# Contents

- Foreword by the Chair of the Intelligence Oversight Committee 3
- Foreword by the Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces 4
- Foreword by the Chief of Intelligence 5
- Finland's military operating environment and the year 2020 6
- Act on Military Intelligence and Act on Military Discipline and Combating Crime in the Defence Forces 14
- Military intelligence organisation and capabilities 18
- Oversight of military intelligence 24
- Military intelligence as a place of work and service 26
- Development of military intelligence 28
Foreword by the Chair of the Intelligence Oversight Committee

In June 2019, new and comprehensive intelligence legislation entered into force. The Act on the Oversight of Intelligence Gathering and the related amendment to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure had already entered into force in February the same year. On 26 June 2019, Parliament’s Intelligence Oversight Committee convened for the first time, and started to exercise parliamentary oversight over intelligence.

The legislative drafting process preceding the enactment of this modern intelligence legislation was long and meticulous. I am pleased to say that this legislation so crucial to our country’s security was drafted in the spirit of genuine parliamentarism – this forms a solid basis both for intelligence and its oversight.

The Acts governing intelligence form a balanced entity. The legislation covers national security needs without jeopardising basic and human rights. The strong oversight counterbalances the new powers vested with the civilian and military intelligence authorities to conduct intelligence both in Finland and abroad.

The primary duty of the Intelligence Oversight Committee is to oversee that intelligence is conducted in an appropriate manner. In addition, the Committee may make parliamentary observations on intelligence and its development. This is particularly important in the early stages, when the conduct of intelligence activities under the new intelligence Acts is still evolving.

Along with its oversight duty, then, the Committee also contributes to the development of Finnish civilian and military intelligence. On behalf of the Intelligence Oversight Committee, I want to wish every success to the Finnish Defence Forces’ personnel responsible for military intelligence in the important work they do for Finland’s security.

Mika Kari
Member of Parliament (Social Democratic Party of Finland)
Chair of Parliament’s Intelligence Oversight Committee
Foreword by the Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces

Over the recent years, Finland’s military operating environment has undergone rapid changes, and the military strategic importance of neighbouring areas has grown. States in the neighbouring areas have continued to increase their defence expenditure, improve their readiness and engage in active exercise operations.

At the same time, the toolkit for exerting multidimensional influence has expanded along with the technological development and increasing interdependence between states and information systems. In the modern world, conflicts may start without any traditional use of military force, and societies can be undermined even in peacetime by targeting critical functions, sites and individuals across the nation. Technological development has broadened the concept of warfare from the traditional ground, air and maritime defence to encompass information, information systems and space.

It is increasingly more important to be able to gain comprehensive situational awareness of the complex operating environment. At the same time, this is also ever more challenging. In fact, the developments over the past years have set more and more requirements for military intelligence, operating at the front line of defence every day.

Military intelligence is one of the key priorities in developing the Finnish Defence Forces. The building and development of different systems and technologies ensures that intelligence capabilities remain at the level required by the operating environment.

The Act on Military Intelligence has clarified and strengthened the foundations for military intelligence.

The Act significantly contributes to the formation of situational awareness, both from the Finnish Defence Forces’ perspective as well as from the wider perspective of the nation. The Act on Military Intelligence also gives the Finnish Defence Forces a broader mandate to counteract intelligence activities by foreign states. The first year of operation under the new legislation is behind us. It has confirmed that the Act was needed.
Dear Reader,

You are now reading the first public review by the Finnish military intelligence (Finnish Defence Intelligence, FDI) in its over 100 years’ history. Until now, Finnish military intelligence has principally operated under a veil of secrecy. Secrecy has helped to protect organisations and personnel from intelligence activities and counteractions by foreign powers’ intelligence organisations.

Since the beginning of this millennium, the thaw that momentarily prevailed in international politics since the Cold War ended has been replaced with robust and increasing competition between key states, which is also reflected in the Finnish security environment. This has in part contributed to the need to enhance our national intelligence capabilities in order to proactively detect threats and utilise intelligence as a basis for decision-making. In 2019, the acts on military and civilian intelligence entered into force, which markedly improved the operating conditions for the Finnish intelligence organisations. Military intelligence now has clearly defined statutory duties, targets and jurisdiction. Along with the intelligence acts, the Finnish system has been transformed into a system similar to that in the other Western countries, with a military intelligence organisation and a civilian intelligence organisation (Finnish Security and Intelligence Service), clear political guidance and a comprehensive oversight system.

The need to protect military intelligence personnel and operations has not disappeared over the years. On the contrary, the activities of foreign states’ intelligence services in Finland and its neighbouring areas are once again on the Cold War level. The new Act on Military Intelligence, however, has made military intelligence more public while giving intelligence new powers and capabilities. For this reason, it is important to open military intelligence to citizens by describing what it is and how it works.

This public review will briefly introduce the Act on Military Intelligence and the tasks, targets, capabilities, operations and oversight of military intelligence. This is not a detailed description or analysis of the operating environment or operations during the past year. Instead, I hope that this review will give the reader an accurate picture of Finnish military intelligence and the significant role it has in guaranteeing national security.

Chief of Intelligence
Rear Admiral Juha Vauhkonen
Finland’s military operating environment and the year 2020

Finland’s military operating environment refers to a geographical and international political entity that has significance when assessing the potential military threats to Finland or to Finnish crisis management forces. In addition to the existing or emerging crises, in 2020 the world was shaken by a COVID-19 pandemic.
To put it simply, Finland’s military operating environment consists of Northern Europe, especially the Baltic Sea region, and the conflict areas where Finland participates in crisis management operations. The military operating environment is intertwined in a multifaceted way with the international political situation and the changed reality in terms of security policy and technological development in past decades. The juxtapositions in international relations are also directly and indirectly reflected in Finland’s military security. The Baltic Sea is important to the states in the region with regard to the freedom of navigation, security of supply and commerce. The states in the region seek to safeguard their own interests, and this is also reflected in the missions of the armed forces. This is manifested by, for example, active military operations on land, sea and in the air. There are also concentrations of military power in Finland’s neighbouring areas that need to be taken into account when making threat assessments or in the planning and readiness based on these assessments.

The growing political confrontation is also manifested in the ability and readiness of states or coalitions to use, when necessary, armed forces in the territory of another state if they consider it necessary for safeguarding their key interests. The return of power politics has increased tensions in Europe. Russia, for example, has shown its ability and willingness to use, where necessary, armed force to achieve its objectives also in Europe, which has increased military confrontation and activity in the Baltic Sea region. However, nowadays the direct use of armed forces for pursuing foreign policy interests is not generally the primary or most useful method. Nevertheless, states prepare for the use of armed force and develop their capabilities for this. Armed forces or the possibility to use them still has a significant role as a foreign and security policy instrument in many states. Key actors in Finland’s military operating environment, such as Russia, develop their military capabilities and the readiness of their armed forces through regular and versatile exercises.

Finland’s military operating environment is also influenced by, for example, the progressive shrinking of the Arctic ice cap resulting from climate change. As a result, the opening up of new sea routes and the potential discovery of new natural resource deposits will increase the competition over resources and influence between the states in the region. The states’ efforts to gain the right to exploit the natural resources and guarantee economic operating conditions make it necessary for the key states to allocate resources to monitoring and protecting the region. In the Arctic region, states seek to promote the realisation of their interests also through military means. The infrastructure of the Arctic region and the capabilities of armed forces are developed in accordance with the special conditions, military needs and threats in the region. A good example of this trend is Russia’s decision to establish a fifth military district, the Northern Fleet Military District, in its Arctic area in the beginning of 2021. The interest of Western countries in northern areas is manifested in,
for example, naval activity in the northern sea areas. Even though the Arctic region has so far remained relatively isolated from the increasing tensions related to the global security situation, the situation may change in the coming years as the key actors in world politics seek to protect their growing interests in the region.

Despite the increase in the competition between Great Powers, in particular between the United States and China, as well as in tensions and confrontation in world politics, it is important to note that the modern world is deeply integrated in many areas. For example, economic interdependencies act as balancing factors between states and international communities in many international policy issues. The interdependent nature of the global economy, however, may be in conflict with national interests, and this may contribute to tensions between states in the field of energy export, for example.

Technological development is reflected in security

Finland’s military security environment is also considerably influenced by the rapid global development of new technologies. Modern societies built on information and mobile network technologies have been able to produce competitive advantage and competence. At the same time, societies’ dependence on information technology has made them vulnerable in several respects, including vulnerability to external influence targeted at minimising the above-mentioned competitive advantage. A good example of such vulnerabilities is the extensive data breach and espionage case that was discovered in the United States in December 2020 and that was particularly targeted at the federal government.

The new operational domains that have emerged along with the technological development, such as space and cyberspace, create many possibilities for positive development but also involve risks. Pursuit for national interests through the exploitation of space as well as the development of military and criminal applications utilising cyberspace have to be increasingly taken into account when assessing developments in Finland’s security environment. Key state actors develop defensive capabilities in cyberspace, but also capabilities that enable espionage and, when needed, operations, such as damaging critical infrastructure, for example power grids.

2020 – the year of a pandemic

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the most important task of the armed forces in Europe is still to guarantee the preparedness and ability to take care of operational obligations as well as to monitor and secure territorial integrity. Military activities in Finland’s neighbouring areas continued to be active during 2020. These include, for example, military exercises, strategic bomber flight sorties and naval deployments. Both the United States and Russia are more strongly seeking to achieve a surprise effect in their exercise activities, which makes anticipating the operations more difficult. In addition to their normal operations, armed forces have supported civilian authorities during the pandemic, for example in logistics, by providing medical aid and protecting infrastructure. Regardless of the disturbances caused by the pandemic to the functions of societies, the ability of European states to secure their territorial integrity and maintain operational readiness has not significantly weakened. Russia’s annual strategic exercise Kavkaz-2020 was carried out in the area of the Southern Military District. The exercise was the largest during 2020 in Russia, and the COVID-19 pandemic had only a limited impact, mostly affecting the scale of the exercise. In 2021, the annual strategic exercise will be organised in the Western Military District. Together with the exercise activities of the West, this likely means that military activities in Finland’s neighbouring areas will continue at least on the same level as in 2020.
1. Crisis: The presidential elections in Belarus led to anti-government demonstrations.
2. Conflict: The conflict in Eastern Ukraine continued without significant changes.
3. Tensions: Disputes over territory and natural resources as well as refugee flows led to an increase in tensions and regional instability in the Eastern Mediterranean.
4. Conflict: Weak governance and economy, resulting from the long-lasting conflicts in Libya, Central African Republic and South Sudan, hindered the stabilization of societies.
5. Tensions: In Western Africa, especially in the Republic of Guinea and Ivory Coast, internal disputes caused instability and unrest.
7. Crisis: In Cameroon, the government efforts to suppress separatism continued, resulting in violence.
8. Tensions: In Egypt, the radical Islamist attacks in the Sinai as well as the unresolved dam dispute with Ethiopia continued to bolster internal and regional tensions.
9. Conflict: In Ethiopia, the internal federal clashes that escalated during the autumn threatened regional stability.

10. Crisis: In Northern Mozambique, activities of the radical Islamists weakened the security situation.
11. Tensions: In Central Asia, the threat of radical Islamist attacks remains.
12. Conflict: The protracted conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh escalated into open war during the autumn.
15. Tensions: In the Persian Gulf area, attacks against energy infrastructure increased tensions.
16. Conflict: The conflicts in Iraq and Syria as well as combating Daesh continued without solution.
17. Conflict: The protracted conflict in Yemen deteriorated the already extremely severe humanitarian crisis.
18. Conflict: The conflict in Afghanistan continued despite the peace process.
20. Tensions: In South-East Asia, regional disputes involving many countries continued.
21. Tensions: The demonstrations in Hong Kong continued.
The pandemic affects both national economies and the global economy. It is, however, unlikely that it would lead to significant direct changes in the global military and security political situation. However, the measures adopted to curtail the pandemic do, especially if prolonged, affect the training and exercise activities of the armed forces and increase costs.

In addition to the pandemic, the military intelligence’s year was marked by developments in defence policies of states relevant to Finland’s security environment, development of the capabilities of their armed forces and general development of military technology, all of which required constant monitoring. The military strategic significance of the Baltic Sea region continued to increase. Especially Russia has deployed more capable and technologically advanced weapon systems in Finland’s neighbouring areas as well as improved the readiness and force projection capabilities of the Armed Forces. The trend has been similar, but at a visibly slower pace, in the NATO member countries in the region.

Extraordinary events during the year included the social unrest resulting from the presidential election in Belarus and the protracted frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh which escalated rapidly, changing the balance of power in the South Caucasus as Turkey assumed a significant role in the region.

According to observations by military counterintelligence, intelligence services of foreign states have continued to operate actively in Finland. The restrictions placed on movement, due to the pandemic, have hindered to some extent the field operations of foreign states’ intelligence services, but computer network operations, in particular, have continued actively.

**Underlying causes of conflicts and crises in the world**

The causes and forms of crises and armed conflicts vary by region, but in practice, a poor economic situation, shortcomings in the rule of law as well as corruption and organised crime, for example, are common factors in all crisis areas. In many places, extremist groups that justify their actions by religious ideologies, exacerbate the problems. The strain on the carrying capacity of societies is increasingly reflected as population pressure towards the neighbouring areas of crisis countries and also towards Europe. Underlying phenomena, the causes of which are often independent of local actors, contribute to the emergence and escalation of crises. These include broader ideological and ethnic factors as well as the need of external actors, often induced by natural resources, to steer the development of countries and areas in the direction of their own interests. Further-
Military exercises and events in the region during 2020.

With respect to crisis and conflict areas, the monitoring focus in 2020 was on regions where Finland participates in military crisis management, especially in the Middle East. In regions where Finland is engaged in crisis management operations, significant recent events include Iran’s missile attack against Iraq at the beginning of 2020, the explosion at the port of Beirut and the consequent governmental crisis in Lebanon in autumn 2020, and the military coup in Mali shortly after this. In all three countries, the situation has calmed down but is still very volatile. A further significant development was the rapprochement between Israel and Arab countries and its wide-ranging effects on the balance of power in the Middle East. Fighting in Syria has largely quieted down, but especially in northern Syria, clashes between the government and insurgents are continuing.

**Tensions and conflicts in an unstable world**

Military intelligence also comprehensively assesses and seeks to identify potential new crisis and conflict areas. The increased activity of foreign states,
especially Russia and Turkey, in Libya during the beginning of the year is reflected in the Mediterranean, i.e. in the operating area of the maritime crisis management operation of the European Union. The ceasefire achieved in Libya in the autumn of 2020 has calmed the situation down and created conditions for a more permanent peace. In the eastern Mediterranean, the greater competition for energy resources over the past year and the protracted territorial disputes are having wide-ranging effects on the situation in the whole area, which is already tense.

The situation in the Horn of Africa will likely deteriorate further. Internal armed clashes increase instability in Ethiopia, the key state in the region. In Somalia, the concentration of power, repeated failure to organise elections and uncertainty about the continuation of military support by the United States will likely weaken the security situation. Despite international counteractions, radical Islamist movement will likely continue in its present form. In Africa, its primary focus areas include the Sahel region, including the region of Lake Chad, and East Africa where the actions of extremist movements are focused on Somalia, the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo and on northern parts of Mozambique.

In Afghanistan, on the other hand, the negotiations that started between the government and the Taliban in the autumn of 2020 to put an end to the nearly 20 years of ongoing war have proceeded slowly. Regardless of the agreement between the United States and the Taliban, hostilities have continued and increased. This trend will likely continue during 2021, with violence being primarily targeted at local population and security authorities.

Security is a comprehensive concept

In general, it is difficult to examine military security separate from other aspects of security. The character of warfare has changed following the end of the Cold War, and wars or warfare no longer necessarily involve traditional battle by conventional armed forces of nation-states. Nowadays, wars often have no clear beginning, not to mention a declaration of war. In modern conflicts, swift governmental decision-making is emphasised — be it the launch of a military operation or a mandate to use force. The means of modern warfare are based on the flexible use of various capabilities of a state, where military capabilities constitute only one method of promoting national interests.

Instead of the concepts of hybrid warfare or hybrid influence frequently used in public contexts, we may as well talk about multidimensional influence. This refers to all capabilities and instruments available to a state actor for exerting influence on a target in order to promote its own foreign and security policy goals. Influence is often sought by means that do not fulfil the characteristics of traditional warfare, which makes the opposing party’s decision-making more difficult. Seeking influence through a multidimensional approach also involves the possibility of issuing a threat to use military force or using such force. The nature and defensive capabilities of the target, the aim of influence operations and the desired effect define the toolkit used for such influence activities.

When assessing potential military threats against Finland, it is important to understand that situational awareness of the operational environment in Finland’s neighbouring areas alone does not give a sufficiently clear picture for assessment. Events in Finland’s military operating environment are part of multidimensional security. Assessing military capabilities and forecasting the development of military activity is important but only a part of a comprehensive situational awareness of the operational environment. Development trends in world politics are reflected in the modern world rapidly, and often also unexpectedly, which means that there is an increasing need for high-quality and timely situational awareness and intelligence provided by the intelligence community.
A military force comprising nearly 20 brigades is stationed throughout the western parts of Russia, and troops can be flexibly transferred from other Military Districts.

An ongoing Baltic Air Policing operation has been established by NATO in Lithuania and Estonia with B-12 air superiority fighters. In addition, NATO has supported each Baltic state with a multinational Enhanced Forward Presence battle group of 900-1,500 soldiers with, for example main battle tanks.
Act on Military Intelligence and Act on Military Discipline and Combating Crime in the Defence Forces

Military intelligence stepped into a new era when the Act on Military Intelligence entered into force. The Act confers new powers to military intelligence and defines its mandate more precisely.
The Act on Military Intelligence (590/2019) entered into force on 1 June 2019. This was preceded by careful preparation, which included comprehensive comparison of international legislation and examination of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Careful legislative preparation allowed time for military intelligence to prepare for the entry into force of the Act. It can already be seen that the Act has clearly improved the conditions for intelligence collection by military intelligence.

Under the Act on Military Intelligence, the targets of intelligence collection conducted by military intelligence may include activities by a foreign country’s armed forces and organised troops comparable to them and preparations for an activity, as well as intelligence targeting Finland’s national defence, including activities posing a serious threat to the security of international crisis management operations. Military intelligence serves the needs of military national defence and, above all, responds to information needs that allow the Defence Forces to perform its tasks with the highest possible quality.

The first experiences and observations from the use of the new powers have been positive, and the decision-making procedures laid down in the Act seem to function as projected in the enactment stage. The capabilities of military intelligence have increased at the same time as the District Court of Helsinki has started to create framework conditions for intelligence collection through its case law.

The national intelligence legislation has also deepened and improved cooperation between the military and civilian intelligence authorities. Furthermore, the new legislation has improved the joint ability of security authorities to conduct intelligence on state threats and to react to them.

Priorities and requests for information under the Act on Military Intelligence

Military intelligence is guided by annual priorities. The Defence Command prepares priorities with the parties listed in the Act on Military Intelligence, i.e. with the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. A joint meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and the President of the Republic (known as the TP-UTVA) preliminarily prepares priorities concerning military intelligence targets.

Priorities refer to long-term trends significant to Finland’s foreign and security policy that may focus on state threats and to react to them.

The District Court of Helsinki decides on the use of intelligence collection methods that encroach on basic and human rights.
on, for example, a certain subject or area. Where necessary, priorities may be modified as a result of significant events or trends. Following the TP-UTVA meeting, the Ministry of Defence, which guides the operation, gives the priorities as a command to the Defence Command. However, the Ministry does not take a position on what kind of intelligence collection methods should be used for intelligence collection in accordance with the priorities. In addition, the Ministry of Defence must submit an annual report to the TP-UTVA on the ability of military intelligence to form and maintain a situational picture as well as to produce relevant reports in accordance with the priorities. The annual priorities form a basis for intelligence tasking of the military intelligence authority, on which a decision is made by the Chief of Intelligence of the Defence Command.

In addition to intelligence tasking defined on the basis of the priorities, Finland’s foreign and security political leadership may, where necessary, make separate requests for information in support of their policy decisions to the military intelligence authority based on military intelligence targets and annual priorities.

**Intelligence collection methods**

The intelligence collection methods of the military intelligence authority fall under chapter 4 of the Act on Military Intelligence. The available collection methods are similar to secret information gathering methods used by the police in combating crime, such as surveillance, technical surveillance or intelligence in telecommunications networks, as well as traditional methods of military intelligence, such as radio signals intelligence. The Act also made available completely new methods, such as targeted acquisition of communications data from border-crossing telecommunications cables, foreign computer network exploitation and use of covert human intelligence sources. The decision-making system associated with the use of methods has been created respecting the protection of confidentiality of communication and fundamental rights. The District Court of Helsinki will decide whether methods that intensely interfere with basic and human rights can be used. The Chief of Intelligence has the power of decision when the use of a method involves, for example, an elevated need to protect the official using the intelligence-collection method.

In addition to statutory intelligence collection methods, the methods available to the military intelligence authority include methods whose regulation by law has not been considered necessary or relevant. Such a method could be, for example, open source intelligence, which is not considered to violate the privacy enshrined in the Constitution.

**Crime prevention**

The Act on Military Discipline and Combating Crime in the Defence Forces (255/2014) confers on military intelligence the task to detect and prevent offences related to intelligence activities directed at Finland in the field of military national defence and to activities endangering the purpose of military
Intelligence collection is undertaken in all weather conditions.

Joint operations require intelligence.

The scope of duties in crime prevention is nowadays relatively established. Cooperation between crime prevention authorities and its significance have grown considerably, and this cooperation is regarded as appropriate in preventing and combating criminal phenomena.
Military intelligence organisation and capabilities

A part of the Finnish Defence Forces, military intelligence serves the leaders of the Defence Forces and the state. It is tasked to produce intelligence information in accordance with the requirements set by national customers and stakeholders, thereby contributing to an efficient functioning of the defence system.

Military intelligence collects and processes information on military or other activities targeted against Finland and relevant to the security environment that may seriously threaten Finland’s national defence or endanger vital societal functions. Military intelligence collects intelligence so that it can give an early warning on possible military threats against Finland, provide adequate situational awareness supporting the decision-making by the Defence Forces and state leaders, and ensure that the Defence Forces can perform its statutory tasks.

The duties of the Finnish Defence Forces are the military defence of Finland, the provision of support for other authorities, the provision of international assistance and participation in international military crisis management. As part of the Defence Forces, military intelligence is responsible for securing the livelihoods and basic rights of the Finnish people and the functioning of government, and defending the lawful social order. Military intelligence also participates in the international duties of the Defence Forces, including providing and receiving military assistance and participating in military crisis management operations. In military intelligence activities, crucial factors are timeliness as well as the credibility and usability of the intelligence produced.

Military counterintelligence is part of military intelligence

Military counterintelligence is part of the Defence Forces’ intelligence system. Military counterintelligence collects and processes information on intelli-
gence activities targeted at Finland’s national defence and threatening Finland’s national defence and vital functions of society. It reveals and prevents threats and offences targeted at Finland’s military national defence and related to intelligence, sabotage, terrorism, organised crime as well as attacks against information networks.

Military counterintelligence is responsible for identifying threats posed by foreign states’ intelligence services as well as following their actions and intentions. The purpose is to support key national defence actors in protecting information, tasks and key personnel and to provide the Defence Forces’ leadership and state leadership with timely early warnings on ongoing developments or changes.

Military counterintelligence also acts as the Designated Security Authority (DSA) in the Defence Forces. In this duty, military counterintelligence performs vetting of personnel for security clearance and validates company security agreements as well as information systems and encryption software.

Military intelligence structure – Finnish Defence Intelligence (FDI)

Military intelligence is part of the operational activities led by the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) of the Defence Forces. The Intelligence Division of the Defence Command is responsible for planning and implementing military intelligence tasking. The Intelligence Division of the Defence Command is led by the Chief of Intelligence. The Chief of Intelligence also guides the Finnish Defence Intelligence Agency. The tasks of the Defence Intelligence Agency include following, assessing and reporting on the military operational environment. The Finnish Defence Intelligence Agency is also responsible for the geospatial and environmental information services in the Defence Forces. Defence branches, i.e. the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, have their own intelligence units, whose primary duty is to support the operational activities of the commanders of the defence branches by drafting assessments of events in the neighbouring areas. The Chief of Intelligence is operationally responsible for intelligence by the defence branches.

Implementing intelligence operations

Intelligence can be described as a cyclic activity. In the five-phase intelligence cycle, the requirements for information on the operational environment are received from the party that needs intelligence, which in the case of military intelligence may be, for example, the Command of the Defence Forces, the Government or the President of the Republic. In the
direction phase, it is assessed what kind of information needs and requirements the party requesting information has and how the information needs can be fulfilled. The direction phase also includes intelligenceRequirement management and collection management to examine what is already known on the inquired topic. After this, it will be decided whether it is necessary to launch an intelligence collection operation so that analysis can respond to the information need.

In the collection phase, intelligence tasking is assigned to different intelligence disciplines that are used for intelligence collection. The intelligence collected is processed, i.e. interpreted, compared and combined for analysis and exploitation. In the next phase, the processed information is analysed and processed further to ensure as high quality intelligence as possible. Analysed intelligence is turned into reports or other relevant intelligence products and then disseminated on a timely basis to the party needing intelligence. The feedback provided on intelligence by its end user contributes to the development of direction. The intelligence cycle is a highly simplified model while the reality is not this clear-cut; yet its phases describe basic processes of intelligence work.

Means of collecting intelligence for intelligence analysis are called intelligence collection methods. A certain intelligence collection method and the related processing, as well as the analysis of the information collected related to the method, is called an intelligence discipline. Depending on the situation, several intelligence disciplines may be used together to implement intelligence tasking, while in some
cases one intelligence collection method is sufficient for completing a task.

Intelligence is also collected through international cooperation and defence attachés. One duty of defence attachés is to acquire information on their host state’s security policy and armed forces and report on these to the Command of the Defence Forces. This activity is part of human intelligence. Intelligence collection by defence attachés is open and in compliance with the diplomatic culture.

The most important national partners of military intelligence are the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, the Border Guard and the National Bureau of Investigation. The Finnish Security Intelligence Service’s mission is to “ward off and combat the most serious threats to national security, such as terrorism and illegal intelligence by foreign states against Finland”, as stated on the website of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service. In military intelligence, internal security is of relevance mainly from the perspective of counterintelligence, which makes room for cooperation between the organisations. Cooperation with the Border Guard is related to its role in national defence and its border security tasks.

The Border Guard’s area surveillance tasks support the tasks of the Defence Forces. Especially in states of emergency, cooperation is very close. Cooperation with the National Bureau of Investigation is important when offences detected by military intelligence proceed to criminal investigation.

**Need to protect intelligence**

Intelligence needs to be kept secret. Intelligence must protect its own sources and information as well as information shortages and it must protect its personnel, methods of operation and capabilities. If a covert human intelligence source is exposed, the source may be lost. Relevant information may be obtained by combining small fragments of information, which may be irrelevant alone but help in creating an overall picture of the intelligence target. A further reason for keeping intelligence operating methods secret is that a successful operation may be repeated, if necessary.

The capabilities and organisation of intelligence are developed to respond to future challenges in order to maintain decision-makers’ awareness of the operational environment on the highest possible level.
Intelligence disciplines

Communications Intelligence (COMINT) is a sub-category of radio signals intelligence targeted at data transmission signals transmitted on radio waves. Intelligence collection and processing may be targeted at the information content and technical parameters of the signal, the location of the signal source or any other information on the signal that produces intelligence on the user of the signal or the system used.

Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) is a sub-category of radio signals intelligence where intelligence is produced from the collection and processing of radio transmissions other than those used for communications. The most typical targets are radar and navigation signals.

Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT) is a sub-category of radio signals intelligence where intelligence collection is targeted at technical signals not including confidential communications between technical systems.

Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) consists of imagery analysis and geospatial data where information associated with a geographic location is processed to describe and assess the characteristics of the target.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is an intelligence category targeted at humans and the information they possess.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) means taking images of intelligence targets and interpreting them.

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) is a technical intelligence category. It seeks to detect or identify a target, follow it and describe its signatures.

Examples of measurement and signatures intelligence include use of information produced by acoustic sensors and seismological sensors used for monitoring as well as protection-related sampling and analysis.

Medical Intelligence (MEDINT) refers to intelligence on entities related to the health of humans and animals. The objective of medical intelligence is, in particular, to identify health threats and analyse the risks they pose to national forces.

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) refers to intelligence collection from public sources available to everyone. These include social media, traditional media, official statements and documents as well as research literature.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) refers to intelligence targeted at electromagnetic signals. In Finland, signals intelligence is divided into radio signals intelligence, network traffic intelligence and intelligence collection on information systems. Radio signals intelligence is typically divided into communications intelligence (COMINT, targeted at communications), electronic intelligence (ELINT, targeted at radar signals) and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT, targeted at system-internal signals). The entity formed by targeted acquisition of communications data from border-crossing telecommunications cables and foreign computer network exploitation is referred to as information networks intelligence.

Technological Intelligence (TECHINT) means examining weapons, other systems and equipment used by armed forces to be able to develop counter-weapons and methods of operation.
Changes in target systems demand continuous adaptation and evolvement of intelligence collection.
Oversight of military intelligence

Military intelligence is overseen both internally and externally. Oversight of military intelligence is comprehensive also by international standards.

The starting point for oversight is to educate the intelligence personnel to take into account the restrictions imposed by law. Every intelligence officer must consider the legality of his or her own actions and every supervisor has clearly defined supervisory obligations. One of the key monitoring mechanisms in military intelligence is internal supervisory control, but actions are also extensively overseen by internal control of the Defence Forces, which is external to military intelligence. The Chief of the Defence Command exercises oversight of military intelligence, and the Chief Legal Advisor of the Defence Forces is responsible for internal oversight.

Internal oversight is implemented through audits conducted by the Chief Legal Advisor of the Defence Forces several times a year on actions under the Act on Military Intelligence and the Act on Military Discipline and Combating Crime in the Defence Forces. The audits include reviewing decisions on the use of powers and a general review of the applicable legal framework within. Briefings are given to the Chief of the Defence Command on the use of intelligence collection methods both regularly and separately at request or when necessary.

Discussions in connection with annual audits by the Chief Legal Advisor have taken place in an open spirit, and the personnel of military intelligence have considered that observations made in audits support the operation of military intelligence, where procedures are constantly evolving.

The Intelligence Ombudsman, whose post was es-
established to ensure oversight of the application of the Act on Military Intelligence, has a key role in exercising external oversight of intelligence activities. For the Intelligence Ombudsman to be effective in conducting the oversight task, the military intelligence authority must give the Ombudsman information on authorisations and decisions concerning an intelligence collection method issued under the Act on Military Intelligence as soon as possible after the authorisation was granted or the decision made. The Ombudsman must also be swiftly informed of, for example, a decision to protect military intelligence or of a request concerning an intelligence collection method submitted to the District Court of Helsinki.

The Ombudsman has actively exercised extensive oversight of the legality of the activities of the military intelligence authority and has drafted a public annual report of his actions. The oversight process and its implementation have been developed in cooperation between the Ombudsman and military intelligence. Here, particular attention has been paid to the implementation of the secrecy obligation and the protection of information contained in documents and information systems as required by law.

In addition to internal supervision and oversight by the Intelligence Ombudsman, activities under the Act on Military Intelligence are monitored by the Ministry of Defence, which has, notwithstanding secrecy provisions, the right to obtain information on issues related to military intelligence that are of social or economic importance or of serious significance. The Ministry of Defence also issues an annual report on the use of intelligence methods and measures to protect military intelligence as well as on the oversight to Parliament’s Intelligence Committee, Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Intelligence Ombudsman. In addition to these annual reports, the Ministry of Defence is given a separate report annually on military intelligence, its quality and extent and its targets. The Ministry of Defence may also request that a separate report be drafted and submitted without delay.

The Ministry of Defence is also responsible for oversight of the legality of external activities for crime prevention under the Act on Military Discipline and Combating Crime in the Defence Forces, and the Ministry must be given information on matters that are of social or economic importance or of significance. The Ministry of Defence provides the Parliamentary Ombudsman annually with a report on the use and oversight of secret intelligence collection methods and their protection.
Military intelligence as a place of work and service

Military intelligence offers interesting positions in the forefront of national security. Well-trained and experienced employees who flourish at work are the guarantee of quality work.
The personnel are the most important resource of military intelligence. The results of military intelligence are produced in day-to-day work done by professional and motivated personnel. Development of the personnel’s competence and supporting their professional development is essential for achieving results.

In terms of personnel management, the key principles of military intelligence include equal and individual encounters, fairness and open interaction. Because of changes in the operating environment and technological development, military intelligence recruits more personnel for responsible positions. Military intelligence has posts for officers, special officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and civilians.

Military intelligence needs skills and knowledge from a wide variety of fields. In addition to soldiers, there is a wide range of positions available for civilians, such as technical personnel and researchers with academic degrees. Conscripts and reservists also serve in military intelligence structures.

Military intelligence functions best when the personnel see themselves as part of a dynamic and proficient work community and newcomers feel welcome. This is the responsibility of the leadership at all levels of military intelligence. Military intelligence wants to be a good and competitive employer as well as an attractive workplace for both newcomers and professionals working in military intelligence.
Development of military intelligence

The objective of developing the military intelligence capabilities is to maintain and strengthen its ability to fulfil its core tasks also in a changing operating environment. Development is technology intensive so that military intelligence can respond to threats caused by developing technologies and, on the other hand, can put to use the opportunities offered by new technology for intelligence collection and analysis.

Development of military intelligence is part of the Defence Forces Development Programme. The Programme is drafted in the strategic planning process of the Defence Forces, and it defines development goals for a 12-year period. Concepts guide the development.

The Development Programme and concepts include key principles and goals such as the primacy of the information need of intelligence users and the swift dissemination of intelligence to its users. Responding to the constantly changing needs of intelligence users requires continuous feedback and dialogue with the users of information. It is further necessary to constantly assess and develop the effectiveness and usability of intelligence products and services. The development goals that are necessary in order to meet the information requirements include the production of more comprehensive intelligence in support of decision-making of the Defence Forces' leadership and state leadership as well as the ability to support the operations of the Defence Forces with intelligence.

The development goals of the Defence Forces are implemented in extensive capability development
Signals intelligence is a traditional intelligence discipline where the requirements and capabilities are constantly evolving.

**Objective of development**
Exceptional intelligence of high quality that the users of intelligence cannot acquire from elsewhere

**Method of development**
Ongoing and professional development of military intelligence

**Areas of development**
- intelligence collection
- analysis and production
- product and service categories and structures
- answering the needs of the end user of intelligence
- personnel competence and skills
projects. This requires a good knowledge of the operating environment and high-quality assessments of changes therein. The planning and implementation of capability development projects in military intelligence are based on long-term and consistent research and development work, which is carried out in close cooperation with the Finnish Defence Research Agency and national and international partners.

Changing operating environment

Changes in the operational environment and in technological development are the drivers that guide the development of military intelligence. Changes are constantly taking place in the operating and target environments of intelligence, and Finland’s geographic location sets its own special requirements for developing military intelligence. Intelligence collection systems are developed in all operational environments, including land, maritime, air, space and cyberspace, and in the information dimension. This enables production of necessary and accurate information for further utilisation.

Because of rapid technological development, even capability maintenance constantly requires significant new investments in intelligence collection systems, for example. On the other hand, techno-
logical development opens up new possibilities of producing intelligence that is critical for military intelligence and national security.

Monitoring new phenomena and threats in the operating environment requires creating new capabilities for military intelligence. For example, military intelligence improves the ability to detect threats against Finland’s military national defence and to support counteractions so as to respond to cyber threats that have increased considerably over the past years. Similarly, detection and assessment of hostile information operations require constant development of intelligence collection and analysis.

Sub-areas of development

Development of military intelligence is roughly divided into the sub-areas of intelligence collection, analysis and production, product and service categories and structures, and response to the user’s information needs. Technological trends, a considerable increase in the amount of information (including irrelevant information) and challenges in analysis impose major requirements for the development of intelligence processes and systems so that military intelligence can produce relevant and actionable intelligence for the end user of intelligence. Another important sub-area is long-term and supportive development of the personnel’s competence and skills.

Continuous and professional development of military intelligence ensures that military intelligence can also in the future produce high-quality and unique intelligence that the users need and cannot obtain from elsewhere.