and political missions play a central role in Tier I and Tier III-related activities. The table below exemplifies a range of activities that civilian actors may perform in peace operations.

THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN-RELATED ACTIVITIES MAY INCLUDE	
Protection through dialogue and engagement (Tier I)	Establishing a protective environment (Tier III)
• Supporting the political process, good governance & government institutions • Human Rights: ensuring protective presence and effective advocacy • Monitoring and proactive presence • Public advocacy and reporting • Supporting reconciliation • Political action • Peace negotiations & agreements • Mediation • Conflict and crises management • Liaison with host government, local political leaders, communities and regional neighbours	• Promotion of legal protection • Facilitation of humanitarian assistance • Support to national institutions • Protection of human rights • Reforming of police, justice and security sectors (SSR) • Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) • Rule of law (RoL) • Return of refugees and internally displaced persons • Mine action activities

Along with the civilian sectors such as Political Affairs and Rule of Law sectors, “protection of civilians has increasingly become an objective **humanitarians share** with UN peace operations. Interaction between peace operations and humanitarian actors is necessary to ensure better protection outcomes by exchanging information and analysis on protection issues, and seeking ways to maximize synergies in areas of mutual concern (including advocacy with conflict parties, engagement with armed groups, child protection, return and integration of displaced populations etc.).²²”

On the whole, civilian actors play a central role in the protection of civilians. Although, provision of physical protection is a job for military and formed police units, civilian missions (such as EU civilian crisis management missions, and UN political missions) make significant contributions to their protection of civilians efforts, both in support of military responses and in their own right. The close collaboration across functions is paramount, since the protection tasks of the UN require joined-up approaches, including planning; early warning and situational awareness; and engagement with international partners, local communities, and national authorities.²³ To foster the effectiveness of protection actions, the UN has promoted the adaptation of **comprehensive Protection of Civilians strategies**, which have helped to coordinate efforts through improved coordination and information sharing within missions.

Key challenges²⁴

As stated by Brigadier Giovanni Pietro Barbano in his opening speech, despite the outstanding and commendable doctrinal efforts, there is still an urgent need for increased capacity in protection of civilians. The international community has repeatedly been criticized for being unable to alleviate the suffering of the affected populations. Huge challenges are posed by the recent trends in the conflicts, and the need to adapt the peace operations to the changes in conflicts, where terrorism and organized crime share a “grey area” with the parties to the conflict.

Undeniably, all field missions have faced innumerable challenges in implementing the extremely complex, but critically important mandate. According to UN three common challenges that peace operations commonly face that make the operationalization of PoC even more challenging;

1. The protection of civilians is often necessary in harsh conditions, with limited or insufficient resources, and with partners who sometimes lack the will or capacity to do their part.
2. Peace operations often deploy amidst the unrealistic expectation that they will be able to protect all civilians at all times.

22 von Einsiedel, S. (2015). Non-Military Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations: Experiences and Lessons, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, *Occasional Paper 3*, May 2015.

23 Ibid, p. 2.

24 The main content of this section stems from the work of the Working groups chaired by Colonel Petter Lindqvist, Brigadier Giovanni Pietro Barbano, Ambassador Pia Stjernvall, and Colonel Claus Amos, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

3. The dynamic nature of the places in which they operate means the security situation can change very quickly.²⁵

In addition to these challenges, the EAPTC Meeting audience brought up a number of other issues that also tend to hamper the peace operations' protection of civilian efforts. These are discussed in the following chapters.

A variety of tasks

As pointed out by Brigadier Barbano, it is evident to all that the nature of conflicts has changed over the years. Peacekeeping, originally developed as a means of dealing with conflicts between States, was increasingly being applied to **conflicts inside States and to civil wars**. This was also argued by Rubert Smith (2006) that a consequence of modern warfare is that war is fought amongst people, and hence we must rethink how military force can be utilized and organized to better support new political objectives.²⁶

In addition to this, peacekeepers are now increasingly asked to **undertake a wide variety of complex tasks**, from helping to build sustainable institutions of governance, to human rights monitoring; from security sector reform, to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; and from the support to the substitution of local law enforcement agencies in ensuring public security and order. The adaptation of the new tasks and the variety of different roles require the peacekeepers to have, among other things, flexibility, social and teamwork skills, respect towards diversity, and the ability and attitude for cooperation and collaboration with the different actors.

Maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the host nation

The safety and security of civilians is in effect critical to the legitimacy and credibility of peace operations. They rely upon their legitimacy with the local civilian population and external observers alike to help build peace and maintain political momentum behind the peace process. Moreover, wherever peacekeepers deploy, they raise expectations among the local population and among those who view missions from a far that the reason for their presence is to support people at risk and any failure or lack of action in addressing large-scale violence directed against civilians will result in a loss of legitimacy and credibility that will hamper the achievement of other mandated tasks to assist with the political and local consolidation efforts and peacebuilding.

Peace operations perform a crucial service in resolving conflicts, saving lives, building peace, restoring and rebuilding broken states. However, incidents where troops seconded to the UN by member states under its command become sexual predators to the civilians under

²⁵ UN website. (2017). Protection of civilians. [online], Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/civilian.shtml>. [Accessed 16.6.2017].

²⁶ Smith, R. (2006). *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. (New York: Penguin Book).

their care have continued to present a cyclical challenge to the United Nations.²⁷ This occurs even though, according to UN Code of Conduct and Discipline, sexual relations with prostitutes and with any persons under the age of 18 are strictly forbidden, and relations with beneficiaries of assistance are strongly discouraged.²⁸

Unfortunately, several cases of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers and civilian staff have been reported during the recent years. In her keynote speech Ambassador Pia Stejrnval pointed out that **sexual abuse is a widespread and complex problem in peace operations**. Although the UN condemns such behaviour, and stronger measures are developed to prevent and punish such misconduct, these incidents have demonstrated the role that divergent social and personal moral codes may play in international peace operations. There have been cases, where the victim or abuser does not feel or believe that what is happening is wrong. What makes this complex is that the victim may be the one enforcing the exploitation by proposing to exchange sex for some basic goods such as water, food or soap. There have also been several cases, where peacekeepers or civilian personnel have exploited minors, committed rape or other forms of exploitation or abuse.

Measures for addressing misconduct were discussed during the working group sessions. The Meeting audience widely agreed that especially preventive measures should be strengthened in order to avoid all forms of misconduct including sexual exploitation and abuse. **Preventive efforts could include mandatory training at all staff levels, sensitization, risk management and enhanced screening of all incoming personnel – be it military, police or civilian – for prior misconduct while serving in peace operations**. Typical behavioural patterns of the personnel should be identified and followed up – what kind of patterns of behaviour can predict the likelihood of misconduct. In addition, open communication among the personnel as well as a culture of respect and the Code of Conduct should be promoted within operations.

Leadership plays an important role in all missions, both in terms of setting the example for behaviour and intervening in potential misconduct in advance, and in addressing the issue. The leaders are role models and their actions have a major impact on the overall culture of the operation. Sometimes the colleagues of the exploiters may know about or even witness the misconduct, but they may be afraid to act as whistle-blowers for different reasons, such as losing their job, becoming an outsider or for other social reasons. **Hence, an effective whistle-blower system could encourage mission personnel to report possible cases**. Furthermore, **more skilled and trained female peacekeepers** can only be an asset to peacekeeping operations. Gender needs to be “mainstreamed” across peace operations, and more women should participate in field operations in military roles as police and as human rights observers. **A training course that would also equip personnel in peace operations to tackle sexual and gender-based violence should be promoted**. Finally, **an impartial civilian** society could also be involved in monitoring the activities of peacekeepers and civilian personnel, and reporting possible cases of misconduct.

27 See for example: Opande D. and Chatterjee, S. (2017). Time for Tough Action to Stop Sexual Exploitation by UN Peacekeepers. *Huffpost*, [online], Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lieutenantgeneral-rtd-daniel-opande-/time-for-tough-action_b_10792688.html. [Accessed 18.7.2017].

28 UN website (2017), Conduct and discipline, [online], Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/cdu/>. [Accessed 10.7.2017].

In case prevention is not enough, **adequate responses** also need to be in place. These may include deployment of immediate response teams to gather and preserve evidence, rapid investigations, immediate disciplinary measures such as repatriation of uniformed personnel when the perpetrator is known and suspension of payments, and pursuing criminal accountability with Member States, including imprisonment. Furthermore, sharing information within the vulnerable groups, and showing that UN or other peace operations convict abusers is essential. Cases of misconduct will affect local perceptions, and peace operations must prioritize maintaining creditability and legitimacy in the eyes of the host nation.

Use of force

Since the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a continuously increasing tolerance for the use of force in peacekeeping. The use of force in the protection of civilians has proved to be a complicated task in mission environments, along with answering the question ‘who is a civilian’. As discussed in **Chapter 2**, one of the key features of the current operational environments is that the conflicts are intra-state, and the targets of peacekeeping actions tend to be non-state actors. This makes identification of the ‘civilians’ a difficult task. The implication of these shifts has also become evident to the peace training community and the use of force came to be a topic of a discussion also during the seminar.

The core principles of UN Peacekeeping are (1) consent²⁹; (2) impartiality³⁰, and (3) non-use of force except in self-defence. As stated in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine), 2008, a UN peacekeeping operation should only **use force** as a measure of last resort. It should always be calibrated in a precise, ‘proportional and appropriate manner, within the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate. The use of force by a UN peacekeeping operation always has political implications and can often give rise to unforeseen circumstances. Judgments concerning its use need to be made at the appropriate level within a mission, based on a combination of factors including mission capability; public perceptions; humanitarian impact; force protection; safety and security of personnel; and, most importantly, the effect that such action will have on national and local consent for the mission.’³¹

29 “UN peacekeeping operations are supposed to be deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict. This distinguishes them from enforcement operations. Consent requires a commitment by the parties to a political process. As the Capstone Doctrine argues, “In the absence of such consent, a United Nations peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict; and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its intrinsic role of keeping the peace.” This is not just for normative reasons, but also for purely practical ones. Consent is sought to make the work and tasks of UN peacekeepers more achievable. It is usually obtained through a peace agreement among the main parties to the conflict. While peacekeepers are deployed to volatile situations, they are not intended to conduct their activities in the midst of open conflicts” Peter, M. (2015) Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping Dilemma. *Global Governance, Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*. July-September 2015, Vol. 21, No. 3, p. 358.

30 According to the Capstone Doctrine, UN peacekeeping missions must implement their mandates without favor or prejudice to any party. Furthermore, impartiality is seen as “crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity.” It is clear that the cornerstone of impartiality is actually consent to peacekeeping activities; impartiality is intended to ensure the continued cooperation of all key political players so that the operation can successfully implement its mandate. In addition, the Brahimi Report clearly argues that “the United Nations does not wage war,” and continues that when such action is required it is entrusted to coalitions of willing states with the authorization of the Security Council. See for example: Peter, M. (2015), p. 359.

31 UN Website, (2017), Principles of UN peacekeeping, [online], Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml>. [Accessed 3.7.2017].

While the reality on the ground is changing and the Security Council is becoming more willing to authorize **robust missions**, the official UN responses to these challenges have not acknowledged the extent of the mismatch between doctrine and practice. The principle of non-use of force except in self-defence is one of the cornerstones of peacekeeping and dates back to the first deployments of armed UN peacekeepers. A move toward more robust mandates in the post-Cold War era led to the Security Council's willingness to authorize UN peacekeepers to use all necessary means to 'deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order.'³² The increasing robustness of missions and their state-building mandates in contemporary peace operations, make it increasingly challenging for individual peacekeepers to operate according to the doctrine and with the objective to protect civilians.

As the link between protection of civilians and peace operations mandates is crucial, the challenge, at the politico-strategic level, is represented by the clarity and credibility of achievable and sustainable mandates. This does not only apply to the military component but also to consequences of the executive power of the police forces. To this respect, the Security Council Resolution mandating a mission, and all subsequent planning and operational documents, including the "directives on the use of force and firearms, and power of arrest, search and detention", **must be coherent with the overall intent of protecting civilians**, and bringing to justice those responsible for the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law principles and norms.³³ In this domain, although uniformed personnel are normally used to making their decisions more autonomously than military personnel, who are normally bound by Rules of Engagement or explicit orders, it is quite important to receive clear guidance and to possess all the relevant information to plan and effectively conduct any kind of operation.

Prioritization of protection is also a propounding question for the military and police. Since the impossibility to be present in any given place of the mission area and to physically protect any single person appears evident, clear priorities should be set forth by the strategic level to direct the subordinate elements in order to better allocate the resources in accordance with the overarching politico-strategic view. Gaps have, regrettably, been identified also in the equipping and arming the contingents. To effectively defend civilians from physical violence, the uniformed elements must be adequately robust and credible in terms of quantity and quality.³⁴

³² Ibid.

³³ Keynote speech of Giovanni Pietro Barbano on Protection of Civilians – Considerations to Police component, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

³⁴ Ibid.

The Meeting audience suggested that some improvements can be made relating to the use of force in Protection of Civilians;

1. **Timing and sequencing of the use of force should be improved.** When peacekeepers enter a country, the population expects change. If this does not happen fast, there is a risk of losing their support. Sometimes this may require early use of force, while other times this could prove to be very costly.
2. There are different approaches to the use of force, hard or soft, and **the mandate should be devised** accordingly, with more focus on the potential threats.
3. **Training and doctrines** should be adopted to fit the specific conflict context. This should be done in close consultation with other sectors and actors, to ensure the comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the operational environment. Currently though, there is a lack of information on what is actually happening, so improvement is needed there too.
4. **Redlines and rules of engagement** have to be clearly set in the mandate, and they should be coherent across all sectors involved in the operation.
5. An area where improvement is also necessary is politics, and more specifically **the political will to use force**. Presently, the lack of will is caused by fear of the consequences that may arise from the use of force, which limits the potential of peace operations.

Fostering sharing of lessons from past missions

The international community's ability to **learn lessons from past missions** has often been criticized. Although much work has been undertaken lately by the international organizations to identify the best practices and main shortfalls with the aim of understanding the effectiveness of the interventions, the ability to operationalize these lessons into the planning and conduct of current and future operations still seems to be limited. One important element complicating the process is related to the fact that since 2005, the main contributions to peace operations are no longer coming from European or other 'Western' countries such as Australia, New Zealand or Canada, they now come either from the continent itself or a few key Asian countries, including Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan.³⁵ Consequently, **passing on the experience gained from over 60 years of involvement in peacekeeping operations to the new key troop contributing countries becomes essential**. Bearing these aspects in mind, the EAPTC Meeting audience raised the issue of how the experience gained among the European nations in the last decades can help enhance the protection of civilians in peace operations. As a result of the discussions, the following practical suggestion was made in order to foster the sharing and learning of lessons within the peace operations community.

³⁵ Della-Giacoma J. and Rappa, R. (2017). UN Peace Operations by the Numbers in Global Peace Operations Review 2016. Center on International Cooperation.

(1) Enhance a culture of communication between the sectors and build effective knowledge management mechanisms

The lack of communication between the different sectors, missions and actors is proven to be a critical issue since it hampers establishing a common understanding between the actors, creates a lack of coherence among the different activities, as well as, a lack of standardization in terms of reporting and information & knowledge management.

(2) Consider the use of Mobile Training & Education Teams in operations

An array of different training programs, doctrines, guidelines and procedures from different organizations and countries have proven to overload the uniformed and civilian personnel and all those exposed to the excessive amount of information. The overload of information makes it more difficult to distinguish what information is relevant for each actor in different operational environments. This is reflected also in terms of a limited capacity to process and adapt the lessons from past missions into the planning and conduct of on-going peace operations. Hence, one practical solution that would support the utilization of past experiences in the conduct of ongoing operations, would be to use Mobile Training & Education Teams in the operations.¹⁵

(3) Joint training and exercises

Joint training for the different mission components and between the different actors should also be encouraged in order to foster daily interaction between the sectors, and the sharing of experience not only before deployment but also during a peace operation.³⁷

Fragmented approaches

Although, UN peace operations increasingly perceive protection of civilians as a 'whole-of-mission concept', challenges related to **fragmented approaches** still prevail. The introduction of comprehensive PoC strategies for missions with such mandates has improved, as have efforts to improve intra-mission coordination and information sharing. This is still a work in progress and the latter remains a work in progress with information silos even between different mission components. Many of the issues inherent in fragmented approaches are related to, among others, different command and control structures, organizational cultures, professional backgrounds, roles and responsibilities, different mandates and prejudices towards different professions and cultures.

36 Results of the discussions in the 'Military Working Group' chaired by Colonel Petter Lindqvist, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

37 These passages precisely represent the content of the conclusions of the Working Group Research & Training (Challenges with reference to POC, Strengthening of cooperation) chaired by Colonel Claus Amon.

These challenges can only be overcome through dedicated coordination mechanisms, persistent leadership and promoting a common understanding of the desired outcome of the peace operations. Joint training and exercises could be an efficient tool for fostering mutual understanding across the different actors and mission components. All in all, **coordination during a peace operation is critical**. Different disciplines must communicate with one another and design and decide on a common strategy to ensure the effectiveness and relevance of a comprehensive PoC strategy.

Furthermore, it was highlighted during the Meeting, that rather than seeking to overcome sectoral barriers through unified structures and practices, efforts should be about **recognizing one another's competences and strengths**, and using them for enhanced civilian protection. It is the appropriate mix of different tools that brings the added value. For example, in certain situations a military advisor can be better suited for a mediation task than a civilian expert, and the involvement of certain civilian experts, such as e.g. legal advisors, can be highly beneficial for the work of military and police component. Using joint protection teams is a good best practice of military-police collaboration, as well as joint patrols with civilians in meeting local leaders, for example. The key issue is that the different components and organizations should not contradict one another, but should rather combine their efforts in a reinforcing manner in order to better protect the vulnerable.

Lack of understanding of conflict dynamics

The point was raised several times during the Meeting that a **common failure to understand local conflict dynamics** tends to undermine the international community's ability to tailor appropriate protection responses. Furthermore, at times this "lack of local embeddedness" prevents mission staff from building trust and personal networks, and inhibits the ability to collect in-depth information and produce high-quality analysis, which is directly reflected in the planning of responses. These deficits are all the more problematic, since local-level conflicts are a key driver of violence against civilians in civil wars. In addition, the importance of local-level political economy analysis in the effort to understand PoC risks would be essential for understanding the long-term effects of PoC activities. A common understanding of the operational environment and threats against civilians should ideally be shared across all components of a peace operation and at the different levels of the organization.³⁸

For example, when addressing the host country's political leaders, national civilian staff should be utilized in order to have a better understanding of the dynamics on the ground. It is also paramount for the peace operation to be aware of how their actions are interpreted by the locals, and ensure that the desired perceptions are pushed forward. Sometimes, a local person can be the 'door opener' in a local region. Operations should also consider making use of the expertise of NGOs and development personnel in planning, since quite often they have the longest experience in the country, and hence a broader understanding of the dynamics of the region.

³⁸ Based on the results of the working group work of Colonel Claus Amos on Protection of Civilians – considerations for Training and Education, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

Addressing challenges through training³⁹

As discussed in previous chapters, there are a range of challenges that make the implementation of protection of civilians on the ground extremely complex. The identified challenges relate to:

- Fragmented approaches as there are many different actors on the ground
- Inefficient coordination and information sharing among the actors
- Different approaches to and understanding of PoC, lack of integration with non-state players
- Lack of understanding of the threats and local dynamics
- National caveats and issues related to use of force
- Managing of local expectations
- Maintaining/establishing credibility and legitimacy among the local population
- Adequate resources to match the ambitious mandates
- Learning from past experiences and making use of those lessons in planning and conduct of ongoing and future peace operations.

The EAPTC Meeting audience agreed that some of these challenges cannot be solved with adequate and effective training and education, yet many of them can. Consequently, a number of suggestions were made to enhance the performance of peacekeepers and civilians experts through valid and systematic training programs.

Standardized and mandatory training

The EAPTC community itself is an example of the fact that there are plenty of training courses and educational programs available for enhancing the capability of peacekeepers (both military and police) in order for them to meet their mandate. Training is often based on UN Standard Training Modules, NATO doctrines and European Security and Defence College (ESDC) curricula. However, there is still **a lack of standardized and mandatory training** for deployed personnel across all sectors (civilian, military and police), which also limits the potential of the existing training architecture.

Standardization should be expanded to include general peacekeeping and crisis management courses, pre-deployment training, mission-tailored training, in-mission training, and task-specific training. This would harmonize the training, and promote establishing at least

³⁹ The main content of this chapter stems from the work of the Working groups chaired by Colonel Petter Lindqvist, Brigadier Giovanni Pietro Barbano, Ambassador Pia Stjernvall, and Colonel Claus Amos, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

a minimum level of knowledge and skills with regard to protection of civilians, including understanding of PoC-related threats and measures that each actor can take to address them. Hence, joint training across the civilian, military and civilian components (pre-deployment training and in-mission area-training) and exercises (e.g. VIKING, CAX, field exercises) should be promoted. In addition, post-mission analysis and lessons identified from past missions should be integrated into new training programs. Finally, the exchange of experienced PoC instructors (mobile training teams), exchange of manuals and course materials, enhanced partnering among the different countries and training institutions should be facilitated and encouraged.⁴⁰

Using scenarios to identify training needs

Scenarios are often used in peace operation-related training. They provide a simplified but effective way of outlining the roles and responsibilities of different actors, and assessing the consequences of different actions. In addition, playing scenarios can provide important insight into what kind of actions would be ideal in different situations.

Two scenarios/settings were used to delve into the question as to what and how PoC should be addressed in different situations. This exercise was developed and conducted by Brigadier Barbano during the working group session.

Scenario 1:

Whereas the primacy of Police and Military in addressing Tier II PoC (protection from physical violence) is well-recognized in the community in practice, there is a role to be played by uniformed personnel also in Tier III (creation of a protective environment conducive to the Protection of Civilians and to the respect of fundamental human rights and freedoms). In the field, however, there is still to some extent mistrust and suspicion towards uniformed personnel from humanitarian and human rights components: how might we overcome such distrust in order to enhance mutually beneficial collaboration?

Means for enhancing collaboration	Recommended training solutions
• Getting people in the same room (co-location) • Leadership, units etc. who are working in the same areas • Coffee (informal etc.) meetings with collaboration • SWOT-analysis from the “coffee meetings” • Trust-building	• Addressing inter-agency cooperation awareness in training; • Emphasizing different roles of different actors in contributing to the mission’s end state in training; • Establishing mission coordination mechanisms (e.g. through imposed coordination meetings or by enforcing this in the mandate/OPLAN).

⁴⁰ These passages precisely represent the content of the conclusions of the Working Group Research & Training (Challenges with reference to POC, Strengthening of cooperation) chaired by Colonel Claus Amon.

Scenario 2:

The existing training programs on PoC are all theoretical/academic in character. The 2011 UN ITS Specialized Training Modules (STM) on PoC provided scenarios for conducting Table Top Exercises (TTX)/Map Exercises (MAPX)/Command Post Exercises (CPX) upon completion of the course. There is a need for addressing practical/tactical training in PoC for the police component. What could be done to address this gap?

Considerations	Recommended training solutions
• Policies are not institutionalized • Training analysis, and a qualification framework should be established • Different requirements for different jobs should be developed • Common competencies needed in peace operations should be identified and training them should be standardized e.g. conducting threat analysis, reporting and procedures • Advising and mentoring should be enhanced and coordinated between IPO and FPU, and also between military and civilian components	• Use different types of training, tailored according to mission, environment, and desired end-state • Seize the advantages of blended learning • Training in real-life context when appropriate -> push officers outside the classroom into informal training • Focus on the tools for PoC according to different context or environment • Evaluate the training, consider training results, lesson learned and good practice as well as providing feedback for the trainees • Create an expert pool for LIVEX/role play

Towards a Protection of Civilians training architecture

What kind of knowledge, skills and attitudes should one have to enhance the protection of civilians in peace operations? To demonstrate the 'what' and 'how' regarding the training of ethics for more effective peace operations, the table below summarizes the 5th EAPTC Meeting audience's key ideas.

Issue	Objective	How to train
Use of force	• Providing an understanding of the challenges and dilemmas facing military and police personnel in the field, as well as best practices aimed at preventing further violence from escalation with a minimum use of force • Providing a comprehensive understanding of the legal framework and guidelines related to use of force, strengthening individual peacekeepers' knowledge on their rights and responsibilities related to protection of civilians from physical violence	• Legal training by providing different real-life case examples, and demonstrating the rights and responsibilities from a normative point of view • Dilemma training on PoC for all peacekeepers to be included in e.g. crisis management courses, pre-deployment training, mission-specific training
Misconduct	• Zero tolerance for SEA must have clear consequences for individuals, leaders, units and sending nations • Transparency in all incidents – in spite of risks to the credibility of the mission • Coherence on the handling of the zero-tolerance • Enhanced gender perspectives in training and education	• Pre-deployment training • Leadership and policy programmes targeting those TCCs that are more exposed and at risk, based on culture and proximity to the conflict zones • Multi-cultural presence in areas at risk • Mixed patrols • Mentoring and in-the-field partnering between nations and cultures

Issue	Ojective	How to train
Understanding PoC threats	• Training and education adapted to the various levels of a mission • Enhanced research- and empiric-based knowledge as a basis for training and education	• Focus on the tools of PoC according to the different context or environment • Improved planning capacity
Fragmented approaches	• Establishing a common understanding of what “protection” means in the context of UN peacekeeping, and in the context of non-peacekeeping protection functions and actors, and how they can align to reinforce each other	• Clarifying the different roles and responsibilities of all protection actors – civilian, police and military – within a UN peacekeeping operation, and how the work of each actor relates and contributes to the overarching PoC objectives
Lack of information-sharing and coordination	• Improve training and preparedness for civilian leadership in UN POs • Establish training programs with comprehensive and integrated curricula across mission components • Develop horizontal SOPs	• In-mission training of senior leadership • Increased use of mentoring – also on leadership at operational and strategic levels
Lack of host country-specific understanding	• Political programmes to be developed parallel to mission plan; • Increased utilization of strategic communication – and communication strategies targeting host nation audiences	• Strategic communication program should be developed to meet the needs on the ground • Training for personnel in strategic communication should be increased
Managing legitimacy in the eyes of the host nation	• PoC strategies of the missions should be subject to communicative efforts through political and diplomatic channels towards the host nations’ various target audiences. This may provide a certain basis for measures taken along the PoC strategy	• Training could also include training of host nation personnel, based on a wider strategy of each specific mission
Learning from past experiences	• Supporting more effective protection planning by improving awareness of protection threats and civilian vulnerabilities, and by giving peacekeepers explanations of what has worked, • and what has not • Allowing access to data from other and past peace operations will help instructors and training centres as well as scholars and researchers in the pursuit of improving effectiveness of protection	• Training and curricula should be developed based on empirical data, research and factual information related to each specific mission. Again this supports the idea of using real life scenarios in the training
Job-specific considerations	• All branches to have PoC-related considerations and relevant issues described as a basis for support to the missions’ PoC strategy	• Training based on the missions’ PoC strategy – would probably be the most effective way of tailoring and creating an understanding of how tailoring should be developed
Leadership	• Providing an understanding of the challenges and dilemmas facing military and civilian decision-makers in the field, as well as best practices aimed at preventing or responding to sexual violence	• Dilemma training on PoC for mission leadership to be included in e.g. crisis management courses, mentor training mission leadership, pre-deployment training, mission-specific training
Planning	• Developing operational level planning tools for integrated missions – tailored to peace operations as they are – not as they should be	• Cross-functional training where planners make use of the same methodology and the same planning tools

Table 2. Training architecture for the protection of civilians

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO EXTERNAL CRISES

In the contemporary world the complexity of environment and the changing nature of conflicts challenge the effectiveness of peace operations as they have simply become more demanding. The growing violence against civilians and poverty, the increasing inequality between humans, the competition for natural resources, corruption and other challenges such as the poor governance of host countries and their capacity to re-build the society, are factors that deeply affect the way peace operations function today. The environments in which peace support activities take place are complex and multi-faceted. Therefore, they require responses that are themselves multi-faceted, taking into account the security, political, development, social, humanitarian, human rights and economic dimensions of crises.¹ To enhance human security through security and development endeavours, solid coordination and cooperation among different actors becomes paramount. Although the different nationalities, actors and organizations have their separate objectives, tasks and competences, a holistic approach, also referred to as **Comprehensive Approach**, is needed to reach the goals of the individual actors. The implementation of Comprehensive Approach requires the various civilian, military and police actors to acknowledge one another's competences, and identify the combination of the full range of available capabilities and resources and use them in a coordinated and coherent manner. Despite the clear advantages of this Comprehensive Approach, its operationalization in the peace operations has shown to be difficult, with common challenges circulating around several questions: How do you get agreement on a same goal? How do you balance competing timelines? Who should be involved? What actions should a CA be applied to?

The 5th EAPTC Meeting audience discussed theoretical and practical considerations related to the implementation of the approach, and came up with a number of practical solutions on how the Comprehensive Approach could be better used as a tool in contemporary peace operations.

Defining Comprehensive Approach

Nowadays, most national governments and international organizations that deal with security challenges have at least a reference to 'comprehensiveness' in their crisis management operations in their policy documents. The rationale of including this reference relates to developing synergy, especially between military and civil interventions, acting on the root causes of conflict, coordinating the efforts of various actors involved and increasing cost-effectiveness in crisis management.²

¹ Keynote speech by Victoria Walker on Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

² Rasmussen, C. V. (2013). Linking instruments in development and foreign policy- Comprehensive Approaches in the EU. Copenhagen: *Diis Report*.

As a concept, Comprehensive Approach (CA) has been around for a while, and various definitions and practices have evolved in international and regional organizations and national governments due to the need to improve coordination, interaction or interoperability between different instruments and actors.³ From the point of view of international organizations, the development of the concept has been promoted by the UN family and is currently verbalized in UN multidimensional peacekeeping **UNSCR 2086**⁴ in the search for better linking security and development concerns; by NATO in the search for better interaction between its military efforts and endeavours in civil reconstruction; and by the EU need to enhance internal coherence among the different instruments and actors as outlined in Joint communication: EU Comprehensive approach to external crisis and conflicts.⁵ As outlined in the table of nuances in how the different organizations refer to the approach resembling their different needs and implementation strategies. NATO and the EU use the term Comprehensive Approach, whereas in the UN system 'Integrated Approach' is applied. In fact, as a result of the EU Global Strategy, there has also been a shift in EU discourse, and since 2016 it has increasingly started also to use the term 'Integrated Approach', emphasizing the need to address all dimensions and stages of a conflict, starting from early action and prevention⁶, and thereby also expanding the meaning and scope of the 'comprehensive approach'.⁷

3 Mustonen, J. (2015). Good Practices of a Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management. Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management. [online], Available at: <http://puolustusvoimat.fi/documents/1951249/2094941/FINCENT-Publication-2015-20162202.pdf/b9dc3163-ab68-4e6c-978f-b1503f036121> [Accessed 13.7.2017].

4 (21 Jan. 2013).

5 Norvanto, E. (2016). D1.3. Civil-Military synergies, IECEU (653371).

6 The different actions as outlined in the EU Global Strategy are; (1) develop a shared analysis; (2) define a common strategic vision; (3) focus on prevention; (4) mobilize the different strengths and capacities of the EU; (5) commit to the long term; (6) linking policies and internal and external action; (7) make better use of EU Delegations; (8) work in partnership. European Union. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy.

7 European Union. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy.

"Comprehensive Approaches"			
	UN	EU	NATO
What is meant by "Comprehensive Approach"	Integrated Approach System-wide coordination across political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions	Comprehensive Approach, but; Narrow: Civil-military integration within crisis management missions and operation Broad: EU institutions and member states seeking to enhance coherence within the wide range of policies, instruments and actions for a more coherent and effective action upstream and beyond crises Integrated Approach: Fostering human security through commitment to synergistically use all tools available in all stages of the conflict cycle while paying attention to all the different levels of EU action (from local, to national, regional and even global)	Comprehensive Approach: Contribute to crisis management operations in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account all actors' respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy
Has emerged from	A need to better link the security and development concerns	Comprehensive approach: A need to enhance internal coherence among the different instruments and actors within EU Integrated approach: Need to expand the approach to conflicts and crisis beyond the security nexus development–	In search of better interaction between military efforts and endeavours in civil reconstruction
Examples of concepts and instruments at mission level	Integrated Missions with Integrated Command and Communication structures	Narrow: Cooperation between the civilian and military missions/operations during planning and conduct Broad: Coordination across EU policies and instruments on the ground Integrated approach. Ensuring a holistic, coherent and integrated response from the various EU institutions and instruments at all stages from early warning to post conflict development	Cooperation with external civilian actors and other international organizations. Training, lessons learned, planning & conduct, cooperation, public messaging

Table 3. Definitions of Comprehensive Approach

In general, comprehensiveness in security refers to an understanding that peace and development are fundamentally intertwined and that a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments are required to address the complex security environment in which crisis management operations are conducted.⁸ The common denominator for the diversity in understanding the comprehensive approach is **that it refers to a mind-set that recognizes a holistic approach**⁹. Some of the approaches entail the establishment of structures and processes for coordination, including pooled funding arrangements, and all the approaches involve cross-sector work. Hence, Comprehensive Approach in the context of peace operations can be understood as a general working method that focuses on results or effectiveness, and aims at promoting coherence among the institutions, instruments and policies to enhance human security by better achieving sustainable security and development.¹⁰

8 Rasmussen, C.V. (2013). Linking instruments in development and foreign policy- Comprehensive Approaches in the EU. Copenhagen: Diis Report.

9 Wendling, C. (2011). The Comprehensive Approach to Civil–Military Crisis Management, A Critical Analysis and Perspectives, (IRSEM Report), 13.

10 Ibid.

At its simplest, ‘Comprehensive Approach’ is based on the idea that a single actor or country does not have all the competences or resources needed to restore peace or manage and prevent crises and conflicts. Consequently, for the purpose of this publication we use the term ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to refer to coordination, cooperation, and communication among the different components (civil, police, military); coordination of different compartmentalized tools (diplomacy, defence, development) at different levels (political – strategic – field level) within one organization (e.g. UN and EU), but also between the different actors (e.g. between UN and AU); and between the international actors and local actors, for enhanced human security.

Civil-military relations in peace operations

All mission personnel should have a basic understanding of the important contribution of each component and its function within a mission. Everyone in a mission has an important contribution to make in achieving the comprehensive approach and the mission mandate.

There is a greater need for understanding the current challenges in a wider, yet more inter-dependent context, whereas no single organization is capable of managing conflicts or crises solely in their own capacity. Therefore, there is a need for joint planning, coordination and cooperation between the different organizations, and for the inclusion of the host community throughout the activities that either ease the burden or avoid duplication of work. **A central issue identified by the peace training community is fostering cross-sectoral collaboration, namely in terms of civilian-military relations.** As witnessed in the previous chapters, there is a need for collaboration among civilian and military actors. Coordination and cooperation between civilian and military actors is perceived to be a most important factor for cohesive and effective conflict management in peace operations.¹¹ Nevertheless, due to prejudices, different organizational cultures, procedures, and among others objectives, the collaboration between these actors has been everything but straightforward. In this chapter we will briefly discuss some of the aspects related to civil-military cooperation and coordination.

Complex relationship

Civil-military relations vary in nature and depend on the scope of agreement on the overall goal of the interaction. Thus, the scope of the interface is context-specific and can take place at different levels and in different forms. Ensuring coherence in terms of limitation of contradictions and search for positive synergies between the multitude of civilian and military components is not an easy task. Due to the major shift from traditional peacekeeping environment to asymmetric conflict, the tasks and mandates of military and civilian actors

¹¹ For example, the need for cohesive cooperation is often described using the term “development-security nexus”, which refers to the difficulties faced when “promoting development without security, and *vice versa*”. Rye, O. G. (2011), Civil-military cooperation in crisis management in Africa: American and European Union policies compared. *Journal of International Relations and Development*. p. 333. p. 333–353. Italics original.

have both expanded from their traditional fields. The civilian actors, including humanitarian organizations and civil servants, have engaged in several peace building tasks ranging from provision of humanitarian aid to several security sector reforms and border management projects. At the same time, the military has adapted its activities into complex post-conflict settings thereby increasing interface with its civilian counterparts. As a result, civilian and military actors have often found themselves coexisting in the same conflict settings.¹² For this reason, a growing number of policymakers and scholars recognize the urgent need for standards, guidelines, and best practices for civil-military relations in peace operations.¹³

Civilian and military specialists share the goal of avoiding tensions and conflicting purposes and maximizing potential for cooperation in order to achieve more effective and timely peace-building interventions. For instance, a civilian organization might undertake humanitarian or monitoring activities during the first stage of post-conflict management. The activities of humanitarian and military operations may affect each other at the strategic, operational and tactical level, and even, on some occasions, have a negative impact on each other. Consequently, the civil-military co-ordination has been recognized as a key issue in post-conflict management, both for its positive and negative attributes.¹⁴

As a result, international organizations have created various concepts to describe the scope and depth of the interaction between civilian and military functions. Civil-military interaction is a broad concept that is reflected through a number of specific doctrines, models and guidelines and policy approaches. The discourse for describing civil-military relations is enriched with different terms. Concepts have emerged based on the functionality and need of the specific organizations, ranging from UN-CMCoord, to CIMIC. Despite the varying definitions, two distinct elements can be identified. These are civil-military coordination and civil-military cooperation.

Civil-military coordination and cooperation

As described by Holshek and de Coning, ‘civil-military coordination is an inherently strategic endeavour that is essentially about managing interaction among disparate players involved in or peripheral to the peace process. It is also about the management of transition from conflict to peace and from military to civilian dominance of that process’¹⁵. As such, the civilian-military coordination is referred to a strategic-political level that sets the guidelines for the cooperation at the tactical level. Therefore, it is an essential feature in any peace operation as it has a central role in mission coordination - providing the framework for further dialogue between civilian, police and military contributors with respect to the political, security and humanitarian dimensions. At best, it helps to achieve the politico-strategic objectives that were planned for the peace operation.¹⁶

12 Schroeder, U. C. (2011). *The Organization of European Security- Internal and External Security in Transition*. (Milton Park., New York: Routledge).

13 Tardy, T. (2015). CSDP in Action – What Contribution to International Security?” *Chaillot Papers*. No.134, p. 1-54.

14 Metcalfe, V., Haysom, S. and Gordon, S. (2012). Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil–military coordination- A review of the literature. (London: HPG Working Paper).

15 Holshek, C. and de Coning, C. (2016). *Civil-Military Coordination in Peace Operations*. Peace Operations Training Institute, [online] ix. Available at: http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/course_promos/civil_military_coordination/civil_military_coordination_english.pdf. [Accessed 10.7.2017].

16 Holshek, C., Coning, C. (2016), p. 5, 13.

On the other hand, **civilian-military cooperation** (CIMIC) mostly takes place at the tactical, e.g. operational field level. Although the CIMIC concept is primarily concerned with coordination in a theatre of operations rather than an overall strategic concept of a complete institutional cooperation, CIMIC nevertheless represents an important operational component of Civil-Military Coordination. At its simplest, CIMIC is a function and a capability that aims to enhance the relationship between a military force and a civil society. In a way, CIMIC is about ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the population in order to contribute to force protection and peace and stability. Thereby, CIMIC derives from the military perspective that focuses primarily on force protection, and on the need to cooperate with local authorities and civilians to reach that aim, as a part of a complex military operation.¹⁷ In practice, CIMIC interaction usually takes place in two cases: a peace operation is partially dependent on civilian institutions and the population for resources, information and even security or/and secondly, there is cooperation between a military force and other international or non-governmental organizations.¹⁸ **The following table summarizes the different approaches to civil-military cooperation.**

Approaches to “CIMIC”			
	UN	EU	NATO
Definition	Military staff function, that contributes to facilitating the interface between military-civilian components of an integrated mission, including humanitarian and development actors in order to support UN-led missions	Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is the coordination and co-operation at all levels - between military components of EU-led military operations and civil actors external to the EU. This includes the local population and authorities, international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies - in support of the achievement of the military mission along with all other military functions	The coordination and co-operation between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national agencies and NGO's
Core functions/ tasks	Narrow: To manage the operational and tactical interaction between military and civilian actors in all phases of a peacekeeping operation; and to support creating an enabling environment for the implementation of the mission mandate by maximizing the comparative advantage of all actors operating in the mission area Wider: Support to the peace process, facilitation of humanitarian and development assistance, election assistance, human rights monitoring, protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reinsertion, and reintegration) and security sector reform under a single over-arching management	• Civil-military liaison • Support to the civil environment • Support to the military force	• Civil-military liaison • Support to the civil environment • Support to the force

Table 4. UN, EU and NATO approaches to civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)

17 Khol, Radek. (2007). Civil-Military Coordination in EU Crisis Management. Conference Publication, 6th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean. Human Security, CIDOB, p. 122.

18 Malešič, M. (2015). Crisis Management in the EU: International Coordination and Civil-Military Cooperation. (Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences), p. 12.

Not only civil-military interaction

The use of the police component in peace operations is not new, as for example the UN has been deploying police officers since the 1960s. However, while traditionally the police component was mandated mainly to monitor, observe, or report, since the 1990s tasks have also involved advisory and training functions alongside the monitoring activities. This has enabled more cohesive cooperation between international and national police forces with other law enforcement agencies.¹⁹ While **military organizations** and from the civilian side NGOs, such as humanitarian aid agencies, are usually seen as vital roles for securitizing and providing necessary needs, the **police component** also plays a critical role in establishing public safety, protection of civilians and preventing crime, as well as facilitating the implementation of the rule of law and human rights. In some cases, the post-conflict environment law enforcement and justice systems may be the first local authorities to be rebuilt in the society step by step.²⁰ In such cases the civilian police component of the peacekeeping operation becomes an important contributor during the transition period.²¹

Measures to promote the police component as part of a comprehensive approach

- Integrated and coordinated security or police reform activities
- A strong commitment from the host nation law enforcement agencies (local ownership)
- A strategy to provide common vision and framework for security / police reform efforts
- A process to mobilize shared objectives and provide a comprehensive response
- A structure to ensure congruence and coordination between the mission, host nation and other relevant actors
Presence in IDP camps, if assigned

Coordination and local ownership

The implementation of a comprehensive approach is anything but easy, and it demands coordination between the different international actors, as well as the close involvement of the local authorities and promotion of local ownership.²² This is because the different actors often co-exist in the same region or are even part of the same peace operation. To avoid wasting resources or incurring fragmented approaches, **collaboration must be based on a clear and shared understanding of priorities**, and the willingness by all actors to contribute towards the achievement of common objectives.²³ In addition, the Meeting audience pointed out a number of other requirements which would enhance the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach. Among others, it requires **a coordinated multilateral approach**, that includes security or police reform activities, a strong commitment from the host nation law enforcement agencies and other relevant authorities (local ownership), as

19 UN website (2017), UN Police, [online], Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/police.shtml>. [Accessed 2.8.2017].

20 Typically the police stations, courthouses or prisons are destroyed following the conflict and legal documents are missing. Laws need to be promulgated and enforced with the consistency of international norms. See more: UN website, (2017), Rule of Law, [online], Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ruleoflaw/>. [Accessed 2.8.2017].

21 UN. (2002). UN Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines.[online], Available at: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/GLINES_UN_CIV-POL_2000.pdf.

22 There is sometimes difficulty to identify the local peacebuilding agencies, without always knowing what “local” might be or entail, what it consists of and how it communicates. OECD. (2005). Security Sector Reform and Governance. DAC Guidelines and Reference series, DAC Reference document.

23 Based on keynote speech by Pekka Kokkonen – Considerations on a Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017

well as an efficient strategy to provide a common vision and framework for security or police reform efforts. It would also require a process to mobilize shared objectives and provide a comprehensive response within a clear structure to ensure congruence and coordination between the mission, host nation and other relevant actors.²⁴ Overall, **multilateral cooperation** is a central element for implementation, as it enables parties to understand each other's capabilities, resources and objectives. However, the EAPTC Meeting audience also raised a number of concerns that in their view hamper the outcome of peace operations, such as a lack of local ownership and host nation-driven approach peace and security.

Considerations related to the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach in peace operations

Despite the commonalities between the civilian, military and police actors serving in peace operations (in terms of the contributing countries involved, international organizations e.g. UN, EU, NATO, and the country of deployment), the cooperation is often challenged by the fact, that organizations may have overlapping, but diverse goals, different organizational and cultural values, lack of shared training and sharing educational experience or that they are using different lexicons.²⁵ These aspects are further elaborated below.

(1) Competing priorities

As discussed above, **a Comprehensive Approach relies on the idea that everyone has a shared understanding of what the desired end state is, and how best to get there.** Yet many peace support activities have inherent differences. For example, during the planning for the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo²⁶, there was a constant struggle to balance the demands by those working on judicial reform to prioritize tackling impunity, particularly regarding senior political and security figures, and those working on security, who needed to rely on the stability brought about by such figures in order to advance the reform of security institutions. This conflict was also seen within the EU's Aceh Monitoring Mission²⁷, with frustrations arising over the restricted scope of the human rights element of the mandate, which was narrowly interpreted in order to better assure the engagement by the Government of Indonesia senior leadership in the process.²⁸

24 Based on keynote speech by Pekka Kokkonen – Considerations on a Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017

25 Ross, K. G., Thomson C. A., Wisecarver M., Foldes, H., Roberts M., Schaab B., Peluso D. A. and Prevou, M. (2012). Development of a Competency Model for Civil–Military Teaming. *U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Research Report* 1960.

26 The mission, launched in February 2008, assist and support Kosovo institutions in the basis of the rule of law, with a specific focus on the judiciary. The mission is a joint effort taking into consideration the local authorities (local ownership principle). The mission entails monitoring, mentoring and advising actions. See more: European Commission, (2017), *The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo*, Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), [online], Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/showcases/civilian_mission_kosovo_en.htm. [Accessed 8.7.2017].

27 The objective of the EU mission was to contribute to a peaceful and sustainable solution to the devastating conflict in Aceh. See more: EEAS, (2017), *Aceh Monitoring Mission – AMM*, [online], Available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/aceh-amm/index_en.htm. [Accessed 6.7.2017].

28 Based on keynote speech by Victoria Walker on Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

(2) Lack of information sharing

Successful recovery from conflict requires the engagement of a broad range of actors, including the national authorities and the local population. One fundamental issue of the Comprehensive Approach is the integration of activities undertaken by the peace operation to assist countries in making the transition from conflict to sustainable peace. One of the key enablers in peace operations is **information sharing** providing a common situational awareness to actors. **Most often the lack of information sharing is due to cultural and national** features; language, national interests or diversity in leadership style impacting the operation or mission both internally and internationally.

Communication and information sharing are prerequisite factors for effective peace operation. Civil and military organizations need to gather information from the field, concerning both physical and human dimensions. In general communication refers to sharing information whether it is done in face-to-face meetings or through electronic means. If there is no reliable means of communication between civilian and military organizations, the minimum interaction needed will fail as critical information may not reach the right people.²⁹ As a result, the communication fails to meet the conditions for building desired mutual trust, confidence, respect and basic coordination.³⁰

(3) Separate planning processes

Planning is often done separately between key actors and personal prestige and self-interest, for example, can prevent actors from approaching situations comprehensively – referring to both individual people, national governments, people in the local areas, NGOs, and the military. For example, in EU crisis management (CSDP) the civilian and military missions are planned and conducted mainly in separate structures. This has at times caused overlapping efforts and inefficiency in the use of resources. In EU missions, the chains of command for civilian and military missions and operations are likely to remain separate and distinct, and the challenge therefore is to develop effective coordination at all levels of command. Additionally, all too often the local actors are not involved in the planning of peace operations. In order to ensure the local ownership of the peace support and peace building efforts, as well as their appropriateness, more measures should be taken in order to involve local actors in the planning process.³¹

(4) Lack of clear exit strategy

Although in UN Multidimensional missions the chain of command between the different components is unified, one key issue related to planning activities on the ground is that the mission planning tends to lack clear goals and a related exit strategy. This has created uncertainty and challenges for personnel serving on missions, as well as for other actors on

²⁹ Based on the results of the “Military Working Group”, chaired by Major Adam Åkerfeldt, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

³⁰ UNOCHA. (2008). UN Civil-military Coordination Officer Field Handbook, 66–86.

³¹ Based on the results of the “Research and Training Working Group”, chaired by Ms Kirsi Hyttinen, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

the ground. The clarity of the preferred end-state often results in the staff having an unclear understanding of what the peace operation is ultimately about and its future role in the host country.

(5) Coordination

This uncertainty is also reflected in the coordination of efforts, both between the mission components and different actors. There exists a tendency for actors to co-ordinate mostly with others who resemble themselves, such as military actors coordinating mostly with other military actors due to familiarity or similarity in their outlook and approach. On the other hand, additional challenges occur when there is no clear vision of who should lead during the co-operation or when there is a clear lack of funding and resources, which may lead some actors to co-ordinate things less. **What is required, is an increased awareness of different timelines, outcomes, roles and responsibilities “Responsive capacity” rather than “Standing capacity”.**

How to mitigate the key challenges

One fundamental issue of the Comprehensive Approach is the integration of activities undertaken by the peace operations in order to assist countries to make the transition from the conflict period to sustainable peace. From the practical point of view, this means that **every individual in a mission has an important contribution** to make in achieving a unified Comprehensive Approach and on the other hand the mission’s mandate at the same time. As such, a purposeful and cohesive approach means, that each actor working in the peace operations should have a basic understanding of the main tasks and functions of the different components in a mission.

The plethora of different actions that occur during support to peace processes also need to be recognised in the Comprehensive Approach (CA). These include **information gathering, analysis, planning, programming, implementation, political dialogue, adapting, and lesson learning**. They combine political, strategic, operational and tactical support. One of the biggest contributing factors to failure in SSR processes is implementers treating it as a purely technical undertaking, when in fact it is inherently political and requires a constant dialogue between those best placed for political dialogue and those with the technical understanding of the issues. Institutional processes, timelines, permissions and awareness may preclude a genuine CA in some of these processes, or between certain actors. So, the question arises **how to get the best solution mindful of the restrictions in place, in such a way as to improve the CA as and when possible as circumstances change**.³² Bearing in mind what was discussed above, the next sections outlines the main suggestions of the military, civilian, and research working groups during the EAPTC Meeting.

³² Based on keynote speech by Victoria Walker on Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

Balancing the competing timelines

When working with security actors, **there is often a tension between the short-term, operationally driven goals of security capacity building, and the longer-term, governance focused goals of Security Sector Reform (SSR).**³³ A Comprehensive Approach can help in such cases. Given the threats that national security actors need to tackle, there is indeed often a need to improve their capacity quickly, for example to counter extremist threats. Yet the empirical evidence from recent years in Africa, Asia and Latin America underlines how doing this, without also focusing on building strong accountability mechanisms, can do significant harm further down the road, and contribute to greater overall insecurity. The different parts of governments or organizations working on training and education and governance are not always culturally or operationally aligned, and this must also be addressed.³⁴

Actors need to be realistic regarding the time it takes to plan and work together. For instance, Sweden is currently pioneering a four-agency approach to supporting juvenile justice reform in Albania. This involves the Swedish police, the national courts administration, the prosecution agency, and the prison and probation service. This is a very positive example of a Comprehensive Approach being applied to the programme cycle, and one that takes into account good practice principles in supporting security and justice reform, but also one that highlights how much additional time is required to go through the different stages: the process is already entering its second year of planning, and this is with agencies that are already within the same national institutions. In more unstable environments, where the international community generally operates in a very crowded space, and where a Comprehensive Approach would be most beneficial, the luxury of time is rarely there, reducing the capacity for different organizations to bring together their ideas to discuss and be open to change in their plans.³⁵

Joint mission planning

The diversity of security and development related challenges requires a wide range of policy tools and responses, both civilian and military. The net effect is that planning tends to inhibit a peace operations' operational effectiveness. It was discussed during the EAPTC Meeting, that the different organizations (e.g. NATO, UN, EU, AU) have different planning processes and capabilities, which reflect the scope and nature of the challenges related to the conduct of the operations. For example, for EU institutions the planning aspect is difficult. Nevertheless, as the empirical evidence has shown, many of the issues seem to be cross-cutting for all the international security providers. Member states have different self-interests, as do other intervening nations and the host nation that requires help. The political scene can be as complex and fractious as the security situation on the ground. Among other intra-institutional challenges, the different components (be they civilian, military, humanitarian, political, or the police) have their own sets of principles, mindsets, procedures and budgets, and a low level of interoperability and cross-sectoral efficiencies.

³³ The term Security Sector Reform describes the security system, that involves key actors, their roles and responsibilities in terms of managing and operating for the benefit of the host nation, in a manner that it is more consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance. (OECD. (2005). Security Sector Reform and Governance. DAC Guidelines and Reference series, DAC Reference document.)

³⁴ Based on keynote speech by Victoria Walker on Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

³⁵ Based on keynote speech by Victoria Walker on Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

Cooperation and information sharing

During the EAPTC Meeting discussions it was also raised that, despite working on the same problems and being in the same country, different teams and sectors have been restricted from accessing information from the intelligence agency of the military. **The shortage of shared databases and hybrid platforms built specifically for sharing information has prevented complete coordination and co-operation between civilians and military segments.** Most organizations have their own closed information technology systems with limitations on access by other actors, as the informational needs are different even when the topic may remain the same. Also, the system of intelligence gathering is often far more sophisticated by the military, and designed for the specific military purposes. In contrast, civilian organizations are highly dependent on open sources of information.

To increase the effectiveness of cooperation, the officers responsible for the cooperation and coordination between civilian-military components need to understand the military and humanitarian issues which may arise in the planning process.³⁶ Experience has shown that in order to maintain the high standing of peace operations, intelligence gathering needs to be controlled and conducted in a way that it meets the expected purposes of the operation.³⁷ Therefore, information needs to be shared with the most critical organizations in the field; primarily this will mean the military organization but information must be shared with every key organization in the field as well. As such, it is essential to clarify and identify all needs, and then provide the necessary information, including all networks and all actors. Providing a clear and reliable vision will help to create trust between the actors fostering cooperation. Furthermore, it is critical that information sharing is executed flexibly at all stages, from lateral to vertical, cutting through political levels to the operational level. For instance, the current challenges in EU-UN peace operations remain mostly at the political level, especially for joint strategic planning, the division of labour, joint reviews and coordination of exit strategies to mention few areas.³⁸

As a whole, the lack of shared tools for joint action and shared planning remain current challenges and harm the success of peace operations. What is required, is to have appropriate tools to analyse the enablers for the Comprehensive Approach. Consequently, joint understanding of the **Comprehensive Approach would benefit from sharing lessons in action as well as field experiences from the national perspective.**

Better coordinated information sharing can prevent harm or at least reduce consequences. Such an environment requires common platforms and common understanding without forgetting the right mindset for information sharing. Even though information sharing tools still need to be developed, there have been improvements between NGOs and military organizations in the past years as it is one vital tool especially in a complex world where borders become more blurred alongside with new emerging forms of terrorism and organized crime. **Increased strategic level coordination is recommended** to facilitate information sharing with other international actors on the ground.

36 UNOCHA. (2008). UN Civil-military Coordination Officer Field Handbook.

37 See for example: NATO. (2017). Lessons learned in peacekeeping operations. NATO review. [online], Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/peacekeeping_lessons/peacekeeping-lessons-eng.pdf. [Accessed 28.7.2017].

38 European Parliament. (2015). EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis management. EU Briefing paper, November 2015. [online], Available at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572783/EPRS_BRI\(2015\)572783_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572783/EPRS_BRI(2015)572783_EN.pdf) [Accessed 28.7.2017].

Furthermore, it was highlighted, that there seems to be a **clear need for dialogue between training centres and the field** so that there is a constant diffusion of freshly gained expertise and knowledge from the field to training. What was also discussed among the EAPTC Meeting audience, was that information sharing should be continued during the operation itself without stopping at the planning phase and combined panels between key actors should be created for cohesive sharing of information.³⁹

Alumni network

Beyond the previous discussions, it was also raised in EAPTC Meeting that, the alumni network allows continuity in sharing societal and professional capital, just like the comprehensive platforms for communication help to avoid knowledge overflow. The alumni network could allow the handover of information in an easier and more convenient manner at the same time enhancing the continuity of providing skilled personnel for work in the field. Sharing information can be further improved by comprehensive platforms, which would eliminate the overflow of knowledge and information. Joint mobile training teams and institutions in turn would create the opportunity for different countries to be prepared for upcoming missions.⁴⁰

Towards effective training system

A systematic and well-structured training system is the key enabler for successful peace operations. While it can be argued that there is still some overlapping in the training provided, both training and education can offer the development of a common mindset of what a Comprehensive Approach is in peace operations and how it can be applied in a cohesive manner. What is required, is more systematic education on raising the awareness of the diverse aspects that individuals face in peace operations; diverse cultural backgrounds, expertise, or experience from the field, for example.

Therefore, **a versatile training system for peace operations would enhance the capacity for actors to work safe in complex conflict environments; produce the adequate capacity to work with local authorities and civil bodies; as well as other international actors.** At best, training activities would also propose the range of needs that individual require to fulfil the mandate adequately. This section discusses the EAPTC findings on how a harmonized and structured training system, joint mission training and cohesive training at the strategic level can respond purposefully to peace operations.

Harmonizing structured training

The current training system would profit from **standardized structures among all sectors and units.** As contemporary peace operations are often deployed jointly, with organizations

³⁹ Based on the results of the “Military Working Group”, chaired by Major Adam Åkerfeldt, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

in zones around the world, there is also an increasing need for the standardization of terminology and concepts. The standardization of terminology and concepts would allow better coordination and mutual understanding between countries involved and lead to better situation awareness of the personnel on missions.

Joint mission training

The structure of the training provided should also be relevant and time efficient for the participants. The objectives and goals of the training should be clear and shared among all sectors so that people can work towards a common target and mission. **Harmonization and the importance of joint training policies** could allow quality training structures that include joint mobile training for exercises, leadership training, in-mission training, without forgetting pre-deployment training for all sectors involved. Joint training and practice in the pre-deployment stage would enable participants to demonstrate a positive attitude to those going on operations because they would actively be networking and learning more about the roles of their colleagues.

Multiprofessional expertise

The complexity of environments is driven by the increasing number of regional intra-state-conflicts, often becoming internationalized, prolonged, or even more deadly.⁴¹ The reasons behind this are driven by a mix of factors⁴² requiring a mix of tools. In such conditions, peace operations require high degrees of professionalism and expertise in the field. Developing expertise and improving the level of professional expertise is highly beneficial for future peace operations. For instance, during the seminar the military working group brought up the idea that training with a mix of participants allows participants to share visions and experiences, and provides a diverse working environment between sectors. This is beneficial when dealing with complex situations where the diversity of the background can ease the work. Additionally, the capital of experience and acquired expertise from several missions helps to “pass on lessons” and share knowledge as professional instructors can provide the proper training and education for the peace operation personnel.⁴³

Research on pedagogy

In recent years there has been an emerging need to better understand the best way to train individuals, and to combine civil and military training and how the training provided can be evaluated effectively. It can be argued, that well-trained and educated personnel improve the best practices in the field, and enhance the cost effectiveness and impact of operations.

41 UN website. (2014). New Challenges and Priorities for UN Peacekeeping United Nations Under Secretary General Hervé Ladsous. The Brookings Institution, 17 June 2014. [online], Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/HL-remarks-brookings.pdf>. [Accessed 1.8.2017].

42 These states are often considered as failing or incapable states, flamed up with the ethnic quarrels, organized crime or terrorism, and filled up with humanitarian and health crises. (Ibid.)

43 Based on the results of the “Military Working Group”, chaired by Major Adam Åkerfeldt, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

For such purposes, **the use of pedagogic tools is directly linked to teaching and learning quality.** Thus, while teachers do not teach in the same way and neither do students learn in the same way, teaching styles have either positive or negative impacts on how education and training is processed by students. While there are a wide range of education and training methods available for traditional class-room teaching including scenarios, and simulations and including modern training technologies, such as mobile-based learning, there is however an increasing need to understand how the research in pedagogy and adopting a more holistic approach to training and education methods could improve teaching. Furthermore, it is important to understand **the best ways to combine different training methods.**

Best practices from training exercises

Although, as the previous discussions demonstrate, much can be done for the better coordination and cooperation from the Comprehensive Approach perspective, there are already available a wide range of training courses that target the current challenges in peace operations and many national military and civilian crisis management organizations provide a multiple range of courses aiming at strengthening the idea behind the Comprehensive Approach. This is also the aim of Finnish International Training Centre (FINCENT), which provides a wide range of courses annually, all related to improving cohesion and cooperation in peace operations.

Practical suggestions

At first it should be remembered that the **Comprehensive Approach is a means to an end**, not an end unto itself. A common framework for engagement can be developed from a shared understanding and commitment to best practice principles in terms of: national ownership; doing no harm; relevant support based on an in-depth understanding of the context, actors and their relationships; human rights based approaches; gender equality; and the political nature of peace support.⁴⁴

It is not possible to develop a set methodology to achieve a Comprehensive Approach, given the uniqueness of different contexts in terms of actors, roles, threats, goals, national capacities, and other factors. However, much progress can be achieved through building the evidence base on what works across all the different. Furthermore, this should focus on how to create a flexible Comprehensive Approach, based on an iterative method that would also create space for different agencies and institutions to come on board at their own pace and build strong, solid foundations. However, this does require a commitment by the relevant actors to take risks, and to put in the resources to monitor progress, as well as to ensure the continuity of the personnel deployed to maintain relationships, to learn from the lessons gathered, and to invest the time required.⁴⁵ The following table summarizes the discussion related to the Comprehensive Approach.

⁴⁴ Based on keynote speech by Victoria Walker on Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

Issue	Objective
Policies	• Creating enabling policies to support a CA in the field, including taking an iterative approach whereby plans can be adjusted to take into account the growing awareness of other actors and approaches to support the development of peace. • Harmonization and importance of joint training policies
Information sharing	• Shared approaches to information analysis, risk management, developing indicators (including ones that move from short-term outputs by actors working in those roles, to longer-term outcomes and impacts enabled by others). • Joint assessment missions • Field experiences from the national perspective
Training	• Joint pre-mission training, involving the right people (those deploying or already on the ground). Lessons could be learned from the First German Netherlands Corps and Dutch MFA Exercise • Improved communication training • In-mission training • Professional teachers • A mix of participants • Standardization of terminology (common understanding) • Time efficient courses • Shared objectives and goals • Understanding roles and responsibilities • Standardized structures • Harmonization of joint training policies • Research on pedagogy • Using alumni networks • Joint mobile training and institutions
Joint exercises	• Common effort: designed to further understanding of the multiple dimensions and complexities of present-day crisis situations and (joint) operations, by exchanging multi-actor, civil and military, perspectives in intensive interaction. • Viking exercise
Capacities	• Use of standing capacities that can reinforce different international actors. ISSAT is an example of this within the field of security and justice reform.

Table 6. Suggestions based on EAPTC seminar discussions⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Based on keynote speech by Victoria Walker on Comprehensive Approach; “Research and Training Working Group”, chaired by Ms Kirsi Hyttinen, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.

WAY FORWARD

We live in a world of problems that are so complex—so tangled up with other problems, so non-linear, ambiguous, and volatile—that they defy solutions and cannot be effectively addressed by any single organization or even by any one sector. In addressing these complex situations, both the root causes and causes of instability, be they political, ethnic, social, or economic, must be addressed. Hence, when looking at specific countries in conflict, international actors should be able to collaborate with other foreign actors, choosing among them the most appropriate mix of diplomatic, economic, security and development instruments for the situation. In addition, human security needs to be at the centre of all planned actions, be it the provision of protection from violence or building a protective environment. The host state's capacity to provide protection must be fostered concurrently. To address the challenges of the current uncertain, volatile and complex environment, there is an increased need to develop and adapt agile, innovative and multilateral solutions to prevent, manage and solve conflicts world-wide. The international peace training community can be the key vehicle in promoting the performance needed to enhance the effectiveness of peace endeavours.

The 5th EAPTC Meeting demonstrated the importance of platforms that bring together policy-makers, practitioners, researchers and educators from different disciplines to discuss and innovate training solutions for enhanced peace and security. Each year, the EAPTC community has grown bigger. The added value of the EAPTC community is that it seeks to advance the exchange of ideas, expertise in the field of peace operations, and progressive methods of training and education, and welcomes any interested expert or organization –be it military, police or civilian – to get involved and contribute. Sustainable peace is a too big of a challenge to be solved solely by one nation, organization or tool.

Recommendations to training & education approach

Based on the 3-day discussions and results put forward by working groups during the 5th EAPTC Meeting, the following recommendations can be drawn to enhance the performance of peacekeepers and civilian personnel in peace operations.

Ethics

- More effort must be put into the provision of context specific training that seeks to describe and explain the historical and cultural dynamics of the conflict in question, as well as the political, social and economic aspects of the host country.
- Training leaders in the fundamentals of ethical behaviour should be emphasised. Training programmes should be designed for mission leadership in line with the Comprehensive Approach for integrated missions.

- The context the training takes place in is instrumental to the usefulness of the training during operations; this could be helped by using simulations. This supports the use of real-life scenarios rather than artificial scenarios – real life situations could therefore be considered as a basis for training for peace operations.
- Consequently, if we are to teach ethics, we need to be able to define what its fundamentals are and how to measure this in terms of job performance. Military ethics in training programmes could be integrated in a variety of topics, across the entire range of different types of training for peace ops.
- Another aspect of teaching ethics, is to present personnel with typical ethical dilemmas other personnel will be facing: military personnel will face entirely different dilemmas than humanitarians – but the underlying considerations may be the same.

Protection of civilians

- Standardized and mandatory training.
 - Standardization to include general peacekeeping and crisis management courses, pre-deployment training, mission tailored training, in mission training, and task specific training.
 - Joint training including military and civilian personnel (pre-deployment training and in-mission area-training) and exercises (e.g. VIKING, CAX, field exercises) should be promoted.
 - Post-mission analysis and lessons identified from past-missions to be integrated into new training programmes.
 - Exchange of experienced PoC trainers (mobile training teams), exchange of manuals and course materials, enhanced partnering among the different countries and training institutions.
- Identify concrete training needs related to POC in each mission.
- Make use of planning tools and approaches to planning known to most audiences.
- Create a doctrinal baseline for approaches to protection from physical violence.

Comprehensive approach / Cross cutting issues

- Build a culture of communication between the sectors and create effective knowledge management mechanisms
- Harmonization and importance of joint training policies
- Shared vision and prevention
- Tools to analyse the enablers and impediments
- Consider the use of mobile training and education teams in the operations

Proposals for an EAPTC development and strategy

Current statutes of EAPTC consist of purpose, goals and objectives, in addition to criteria for membership. Access to communication between members can be further described and could need a simple mechanism for communication between the annual conferences. The EAPTC network has existed for 5 years – and has reportedly demonstrated steady progress in the time elapsed. It seems there has been an increase in participation, among all interest-audiences. This has potential for reaching out to communities and building a network of competence. With its current loose structure, increased volume may also call for carving out a direction, content and short-term objectives to maintain a unity of purpose and to ensure the effectiveness of the efforts and resources spent during annual conferences – and between meetings. Hence, it is advised to consider mechanisms for a balance between the need for a flexible and non-formal structure on the one hand, and a way of providing direction, priorities, planning horizons and maintaining a clear sense of purpose within the association on the other.

Each annual meeting is chaired by a volunteer host, who provides the venue, facilitates participation, and organizes the meeting secretariat and the planning for the event. A host for a prior annual meeting is expected to provide advice for the upcoming host. The advice should also include considerations related to topics, views and expectations on the way forward from this years' participants, possible continued discourse, follow-up by certain organisations or members, and on overarching trends that would be of interest to the membership communities.

A concrete proposal from FINCENT and the expert team behind the 5th EAPTC Meeting in this regards should therefore be sent to DCAF, and could be posted on the EAPTC website to maintain transparency for members and adherence to the statutes. These proposals could be forwarded to the next host, and included in the planning for next year's EAPTC, with copy to the interest community.

Suggested points for development:

1. Every annual conference should assign an amount of time at the beginning and towards the end of the conference to allow for participants to consider the programme, contents and contributions against the backdrop of the statutes. During the conference, a programme committee could prepare a final sequence to review possible amendments. Statutes should be reviewed during the annual conference.
2. Establish an executive board with the purpose to maintain consistency and continuity in activities and development between the annual conferences. The board is to exercise oversight over the association and its purpose related to overarching goals, and should provide strategy and direction in line with the purpose of the association. The board should also maintain dialogue with the board of the IAPTC and other relevant actors in the international community.
3. The outgoing host should provide an overview of those organisations and bodies who were present during the conference. This would help maintain and build on achievements and outcomes of each conference and further cultivate development over several meetings.
4. Publications and products from the annual conference should be published under an “EAPTC Co-brand” in addition to that of the host, to help maintain purpose and utility of the association.
5. In line with the above, a simple communication plan should be developed and approved by the annual conference.
6. It should be considered whether each conference should advise on the contents of the forthcoming conferences, e.g. the 2017 publication could include a section with suggested topics for the next years - without obliging a coming host, but at the same time ensuring a strategic approach in the interest of the communities involved. This would be within what is already suggested in the statutes, but providing some clarification on the issue of topics.

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APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH TEAM AND ARTICLES FROM THE RESEARCHERS

'SOFT SKILLS FOR PEACEKEEPING AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXPERTS' Gaming for Peace Project

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Introduction: Gaming for Peace (GAP) Project

Gaming for Peace (GAP) was launched in September 2016. GAP is an EU H2020 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation project. The main goal of the project is to develop a curriculum in relevant 'soft skills' (cooperation, communication, gender and cultural awareness) for personnel from diverse organisations working in the field of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations. This curriculum will be embedded in a serious online role-playing game, renewed and updated by returning personnel playing the game. GAP fills a gap in training and offers an efficient and inexpensive way of delivering universal and standardized training in these skills.

The requirements to effectively operate and partake in conflict and post-conflict situations for preventive measures and peacebuilding, demands the best expertise and individual skills in adapting to fraught and complex environments. Although the personnel involved in conflict prevention and peace building (CPPB) generally have 'traditional based skills', (e.g. intelligence, investigation, weapons handling etc.), soft skills such as communication, cooperation, negotiation, mediation, gender and cultural awareness are less well emphasised. The GAP project proposes to fill this recognised training gap in peacekeeping; embedding a base curriculum of soft skills that facilitates coordination and relationship building in an environment of organisational, gender and cultural diversity. The ability to foresee and surmount social, cultural, or historical barriers necessitates the most up-to date training for peacekeeping. Gaming for Peace represents an innovative technique for the training of personnel involved in peace operations and requires further expert input as the project continues.

The CPPB training landscape

Twenty-first century peacekeeping has evolved into a multifaceted and complex process. Immersion into the CPPB world requires in-depth knowledge of the practices of peacekeeping in diverse contexts and on a variety of distinct levels. The first phase of research in the GAP project therefore focused on assessing the often-complicated nature of current training methods in CPPB and determining areas for improvement. [The full report will be available publicly on the project website (www.gap-project.eu) December 2017.] It incorporates an evaluation of CPPB in terms of EU development, concepts and training approaches in a European context; the UN approach to crisis management and peacekeeping; worldwide approaches to training, looking at the OSCE (Organisation of Security Cooperation in Europe), the African Union (AU), ASEAN (Association of South Eastern Asian Nations) and other trends in CPPB training.

With the growth of peacekeeping, there has also been growth in international organisations and joint UN missions, especially between the UN, EU and AU. In the evaluation of CPPB training approaches, there are many similar approaches to training from these organisations, but there are also significant differences in training assessments and requirements and from classroom-based teaching and seminars to simulations, role playing, online learning and e-learning. There have been various attempts at the standardisation of approaches but with limited success. In addition, there can be many phases to peacekeeping training. While there is a level of interconnectivity between the UN and other international organisations, in particular the EU in terms of CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) missions, the lack of coordination and standardisation in pre-deployment training has limited the potential impact of practical cooperation in the field. These problems result chiefly from differences in the organisational culture, practice and procedures of the EU and UN at both policy and operational level.¹ Recognising these deficiencies, the recent document on strengthening the UN-EU strategic partnership on peacekeeping and crisis management facilitated the linking of the EU 'Goalkeeper' and 'Schoolmaster' platform to recruitment and training of civilian personnel in addition to uploading information on UN training opportunities. The statement also calls for a move toward a tri-lateral training partnership with the AU in terms of supporting indigenous training and capacity building, including police and civilian components.²

Given that there are around 300 centres, colleges, institutions and academies worldwide providing training for personnel involved in peace operations or crisis management operations (over 100 of these training providers are in Europe alone), finding common ground between these facilities is a daunting task. Naturally, with different rules of engagement and different training backgrounds, involvement in peacekeeping operations requires a whole range of skills and effective training needs to incorporate specialised skills, including soft skills. Most approaches in the EU, U.S. or Asian training centres do account for courses on gender and culture, for instance, but this is not consistently applied and in-depth knowledge of these subjects is both undersupplied and inadequate.

1 European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), EU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping and Crisis Management Briefing (2015):9

2 EEAS, (European External Action Service). *Strengthening the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management: Priorities 2015-2018* (2015): 5

The Evolution of E-Learning and Online Training

As online training has gained momentum in recent years and is less classroom-based, several core topics in the training of personnel for peacekeeping have yet to be developed. More needs to be done in terms of reform to training procedures at all levels and developing a coherent curriculum for online learning. The evolution in the field of distance education and distributed learning increased rapidly after the development of Computer Supported Collaborative Learning (CSCL)³. Online learning includes sets of learning applications, web resources, web-based applications and new collaboration technologies. Moreover, new hybrid approaches regarding online learning activities are increasing. Ideally, the online learning components are combined or blended with face-to-face instruction to provide more learning outcomes.⁴ Even with the opportunities that technology can provide, researchers have seen the implementation of a technology-supported collaborative learning environment as a challenge.⁵

The Soft Skills Approach in CPPB

While soft skills in particular, are not easily discernible in peace operations, there are certain models and assessments of soft skills available that can be ascertained for the GAP project. For instance, the cornerstone to peacebuilding is building relationships and the element of trust is clearly important in that endeavour. Trust, like empathy, communication and negotiation can be considered a soft skill. In training for missions, organisations need to give soft skills prominence. This includes areas such as negotiation techniques, mediation and stress management, particularly to improve the chances of success in any mission. Soft skills, can be interpreted and adapted for scenarios that will fit into the design of game. What is certain, is that the concept of soft skills is a recent phenomenon and not universally well-known; attempts to define the concept have encompassed such phrases as “emotional intelligence,” “individual skills”, “emotional competencies”, “soft aptitudes” and the “soft side of work.” There is no consensus on, or a universally accepted, list of soft skills. While there is a need for greater demarcation, within this constraint Matteson et al have provided the following examples;⁶

• Sociability; • Self-management; • Communication skills; • Ethics; • Diversity sensitivity; • Teamwork skills;	• Problem-solving or critical thinking abilities; • Customer service competencies; • Emotional intelligence; • Leadership skills.
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3 Charalambos, V., Michalinos, Z. Chamberlain, R. 2004. The Design of Online Learning Communities: Critical Issues. Educational Media International. ISSN 1469-5790 online © 2004 International Council for Educational Media.

4 Means, et al. 2009. Evaluation of Evidence-Based Practices in Online Learning: A Meta-Analysis and Review of Online Learning Studies. Available at: www.ed.gov/about/offices/ed.gov/about/offices/list/opepd/ppss/reports.html

5 Zhang, D., Zhao, J. L., Zhou, L., & Nunamaker Jr., J. F. 2004. Can e-learning replace classroom learning? Communications of the ACM , 45 (5), 75-79.

6. See Matteson, M. L., Anderson, Lorien & Boyden, Cynthia. 2015. ‘Soft Skills’: A Phrase in Search of Meaning’. *Portal: Libraries and the Academy*. 16 (1), pp. 71-88.

7 Trevithick, P. 2005. Social work skills: A practice handbook (2nd ed.). Maidenhead: Open University Press. p.81

Soft skills are the personal attributes that allow one person to successfully relate to another. In terms of empathy, Trevithick states that ‘empathy involves trying to understand, as carefully and sensitively as possible the nature of another person’s experience, their own unique point of view and what meaning this conveys for that individual.’⁷ It is a key inter-personnel skill, a vital component of emotional intelligence and an important soft skill. It aids our ability to understand others by being able to put ourselves in their shoes but also supports and fosters a sense of teamwork and shared goals. For emotional intelligence, Salovey and Mayer first explained emotional intelligence as a form of social intelligence which involves a person’s ability to monitor not only their own but others’ emotions, to distinguish among them and to use that information to inform responses and actions.⁸ The 2014 Hanover Research examined best practice in measuring soft skills, such as teamwork, creativity, and character, with a focus on soft skill assessment embedded into the core academic curriculum being key.

Serious Games and CPPB

As a result of the popularity of gaming, professional trainers, educators and managers have sought to utilise the prevalence of gaming by bringing gaming into the training room and classrooms. Serious games (SR) are games for learning, educating, and developing new skills. It is argued that digital games, including simulations and virtual worlds, have the potential to be an important teaching tool because they are interactive, engaging and immersive activities.⁹ The applicability of gaming for soft skills training is gaining ground especially given the capacity of gaming to support reflective learning, self-efficacy and reflection on performance. Yet these critical elements require central components of the game design to feature learning outcomes that are recognizable and measurable as well as feedback on performance and opportunities for reflection. Substantive literature, research and scholarship have pointed overwhelmingly in favour of gaming as an educational tool.¹⁰ However, several studies have pointed to a dearth of evidence regarding the design and delivery of gaming as a method for training in soft skills.

Gaming can be distinguished from traditional learning because games by their nature are designed to measure progress since learning is happening and is captured in the gaming experience itself.¹¹ An important aspect of any education tool is the ability evaluate outcomes and obtain feedback, to self-reflect and build on the feedback. Gaming is particularly well suited to such self-reflection and critical learning. Within this mechanism, learning soft skills avoids a linear approach and extends into a more complex lesson learning process. A key study carried out as part of the GaLA: The European Network of Excellence on Serious Gaming (FP7: ICT) demonstrated a number of structural, organizational and individual barriers to utilizing gaming for soft skills training. The report highlights some of the pro-

8 Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D. 1990. Emotional intelligence *Imagination, Cognition and Personality*, Baywood Publishing Company, Inc. 9, pp.185–211.

9 Ulicsak, M. & Wright, M. 2010. ‘Games in Education. Serious Games. A FutureLab Literature Review. See also Gee, J.P., 2005. ‘What would a state of the art instructional video game look like?’ *Journal of online education*. Smith, R, 2007. ‘Game impact theory: The five forces that are driving the adoption of game technologies within multiple established industries. *Games and Society Yearbook*.

10 Pivec, M, and Dziabenko, O. 2004. *Game-Based Learning in Universities and Lifelong Learning: “UniGame: Social Skills and Knowledge Training” Game Concept*, *Journal of Universal Computer Science*, (1) 14-26

11 See GLASSlab. 2012. ‘Groundbreaking Video Game Design Lab will Research and Develop Video Games to Engage Students and Measure Learning.’ *Computer Weekly News* 12 July 2012: 985

grammes which may be helpful in arena of soft skills: Minecraft: Education Edition, Use Your Brainz Edu, Gamelearn and Merchants all of which encompass a variety of game learning techniques. A further well-known example is Food Force, the first serious game developed by the United Nations. By focusing on the potential of gaming to contribute to the key soft skills debates, GAP research has revealed that the utilisation of this methodology offers up new horizons in terms of equity of access and supporting learning through experience. Serious gaming is a developing area with significant research starting to emerge that helps to underpin the need for strong pedagogical frameworks in terms of learning outcomes, feedback and reflective learning. This aspect does not detract from the gaming element but serves as an important reminder that learning methods remain paramount. Existing approaches to soft skills training are embedded in pedagogical design, delivery and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation of that training.

Stakeholders have a key role in planning and designing soft skills curricula and game development

The selected key stakeholders and initially identified end users are playing a crucial role in the development of curricula and GAP game focusing on soft skills. Almost 200 interviews of peacekeeping experts (military, police, civilians) have been conducted thus far in the project from several EU countries. The interviewees were selected based on their individual experience during peacekeeping missions and operations, with a special emphasis on soft skills (communication, interaction, trust building, risk and stress management, gender and sexuality) and training needs. All the interviews have been analysed using qualitative methods with the GAP methodology set by Trinity College Dublin and all academic partners. Beyond the interviews, end user stakeholder panels will be facilitated in Finland, Poland, Portugal, Ireland and UK. Based on the analysed research data, scenarios focusing on skills, competences and behaviours will be developed by the GAP consortium and stakeholders throughout 2017. As an example, based on the research conducted in GAP, communication has been identified as essential in peacekeeping missions by military experts. At the meta-level, communication is identified in multiple ways, such as via language, or the use of an interpreter, in meetings, by using various communication channels, facilitating official and unofficial discussions, as well as physical presence in the field. The ability to communicate effectively can make a difference in avoiding future conflicts and risks. In a peacekeeping operation, an expert may communicate with multiple organisations, civil servants, local authorities and the local population.¹²

¹² GAP Stakeholder Consultation Report, 2017 (not published). The consortium working on this GAP project includes Trinity College Dublin, Laurea University of Applied Sciences, Kennedy Institute for Conflict Intervention Maynooth University, EnquiryA, Haunted Planet Studios, Upskill Enterprise, Ulster University, Future Analytics Consulting, and end-users including Fincent, Ministry of Interior Portugal, Police Service Northern Ireland, Bulgarian Defence Institute, National Defence University Poland, Irish Defence Forces and the Police Academy Poland.

Conclusion

Given that peacekeeping has grown into a multidimensional phenomenon, enhancing the training of peacekeepers in soft skills is paramount. Capability gaps in peacekeeping operations have been a feature of modern peacekeeping missions. However, operating effectively in UN and EU missions requires the best expertise and skills available and organisations involved in crisis management need to have the right mix of capabilities in terms of personnel, operations and equipment. Just as the EU is taking steps to strengthen its training initiatives, the UN is also bringing preventive diplomacy to the fore. Implementing training reforms to advance the effectiveness of training must be a priority. Moreover, the development of GAP can go a significant way to improving and advancing current training approaches in the field of CPPB. Visit www.gap-project.eu for more information on developments in GAP and information about our upcoming conference and other consultative activities.

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ENHANCING PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS

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Introduction

In contemporary UN peace operations, protection of civilians involves the entire spectrum of actors, from NGOs, humanitarian communities, agencies engaged within rule of law, on the political level, and the military force. POC is therefore a shared responsibility of several actors both within and outside the UN's structure. The orchestration of efforts requires ability to conduct multi-annual planning, coordinating resources and assets along the various lines of effort in each mission. The ability to protect civilians from threats of physical violence is however a pre-requisite for other actors to play their role. As long as the host nation fails its primary responsibility to protect its own population, the military force becomes the UN's most important tool to protect civilians from violence.

In a UN peace operation, planning must consequently include all substantial actors involved in POC. The mission analysis will include all aspects related to the particular mission's POC tasks, ranging from the specific mandate, to policies, strategies, guidelines and concepts. The development of courses of action focuses on how the military component can utilize its assets in response to specific threats within this framework.

Human security

Protecting civilians from violence is all about creating human security. Human security, as defined by the UN General Assembly, contains: "the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential" (UN General Assembly 2012, 1). The dilemma of creating human security through the use of force requires a thorough understanding of how and when to use it. Understanding when not to use military force, is equally important.

Two key questions are essential to understand how one can utilize force to protect civilians from violence;

1. What is the potential role and utility of military force to protect civilians? Military leaders and the leadership of a mission must understand what the military component can and cannot do to protect in different situations.
2. How can military force be more targeted towards protection in particular situations? Military leaders and the mission leadership must understand which courses of action will reduce the threat to civilians most effectively, and opposite; which courses of action may inadvertently increase the threat to civilians.

Different situations will require different approaches. Understanding the threats remains key to answer the questions above. A set of generic scenarios describing fundamentally different types of threats to civilians seeks to capture the full range of threats a UN mission can be expected to protect civilians from.

Scenarios describing the range of POC-threats

The following eight POC scenarios systematize the complexity of violence against civilians by breaking it down into generic categories. This categorization is meant to facilitate systematic analysis of perpetrator behavior and strategies to inform POC planning, POC responses, and POC monitoring and evaluation within a whole-of-mission UN approach. The scenarios have been drawn up using five parameters that describe the characteristics of violent perpetrators: (i) actor type, (ii) rationale for attacking civilians, (iii) strategies and tactics used, (iv) relevant military capabilities to attack civilians, and (v) the expected outcome in terms of human suffering, if the perpetrators succeed.

Mob violence. Individuals or mobs committing criminal acts for personal gain, revenge or political influence. Few killed, but possibly extensive material damage to property and general perception of insecurity. Examples: Liberia ('04, '05, '09, '11, '15), Ivory Coast ('04), Sierra Leone ('00, '02).

Post Conflict Revenge. Individuals or mobs involved in tit-for-tat score-settling through criminal acts of violence such as murder, arson, kidnapping, looting to avenge past crimes on a personal basis. Few killed, but groups associated with previous perpetrators may flee following relatively little violence. Examples: Kosovo (post-'99), Iraq (post-'03).

Insurgency. Rebel groups (with political or ideological objectives) using selective and indiscriminate violence such as threats, targeted killings, bombings etc to control populations upon which they depend and undermine trust in their rivals. Fewer killed and injured than many other scenarios, most due to indiscriminate weapons; gradual displacement from areas of heavy fighting. Examples: Mali ('13-'15), DRC ('12-'13), South-Sudan ('12-'13).

Predatory Violence. Rebel groups coercing civilians into compliance through plunder, taxation, forced recruitment, opportunistic rape, brutality against "easy targets" in order to survive or to simply make a profit. Temporary, but large-scale displacement in affected areas,

disproportionate to the number of actually attacked; many abductions, especially of young adolescents. Example: DRC ('99-'15).

Communal conflict. Whole communities engaged in continuous cycles of violence, driven by a combination of revenge and self-protection through massacres, abductions, raids, destruction of homes and means of survival. Relatively high number people killed and abducted on both sides, especially women and children; livelihoods stolen or destroyed. Examples: Mali (the Tuareg vs. Fulani), South-Sudan (the Lou-Nuer vs. Murle), Abyei (Misseria vs. Ngok Dinka), DRC (Hema vs Lendu)

Government repression. Authoritarian regimes or de facto authorities in the area repressing populations through selective and indiscriminate violence, threats, detention, rape as terror, destruction, occasional massacres with the aim of controlling groups perceived to be affiliated with the opposition. Mostly combatant deaths, gradual increase in civilian deaths due to heavy weapons and in accordance with intensity of fighting, large-scale displacement, wide-spread destruction of population centers. Examples: Ivory Coast ('10-'11), Syria ('12-present).

Ethnic cleansing. States, or the military superior actor forcing targeted groups to leave through threats, highly visible killings, brutality, mass-rape, destruction of property, in order to have that particular group expelled from a specific territory. Only a few percent killed, but the vast majority of the targeted population expelled. Examples: Bosnia ('92-'95), Central African Republic ('14).

Genocide. States, or the military superior actor destroying the existence of a group through several, simultaneous mass-killings, deportation camps, systematic rape to prevent reproduction, all with the goal of radicalizing that specific group. The majority of members of the targeted group killed in relatively short time.

These scenarios are only generic descriptions of what perpetrators of violence may do. In many armed conflicts, perpetrators display more than one strategic rationale for attacking civilians. Also, their rationales can vary across time and space. This mosaic of rationales can cause confusion to those aiming to protect civilians in a certain geographical area. Future conflicts may also see other types of scenarios emerge. For example, it is still unclear whether and how UN peace operations may provide protection against violent extremism (such as ISIS and Boko Haram).

Understanding the threats as a means to protect

Civilians are more at risk than soldiers in modern conflicts. This grim fact explains why more than half of the ongoing UN peace operations being mandated with explicit tasks to protect civilians – and authorized to do so by using all “necessary means” including lethal force. Not only UN peace operations are battling with how to protect civilians from threats of physical violence. The international community’s military intervention in Libya in 2011 was with the sole purpose of protecting the civilian population from being attacked by the Ghadafi regime.

Civilian suffering in conflict is not merely a result of so-called collateral damage; unintended harm to affected populations as a result of military operations with a goal of defeating other military actors. On the contrary: violence against civilians is mostly a part of a perpetrators strategy; intended and with a purpose. (Slim, 2008.)

The types of perpetrators range from state actors, paramilitaries, rebel groups, insurgents, to criminal networks, mobs and even tribes and communities. The differences are huge, also in terms of goals and weaponry. The one thing these actors have in common, is the use of violence against civilians as a means to reach their objectives. (Beadle, 2014.)

Capabilities and strategies to attack civilians vary greatly from those to attack a military opponent. Consequently, the type of violence may also vary largely: from massacres, rape and sexual violence to abductions, displacement and dispersion. The suffering of civilians in conflict is more often than not because one or more of the belligerent parties wants it to happen, regardless of what international law on armed conflict and international laws on human rights.

To be able to protect civilians from physical violence, one must therefore understand the threats. Who are those committing atrocities, why are perpetrators abducting, maiming children, raping and molesting innocent, and torturing and killing those who are protected by international conventions? Finding the rationale of a perpetrator, provides a way to utilize military force to protect civilians against physical violence.

A vital point when applying military force to protect, is to avoid causing more harm to the civilians than in the first place. Taking up presence in an area where insurgents are trying to gain control, may put the civilians in this area at higher risk when and if own troops are pulling out, because civilians will be "punished" for being affiliated with government or intervening forces. Fighting an insurgency and at the same time being mandated to protect civilians, may therefore be extremely difficult.

If a force is destroying crops by using Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) to patrol and safeguard a community under threat by rebel forces, poor harvest and lack of food may pose a larger threat on the longer term, by causing displacement, malnutrition, to mention few.

Why do perpetrators attack civilians?

The principle of do no harm is essential when considering how to provide protection for civilians under threat of physical violence. A perpetrator may not be a clearly identifiable and uniformed actor. In some cases, whole communities engage in cycles of violence, driven by a combination of revenge and self-protection. Disarming one part in a communal conflict, often recognized by a relative balance of means to attack, may turn into a far more violent and potentially more deadly scenario for those left without means to protect themselves.

To military intervening forces, protecting civilians from violence is not equal to neutralizing a threat actor, eradicating a rebel group or defeating a belligerent along the logic as one apply when fighting an enemy or opposing force. Some threat actors will simply avoid confronting

a military force. They may not have the means to engage, and more importantly, fighting a military intervening force does not serve their goals. Other perpetrators, in the case of being organized military forces, may escalate the conflict if being strategically challenged, causing more harm to civilians, also those not directly affected in the first place. This is not to say that state actors should be stopped in their misdoings. The point is to be able to find effective ways of reducing the threat to civilians under threat. To some perpetrators, this actually means to defeat and destroy their ability to attack civilians. To others, it will more effectively affect the motivation to attack civilians, as exposure of being held accountable for war crimes or crimes against humanity may run counter to their strategic goals.

Understanding why perpetrators attack civilians is hence key to find effective ways to protect. In many armed conflicts, perpetrators display more than one strategic rationale for attacking civilians. Their rationales can also vary across time and space. This can cause confusion to those aiming to protect civilians in a certain geographical area. Creating a buffer zone between tribes involved in a communal conflict may be an effective way of reducing the threat on both sides. In other areas, buffer zones of separation may generate more deadly scenarios if one of the sides is left with options of attacking other accessible groups affiliated with or sympathising with the actual opponent. Future conflicts may also see other types of scenarios emerge. For example, it is still unclear whether and how UN peace operations may provide protection against violent extremism (such as ISIS and Boko Haram).

Planning for the protection of civilians

Planning for POC is about the relationship between perpetrators and those threatened. Protection is achieved by affecting the intention and capabilities of a threat actor. Although own forces must prepare to defend themselves against perpetrators of violence against civilians, the key goal of military protection is to match the perpetrators' ability to threaten civilians. This will vary with the rationale and the strategies of the perpetrators.

In some cases a passive approach to protection may be the only option. When UN troops have offered safe-havens to civilians fleeing from their attackers, international criticism has been lashed against peacekeepers for being risk averse and impotent. Without the tools to make assessments as to how protection can effectively be conducted – the faults are just as much systemic as related to unwillingness among troop contributors.

Concentrating solely on passive protection of civilians does however not address the real problem. In the case of South-Sudan, with UNMISS having been prone to protect a small part of the suffering population by making the five IDP camps the centre of the attention of around 12 000 troops – the threat against civilians is left more or less totally unaddressed, with the inevitable result of a hopeless spiral of more troops required to protect more IDPs as the atrocities continue. Seeing a population or a group ghettoized in IDP camps may just as well be considered a demographic victory by those dispersing a population, as it is seen by others as a convenient political way of providing humanitarian assistance and a safe haven (Slim, 2008).

Even increased effectiveness in conducting basic tasks of a military component will have deterring effects on a perpetrator who attack civilians – and so it will have improving effects on POC. Perceptions become reality through strategic communication. Ability to convey messages reflecting the capacity and ability of a military force will have immediate effects on targets audiences aiming at attacking civilians. Strat comm is the extension of the body language of the intervening force. Activities and actions that create a perception of security, deterrence of threats, and amelioration of intolerable conditions and containment of threats – will inevitably resonate in audiences well beyond the presence of those units. This is how strategic communication can enhance efforts and thus should be closely linked to – and create synergies in POC.

Conclusion

Protection of civilians is a task for the full spectrum of capabilities – military and non-military. However, protection from threats of physical violence is a military/police task, and only they can do it. Protection from physical violence is also a pre-condition for other means of protection. In other words, if the military efforts to protect from physical violence fails, other efforts are likely to fail too. POC is an outcome, not an activity. That is also why POC becomes an element of all operations and activities. In cases where the host nation is a part of the threat to its own population, POC becomes a challenge that first and foremost must be handled at the political level, and not left for the military component to become a scape-goat. The use of force is one key factor dividing opinions on how peacekeeping should evolve. The Force Intervention Brigade of MONUSCO has brought this discussion to pragmatic questions about how the military and police units should resolve their tasks in operations where the traditional approach of peacekeeping is by far outdated and where the expectations of both local communities, international community as well as within the communities of troop contributing countries are creating fundamental dilemmas for those who are set to command international operations with blue helmets. By applying analytical and robust tools of planning and developing a thorough understanding of the threats to civilians, missions can achieve a lot within their existing capabilities. Protection of civilians from physical violence can be enhanced considerably – not raising questions about more or less use of force – but how to utilize force – based on knowledge and awareness.

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EFFECTIVENESS IN OPERATIONAL CONFLICT PREVENTION: How should we measure it in EU missions and operations?

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Introduction: Effectiveness in operational conflict prevention

This contribution presents an analytical approach to evaluating ‘effectiveness’ in operational conflict prevention specifically with regard to the European Union’s missions and operations. First, it emphasises the importance of considering the intervener (EU) as well as the target (conflict) and the aspect of the mission/operation examined in this paper (operational conflict prevention). Second, it proposes that ‘effectiveness’ must include not only what missions/operations achieve, but also the ways in which they seek to achieve what they do. This establishes the relative importance of means and ends in these endeavours; in other words, appraising not only whether the intervener did the right thing, but also whether it did things the right way. Thus, ‘effectiveness’ should encompass efficiency as well as effect, and the input, output and outcomes in operational conflict prevention should all be considered. To summarise, effectiveness is when a mission/operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner when seen from the perspective of the intervener as well as the conflict in which it intervenes (at least in part) to prevent (further) violent conflict.

A two-pronged approach to understanding effectiveness

Based on the above, it is important to combine perspectives which are (1) internal and (2) external to the EU. The internal perspective examines the extent to which missions/operations succeed according to the EU’s politico-strategic goals and key operational objectives. This goes further to examine whether their implementation went well according to the Union’s plans, procedures and principles. In other words, the internal perspective assesses the EU on its own merits. That is, whether it achieved what it set out to do in the

¹ The starting point for this contribution is the notion of ‘success’ that featured in: Annemarie Peen Rodt, 2014. *The European Union and Military Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and Achieving Success* (London: Routledge). Based on that work, this piece defines ‘effectiveness’ in operational conflict prevention. A previous version of this paper is published as part of the IECEU project, 2015. *Deliverable 1.4. Success Factors and Indicators*. The project ‘Improving Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention’ received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No 653371. The content of this document reflects the author’s view. The European Commission is not responsible for it or any use that may be made of the information it contains.

way that it set out to do so. This perspective acknowledges the internal EU context and its constraints and assesses performance against what was possible rather than what would have been ideal. The external perspective appraises missions/operations according to the overall purpose of conflict prevention. That is, to prevent (further) violent conflict. It considers the effectiveness of short-term EU missions/operations with regard to medium-term peace building and long-term stability. The external perspective limits its assessment to what can reasonably be expected of operational conflict prevention. Likewise, it examines the ways in which missions/operations seek to prevent (more) violent conflict and determines whether such prevention efforts were proportional to the challenge at hand.

Internal effectiveness: success for the EU?

In order to qualify as an overall success a mission/operation must be internally effective. Two key criteria determine whether the main objectives of an EU mission/operation are successfully achieved and whether the way in which these were (sought) achieved is appropriate – from the intervener's perspective. These two internal effectiveness criteria are (1) internal goal attainment and (2) internal appropriateness.

Internal goal attainment in EU missions and operations

Missions/operations are goal orientated in nature. Their success is typically thought of in terms of fulfilling their mandated objectives. EU missions/operations must, thus, be analyzed according to whether they achieve their intended purpose and the tasks they set out to do. To this end, the first effectiveness criterion is internal goal attainment. The indicators hereof reflect the key objectives and overall mandate of each individual mission/operation. As there may be significant differences between the *politico-strategic goals* and *operational objectives* of a mission/operation, both must be considered. Likewise, missions/operations pursue multiple goals, which may change over time, often making goal attainment a matter of degree. Examining internal goal attainment must reflect these nuances and take such developments into account, so as to appraise and allow for operational flexibility, which may well be an appropriate response to a changing context. Furthermore, as all goals are not equally important to the intervener, evaluating their achievement evenly would be misleading. It is, therefore, necessary in analytical terms to rank politico-strategic and operational objectives to identify the EU's main goals in each mission/operation to then determine whether it successfully obtained its *raison d'être* as defined by the Union itself. Internal goal attainment is a necessary first condition for overall effectiveness in any mission/operation – after all if the EU is not achieving what it set out to do in these endeavours, which are often risky and costly in the broad sense of both terms, the Union is unlikely to continue (to launch) such efforts and thereby increase its effectiveness in operational conflict prevention.²

2 Baldwin, David A., 2000. Success and Failure in Foreign Policy, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3, pp. 167-182; Pushkina, Darya, June 2006. A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission. *International Peacekeeping*, 13(2). pp. 133-149; Ross, Mark Howard and Rothman, Jay, 1999. *Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management: Theorising Success and Failure*. Palgrave: Basingstoke.

Internal appropriateness in EU missions and operations

Complementing internal goal attainment with an internal appropriateness criterion allows the evaluation of whether the way in which each mission/operation was implemented was appropriate, seen from the point of view of the intervener. Internal appropriateness considers both whether a mission/operation is implemented well on the ground and from the Headquarters perspective. *Timeliness*, *efficiency* and *cost-effectiveness* are three key indicators of internal appropriateness.

Timeliness refers to early warning as well as early action. It includes efficient decision-making, budgeting, planning and preparation as well as the generation, training and deployment of personnel and hardware, as mandates, and mission and operation plans are agreed and implemented. In order for a mission/operation to implement its mandate in an appropriate manner in the field, it is essential that it is deployed without significant delay. However, timeliness includes not only the arrival of the first sets of boots on the ground, but also the timely and otherwise efficient implementation of the mandate. An effective mission/operation should implement its mandate as quickly and efficiently as possible without compromising its effect.³ Likewise, it should withdraw when its mission has been accomplished.

In order to achieve full internal appropriateness, a final concern is that the costs of a mission/operation do not outweigh its benefits for the intervener. Evaluating any policy based on its achievements without taking into account its cost is, as Baldwin has suggested with regard to Foreign Policy Analysis, like assessing a business solely in terms of its sales disregarding its expenses.⁴ Costs are crucial when assessing implementation from an internal perspective. It is important to remember that although the financial burden of EU military operations is primarily covered by contributing Member States, the internal appropriateness of these operations (like that of the civilian missions) must be evaluated from the perspective of the Union as a whole. Moreover, costs are political as well as material. Cost-effectiveness must, thus, include the political costs for the EU.

External effectiveness: success in conflict prevention?

In order to assess the extent to which an EU mission/operation was effective overall, observers must also consider whether and how the target conflict and country benefitted (or not) from the intervention. In other words, whether the aim of the operational conflict prevention was achieved: A successful mission/operation must help prevent (further) violent conflict, but only by proportional preventative means. Accordingly, the external perspective on effectiveness first assesses whether a mission/operation contributed in a meaningful way to the prevention of (further) violent conflict, and then examines whether the ways in which it sought to do this were appropriate measures of prevention. To this end, two external effectiveness criteria (1) external goal attainment and (2) external appropriateness are presented below.

3 Diehl, Paul F., 1994. *International Peacekeeping*. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp.33-61.

4 Baldwin, David A., 2000. Success and Failure in Foreign Policy, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3, pp. 167-182.

External goal attainment in EU missions and operations

Violence is never a given. It is neither a constant nor necessarily a logical linear next stage of conflicts, which may indeed move back and forth between violence and non-violence. If a conflict does become (more) violent, however, there are five different processes by which this may take place: namely, through *initiation*, *continuation*, *diffusion*, *escalation* and/or *intensification of violent conflict*. Initiation is when a conflict turns violent in the first instance. This may be more or less likely, but it is never a sure thing. Continuation is when the violent aspect of a conflict continues over time, which may occur over shorter or longer periods, sometimes with non-violent ‘interruptions’. Diffusion is a process by which violent conflict in one geographic area directly or indirectly generates violent conflict in another area. It can take place within or across state borders. Escalation occurs when new actors become involved in an existing conflict. Such actors may be neighbouring states, ethnic kin, diaspora or others who become actively involved in the violent conflict. Intensification refers to a process by which the violence itself increases; and can include both an increase in the number and nature of violent incidents, albeit only those directly related to the conflict in question should be included in the assessment of operational conflict prevention. Although these are five conceptually distinct processes, initiation/continuation, diffusion, escalation and/or intensification of violence may well occur simultaneously.⁵

To fulfil the external goal attainment criterion, a mission/operation must have a positive and sustainable impact on the (potentially) violent conflict on the ground.⁶ This might seem an obvious criterion for success, but it is all too often bypassed or misinterpreted when missions/operations of this nature are evaluated. Goal attainment from an external conflict prevention perspective is not necessarily achieved by a mission/operation, which merely fulfils its mandate. However, it is also not necessary – nor desirable – that all underlying issues (root causes) related to the conflict are resolved by the mission/operation.⁷ EU missions/operations are often undertaken in the hope that they might help bring about the peaceful resolution of a conflict, but this has never been their primary purpose. Conflict prevention must not be confused with conflict resolution. There is a significant difference between successful conflict prevention (particularly of the operational kind) and successful conflict resolution. This distinction is imperative in order not to confuse the responsibilities of EU personnel and decision-makers with that of others involved in the conflict or indeed its resolution. In the end, it is adversaries, not international interveners, who must resolve their conflicts.⁸ The primary purpose of operational conflict prevention is *to prevent (further) violent conflict* and in this way help to bring about conditions under which the parties involved can resolve the conflict themselves. The external goal attainment criterion has been developed to help assess

5 Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, 2007. Transnational Dimensions of Civil War. *Journal of Peace Research*, 44, pp. 293-309; Lobell, Steven E. and Mauceri, Philip, 2004. *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.1-10.

6 Stedman, S. J. 2001. “Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers”, *IPA Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation*, New York; Reimann, C. (2004): “Assessing the State-of-the-Art in Conflict Transformation” in Austin, A., Fischer M. and Roberts, N. (eds.): *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Handbook*, Springer VS; Bercovitch, J. and Simpson, L. (2010): “International Mediation and the Question of Failed Peace Agreements: Improving Conflict Management and Implementation”, *Peace & Change*, 35:1, pp. 68-103.

7 Johansen, Robert, C., 1994. UN Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success? *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38(2), pp. 307-310; Reagan, Patrick M., 1996. Conditions of Successful Third Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40(2), pp. 336-359.

8 Johansen, Robert, C., 1994. UN Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success? *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38(2), pp. 307-310; Wolff, Stefan, 2006. *Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

whether a given mission/operation is effective in this regard in the specific context in which it engages. The indicators of external goal attainment are therefore whether, if this has not already taken place, there is an initiation of violent conflict or if the violent conflict is already underway whether it continues, diffuses, escalates and/or intensifies.

EU missions/operations only rarely seek to prevent (more) violence through their own presence – either directly through containment or indirectly through deterrence. More often, they subscribe to theories of change, which propose that peace and stability will result from gradual changes in the society, security sector, distribution of power, etc., which they seek to bring about through external intervention. Either way, it is important to recognise that change can be negative as well as positive – and at times continuity may be the best possible outcome. Regardless, EU missions/operations must be assessed according to the extent to which they make *a meaningful, positive and sustainable contribution* to preventing (further) violence.

EU missions/operations are usually part of wider efforts to prevent or even resolve the conflict(s) in question. The external goal attainment criterion must, thus, consider the EU mission/operation in light of these broader efforts – by the Union and other actors involved. Does it make a meaningful contribution to the EU's comprehensive approach towards the conflict country or region? Does it facilitate successful cooperation and coordination with international, regional, national or local actors involved in preventing (further) violent conflict? Does it strengthen peacebuilding, stabilization and/or security sector reform in the country? Whether civilian or military – a EU mission/operation is only effective in terms of its external goal attainment, when it fulfils its potential role within this wider conflict prevention process and contributes meaningfully to it. That is, through a positive and sustainable impact (however small) with regards to preventing (more) violent conflict.

External appropriateness in EU missions and operations

The final effectiveness criterion is one, which has been much neglected in the analysis of EU missions/operations; namely, external appropriateness. Appropriateness assesses the ways in which a mission/operation seeks to achieve its purpose. Where internal appropriateness evaluates operational effectiveness according to internal indicators (timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness), external appropriateness evaluates the implementation of a mission/operation according to a set of standards focused on appropriateness in operational conflict prevention, because as Lund points out, 'misapplied preventive efforts, even if timely, may be worse than taking no action at all.'⁹

The external appropriateness criterion takes as its starting point that an intervention must do good – and more good than harm. This is equally important for civilian and military deployments.¹⁰ Proportionality should govern any type of external intervention, including preventive measures and non-coercive as well as coercive tools. Foreign interventions, which

9 Lund, M. S. (2009): "Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice" in Bercovitch, J., Kremenynuk, V. and Zartman, I. W. (eds.): *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, SAGE, London.

10 Guthrie, Charles and Quinlan, Michael, 2007. *Just War: The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare*. London: Bloomsbury.

are inherently intrusive and limiting to both national sovereignty and local ownership, must always be proportional to the challenge at hand.¹¹ Therefore, the concept of necessity, which condemns unnecessary interventions or measures as illegitimate must be considered in any deliberation concerning the external appropriateness of operational conflict prevention.¹²

Operational conflict prevention requires that analyses take these principles beyond the battlefield, where they are traditionally applied, and assess any impact – intended or not – on the lives and wellbeing of populations in areas where the EU engages as well the impact on its own personnel and any (potential) adversaries to its missions/operations. Because if an actor such as the EU engages in coercive measures – of any kind – for any purpose – it is important to scrutinize its actions according to widely accepted principles governing the legitimate use of force, whether that force be violent or not. As the focus of this enquiry is on operational conflict prevention by both civilian and military means, it is important that these principles are applied to a wider spectrum of interventions, e.g. different types of missions and operations as well as a broader concept of ‘coercion’, not necessarily physical, violent or lethal. With regard to physical force, which is rare but sometimes mandated in EU mission/operations, this criterion scrutinises the appropriateness of its use as well as the non-use thereof.

External appropriateness in operational conflict prevention is best understood as ‘proportional prevention’, which assesses whether more good than harm is done as well as ensuring that what is done is done by proportionate means of power and persuasion to facilitate the effective prevention of (more) violent conflict. External appropriateness is closely linked to external goal attainment in the sense that it explores whether the contribution that a mission/operation makes is meaningful (positive and sustainable) enough to justify the measures (necessary and sufficient) taken to make that contribution. A question that this comparison raises is whether – and if so when – it becomes inappropriate to do too little – in particular as one response may delay or even exclude another possibly more appropriate one. In other words, external appropriateness also addresses whether the mission/operation was the most appropriate response to the challenge at hand.

Conclusion

This contribution proposed effectiveness in operational conflict prevention is when a mission/operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner, seen from the perspective of the intervener as well as the conflict in which it intervenes to prevent (further) violent conflict. This two-pronged approach to understanding effectiveness in EU missions and operations is illustrated in Figure 1, which also presents the four effectiveness criteria: (1) internal goal attainment, (2) internal appropriateness, (3) external goal attainment and (4) external appropriateness. Finally, it provides indicators for each of the four criteria by which effectiveness in operational conflict prevention can be measured. The IECEU project has

¹¹ Bellamy, Alex, J., 2006. *Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p.199-228; Walzer, Michael, 2006. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. New York: Basic Books, p.127-137.

¹² Guthrie, Charles and Quinlan, Michael, 2007. *Just War: The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare*. London: Bloomsbury, p.1-49; Walzer, Michael, 2006. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. New York: Basic Books, p.144-151.

applied this approach in a comparative case study of effectiveness in EU missions and operations in the Western Balkans, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Individual and comparative case studies are available at: <http://www.ieceu-project.com>. Please do not hesitate to contact the author for any further information.




Figure 1: effectiveness criteria and indicators of success

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ETHICS TRAINING AND ITS RELEVANCE TO PEACE OPERATIONS

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Introduction

It is unnecessary to labour the point that peace operations have seen significant changes over the last two decades, nor that those changes have been accompanied by numerous new challenges. In such circumstances peacekeepers can find themselves ill prepared, either as the result of the operational situation being such that they are denied time for adequate preparation or an over emphasis on the achievement of short-term objectives. In this respect, it is entirely understandable that the requirement to restore stability is likely to be a priority but there are some very real dangers if longer-term objectives, and the need to address the underlying causes of conflict, are seen as less important. This can be a particular problem if it results in an absence of training for mission personnel with responsibility for some of the more complex tasks that the mission will have to address.

Mandate implementation

Effective mandate implementation relies on capability, an issue that goes far beyond the need for personnel and equipment although clearly those aspects are important. A credible posture, both politically and militarily, is key but even this is insufficient if a mission lacks, or loses, legitimacy. The deployment of a mission raises the expectation that things are going to improve as it comes in the name of the UN with the legitimacy that this implies. This is one of the great strengths of UN missions but it can easily be squandered if the mission, or members of it, act in a way that is perceived as unethical. Perception is crucial as it only takes a few members of a mission to act improperly for the whole mission to be viewed in a negative light.

As mandates have increasingly included the requirement to protect civilians the consequences of failing to do so can be severe. It is one thing when a mission cannot provide protection due to lack of intelligence or not having resources in the right place; it is entirely another when the actions of a minority of mission members result in the perception that the mission, far from providing protection, actively exploits the people. The ensuing loss of legitimacy can frustrate the mission's ability to achieve its objectives, undermine relationships that may

have been established with the host government, erode trust between troop / police contributors and the UN, and lose the support of the host population. The result is likely to prolong instability in the mission area and inevitably require more time and resources.

There are plenty of examples to support this hypothesis. Incidences of sexual abuse and exploitation (SEA), particularly in MONUC / MONUSCO and MINUSCA illustrate the problem graphically, but notwithstanding the unacceptability of SEA, it is important that it is viewed in the context of the full range of activities that can threaten a mission's legitimacy and that action is taken to ensure an overall ethical approach.

Legitimacy

The importance of mission legitimacy is clearly articulated in the Principles and Guidelines for UN peacekeeping, which states:

“The manner in which a United Nations peacekeeping operation conducts itself may have a profound impact on its perceived legitimacy on the ground. The firmness and fairness with which a United Nations peacekeeping operation exercises its mandate, the circumspection with which it uses force, the discipline it imposes upon its personnel, the respect it shows to local customs, institutions and laws, and the decency with which it treats the local people all have a direct effect upon perceptions of its legitimacy.”

Similarly, the report of the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations states:

“The credibility, legitimacy and relevance of the United Nations in the coming years will depend on its ability to leverage its strengths, address its weaknesses, and empower others to realize their own potential to maintain and achieve peace and security.”

While a mission's senior leadership will be fully aware of the damage that can be done to the mission's legitimacy by the actions of a minority this does not prevent bad things from happening. While it is not the intention of this paper to focus on SEA it illustrates the problem very clearly in that notwithstanding the policy of 'zero tolerance', cases still occur and missions suffer the consequences. Disciplinary measures are essential in this context yet on their own they will not necessarily address the problem. It is much more complex in that it includes issues that involve leadership, the need for a comprehensive risk analysis to pre-empt potential threats, operational priorities, the impact on planning, T/PCC cultural background, the availability of training and the presence of opportunities that may lead to temptation amongst others. The multiplicity of factors calls for a comprehensive response to preserve a mission's legitimacy; these can loosely be grouped under the overall need for an ethical approach which, if applied across the spectrum of mission activities, will support the successful implementation of a mission's mandate.

Developing a comprehensive ethical approach

A first step in establishing an ethical approach is to ensure that standards are established and that they are clear to all. A mission must set the example to the host nation with whom it is working to consolidate peace, as this is key to long-term success. As far as T/PCCs are concerned the process begins in the pre-deployment phase and includes pre-deployment training and pre-deployment visits, and continues through induction training and any subsequent continuation training that takes place.

Inevitably much of the focus tends to be on conduct and discipline and as far as uniformed personnel are concerned responsibility rests largely with T/PCCs who are:

“responsible for ensuring that their personnel serving in United Nations field missions are aware of the expected standards of conduct, including by providing their personnel with pre-deployment training on the United Nations standards of conduct”

Given the impact of SEA the requirement to train personnel to be aware of UN policy and of the consequences of committing acts that contravene it has become a major driver behind activities undertaken in the field. While this is totally understandable it has meant that the emphasis has been placed on conduct and discipline, and one specific aspect of it, to the possible detriment of developing a more comprehensive ethical approach. By way of example, in one mission troops have been given specific instructions not to have any interaction with women or children as a means of preventing potential problems, yet the same mission has a mandate to protect civilians with all that this implies. Such a situation leaves troops uncertain, risks creating contradictions and distances the mission from the people that it is there to help thereby missing an opportunity to strengthen its legitimacy.

It follows that it is important to avoid focusing on individual issues, especially when the response may not necessarily help to further broader mission objectives. Many of the components of an ethical approach exist already; these include policies on SEA, Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), as well as gender policies and codes of conduct, amongst others, yet rarely is there an attempt to develop a coordinated approach that encompasses the full range of issues in the context of their impact on a mission's ability to achieve its political objectives.

The reasons this does not occur are many and include the pressures of time, operational priorities and a lack of resources or expertise that make it difficult to develop a coordinated approach. A coordinated approach will only be possible if it is based on a comprehensive risk analysis of the threats that have the potential to damage the mission if they are not identified and steps taken to pre-empt them. This process, call it an 'ethics risk analysis' would support the wider political and conflict analysis and the planning process and should be applied whenever a new mission is deployed or a transition from another organisation takes place.

The circumstances under which the UN takes over responsibility for a mission from another organisation deserve specific attention, particularly when significant numbers of troops are re-hatted to the UN. Such troops are likely to have been deployed under different standards, may not have had previous experience of serving in a UN mission and may not have had

the opportunity to benefit from the same level of pre-deployment training. This is not a criticism, but it is the reality, and it is a reality that cannot be ignored; and it has resulted in troops that not only have little understanding of the standards expected by the UN but who are guilty of committing sexual abuse, other breaches of human rights and involvement in corrupt and criminal activities. It will never be possible to eliminate every potential threat, but a lack of awareness of problems increases the likelihood that missions will be caught off guard and suffer significant damage to their legitimacy.

Developing a comprehensive approach is not straightforward given the nature of the issues involved, the responsibilities of the various agencies and the need to acknowledge operational priorities but doing so enhances mission capability. It ensures that potential problems are identified early and can be pre-empted on one hand while simultaneously strengthening a mission's legitimacy by ensuring that it is seen to act in the long-term interests of the host nation population on the other.

In the past, it may have been sufficient to make the personnel aware of the complexities that they would encounter, but having some understanding is insufficient unless it is supported by proactive measures to address the problems. Observing and reporting breaches of human rights is insufficient unless it is backed up by measures to resolve the issues; knowing that corruption is prevalent is not going to achieve much in the absence of initiatives to mitigate the consequences; and neither will gain traction unless a mission establishes appropriate values.

Implementing an ethical approach

Most missions have existing elements of a comprehensive ethical approach, but the challenge to their successful implementation as a coherent strategy is that they are not sufficiently integrated on the one hand, and on the other that some elements may be seen as something that can be deferred in favour of operational priorities. While flagrant breaches of human rights or cases of SEA will tend to demand immediate attention, other issues may be seen as less important.

It follows that the first step is to identify potential problems through a detailed mission specific ethics assessment and that should support the mission's wider mandate. The assessment would identify potential problems and allow the mission to mitigate the consequences. To illustrate this the mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) provides a useful example; the need to affect a transition from the African Union to the UN to prevent further loss of life was the operational priority but achieving this meant assuming responsibility for troop contingents that had not undergone the preparatory training that would normally have taken place. While a comprehensive assessment would not necessarily have prevented the subsequent cases of SEA, excessive use of force or other human rights abuses it would have flagged the potential problems and enabled the mission to take pre-emptive action.

An assessment would enable a mission to achieve clarity and ensure that all personnel understand what amounts to its 'values.' These would draw upon legal documents such as the International Humanitarian Law, key policy documents such as that for SEA and appropri-

ate SOPs. There can be no room for misunderstanding. While a mission may be under pressure to meet its operational priorities, ensuring that all personnel are aware of their obligations and responsibilities is crucial to a mission's ability to maintain legitimacy. The appointment of a Special Coordinator to improve the UN's response to SEA is a welcome step in terms of addressing that specific issue but perhaps the approach could be broadened to address the wider ethics at large.

Policies and SOPs can only go so far, they cannot have the desired effect unless they are promulgated and supported by training. The former calls for strong leadership throughout the chain of command and the means to ensure accountability, while the latter is complicated by the fact that the requirements are likely to vary according to the level of appointment. The minimum requirement is to train senior appointees who may, or may not, have served in a UN mission to ensure that they are aware of the potential threats and the various means available to mitigate them.

The time available for training will always be short, especially for senior appointees, but time spent in preparation has the potential to prevent problems that might otherwise threaten a mission's ability to implement its mandate effectively. It is not the intention of this paper to list every issue that has an ethical dimension, but it is important to highlight some of the key ones that would be part of an ethical risk assessment:

Human Rights, including the application of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP). Steps have been taken in recent years to reduce the risk of including personnel with a record of human rights abuses being deployed on UN missions; this may be effective in the case of new mission but it can be a serious challenge when the UN assumes responsibility from another organisation as occurred in the Central African Republic.

Sexual Abuse and Exploitation (SEA) has received an enormous amount of attention in recent years following the large number of cases that have occurred in missions such as MONUC/MONUSCO and MINUSCA. Notwithstanding the Secretary General's zero tolerance policy, the problem is still there as evidenced by the appointment of the Special Coordinator. Training is essential to ensure that senior appointees are better prepared to act proactively rather than to react once cases come to light. Assessment of the potential risk is clearly critical in this respect.

Corruption has often been seen in the context of financial malfeasance on behalf of mission members and as such largely a disciplinary issue. Peacekeepers may still be tempted to exploit opportunities for personal benefit and measures exist to deter them but there is a broader and potentially more serious issue in the threat posed by operating in an environment in which endemic corruption is rife. The increasing threat posed by organised crime and fragile governments which lack the strength to resist its influence have created an environment in which missions must understand the implications if they are not to be perceived as complicit in their dealings with government.

Somewhat inevitably the aforementioned are interlinked, hence the need for training to support a **comprehensive approach**. Underlying that approach is the need for missions to ensure that their actions are transparent and that all personnel are accountable and seen to

be so; this is both complex and sensitive as it may affect the relationship with T/PCCs and encompasses other issues such as the importance of reporting infringements and protection of whistle-blowers.

In addition to the above it remains important to address any issues that relate to, or have the potential to undermine, These issues range from lesser disciplinary incidents to abuse of authority.

Conclusion

There is little that comes as a surprise and missions will always face challenges, either through the behaviour of individuals or as a result of being confronted by issues that had not be seen as a threat and consequently had not been given the priority that they deserved. The increasing complexities facing today's missions demand a comprehensive approach that will enable missions to pre-empt potential challenges, manage the perceptions of host nation populations and ensure that legitimacy is not undermined. Failure in this respect will reduce the ability to implement mandated tasks and prolong the life of the mission. Much has been done in terms of strengthening the political approach, providing protection for civilians and taking steps to address specific issues such as SEA but there is a need to develop a comprehensive ethical approach that covers the full range of threats that arise either directly, or indirectly, from the mission's profile and how it is perceived in the eyes of the host nation population. Achieving a comprehensive ethical approach will only be possible if it is supported by a detailed ethical risk analysis and comprehensive training.

“WHEN DIVERSITY IS THE ONLY UNITY” – How to Train for a Comprehensive Approach in EU Crisis Management

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Introduction

There is no doubt that training increases the effectiveness of any EU field mission, since trained personnel are equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills to be operational immediately after deployment, and to thereby contribute more effectively to the implementation of the mission mandate. One of the key factors, when preparing personnel for complex, multidisciplinary operations, is to enhance the understanding of other actors and the Comprehensive Approach.

All of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions operate in the framework of a comprehensive approach. There are currently more than 5,000 persons serving in six military missions and operations and in nine civilian CSDP Missions. Civilian missions contain fewer than 2,500 persons and half of them are locally recruited staff, whereas the military missions and operations have approximately the same number of people, mainly military personnel seconded from EU Member States and third states. Personnel competences are the most important capability in the CSDP missions and operations.

Civilian and military cooperation was the buzzword of 1990s crisis management, and since then it has been acknowledged that responding to crises and conflicts requires an even broader context of cooperation. In 2017, comprehensive crisis management means the effective, coordinated use of different tools and capabilities, such as conflict prevention, diplomatic activity, economic support and sanctions, developmental cooperation, and lastly, civilian and military intervention. So, crisis management is a subtle blend of activities that the international community can carry out.

“Consolidating a comprehensive approach to EU security is dependent on ensuring sufficient, regular and systematic training” captures the essence of one of the recent IECEU project research studies.¹ “Train as you fight” is a slogan in many military organisations,

¹ IECEU review 1.3 of civil-military synergies. <http://www.ieceu-project.com> accessed 29 April 2017

and the motto of the EU is: “United in Diversity”. This article presents views on how to plan and conduct training in the spirit of these mottos and principles, and how to organize CSDP mission related training in a way that deploying personnel would understand the EU Comprehensive Approach in a better way in the field.

The EU Comprehensive Approach

The current understanding and definitions of a comprehensive approach reflect the present response to conflicts and crises. International organizations hold their policies and concepts for different political purposes, and hence it is hard to find one single definition for a comprehensive approach. UNSCR 2086 on Multidimensional peacekeeping and ‘EU’s Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises’, both written in 2013, laid the foundations for a joined-up policy to more effectively respond to the causes of instability.

The EU Comprehensive Approach (CA) to external crisis and conflicts is a description and vision of how the EU should improve its capabilities. The CA is based on the shared analysis and common vision on how to best respond to crises. The CA focuses on conflict prevention and emphasizes that internal and external operators should work closely together and always commit in planning to seek a long-term solution.²

The EU Comprehensive Approach corresponds in some parts to the UN Integrated Mission Concept, which means a peacekeeping operation where there is a shared vision between all UN actors of the strategic objective of the UN presence at the country level, and that brings together all UN components (security, political, humanitarian, human rights and development). The UN has however, progressed to a more advanced system for coordination by also introducing an integrated mission command structure.

The Comprehensive Approach has been introduced in the EEAS and for the Member States. The EEAS has successfully implemented CA as concept and searched for common ground with other EU actors – in particular the European Commission – on its interpretation. Some structural changes have also been implemented by establishing a new division, called PRISM, within the EEAS to further coordinate conflict prevention, rule of law, an integrated approach, SSR and mediation. CSDP mission planning has benefitted from this shared analysis and vision as the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) has developed over the last years. However, on the operational level much needs to be done.

The Comprehensive Approach is only as strong as the personnel deploying in the theatre of operations apply it. Therefore, training the personnel to understand and to act in the spirit of the Comprehensive Approach is of the utmost importance.

² EU Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crisis. Joint Communication, 11 December 2013

Different audiences – same training needs?

“Training for CSDP is driven by requirements, not events,” states the new EU policy on training for CSDP. CIVCOM and the EUMC have the responsibility for defining civilian and military training requirements respectively for CSDP training activities through their specialised training groups: the EU Military Training Group (EUMTG) and the EU Civilian Training Group (EUCTG). The working groups are also responsible for defining quality assurance standards and overseeing their implementation in CSDP training and education, in accordance with international educational standards, civ/mil standards developed by European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and the EU Qualification Framework.³

Furthermore, the evolving nature of missions and the security environment itself creates new requirements. The CSDP Training Requirements may derive from political guidance, operational requirements of the EU generic civilian and military tasks, and new capabilities. CSDP lessons identified annually provide recommendations on what to include in the mission related training.⁴

For the *civilian* CSDP missions the general essential and desirable skills and experience required for every job in every mission are presented in the Call for Contributions. Applicants must meet at least the general essential qualifications and experience before they can apply for a position within a mission. Training is mentioned as a desirable skill, so it is not necessary to undergo any CSDP specific training before recruitment. Furthermore, an essential requirement for civilian personnel is that the candidates “must have excellent interpersonal and communication skills, both written and oral”. In addition, future mission members “must have the ability to work professionally as a member of a team, in task forces and working groups with mixed composition (e.g. civilian and military staff)”.⁵

For *military* operations, the force generation is a slightly different process. Member States agree on their respective contributions, and fill in the previously agreed positions with pre-defined ranks and qualifications based on the NATO qualification system. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) has examined the CSDP specific training requirements and concluded that the NATO training system covers most of the basic tasks for envisaged military scenarios. However, it was identified that the EU has some distinct military training requirements and they need to be further elaborated.⁶

The training policy continues, that, “Appropriate training is a prerequisite of deployment, so all staff recruited for CSDP missions or operations shall receive certificated pre-deployment training prior to deployment.”⁷ So, training complying with EEAS standards is required at the time of deployment. Pre-deployment training in particular is important for the coherence in a multinational force or HQ. Pre-deployment is an important part of mission preparation and training can make the management culture of the CSDP missions more uniform and promote a European identity among the participants.

3 Draft EEAS Implementing Guidelines for the EU Policy on Training, 2016

4 Draft EEAS Implementing Guidelines for the EU Policy on Training, 2016

5 CPCC, Force Generation for the civilian CSDP Missions: A planning guide for Member States Seconding Authorities, 19 September 2016

6 Bodescu, A. 2014, p. 22.

7 EU Policy on Training for CSDP. 1 July 2016

The European Security and Defence College has developed a specific pre-deployment training (PDT) for CSDP missions. During the planning phase of this training, the training needs analysis revealed that the core of the training should be fostering a European identity and enhancing the understanding of the CSDP Missions' functioning principles. Furthermore, it was identified that the EU Comprehensive Approach should be considered a cross-cutting theme in pre-deployment training courses for both civilian and military audiences.⁸

Civilian and military mission members possess different educational and professional backgrounds. Each function requires specific civilian and military expertise that can be achieved through relevant education and working experience. However, much of the generic training requirements are the same: All should obtain basic knowledge and skills on working in the conflict areas. Furthermore, all should understand what the EU is, why the EU is deploying the mission, and what the external actions of the EU are all about, since, after all, the personnel are there to represent the Union.

Plenty of CSDP training is available

“Training for CSDP is a shared responsibility between the EU Member States, its institutions and dedicated bodies, and the training of personnel for CSDP missions and operations is primarily the responsibility of the Member States.”⁹ Training for CSDP missions can be provided in various phases, settings and frameworks. Training activities can be classified as basic, advanced, pre-deployment and in-mission training.¹⁰ Pre-deployment training (PDT) is the most important type of the training and it should be organised immediately before the mission deployment. PDT aims to harmonise the management culture of CSDP missions and ensure that the persons concerned receive the knowledge and skills they will need to be fully operational from the beginning of their tour of duty.

The sole training network specifically for CSDP is the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), mandated by all EU Member States. The objective of the ESDC is to provide Member States and EU Institutions with knowledgeable personnel able to work efficiently on CSDP matters. In pursuing this objective, the College makes a major contribution to a better understanding of CSDP in the overall context of CFSP and to promoting a common European security culture. The ESDC organises approximately 80 CSDP related training events annually and all training courses are offered to civilian (including diplomats), military and police personnel. In 2014-2015 the European Security and Defence College developed specific pre-deployment training (PDT) for CSDP missions, targeted for personnel already selected, but not yet deployed on civilian and military CSDP missions.

⁸ ESDC Curriculum: Pre-deployment training for CSDP Missions and Operations. Activity 33. Steering Committee 17 June 2016

⁹ EU Policy on Training for CSDP, 1 July 2016

¹⁰ The training types and terminology are described in the Implementing Guidelines annexed to the training policy. *Draft EEAS Implementing Guidelines for the EU Policy on Training*, 30 June 2016

Another network college at the European level, working closely with the ESDC, is the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training, CEPOL. According to the renewed mandate since 1 July 2016 “CEPOL shall support Union missions developing and providing training to prepare law enforcement officials for participation in Union missions.”¹¹

In addition, EU Commission Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI) funded projects, such as ENTRi and EUPST provide advanced training for experts deploying on crisis management missions. Both of the projects limit their training audiences to either civilian or to law enforcement authorities respectively.¹² It is noted that FPI funded projects are not aimed at enhancing purely EU capabilities, but also those of the UN, OSCE and AU.

Security training programmes and standards are a perpetual challenge in the EU. The training requirements were already laid down in 2009, when the Council set the rules for deploying civilian personnel to medium and high-risk areas. At that time an e-learning tool (eHEST), was developed for the low-risk missions and a training course was created for the high-risk areas (HEAT). After the Lisbon treaty and establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) crisis management structures were developed, and security structures within the EEAS started to drift apart. Headquarters for civilian missions (CPCC) with its security coordinator currently steers security management in missions, and EEAS Field Security is developing a security system for the EEAS and EU delegations. Due to scarce resources, the CPCC is still relying on the 2009 standards and materials, whereas an advanced security training system, including advanced e-learning courses (BASE and SSAFE), has been developed for the EEAS delegations. Furthermore, the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) and the European Commission’s European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) have imposed their own security standards and training systems for field personnel.

In addition, two more training systems outside the scope of CSDP, that can complement the competences needed in the crisis management, are the Union Civil Protection Mechanism training programme and training for the election observers. Learning more about these training systems could be beneficial for the CSDP, too.

There have also been initiatives to develop on-line portals to strengthen the availability of relevant training courses. One of them is the “Schoolmaster” database, a portal that Member States have decided will be a central platform for training coordination. Schoolmaster contains information on all courses delivered through the EU with relevance to CSDP. In April 2017, there were 22 training courses on the list, of which approximately half are conducted in the framework of the CSDP. It is obvious that the number does not reflect the real availability of the courses, it rather describes the general awareness of the portal.¹³

11 Regulation (EU) 2015/2219 of the European Parliament and of the Council, *on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL)*, 25 November 2015.

12 Information on the two EC-funded projects and on the activities of ESDC can be found at the following websites: <http://eeas.europa.eu/esdc>, www.eupst.eu and www.entriforccm.eu. Accessed 17 April 2017

13 <https://goalkeeper.eeas.europa.eu/>. Accessed 29 April 2017

As presented, there is plenty of CSDP specific training available, and some of the courses do not limit participation or exclude any of the personnel categories. Thousands of persons receive CSDP related training every year, but according to vague sets of statistics¹⁴ it seems that non-trained personnel are those selected to join missions. There is plenty of space for improvement when it comes to EU internal coordination and cooperation in the field of training. However, many good practices exist in training networks, e.g. the ESDC model of including a comprehensive approach to pre-deployment training and inviting civilian, military and police to the same training audience.

Conclusions

Preparing personnel for field missions that operate in the framework of the EU Comprehensive Approach, requires specific knowledge and multiple skills. Adapting these skills and knowledge, can lead to the envisaged outcome of adapting European security culture and European identity. Learning the required knowledge and skills can be achieved in several ways. Some guiding principles could be:

- ensure that training course curricula includes the awareness raising of other EU actors in the field
- benchmark training curricula learning outcomes with other actors, and try to streamline them
- include other actors' mandates, principles and terminology in the training course curricula
- train different actors together when appropriate in order to facilitate peer-learning
- exercise soft skills: communication, negotiation skills, and trust building
- share actively good practices on how to enhance comprehensiveness

Multidiscipline international crisis management exercises, such as the EU's MultiLayer and VIKING, are excellent platforms to train personnel for the Comprehensive Approach. In exercises, different crisis management actors solve problems, conduct joint analysis and planning, and learn how to interact in a safe learning environment. Training exercises have been also identified as one of the areas of deeper EU-NATO cooperation¹⁵.

The new training policy states that training for CSDP should respect adult learning principles. Therefore, developing skills and knowledge needed in a comprehensive approach, should be a constructive process, where the learner's previously adapted competences are

14 1)PSC, Civilian crisis management pre-deployment training - report on survey results and elements for way ahead ,10976/11, 8 June 2011.
2)CPCC survey on training. August 2015

15 The Joint Declaration signed by Presidents of the European Council Donald Tusk, of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in Warsaw on 8 July 2016

recognised and utilised. The learning process begins always by screening what competences participants have and those competences that can be utilised to enhance others' learning processes. Knowledge needed in a complex multifaceted crisis environment is therefore mutually constructed by future mission members and later on utilised together. This socio-constructivist learning approach can create a framework and theoretical basis for a training system focussed on the Comprehensive Approach.

Although many deficiencies exist in the various EU training networks, the EU deploys highly qualified experts to its missions. Globally seen, the EU has the most training potential for peacebuilding and peacekeeping, and now it is time for the EU to take advantage and further develop one of its own strengths, which is training for crisis management.

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PROGRAMME EAPTC 2017 – 5TH ANNUAL MEETING, HELSINKI

“ADDRESSING THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE”

Tuesday, 02 May	Wednesday, 03 May	Thursday, 04 May
Arrivals 08:00 - 18:00 Shuttle transport from the Airport to the Hotel Scandic Paasi/Santahamina	07:30 - 08:00 Transport from the Hotel Scandic Paasi to FINCENT, Santahamina 08:00 - 08:30 Registration for the meeting at FINCENT 08:30 - 09:10 Meeting Opening and welcome Admin remarks 09:15 - 10:15 Introduction to Theme Topic 1: Ethicality in Peacekeeping 10:15 - 10:45 Coffee Break	08:00 - 08:30 Transport from the Hotel Scandic Paasi to FINCENT, Santahamina 09:00 - 10:00 Introduction to Theme Topic 3: Comprehensive approach 10:15 - 10:45 Coffee Break
12:00 - Registration for the meeting at the Hotel Scandic Paasi	10:45 - 11:45 4 Parallel Working group Sessions Theme: Ethicality in Peacekeeping 1. Civilian Group 2. Police Group 3. Military Group 4. Research Group 11:45-12:45 Conclusions of the working groups 12:45 – 14:00 Lunch (National Defence University, Helsinki)	10:30 - 11:30 4 Parallel Working group Sessions Theme: Comprehensive approach 1. Civilian Group 2. Police Group 3. Military Group 4. Research Group 11:30 - 12:30 Conclusions of the working groups 12:30 – 13:45 Lunch (National Defence University, Helsinki)
14:00 - 16:00 Market Place preparations	14:00 - 15:00 Introduction to Theme Topic 2: Protection of civilians	13:45 - 14:45 Concluding remark Hand over of the EAPTC chairmanship
15:00 - 17:30 IECEU Project Policy Dialogue (optional)	15:00 - 16:00 4 Parallel Working group Sessions Protection of civilians 1. Civilian Group 2. Police Group 3. Military Group 4. Research Group	15:00 - Transport to the Hotel Scandic Paasi/ Airport 15:00 - Cultural Event at pleasure, Guided Suomenlinna Tour and Military Museum (optional)
	16:00 - 16:30 Coffee Break 16:30 - 17:30 Conclusions of the working groups 17:30 - 18:45 Guided Bus Tour of Helsinki, ending at the Hotel Scandic Paasi (or direct transport to the hotel) 19:30 Transport from the Hotel Scandic Paasi to the Restaurant Pörssi	
17:30 - 21:00 Ice Breaker and Market Place at the Hotel Scandic Paasi	20:00 - Hosted Dinner at the Restaurant Pörssi 23:00 Transport to the Hotel Scandic Paasi/ Santahamina	

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ISBN 978-951-25-2944-5 (print)
ISBN 978-951-25-2945-2 (PDF)



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