



The Many Faces of Military Crisis Management

Lessons from the Field

Finnish Defence Forces International Centre



Edited by Mikaeli Langinvainio

**Finnish Defence Forces
International Centre**

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EDITED BY MIKAELI LANGINVAINIO



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Preface

Competence in both managing and understanding crises is scarce. Because of this, the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) asked a group of leading experts to share some of the lessons learned from their undertakings, in articles compiled for this publication. It is my hope that this volume will prompt thoughts and ideas regarding operational practice in future operations. We are faced with endless unsolved problems both old and new, and it is often the case that a coherent response is required from the military whatever the phase of the conflict.

The issue of how to conduct current and future crisis management operations successfully is becoming increasingly challenging. The aims of military operations are often overambitious, involving comprehensive state-building end-states, where creating a safe and secure environment includes numerous tasks not conventionally assigned to the military. The political will and the resources required do not always match the demands of competing ambitions. Military operations are in danger of becoming overtly political, with less emphasis on security matters. The planning of operations is always complicated by the requirement of political consent, and the 'logic of conflict' is hardly ever on the table, as Mikko Laakkonen insightfully points out in his opening article.

The operations in which Finland participates are becoming more complex and in some cases even more dangerous. Yet for the most part Finnish soldiers, professionals and reservists alike are willing to join ongoing military operations, and presumably future ones too. This volunteer spirit and attitude has been the most valuable factor in the many success stories to which Finnish soldiers have contributed alongside partner forces. However, it takes more than will to cope with demanding and stressful tasks. The present volume contains a survey of what it takes to perform well and to thrive in the field and at sea. One point emerges time and again: training is vital for the performance of every soldier.

Course catalogues may look interesting and attractive, but their appearance is irrelevant – it is the content of the training that matters. FINCENT provides specialist courses to train experts for crisis management efforts. Antti Häikiö provides a good overview on the state of crisis management training and evaluation. Operating environments are changing, and it is not always entirely clear what the aims of the constantly updated courses are, but there is an obvious need for carefully planned training: the individual tasks that need to be undertaken are extremely difficult and require a comprehensive understanding of the operating environment.

Petteri Kurkinen, in his article on Partnership for Peace Training and Education Centres (PTC), convincingly argues that improved cooperation and coordination are imperative. Learning is best accomplished through in-depth training, which is not possible without sharing of expertise and knowledge. This is what the FINCENT publications series is about, especially this volume: sharing lessons learned in the field.

Mika Raunu shares his experiences from the EUNAVFOR Atalanta operation and highlights the importance of high professional competence among personnel. Raunu also interestingly describes how a single operation can become a significant political issue while being dependent on the smallest technical widget in the vessel's systems. Aki Leino, in his article detailing his interesting personal experiences in ISAF, touches on many of the competences that a soldier needs as a member of an operational mentor and liaison team (OMLT). Cultural awareness – or, more appropriately, understanding and respect – is absolutely vital for in specialised tasks undertaken in cooperation with local security forces. A soldier may find himself/herself in a complicated web of values and norms. The social, physical and mental pressures exerted on a soldier in crisis management operations may be unexpectedly great. Dr Vesa Salonen provides a vivid description of coping strategies for such demands from a medical perspective.

In many cases, planning and preparation does not pay off until after years of work. Ali Mättölä and Janne Jaakkola testify to this in their article on the development process leading to a fully operational NATO-evaluated Special Operations Forces (SOF) unit, now maintained as a permanent capability administered by the Utti Jaeger Regiment. The Special Operations Task Group participated in the Netherlands Battle Group (NLBG11) and leveraged its experiences to the greatest extent. Markku Laine describes the composition of the Nordic Battle Group (NBG11), and Tommi Sikanen shares his experiences of how to set up a highly professional battle-ready unit consisting mainly of reservists.

Oskari Eronen, Jari Mustonen and Markus Peltola contribute a commentary reflecting on the findings of other articles in this volume, discussing the effects and challenges to be faced in future military crisis management operations. At the time of this writing, the crisis in Libya is still waiting for a long-term solution after the inevitable fall of Gaddafi, the newborn Republic of South Sudan is taking baby steps towards stability, and the crises in the Middle East are expected to turn acute again any day.

The world is in a state of flux. Events are almost wholly unpredictable, and the pace of political and economic change is speeding up. New currents are emerging in the climate of world politics, and there is no longer a single narrative or template by which to navigate. The events unfolding in northern Africa and the Middle East are good examples. The changing context influences the demands placed on crisis management.

The international community may find itself acting on new frontiers soon. Finland, as an active peace partner in the international community, needs to be at the cutting edge in this development. It can be taken for granted – a bitter lesson learned from many past operations – that military force alone is not a sustainable solution to any modern violent conflict. Comprehensive planning and implementation are needed, and the know-how of Security Sector Reform, among other things, will be required for resolving many future situations.

FINCENT wants to be proactive in responding to the changing needs that Finland faces as part of the international community. Whether Finland is asked to contribute individual experts or a larger force, FINCENT wants to be able to meet the challenge by organising specialised courses for training professionals. FINCENT will act and adapt by constantly reviewing its courses, changing their content or creating entirely new content as emerging needs dictate. FINCENT must evolve with the world in order to be able to carry out its challenging task: training military leaders and experts for action in the field.

I would like to take this opportunity to extend my heartfelt thanks to the writers contributing to this volume and to reiterate my hope that it may prove fruitful for the reader.

Jukka Tuononen
Lieutenant Colonel
Commandant FINCENT

Introduction

Mikaeli Langinvainio

“Short-term thinking drives out long-term strategy, every time.”

Herbert Simon, Nobel Prize winning economist

It is said that in responding to the changing and emerging situations of the crisis management operation (CMO) theatre there is not always time to think all the decisions through. Nor is there always a realistic long-term strategy in place for an operation to rely on. Soldiers are trained to respond to events, and they are prepared for the moment, every moment. At the same time, senior officers issue orders and carry out tasks according to their best judgement. Decisions made at any level of a military operation can influence the direction of the operation as a whole – for better or for worse. Every soldier learns lessons all the time. Many of these lessons need to be shared in order to know what to do and what not to do in the future.

Thinking and planning in the field is often oriented towards patching up the lack of strategy. A huge amount of intellectual and moral processing goes on in the field, and the individual knowledge gained is often processed further after returning home. Likewise, however immediate or precipitate military decisions may seem in the moment, they may nevertheless be grounded in extensive thought processes and insights derived from prior training and experiences. It is extremely interesting to study these approaches and stratagems – the Finnish term for them, *peliliike*, translates literally as ‘game move’ – made in the field (or at sea). These are lessons that would be rather relevant for strategic planners and policy makers too. The present volume contains numerous good examples, written up by authors with plenty of experience.

This publication contains ten articles whose writers are leading experts in their respective fields. They were asked to contribute their own experiences and thoughts on various topics in military crisis management. Both tactical and strategic issues are covered, with practical notes and suggestions for long-term development. Through individual observations in recent operations, the authors discuss a wide range of essential military issues: planning, training, cooperation, leadership, mentoring, coping, structures and capability development.

Addressing conceptual issues with considerable foresight, Mikko Laakkonen opens the volume with a discussion of the principal strategic questions for future operations in his article *Military Crisis Management in the Next Decade (2020–2030)*. He reflects on the influences of the politics of consent on planning and decision-making in future crisis scenarios. Laakkonen portrays how the nature of an operation’s implementation depends on the perception and treatment of spoilers and the enemy. He challenges the traditional approaches in favour of an appreciation of consent-based peace processes where understanding the ‘logic of conflict’ is essential.

There can be little learning without training and education, which constitute the primary domain of FINCENT. Accordingly, one of the purposes of this publication is to provide

ideas for future training. The focus in the present volume is on personal experiences that form a part of the big picture of crisis management; no pretence is made at comprehensive coverage of any subject, and that is precisely the point. A purely theoretical approach would not have allowed the showcasing of lessons learned – the only way to build special capability and expertise.

Preparing for a crisis is a typical case of life-long learning and endless lessons, as Antti Häikiö notes in his article *New Military and Civilian Training*. He is nevertheless able to provide helpful advice on how to organise crisis management training, reminding the reader how quality in training cannot be created without addressing comprehensiveness and looking into system-based differences. Häikiö further describes the positive evolution of training and concept development and also lists certain essential new training needs for future consideration.

To train experts in several specialities for crisis management is too expensive and challenging for individual nations to undertake. Petteri Kurkinen surveys the available international training cooperation platforms and their purposes. With a wealth of practical knowledge under his belt, Kurkinen outlines the network of training opportunities and what their particular benefits for Finland might be. Like Antti Häikiö, he recommends proper training needs assessments, which would allow a more efficient use of resources. Kurkinen suggests modifying international cooperation by introducing new forums and training methods. This would be surprisingly easy to achieve through flexible arrangements and the good international relations that FINCENT enjoys.

The EUNAVFOR operation 'Atalanta' is the first ever maritime crisis management operation for the EU, and for Finland too. In the spring of 2011, Mika Raunu served as the Commanding Officer of FNS Pohjanmaa in this many-faceted operation, gaining rare experiences which he shares in his article here. He describes the principal tasks of the operation and Finland's contribution to it, with an interesting analysis of the challenges. He discusses many aspects of the operating environment, opponents, economy, politics, technology and available resources. Raunu describes phases of the operation at sea, known as legs, and shares his thoughts on successful operations. Escorting ships of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the World Food Programme (WFP) were significant parts of the mission. Raunu also relates how FNS Pohjanmaa located, inspected and assisted the Korean fishing vessel that was released after being held by pirates. FNS Pohjanmaa also participated successfully in the disruption of Pirate Action Group activities by intercepting 18 suspected pirates at sea. In conclusion, Raunu stresses the importance of skilled personnel, highlighting the diverse know-how of reservists in the crew behind the success of FNS Pohjanmaa; it seems a fair assumption, though, that the commanding officer played some part in it too.

Moving from the sea to the deserts of Afghanistan, Aki Leino discusses the background to the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). He shares his extensive personal experiences and explains the skills one has to develop when working as a mentor. Language skills, flexibility and know-how are important, but having the proper social attitude and cultural respect is even more essential for the task. Leino explains how much relations in the field matter and how cooperation

even with the most unexpected multinational and local partners translates into a long series of small victories.

Operating environments pose many human challenges for a soldier. Dr Vesa Salonen shares some of his views on how to cope with operational, physical and mental demands in crisis management operations from a medical perspective. He draws on his extensive personal experience in working in several environments in crisis management operations. He outlines the principal challenges faced by the individual soldier and by the military force as a whole. Every soldier reacts to these challenges in his/her own personal way, but Salonen here also outlines general trends and coping strategies that can be discovered through prior experience.

The final three articles explore the pains and gains of the EU Battle Group (EUBG) concept. In the first of the three articles – as an introduction to the others – Markku Laine outlines the general idea and planned tasks of the European Union Battle Groups. He also discusses the composition of the Nordic Battle Group 2011 (NBG11).

Taking a tactical view, Tommi Sikanen describes his experiences as a company commander with the Finnish Infantry Company (FINCOY) that belonged to the Nordic Battle Group 2011. He discusses his intensive training methods and summarises the training lessons learned in the training and standby periods. He provides a well-argued practical model for how to build capabilities for crisis management out of recruits consisting mainly of reservists. He rates his company's performance highly, thanks to the soldiers' motivation and their remarkable ability to learn and develop. The most valuable lesson for the personnel involved was that traditional combat training and crisis management training are not two separate things; they actually support one another.

Finland also took part in the other EU Battle Group on standby in the first half of 2011 by contributing the Special Operations Force Task Group (SOTG) from the Utti Jaeger Regiment to the Netherlands Battle Group (NLBG11). Unlike Finland's usual contribution to an EU Battle Group, the Finnish contingent in NLBG11 was composed mainly of professional soldiers. Ali Mättölä and Janne Jaakkola describe what participation in the Battle Group yielded in the way of experiences and how these experiences were leveraged. The main objective of the Finnish contingent was to attain interoperability with the Dutch and the Germans. This was achieved in all aspects. Mättölä and Jaakkola also introduce the list of capabilities that the SOTG has developed for the use of Battle Groups. The Utti Jaeger Regiment gained valuable lessons from the Battle Group participation that can be shared with the entire regiment.

Many lessons learned are referred to in the present volume, and there is much to digest. The articles touch on multiple aspects of military development. The volume concludes with a commentary by Oskari Eronen, Jari Mustonen and Markus Peltola exploring the significant findings and issues outlined in the articles. The commentary compiles, mixes up and analyses ideas and arguments put forth by the other contributors and presents alternative views. The three writers present a framework for assessing the effectiveness of military crisis management that will be highly useful in structuring and analysing the effects

and values of lessons identified. They also call for debate on future direction and plans for crisis management.

It has been a great pleasure to work with all the writers, all of whom delivered the valuable contribution that was expected of them, sharing their valuable experiences in the interests of augmenting public knowledge. I am confident that this publication will help lessons identified become lessons learned. Lessons from the field should not be ignored; they should be translated into formal learning or applied practices. There is a limited number of platforms for the sharing of knowledge about crisis management between practitioners and interested parties. This publication will act as one such platform, prompting further discussion and learning.

Military Crisis Management in the Next Decade (2020–2030)

Mikko Laakkonen

Introduction: The Principle of Consent in Military Crisis Management

The greatest conceptual challenge in modern crisis management is the principle of consent. This is a problem not only at the operational level; it challenges the entire decision-making structure of crisis management operations. After the Cold War and especially in the 21st century, there has been a transition from peacekeeping limited in scale and scope towards large and complex peace operations. This shift has presented peace operations with a dilemma: *How can we balance between maintaining consent for peace operations and being able to use military force to coerce those attempting to undermine peace processes?* The present article is based on the approach that “consent is a requisite for legitimacy and long-run sustainability, yet coercion will be required to deal with factions resisting or defecting from a peace process¹.” This approach raises the question of whether this statement will remain applicable in the future, and if so, under what specific circumstances. The present article aims to promote an understanding of what can be achieved by military crisis management operations (i.e. peace support operations) in the next decade (2020–2030), drawing on a study conducted at the Finnish National Defence University.² This study focused on strategic consideration at the military and political level. The key research question was: *Should military components induce consent or rely on the compliance of conflicting parties in crisis management operations in the next decade (2020–2030)?* The research findings and subsequent conclusions are illustrated here.

Operating Environments of Future Peace Support Operations

NATO, like many other institutions, has conducted an extensive study of plausible future scenarios or ‘Multiple Futures’ and risk conditions pertaining to these futures. In the first future (known as the Dark Side of Exclusivity), globalisation, climate change and misallocation of resources affect the capacity of states to maintain sovereignty. Weak and failed states generate instability in areas of interest. Developed states are faced with strategic choices on how to react to instability. There is *friction between the developed and the developing countries*. The future is complicated by nationalism, poverty, demographic pressures and deteriorating environmental conditions. The second future (Deceptive Stability) highlights the requirement to manage the demographic shift resulting from ageing populations and young migrants. Here, resource allocation is efficient as resource-rich parts of the world become part of the dominant system. However, a wide range of problems persists in less developed and resource-poor regions of the world. This dichotomy is exacerbated by the lack of intervention by liberal democracies absorbed with domestic priorities. Ensuing tensions and poor economic and cultural integration worsen pre-existing security issues such as crime

¹ Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 303–304.

² Laakkonen (2011).

and terrorism. The overall theme of this future is *preoccupation with domestic concerns in the developed countries, leaving them less able to react to instability and geopolitical risk*. The third future (Clash of Modernities) outlines a world where continued globalisation and technological advances have helped drive urban centres in the developed world to become mega-hubs of wealth and culture. However, *disconnected, segregated and disassociated frontier areas* experience the greatest tension. Elements further destabilising these regions include organised criminal elements that engage in human and black-market trafficking, intellectual and technological piracy, and illegal arms trading. The authorities focus on keeping these disruptive forces at bay by managing flows of trade, resources, and recruitment of workers that traverse the borders between the *urban cores and outlying areas*. The fourth future (New Power Politics) involves friction in international decision-making, competing world views, conflicts over resource allocation and lack of economic integration. There is also a heavy emphasis on power politics. *Competing regional powers dominate a truly multi-polar world*. These powers have established a fragile balance in which globalisation and international rules and norms are challenged by competition for resources and influence. These countries may not have a global reach, but regionally they play a significant role in shaping world politics by promoting their strategic interests and competitive advantage. Competition and demand for resources, particularly in ungoverned spaces, continues unabated as the most powerful governments continuously strive to improve their economies and protect their populations.

One may argue that within these futures some specific risk conditions are likely to merit a peace support operation. With varying degrees of likelihood, such operations include either peace enforcement or peacekeeping activities or a combination of both. It is likely that *peace enforcement* will be feasible and necessary at least under risk conditions related to failed governance and the vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures. Furthermore, some form of peace enforcement is probably necessary under risk conditions pertaining to extremism of marginalised groups as well as inter-country rivalry. On the other hand, it is likely that *peacekeeping* measures will be feasible and necessary at least under risk conditions pertaining to uncontrolled migration and the consequences of environmental disasters or changes. A combination of peace enforcement and peacekeeping will most likely be a feasible option under risk conditions related to ethnic, religious or ideological conflict; territorial and extra-territorial border disputes; or disputes over resource-rich territories. Research findings suggest that *peace enforcement will possibly be deployed* to counter risks related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or effect and their technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements. By contrast, peace enforcement measures undertaken to counter transnational criminal movements are not universally accepted. This is mainly due to the conceptual reservation that criminal elements cannot be construed as parties undermining a peace process. Nonetheless, based on the research findings, peace enforcement in support of police operations remains a *possibility*. All these findings are subject to both generic and case-specific preconditions, which are described in the following chapter. What is important about these findings is that they advocate that both peace enforcement and peacekeeping will be absolutely necessary for successful military crisis management in the next decade.

Preconditions and Implications for Peace Support Operations

Regarding *generic preconditions*, the research findings offer several points. Firstly, there must be a *definable mission* for the operation. The defined mission must include a desired end-state as well as a plausible exit strategy. Secondly, there must be *sufficient interests* (e.g. political and economic) for various nation states and international organisations to intervene. Thirdly, *sufficient resources* corresponding to the scope of the mission must obviously be available. These are evident prerequisites for a logical sequence of military planning and apply to the use of military capabilities in all imaginable cases. Apart from these rather obvious preconditions, the research findings suggest that three further equally important preconditions apply to peace support operations. Firstly, one must identify the *logic of conflict* and the consequent incentives and dynamics. This is a requirement however illogical the conflict may seem. Secondly, one must *understand the transition* from war to peace, from conflict to stability, from failed governance to good governance, and so on. Thirdly, one must appreciate that the *level of hostility* correlates crucially with the authorisation of coercive measures.

Alongside the generic preconditions, several *specific preconditions* should be highlighted. Although categorising specific preconditions is challenging, they may be elaborated based on the framework provided by the UN principles of peace operations.³ As far as *consent* is concerned, failed governance and interstate rivalry risk conditions specifically underscore the importance of a credible political process. Furthermore, extremism among marginalised groups as a risk condition emphasises international legitimacy for intervening. Although not a robust research finding, the study does suggest that an inclusive peace process should be extended even to include total spoilers. Regarding the *use or non-use of force*, it was highlighted that preconditions related to the responsibility to protect civilians are somewhat diffuse at the political level. Coercive action can only be justified if there is a direct threat to the physical security of a population. In the risk condition related to extremism, there are hedges on coercive measures related to capability of resistance and justification. It was also suggested that threats to truly strategic interests would not merit peace support operations – quite the opposite, as they are causes for war. Overall, when intervening there should be a common understanding that an intervention would be successful in stopping the rivalry. Maintaining *impartiality* was considered especially demanding in the risk condition related to the spillover of a religious, ethnical or ideological conflict. This is also important in risk conditions related to territorial disputes. Time is a factor in maintaining impartiality; in many of the risk conditions there are no quick solutions.

Unlike with preconditions, the list of identifiable *generic implications* is considerably shorter. An ‘evolution’ of preconditions begins from the outset of a peace support operation. This implication encompasses escalation prospects and the need to avoid and prepare for spillover effects. Furthermore, we must realise that coercive measures are likely to have unknown and undesired consequences alongside the intended effects. In the area of *specific implications*, the need to generate a peace agreement is self-evident, assuming that such an agreement is not already in existence. This is particularly relevant in territorial disputes. The use of force, especially in the failed governance risk condition, must aim at providing a safe and

³ The UN Peacekeeping principles: (1) consent of the parties; (2) impartiality; and (3) non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

secure environment. Furthermore, the passage of time raises a dilemma. Crisis management should achieve results quickly; otherwise, political support and the backing of the home front will be taxed. However, as stated in many of the risk conditions, there are no quick solutions. The passage of time also poses a challenge for operations. Regarding the risk conditions defining what is being countered (e.g. the risk condition related to criminality and exploitation), the idea of what is actually being countered must be retained over time. Otherwise, the operation will lose focus and eventually fail or waste resources or both. Finally, it is a specific implication that adversaries, especially extremists, may take hostile action beyond the immediate area of operations and thereby challenge the robustness of the home front.

The identified preconditions are relevant, as they outline criteria that must be met in order to conduct a peace support operation. The lists of preconditions are not exhaustive, though valid and reliable. Once a peace support operation is underway, a dynamic process begins to affect the preconditions directly and indirectly while raising both predictable and unpredictable implications. In this regard, the study highlights what should be anticipated at the very least. The study promotes broad understanding by identifying preconditions and implications that pertain to specific risk conditions.

Discussion and Conclusions

Regarding operating environments, the primary conclusion is that the risk conditions that merit a peace support operation are *very distinct* from one another. This distinction is heightened by the *different overall settings* of the international relations system in each future. Therefore *any crisis management operation should be customised for its respective case*. Spillover of ethnic, religious or ideological conflict is a common risk condition in the first three futures. The existence of such a broad-impact risk condition implies that future peace support operations will continue to be challenged by issues of legitimacy. Also, uncontrolled migration appears in two futures: in the first, uncontrolled migration appears in a world polarised between the developed and the developing countries; in the second, uncontrolled migration appears in a world where states with capabilities to react to are preoccupied with domestic internal issues and are thus less able or willing to react. Bearing the above in mind, *it is reasonable to assume that risk conditions are intertwined*, not isolated and mutually exclusive. This is especially the case in the first future, where failed governance may cause uncontrolled migration or vice versa. Failed governance may also lead to uncontrolled spaces that threaten strategic chokepoints.

Testing the risk conditions against fundamental strategic issues highlights their differences.⁴ For instance, failed governance may not directly threaten other states, but the vulnerability of strategic chokepoints does. Failed governance is likely to have many undesired effects, but it raises the issue of viewpoints and standards by which judgments are made. For instance, the viewpoints of international organisations, superpowers, nation-states, leadership and

⁴ Here I refer to the following questions: "(1) What is it all about? (i.e. what are the stakes at hand?); (2) What strategic effect are we having?; (3) Is the strategy selected tailored to meet our political objectives?; (4) What are the probable limits of our power as a basket of complementary agencies to influence, and endeavour to control, the enemy's will?; (5) How could the enemy strive to thwart us?; (6) What are our alternative courses of action or inaction? What are their prospective costs and benefits?; (7) How robust is our home front?; (8) Does the strategy we prefer today draw prudently and honestly upon the strategic education that history provides?; (9) What have we overlooked?" See Baylis, John et al. (2009).

the population differ from one another. Different *stakes* are involved if one compares transnational crime with conflicts related to ethnicity, religion or ideology. To suppress crime, it is necessary to defend legality in a national and/or international legal context. To mitigate ideological conflict, it is necessary to balance between reciprocal respect and the legitimacy of alternative views. Comparing interstate rivalry and uncontrolled migration, it is obvious that the stakes involved are different. Furthermore, uncontrolled migration is extremely vague by definition. In practice, it raises questions about the scale, direction, impact, responsibility to protect, moral norms, legitimacy and legality of actions.⁵ Thus, since political objectives are expected to vary, the *strategies* selected should also vary. Pertaining to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction/effect (WMD/WME), nation-states and international organisations are faced with the dilemma of preventive measures (against potential threat) as opposed to pre-emptive measures (against imminent threat). In these cases issues of legality, legitimacy, likelihood and lethality must be considered, as well as the merits of *action vs. inaction*. All the above considerations have an impact on the robustness of the home front in countries participating in a peace support operation. Furthermore, it may be argued that from a *historical perspective*, the risk conditions are neither novel nor new. These risk conditions go back not only to the recent past but to eras centuries ago. For instance, it is a convincing argument that piracy at sea in the 17th and 18th centuries, the contemporary drug-trade related conflicts in Latin America and modern cyber-crime are all forms of transnational crime. Such crime has exploited and continues to exploit existing technologies. All the other risk conditions have also occurred in the past. Thus, from the viewpoint of practicing strategy we are actually fortunate. *History yields strategic education. The difference is that the risk conditions occur in novel scenarios. Hence, lessons learned from the past should be adapted to the case at hand.*

The identified preconditions and implications raise certain unique considerations. Firstly, some risk conditions have a *logical* attribute to them, while others may *seem illogical*. This affects the identifying of the aims, interests and incentives of parties and spoilers. In a conflict that appears illogical, the identification of aims and incentives is even less straightforward than in a logical conflict. The logic of a conflict challenges all involved at the outset of any planning. A correct appreciation of the logic is crucial for choosing the correct approach for a peace support operation. Should it be weighted towards peace enforcement or peacekeeping? The logic of a conflict remains a factor during implementation of an operation. To achieve the desired effects we must understand the consequences that inducing consent or relying on compliance are likely to have. The obvious guideline derived from the study is that peace enforcement should counter offensive incentives in order to support transition. At the same time, peacekeeping should be utilised to avoid defensive incentives developing into security dilemmas. Also, it must be kept in mind that bursts of tactical actions will have impacts throughout an operating environment – including its military-strategic and political-strategic levels. This also pertains to the idea of consent. One may argue that regardless of the approach adopted in a peace support operation, consent is always an essential feature of a sustainable end-state. Regardless of these challenges, understanding the underlying logic⁶ of a conflict is fundamental to understanding transition, which is described next.

⁵ Williams, Paul D. (ed.) 2008, pp. 468–475, 480–481.

⁶ E.g. the interdependency of aims, offensive and defensive incentives, the existence and role of a security dilemma, opportunity and grievance factors, and relationships between actors.

Secondly, practitioners of crisis management must possess *cognisance of transition*. This means for instance an understanding of the features of and differences between war and peace; threat and safety; conflict and stability; failed governance and good governance; ideological conflict and peaceful coexistence, and so on. An understanding is also required of how spoilers may transform. For instance, what is the transition process of a total spoiler to a greedy or limited spoiler? Moreover, how do spoilers eventually transform into supporters of a peace process? Understanding transition is imperative for managing the dynamic evolution of preconditions, which begins at the outset of a peace support operation. Cognisance of transition calls for an evaluation of several questions. What is the extent of the effort towards a safe and secure environment that increases the peacebuilding space by decreasing hostility? To what extent should military capabilities and expertise be used in security sector reform contributing to local capacity – and, again, increasing peacebuilding space? What capabilities should be developed for and deployed in peace support operations? This applies to the increasingly international capacity dimension of the peacebuilding space. How are these efforts phased, sequenced and synchronised with other efforts in a peace operation? Understanding how and why transition occurs within the peacebuilding space is crucial. Without the understanding outlined above, inducing consent is guesswork and relying on compliance is wishful thinking.

Thirdly, in crisis management operations *spoilers must be identified from the perspective of the peace process*. Otherwise, the identification of spoilers will not be consistent with either the theory or the prudent practice of peace support operations. *Defining spoilers otherwise changes the nature of an operation towards war, where the logic is to break the will of an enemy – to force surrender. Peace support operations act on a different logic: the purpose of actions towards spoilers is to cause transition towards consent – not defeat*. Thus, the political-level actors who are the custodians of the peace process must first identify the existing spoilers. Then, the military and political actors must agree on a feasible spoiler management strategy. Once the approach towards spoilers has been agreed, the military must generate the required capabilities, plan the concept of operations and execute it accordingly. However, we should note that the research indicates that spoiler theory is not applicable in all risk conditions where peace support operations are conducted. There are other motivations for the approach and actions of an operation, mainly in the case of peacekeeping. All in all, what is described above is very much the practice of strategy: matching ends to means.

Fourthly, it appears that *'sufficient' levels of hostility and violence are a prerequisite* for conducting peace enforcement operations. This poses a problem in many dimensions: moral, legal, legitimacy and military capability, to name a few. For instance, intervention should be less demanding if the levels of hostility are relatively low. If intervention is postponed until hostility is relatively high, peacebuilding becomes more challenging, as the peacebuilding space is diminished: international capacity is relatively less, as matching available means to desired ends is strained; local capacity is likely to be lower due to sustained violence, which causes loss of life and damage to infrastructure; and hostility threatens a safe and secure environment. This *problem of intervention timing* remains an important area of research and related to contemporary practice.

To conclude, we should reflect on the nine fundamental strategic questions. Peace support operations are about supporting the achievement of sustainable peace. Appreciating that consent is variable, multilayered and malleable, operations should address the operating environment and actors to increase consent. Understanding the logic of conflict is a prerequisite for an applicable strategy supporting transition towards peace. Peace support operations should limit their scope to focusing on achieving transition towards consent – not on achieving victory over enemies. Spoiler behaviour will remain the key factor thwarting peace processes. In scenarios of limited supply and infinite demand, the problem of timing interventions will hinge on decisions of action vs. inaction. Both participation and non-participation will continue to have direct and indirect effects on the home front. Practitioners of peace support operations are fortunate in at least one respect: it is possible to derive prudent and honest lessons from history. With continued involvement in peace support operations, we ignore emerging challenges at our peril.

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New Military and Civilian Training – What can they learn from each other? What should they learn together? And what must both learn?

Antti Häikiö

We all learned at school how to tell a good teacher from a bad teacher and can vividly remember the times when learning was easy and the times when it was difficult, boring and frustrating. I recall asking myself on several occasions in the classroom: am I in the right place? is this a smart use of my time? It was not until later that I realised that the teachers alone were not to blame. Crisis management, peacekeeping and peacebuilding take place in crisis situations, a complex environment with multiple unexpected factors, and you cannot learn how to cope with them at any one school, with a single final exam and graduation. How to prepare for a crisis is a typical case of lifelong learning and endless lessons.

Governments, governmental organisations and NGOs exert their best efforts in bringing and building peace, statehood, stability and development to those who need them, but they are mainly supported by public funds and government budgets. Budgetary resources, budget lines and appropriations can be dealt with as calculated quantities, but dealing with human resources and human capabilities is a very different challenge, and in this the current state of operations is rather less systematic.

There are multiple reasons for this lack of a systematic approach, ranging from international politics and government affairs to organisation culture and institutional developments, not to speak of the professional and operating aspects, and finally the tactical and technical conduct of operations and missions in the field. Education and training can make all the difference in improving the quality of crisis management, peacekeeping and peacebuilding; but more research is needed, and we also need to communicate research and research findings to the missions on the ground. This is not yet the case, even though a relevant study may cost less than a single armoured vehicle.

Military and Civilian: Respecting the Difference in Aiming for the Future

The operations map of Libya has bright colours drawn with fresh markers, while the maps of Iraq and Afghanistan have more pin holes in them than pins. The maps of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Kosovo are already gathering dust. All too few are the occasions when men and women, with green, blue or no uniforms, have sat down around or in front of these maps simply to study them, to talk, to listen, to think and to exchange views.

No one would ever send a military force on any mission without the appropriate training, and no military commander would take responsibility for any action without knowing to some degree of accuracy of what the capabilities of his or her troops are. However, it is not at all unusual for a civilian mission to be launched and civilian crisis management experts to be sent abroad with no proper preparation at all.

As missions and operations today require a more comprehensive approach that obliges civilian and military actors to work together, education and training play an increasingly significant role in providing both parties with a better understanding of the planned action and their shared objectives. All too often, a lack of mutual understanding, knowledge and skills hampers interoperability and jeopardises the success of the mission.

In comparing the military system and civilian arrangements for crisis management, we find a number of differences, mainly historical, which outline one of the major immediate challenges facing these international duties: the military system is based on long-term education and training, while corresponding civilian capabilities are created mainly through short-term volunteer training, with participants often paying for the training themselves and using their annual holiday to take the courses.

Education, Training or Both?

In a multinational military force, every single member has undergone basic military service, and the leaders have gone through years of education at military schools and academies. They are thus prepared to operate under changing, challenging and even chaotic circumstances. This is the main point of education and training in the military forces of any country.

Civilian members of a mission, on the other hand – operating in the same conflict environment and often as colleagues of the military staff – may never have left their police, border guard or customs positions, their court rooms, their prisons, their lecture theatres or their government offices before in their lives. They are still subject-matter experts and nationally or internationally qualified professionals educated in their respective fields.

Defence forces in peacetime are principally training forces with planned, tested and developed education and training programmes and exercises in place at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Civilian education is built on academic programmes (law, politics, social sciences, etc.) and vocational education (border guard, customs, logistics, technology, etc.), which are geared to the needs of government and society, not of conflict or crisis situations.

Does this mean that the military education system is by its very nature superior to civilian capacity-building? Is every major, captain and lieutenant an expert in training simply because they have trained hundreds of thousands of subordinates, this being their task given?

How to tackle these system-based differences¹ – whether institutional, organisational, professional or individual – is the key issue of the present article. Without discounting in any way the historical, traditional or cultural reasons underlying the dilemma, it is obvious that modern crises and conflicts require new and innovative development of capabilities and capacities in order to leverage the current complex setting or settings in the best possible way.

¹ 'System-based' in the sense of both 'systemic' and 'systematic'.

The Developing Education Sector in Europe

Europe has traditionally had a strong education sector, from basic and vocational education to higher education. Since 1999, the Bologna process and European Higher Education Area (EHEA)² have achieved significant integration between national systems at the various levels of education and in many academic and professional fields. Moreover, certification and accreditation mechanisms have introduced quality assurance concepts into the work of educational organisations and institutions.

Quality assurance, certification and accreditation have also been adopted in education in the security sector, both in internal security (public safety) and external security (military and defence). Most countries have defence colleges, military academies or universities of defence studies and security sciences, but many European countries have also made progress in establishing bachelor's and master's degree programmes in police, rescue, emergency and prison management training. A case in point is the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences (*Sisekaitseakadeemia*),³ accredited in 2009, which provides education in the fields of police, border security, correctional services, emergency services and customs services in a unique one-stop shop model.

Nevertheless, the point is often ignored that education systems are national systems and as such are not within the competencies of the European Union. The Bologna Process is not an EU programme, and both the European Association of Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA)⁴ and the EHEA are networks of educational institutions, not EU policy instruments. The ENQA and the EHEA are recognised as agents and authorities in their respective fields by corresponding global networks and institutions whose domain is broader than Europe.

Whether an educational institution (or a training institution, for that matter) is called a university, a university of applied sciences, an academy, a college, a polytechnic, a centre of excellence, a centre of expertise, an institute or something else may depend on a number of reasons. True certification and accreditation of the institute is based on a quality system consisting of agreed and accepted mechanisms, not on political decisions.

The Importance of Training Individuals

Civilian crisis management will always be more about human performance and individual expertise than military crisis management ever can be, as the latter involves the use of force, troops and technology which can all be replaced or substituted with a close equivalent reserve if needed. The question of the meaning of training may thus be easier to address in civilian crisis management than in military training: the meaning of training is learning.

The training market, whether at the national, European or international level, offers a wide range of interesting courses, and the members of what is still a relatively small body of

² For more on the Bologna process and the EHEA, see <http://www.ehea.info/>.

³ For more on the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, see <http://www.sisekaitse.ee/eass/>.

⁴ For more on the ENQA, see <http://www.enqa.eu/>.

civilian experts often list an impressive string of crisis management courses in their CVs. This prompts the question: What have they learned? What differences have these courses effected in their attitudes, personalities, knowledge and skills?

We should note that for economic and practical reasons what is on paper a five-day course easily becomes a course involving only three full days of effective learning, as travel and administration often take up half of the first and last day of the course. Courses lasting two weeks or 10 days are considered too long for the participants to leave their jobs and other commitments, which is only understandable given the cuts made and limited resources available in many public services, no one being available to replace a participant for the duration of the course. Yet longer courses may be vital for the application of theories and concepts to actual cases, methods, techniques and practice. A longer course allows both the instructors and the trainees to project their personal skills better and observe their development.

Individual evaluation is often missing from courses these days, and unfortunately personal and professional performance evaluation during missions is very much conspicuous by its absence as well. Applying a standardised evaluation procedure and template does not mean that the supervisor's evaluation skills are good enough or that the evaluation process is necessarily fair, professional and of high quality. From the system's point of view, course attendance and the mission contribution are part of the professional career development of the individual both in his/her regular job at home and in the crisis management mission abroad.

The fact that there are no links between basic education, work and service at home, further training, application to a posting in a mission, selection, assignment and deployment, service abroad and returning home to the old job (or a new one) – no career development continuity or evaluation – represents a distinct lack of quality in the leveraging of human resources.

The issue of how learning takes place during a training course is not only an issue for the individual but also for the education sector at large, translating into questions such as: Can a list of courses constitute a programme (and if so, when, how and why)? Can these programmes be thought of as providing an education (and if so, when, how and why)? And does this in itself transform a training centre into an educational institution, an academy or a college?

System-Based⁵ Development Needed in Crisis Management

Developing education or training for crisis management is not possible without carefully considered ways and means for assessing and analysing crises and conflicts and current engagements in the field. Simply recording lessons-identified/lessons-learned, describing best practices and writing after-action-reviews is not nearly enough for achieving effective, efficient and economic crisis management.

⁵ 'System-based' in the sense of both 'systemic' and 'systematic'.

Considerable progress has recently been made in developing crisis management and international engagement capabilities. The Multinational Experiment (MNE)⁶ process began as a welcomed initiative of the US JFCOM and has evolved into a successful and productive forum for active participants, allowing space for ideas and creative thinking in the otherwise conventional context of crisis management and sectoral government administration. Its multi-discipline approach has brought together military and civilian personnel, experts from various fields, academics and practitioners, etc., while providing time, place and structured topics to encourage discussions and new thoughts.

There are other, less positive examples: the European Union has been struggling with organisational changes before and after the Treaty of Lisbon, and the units in its bureaucracy responsible for crisis management are still debating basic issues such as which things fall in the domain of military vs. civilian expertise, or what technical format should be used to collect data from the missions. It is not so long ago that according to a body of opinion in Brussels information on quality matters should not be collected and distributed among the contributing Member States.

Unnecessary and irrelevant issues and excuses cannot be tolerated for long; the list of modern and current missions and operations is too long. There are too many unsolved conflicts, and those appearing on the list stay there for far too long. This list is unacceptable in many ways: from the human perspective, every conflict and crisis results in prolonged suffering for too many individual innocent victims on a daily basis; yet from the perspective of the developed countries, every mission represents a budgetary outlay that can be questioned by other individuals, viz. voters and taxpayers.

Prolonged missions cause organisational, professional and personal losses to those who are actually in the field, employing their knowledge and skills as best they can as military or civilian professionals. Indeed, the most disastrous outcome of neglecting the systematic development of capabilities, knowledge and skills is the number of casualties and victims – whether ours or someone else's.

Ideas for Peace Innovations and Crisis Invention

Describing Libya as a testing ground can sound callous if the context is misunderstood. We need to regard this operation as a test so that missions of the future can avoid what happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina 16 years ago and in Kosovo 12 years ago, and what is happening in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East or the Horn of Africa today. Actually, many of the requisite tests have already been carried out, but their results have not yet been analysed and applied to plans and future actions. An idea has no value without innovation, invention and putting it into practice as a new tool or process. Studying old missions from a research and development (R&D) perspective can help bring these tools and processes into strategic and operational planning.

⁶ See e.g. <http://mne.oslo.mil.no:8080/Multinatio/GeneralInf/MNE6USJFCO/file/MNE%206%20Rev%20--%20JCDE%20Spotlight%20--%2019May091.pdf>

There are two main areas of results from the lessons identified and learned, established as workable solutions based on best practices: 1) understanding the transition process from root causes to societal changes and leveraging that knowledge in the management of the mission, and 2) transformation of new attitudes, knowledge and skills to local ownership, responsibility, understanding and capacity.⁷

As an example, over the past 10 to 15 years tens of thousands of military, police, border security and other law enforcement officers have been trained by international experts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo; yet the contributing countries attempt to allocate budget appropriations and personnel for deploying in Afghanistan, and soon in Libya or in some other unexpected location, without being able to wind down the old missions. Employing newly-built third-country and host-nation capabilities in missions could be an innovative way to address transition in one process and transformation in another.

List of New Training Needs

A survey of training catalogues and the sheer number of e-mails providing information on or invitations to training demonstrate that there are a lot of new courses out there. The titles and concepts of these courses sound interesting, up-to-date and attractive. But as a desk officer in this field of expertise, I have not seen a proper and relevant training needs assessment (TNA) in many years. We may well ask (or at least I do): Why have these courses been developed in the first place? Where are the additional and available resources that they require? To what larger context do they contribute?

The problem is that there are indeed certain obvious training needs that have been studied and assessed, based on critical factors that would make a difference in one or more missions, and courses have been developed to address these⁸ – but in the current over-supply on the training market, these genuine needs are lost in the confusion. A good example of this is the concept of Programmatic Approach and its methodological implementation as monitoring-mentoring-advising (MMA) using advanced techniques and reporting; this remains little known to those who remember the old generic monitoring missions better and is even less known to decision-makers. MMA is able to make a real difference, not just as a principal tool of civilian crisis management but also in fostering steady progress in the host nation.⁹

Another example is the broad concept of security sector reform (SSR) and in particular how it is made operational, with a wide range of situational and operational variations; it cannot be copied – or taught – without mission-specific applications. SSR is a demanding field for education and training and requires high-level expertise especially from its teachers, trainers and instructors. There are not many people and players in Europe qualified for this.¹⁰

⁷ The main issue for the curriculum in both the transition and transformation theme is to address the question of how a host nation can become and assume the role of subject instead of being the object of actions by others, i.e. the presence of the international community in the country.

⁸ For example, new concepts and methods in the Operation Plans, with which most of the mission staff are not familiar.

⁹ See e.g. <http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/docs/tracking/EULEX%20ProgrammeReport%202011.pdf>.

¹⁰ See <http://issat.dcaf.ch/>.

The risk in offering leadership, management and senior-level courses is that any one of the participants may consider himself/herself qualified for a mission head or command position after taking a five-day or ten-day course. On the other hand, leadership and management courses may be crucial for those who already are in a senior position. Peace mediators and negotiators may need to engage at the highest level with heads of state and government, or at the grass-roots level with communities and villages – and there is no guarantee that a single course will enable them to perform well in both settings.

Logically, once risks are identified in the learning process, they become not so much risks as opportunities. If some training providers would like to explore new products, my suggestion would be to develop two new courses: one for those who plan, make decisions and manage transition processes, and another for those who operate and implement the processes at the local level. If setting up completely new courses is not feasible, these topics could be introduced in existing programmes and courses. They should, however, in any case be taught before anyone goes to Libya.

If I had the money to either buy an armoured vehicle or organise a course to train the trainers (the cost being about the same), I would prefer to organise the course. The problem is that so far I have not found a good one.

Concept for the PfP Training Centres

Petteri Kurkinen

Background

There is a very large number of organisations providing crisis management training. New training centres are set up in various parts of the world every year. Crisis management training can be divided into two major sectors, military and civilian crisis management. In addition to this, various organisations provide training that is applicable to both military and civilian actors in crisis management. A good example of the latter is the annual Integrated Crisis Management Course (ICM Course) jointly organised by the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) and the Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland) in the context of the likewise jointly founded Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management.¹

The crisis management training provided by the various organisations worldwide is by default based on national needs. One exception is the NATO School Oberammergau (NSO), whose courses are geared to the specific needs of the alliance.

To ensure efficient leveraging of existing resources, many governments have entered into bilateral agreements on crisis management training. Multilateral arrangements are much more rare; as an example, we may mention the arrangement in place among the Nordic countries. Previously known as the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS), it has evolved into the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO).²

Under the NORDCAPS/NORDEFCO arrangement, the Nordic countries divide areas of responsibility in military crisis management training among themselves. Some 20 NORDEFCO courses are planned for 2012, some of them repeated once or twice for a total of more than 30 training events. Finland will be hosting a UN military observer course to which the other Nordic countries will send their trainees. The participant countries not organising a particular course undertake to send not only their trainees but also one or two teachers to the course. Nordic participants are not charged a course fee for NORDEFCO courses; the only costs are food and board and any per diems. This arrangement achieves significant savings in costs.

The Concept for the PfP Training Centres launched by NATO in 2001 is one of the various current forms of cooperation between organisations providing crisis management training. The purpose of this concept is to create a network bringing together training centres in NATO countries and Partner countries. A PfP Training and Education Centre is a national

¹ The Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management was founded jointly by the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) and the Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland) in November 2008. The core tasks of the Centre of Expertise are to develop and understanding of the big picture in and coordination of crisis management, involving national crisis management capacity building and preparedness on the one hand and crisis management and peacebuilding missions on the other, and to outline a clear framework for the existing co-operation between these two institutions. The Finnish Centre of Expertise is based on the shared campus principle, with responsibility shared between FINCENT and CMC Finland, both remaining independent governmental institutions in other respects.

² For more information, see www.nordefco.org.

training facility in an Allied or Partner country, recognised by NATO as such in accordance with the terms of the NATO concept for PfP Training Centres, which by national decision conduct PfP-related education and training activities that are made available to all Allies and Partners.

At the moment, the PfP Training and Education Centre (PTC) community includes 23 training centres in NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) countries. PTCs operate at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, most of them providing tactical training for individuals and units participating in crisis management operations. Strategic-level actors include the USPTC, the Naval Post Graduate School and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GSCP).³

The present article is mainly based on the author's observations as Finland's representative in the PfP Training and Education Centres Working Group (PTC WG) from 2008 to 2010.

The PTC Concept

The motivation underlying the PTC Concept is to develop the interoperability of Partner countries through deeper and broader cooperation in training. The concept has been developed through the efforts of regularly meeting working groups and support programmes.

NATO accepts organisations in countries other than Allies for the PTC community on the basis of submissions made by the host countries. One or more inspection visits by an expert group are conducted before an organisation can be accepted. Such an expert group may include military and civilian personnel from NATO Headquarters, from the NATO School or from another training centre in the PTC community. The key criteria considered are:

- The proposed activities should fall within the overall scope of PfP and support its objectives; in particular, they should enhance Allies/Partner interoperability. PfP activities at the Centre will be transparent and open to all members of the PfP.
- The activities of the Centre should aim to promote national and/or regional initiatives, without creating dividing lines.
- The Training Centre should contribute to the Partnership Work Plan by offering education and training opportunities, such as workshops or courses, or by supporting other PfP activities such as exercises, or both; and in the case of Partner nations, PTCs will be declared in the Individual Partner Plan.
- In order to avoid duplication of efforts and resources, the Training Centre should, as far as possible, contribute and conform to a regional and functional spread of training facilities.

Training facilities in NATO Allied countries are accepted as members of the PTC community without a separate assessment.

³ For more information, see <http://www.act.nato.int/organization/education-a-training/430-pfp-training-and-education-centres>.

At the moment, the two most significant elements in the PTC Concept are the PfP Training and Education Centres Commandants' Conference (PTC CC) and the PfP Training and Education Centres Working Group (PTC WG).

The purpose of the annual PTC CC is to make decisions on open issues in strengthening practical co-operation between PTCs, considering the recommendations made by the PTC WG on these issues. The PTC CC assigns the PTC WG new tasks in order to facilitate the decision-making of the PTC CC. The Commandants' Conference is chaired by the Commandant of the NSO.⁴

The PTC WG was established as a permanent bi-annual Working Group preparing for the annual Commandants' Conference. The purpose of the PTC WG is to prepare recommendations for the Commandants of the PfP Training and Education Centres on the tasks assigned to the WG by the previous PTC CC. These recommendations result from plenary discussions among all participants.

As part of the PTC Concept, NATO/ACT supports the PTC community through two separate programmes, the Train the Trainers programme (TtT) and Instructor Exchange (IE).

Under the **TtT programme**, organisations in the PTC community can submit personnel members to be trained on NSO courses in how to conduct certain specific courses. For example, for a one-week course the trainee will spend about two weeks at the NSO, preparing for the course in the first week and participating on the course as a trainee in the second week. After the course, the trainee will be instructed in how to wrap up and document the course. NATO/ACT has an annual appropriation for supporting the TtT programme.

There are two aspects in the TtT programme: training for the technical implementation of a course, and training on how to plan course content consistent with the objectives of the course. The technical implementation aspect is highly useful for organisations that are in the process of setting up their activities. A properly planned TtT event can provide the trainee with an excellent overview of all of the components that go into organising a course, such as student selection and administration. The content aspect is the most useful in terms of updating information and networking with other experts in the same field.

One of the prerequisites for success in the TtT programme is that trainees must have sufficient personal knowledge of course activities in general and of the subjects discussed on their course in particular. The sending organisation is primarily responsible for ensuring this. The organisation providing the training is responsible for customising the training, which in turn requires that the baseline skill and knowledge level of the trainee is known and that a 'mentor' cognisant with the nature of the task has been assigned to the trainee. The course leader is not necessarily the best person to be a 'mentor', since his main duty and principal interest is in leading the course.

⁴ Terms of reference for the Partnership for Peace Training and Education Centres Commandants' Conference / Draft document.

Under the **Instructor Exchange programme**, individual PTCs may invite Subject Matter Experts (SME) to whom they do not necessarily have access themselves to contribute to their courses. In the course of SME exchange within the programme, it would be feasible for the receiving organisation to prepare to leverage the expertise of the visiting instructors to improve the competence of its own personnel. For instance, organising separate training and discussion sessions between the personnel of the PTC and the visiting SME might be very useful for the further education of the PTC personnel. At the very least, the institution should use the opportunity to initiate networking. A scenario where a visiting SME simply comes in, teaches the sessions agreed and then leaves is simple but extremely short-sighted.

Under the PTC Concept, the PTCs report annually on their training and exercises. A compilation of these reports, the *Annual Status Report on the PfP Training Centres*, is prepared at NATO. This is a comprehensive listing of actions taken in the PTC community in the previous year. Its disadvantage is that so far none of the reports has contained an analysis of whether the training provided has been comprehensive enough or whether there are any areas where the training offering requires more depth.

Participating in the Activities of the PTC Community

From the perspective of an individual PTC operating at the tactical and operational level, networking opportunities are one of the key motivations for joining the PTC Concept. Networking is vital for improving the institution's own activities and for revising its training content. Indeed, self-improvement is one of the principal arguments in favour of participating and is encouraged through support programmes sponsored by NATO/ACT.

Moreover, the PTC community is an excellent forum for marketing the institution's own activities. Nearly all PTCs seek to market their training opportunities in order to gain new students. Even though individual national training centres plan their curricula based on national needs, foreign students are welcomed in almost all cases. There are two clear reasons for this: cost-effectiveness and offering the right training environment for the trainees. Cost-effectiveness is attained when a course has the maximum number of enrolled participants, and from the institution's point of view the presence of international students creates a good exercise for domestic students on how to operate in a multinational setting.

The PTC community also provides an efficient framework for developing bilateral cooperation between PTCs. Student and teacher exchange is one of the vehicles used for this purpose, as is information exchange in the context of organising courses with similar content. Indeed, members of the PTC community should be encouraged to make use of the course offerings of other institutions more actively. It is often more cost-effective to send a few students out to take a course at another PTC than to plan and implement an entirely new course at home. The chairman of the PTC WG (NSO) has offered support to such efforts by adding the Internal Marketplace to the WG programme. This is an opportunity for participants to present their operations and promote their new courses and seminars.

A Marketplace event is held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels for the PTC community every year. Here, each PTC has the opportunity to showcase its work over a period of two to three days for the benefit of representatives from other PTCs and NATO Headquarters staff. There has been no evaluation of the practical impact of these events. There has been no conspicuous increase in student exchange, for instance, even though this should be one of the best ways of enhancing operations.

The PTC WG has launched the development of a 'PfP Training and Education Centres Strategic Communications Plan' which, when completed, will provide a framework for increased visibility and more effective marketing.

Future Challenges

The key challenges facing the PTC community are enlargement, development, marketing and ensuring that participants can benefit from the community.

In the early days of the PTC Concept, nearly all of the participating institutions were similar training centres with coinciding interests. As more and more centres join in, with different operating principles and cultural backgrounds, the working methods of the PTC WG and the PTC CC may have to be revised. The increase in numbers alone may affect the informal talks held in the working groups. There is a danger of dynamism congealing into bureaucracy.

In a community like the PTC community, where taking action is on a voluntary basis and membership in which requires some level of commitment, participants must be proactive. If this is not the case, the cohesion of the community may suffer. Therefore appropriate steps must be taken to welcome new members to the community, whether new contact persons or wholly new PTCs.

In recent years, the PTC WG and PTC CC have evolved into a highly functional forum for members of the PTC community. In my view, the most important factor in getting to where we are now has been the active and professional contribution of NSO staff to the various working groups. Now that the PTC Concept is established and recognised, it should be further developed so that the member PTCs could feel that they are deriving concrete benefits from participation. For this, the PTC community must have commonly agreed development objectives. However, in planning development we should not ignore current strengths: a solid platform for networking and cooperation, and ACT support measures.

I feel that the key development areas are training and marketing. Training development could focus on joint online courses and downloadable training packages. The special expertise areas of the various PTCs should be taken into account in the updating of the training packages. Planning of the training packages requires needs surveys, which would be very easy to conduct in the PTC WG. Enhancing marketing of training requires completion of the PfP Training and Education Centres Strategic Communications Plan.

Atalanta – a Multi-dimensional Naval Operation on the Indian Ocean

Mika Raunu

Governments and world trade are highly dependent on functioning sea lines of communication (SLOC). Approximately 90 percent of the world's trade is moved by sea. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the sea is a free route of transit open to all and the freedom to use it can be considered a kind of "essential basic right". Even the smallest disruptions in world trade and logistics at sea can cause significant challenges for the economy of governments and businesses as well as citizens. In recent years, pirates in the Indian Ocean have been a significant threat to functional and safe sea lines of communication.

This article will focus on the following three aspects: Operation Atalanta led by the European Union, piracy as a phenomenon and the enriching experiences Finland gained from its participation in Operation Atalanta. Crisis management at sea is a small part of the success story of Finnish Peacekeeping that began in 1956 in Suez – then too the sea and securing the sea lines of communication lay in the background of the operation.

EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta

The European Union adopted a joint action to launch its first maritime crisis management operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta on 10 November 2008. Finland has taken part in the operation since the very beginning. Atalanta's mandate is based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846 and 1851 from 2008 and Resolution 1897 from 2009, where the Security Council asks governments and regional organisations to support the transportation and delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia as well as UN-authorized actions to protect transport vessels.

The main task of Operation Atalanta is to protect the vessels used by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in delivering humanitarian aid to Somalia. In addition to this, Atalanta is also tasked to protect vulnerable shipping in the coastal waters of Somalia and nearby sea areas as well as preventing and deterring piracy and armed robbery.

Operation Atalanta has succeeded well in fulfilling its main tasks. Atalanta cooperates with numerous different actors. The most important of these are NATO and the CMF (Combined Maritime Forces, regional coalition), which both have a maritime task force and conduct an operation to protect maritime traffic in the area. Numerous individual states, such as e.g. Russia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Iran and Malaysia also conduct national operations to protect maritime traffic in the area.

Maritime Crisis Management is About Protecting Human Beings

The idea of the sea being a uniting, not dividing factor, is descriptive of the operational environment of Operation Atalanta. In the same way, piracy is a problem that unites – not divides – governments, users of the sea and different actors. Piracy is a common challenge and it affects everyone who uses the sea. The effects of piracy reach far into the Indian Ocean and can be seen though e.g. the rise in cost of raw materials, consumer prices and insurance payments even in Finnish wallets.

Although the main task of Operation Atalanta is to protect aid and merchant vessels destined for Somalia, the Operation is in fact about protecting civilians and helping people in distress. The primary duty of the warships and maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) is to protect the civilian crews of the vessels and not just the cargo or the vessels themselves. It is a task that is based on the central idea of the UN Charter, as stated in the preamble:

“We the peoples of the United Nations [...] have resolved to combine our efforts [...] to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples [...]”.

By participating in Operation Atalanta, Finland and other countries systematically continue their efforts for the good of a safer world and to eliminate one long-lasting problem. Operation Atalanta has a strong UN mandate and is led by the EU. Thus, it is in accordance with Finnish foreign policy – and is as the majority of the people want it to be. Participation in Operation Atalanta supports Finland's and the EU's comprehensive approach to stabilising the situation in Somalia, which is a prerequisite for a solution to the piracy problem.

Piracy in a Nutshell

Piracy exists on almost all of the world's seas. Eliminating it is at least as difficult as doing away with criminality on land - in other words near impossible. Behind the piracy originating from the coast of Somalia lies poverty and the lack of a functioning central government. The situation is very typical of a country facing many problems, where government has failed and chaos reigns.

In the case of the piracy originating from the Somali coast, the objective is to pirate merchant ships, take the crews hostage and release them against considerable ransom. The pirates use the ransom money to buy better equipment that enables them to attack even further off the coast of Somalia into the Indian Ocean. In terms of distance, it is as if a fisherman would go from Porvoo in Finland to fish in the Mediterranean.

Piracy is an exceptionally cruel form of criminality. While a burglar is satisfied with the property he has stolen, the pirates along the Somali coast take civilian crews hostage for many months and then set them and the vessels they have pirated free against ransom of

up to millions of euro. In the case of merchant ships, the average length of the time held hostage is around three months, on fishing vessels it can be up to twelve months. While they have been held hostage, crews have sometimes been treated badly, they have been abused, tortured and held without sufficient nutrition or possibility for health care. It would be a grave underestimation to describe the piracy and the Operation in the Indian Ocean as e.g. "pirate hunting", "modern-day Robin Hoods" or "a game of Smokey and the Bandit" – when this is in fact a very dangerous and serious form of criminality, the target of which are civilians.

The costs caused by piracy end up being paid by regular people, Finns among others. The payment of these costs will always fall on the consumer, no matter if the consumer is in Finland or somewhere else in Europe. Currently for example, a fee of approximately \$50–200 is paid for one container (1 TEU = 20 feet) coming from Asia to Europe, and an additional fee of \$100–300 for a 2 TEU (40 foot) container due to the risk of piracy. One merchant ship can carry up to 14,000 TEU (i.e. 14,000 containers on one ship). The additional fee is taken directly out of among others' the consumer's pocket, even though the goods coming from Asia arrive in Finland via the so called feeder ports of Europe.

Although the keys to a solution that would reduce piracy are in Somalia, the flow of millions of euro in ransom money into Somalia does not help stabilise the country, quite the contrary. In recent years, of the approximately 100 attempts to pirate vessels for ransom that are made annually, roughly one third have succeeded. In 2010 and 2011, pirates held approximately 16–30 vessels and 300–500 crew members for ransom at the same time. The situation could be compared to one where the same number of passenger planes with their passengers would be under a constant state of hijacking.

Maritime Crisis Management is Different

In order to implement the tasks of Operation Atalanta, there are two Headquarters (OHQ and FHQ) under the command of the Operation Commander, a logistic support element in Djibouti (ASA Djibouti) and Task Force 465 at sea, in which the Operation's warships and maritime patrol aircraft are placed. The Operational Headquarters (OHQ) is situated in London with a staff of 100–200 persons. Approximately 20–30 persons serve in the Force Headquarters (FHQ) at sea.

The EU's Task Force 465 includes 5–9 warships at a time and 2–5 maritime patrol aircraft. In practice, each warship participates in all of the different tasks of the operation and is active in the entire area of operation. The size of the area of operation is immense. It extends from the southern part of the Red Sea to Madagascar and further on out into the central Indian Ocean. The greatest tactical challenge relating to leading, planning and logistics for the warships and maritime patrol aircraft is the area's size. The situation is the same as if one planned to protect and supervise the road traffic of all of Europe by putting 5–9 police cars in an area the size of Europe. The challenges are in other words considerable and it is impossible to guarantee the safe use of the sea in the entire area.

When Finland decided to send a warship to take part in Operation Atalanta, we were faced with many new kinds of problems and challenges. Most of these are related to law, command and control systems and logistics. By distinguishing between these, it is easier to understand the special features of a maritime operation.

Warships operate in a vast area. Crisis management operations on land usually take place within a very limited area, e.g. in a province or city. At sea, warships operate in international waters, that are subject to the law of the flag state. Within the framework of their mandate, the ships can operate in the territorial waters of different states. The differences in areas and mandate form a challenge for know-how in relation to jurisprudence.

The extent of the area of operation poses a challenge for know-how. Within Operation Atalanta's area of operation there are several different states, cultures, religions, languages, different health-related situations and threats. All of these pose a considerable challenge, where familiarity with the area of operation and the ability to act within it are important. Arranging logistic support for vessels in different countries is also a challenge for support and logistics.

Technology and people. Having skilled and qualified personnel is a prerequisite for the functioning of a vessel. Contrary to the situation in land-based operations, on a warship one is exceptionally dependent on working systems and technology. Technical failure on a warship could discontinue the whole operation. In land-based operations, one does not have the same dependency on the technology of one launcher.

Maritime crisis management is flexible. In a maritime crisis management operation, the troop is literally "in the same boat". Participation in the operation does not require the establishment of extensive and expensive bases or camps. If the decision is taken to end participation in the operation, "one helm command" is literally enough for the entire crisis management force to leave the area of operation and return home.

Finnish Crisis Management Force in the Indian Ocean

The Finnish Crisis Management Force in the Indian Ocean was established on 1 January 2011. Before this, there was no actual crisis management force. The people working in the different HQs of Operation Atalanta were assigned as individual staff officers.

The Finnish Crisis Management Force included Finnish Navy Ship (FNS) Pohjanmaa (approximately 90 persons), a National Support Element (NSE) (approximately 5 persons), staff officers in London, in Djibouti and on the command ship on the Indian Ocean (3-5 persons). The CO of FNS Pohjanmaa also acted as the Commander of the Crisis Management Force and Deputy to the Commander of the NSE. The Finnish Crisis Management Force did not include a large staff element. Administrative support was provided from Finland, for the most part by the Gulf of Finland Naval Command and the Navy Command.

The National Support Element (NSE) is responsible for the vessel's logistic support.

The National Support Element (NSE) produces all necessary replenishments and logistics needed by the vessel according to the so-called "one window" principle. The vessel's logistic needs were sent to the NSE which in turn forwarded them to the Norwegian ship handler, the different HQs, establishments or echelons in Finland, or procured the necessary logistic support locally. A special feature related to the ship's logistics was that FNS Pohjanmaa took support in different countries and ports in Europe, Africa and Oman, and it was not possible to plan for a permanent port for logistic support.

Staff Officers at Operational Headquarters in London and Force Headquarters at sea.

Finnish Staff Officers have taken part in Operation Atalanta since it was established at the beginning of 2008. During the Operation, the Staff Officers played a central role acting as representatives of FNS Pohjanmaa and Finland in different echelons. Thanks to the Staff Officers, the Defence Forces had very good knowledge of the grounds and requirements for the Operation when FNS Pohjanmaa was being prepared for operation.

FNS Pohjanmaa in Operation Atalanta. Leaving Finnish territorial waters is not something new for the Finnish Navy. Among the Services, the Navy has the most long-term experience of international activity. The ocean sailings of the training ship *Suomen Joutsen* can be mentioned as an example among others. Although FNS Pohjanmaa has visited e.g. Africa, North and South America and taken part in tens of international naval exercises during its lifespan, participation in an actual operation was something totally new.

FNS Pohjanmaa was a part of EUNAVFOR Task Force 465 from 1 February to 30 April 2011. During that time, the vessel took part in all of Atalanta's main tasks. While in the Operation, FNS Pohjanmaa was at sea approximately 85 percent of the time. FNS Pohjanmaa protected aid deliveries to Somalia for 21 days and other maritime traffic in the Indian Ocean for 44 days. In addition to this, the vessel also had separate special tasks along the Somali coast. FNS Pohjanmaa carried out 22 friendly approaches and two more demanding boardings. While in the Operation, FNS Pohjanmaa sailed 13,483 nautical miles. When taking into consideration the transit to and from the area of operation, FNS Pohjanmaa sailed altogether approximately 26,000 nautical miles, which is more than a journey around the world. Throughout the Operation, FNS Pohjanmaa experienced no serious technological problems.

While in the operation, FNS Pohjanmaa met with many different tasks and events. FNS Pohjanmaa received the most publicity after assisting the *Golden Wave*, a South Korean-owned fishing vessel sailing under the Kenyan flag off the eastern coast of Somalia between 10–14 February 2011 as well as after detaining a suspected Pirate Action Group on 6 April 2011 in the Arabian Sea.

During the Operation, FNS Pohjanmaa was normally at sea for 9–11 days at a time. The phases at sea are called legs. After a leg, the vessel was ordered to make a port call in the area for a 2–4 day logistic stop, mainly in order to replenish food supplies and fuel. Naturally, during logistic stops, efforts are also made to acquire other necessary materiel, such as e.g. mail from home, spare parts and other material needed aboard.

Escorting AMISOM and WFP ships. During the Operation, FNS Pohjanmaa escorted AMISOM ships to Somalia for a total of 21 days. The escort operations began in Mombasa, Kenya from where the merchant vessels were escorted to Mogadishu, Somalia. The task also included escorting the ships back to Mombasa. FNS Pohjanmaa placed so-called vessel protection squads on the vessels to be protected, which stayed aboard the merchant vessels for the duration of the escort. Because the merchant vessels are the sovereign territory of the state under which flag they sail, a treaty-level agreement was required in order for the Finnish naval seamen to go aboard. The purpose of the agreement was primarily to exempt the Finnish soldiers from the national legislation of the flag state (e.g. Panama). This means that in case of e.g. an accident or disaster, Finnish soldiers will always be subject to Finnish legislation. All escorts were carried out successfully.

Assisting the fishing vessel. The fishing vessel, the Golden Wave, had been pirated and held by pirates for approximately four months' time. Aboard the vessel was a crew of approximately 42 persons, including Kenyan, Chinese and South Korean men and women. The Task Force Commander gave FNS Pohjanmaa the task of locating and inspecting the fishing vessel in question that had then been released by the pirates. When receiving its task, FNS Pohjanmaa was approximately 24 hours away from the Golden Wave. A Spanish maritime patrol aircraft assisted in searching for the vessel. When FNS Pohjanmaa located the vessel there were no longer any pirates on board. The vessel's crew was given medical care, food supplies and water. In addition to this, the vessel also received fuel so that it could reach the closest harbour in Mombasa in Kenya. Together with an aid ship of the African Union, FNS Pohjanmaa escorted the vessel to Mombasa and assisted the Kenyan police in investigating the incident. This is an excellent example of how countries and different nationalities meet at sea. The South Korean government thanked Finland for FNS Pohjanmaa's actions.

Disruption of Pirate Action Group activities. On 6 April in the Arabian Sea, FNS Pohjanmaa intercepted 18 suspected pirates. The suspects were detained in accordance with Operation Atalanta's regulations concerning use of force and mandate. Adherence to these is based on our national Act on Crisis Management. All of the persons detained were released on 21 April 2011 on order of the Operation Commander because despite considerable efforts, no state could be found that was willing to prosecute the suspects. During the entire duration of the detention, FNS Pohjanmaa continued to carry out its duties in protecting sea lines of communication in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Aboard the suspects' dhow-type vessel several different kinds of weapons were found, including e.g. one anti-tank missile, six assault rifles, a pistol, knives, axes and sledge hammers which are used for among other things breaking into safe rooms on merchant vessels. A considerable amount of ammunition for all of the aforementioned weapons was also found on board. When interrogated the detained admitted that when FNS Pohjanmaa was approaching, they threw among other things ladders, weapons and ammunition into the sea, as well as all of their own personal identification papers and the documentation of the boats they were using. FNS Pohjanmaa's crew observed things being thrown into the sea as they approached the vessel and recorded this using different systems in order for it to be used later as evidence. The detained also broke their cellular and satellite telephones as FNS Pohjanmaa approached.

Approximately 24 hours before they were intercepted, the suspects had tried to pirate a Singapore-flagged merchant vessel by the name of MV Pacific Opal in the Arabian Sea. Already before intercepting the suspected pirates, FNS Pohjanmaa had received the report of the merchant vessel's security team on the pirating attempt, which included e.g. a photograph of the pirates attempting to pirate the vessel. It is likely that some of the suspects had a background in criminality or military training. The people detained proved to be dangerous professional criminals, who would have been ready to use the weapons in their possession. The pirates in the Indian Ocean are known to be especially rough. Usually pirates, in e.g. Asia or on the West Coast of Africa are content to rob the vessels of everything that can be quickly turned into cash, such as valuables or the vessel's cargo.



FNS Pohjanmaa assisting a South Korean fishing vessel held by pirates off the Somali coast for four months.

Military Service and Reservists Behind the Successful Participation in Operation Atalanta

FNS Pohjanmaa succeeded well in Operation Atalanta. Naturally there are many reasons for the success, the most important of these is its skilled crew. Here, once again, our military service system proved its strength. Around half of the peacekeepers that took part in Operation Atalanta were reservists. The versatile know-how of the reservists and the regular staff's previous experience of international maritime operations and exercises were a resource that helped FNS Pohjanmaa succeed in the EU's Atalanta Operation. The ability of the

highly educated Finnish reservist to adapt to new situations and challenges was once again found to be excellent.

An exceptionally large number of people applied to be part of the Finnish Crisis Management Force in the Indian Ocean. In the autumn of 2010, approximately 920 persons from among the Defence Forces personnel and reservists applied for 120 tasks. Thanks to our military service system and the great interest of the reservists in peacekeeping tasks, I, as Commander of the Crisis Management Force was able to choose the most suitable persons for the Operation. It was a challenging selection process, as there were so many experienced and suitable applicants.

Quo Vadis Maritime Crisis Management?

The decision of the Finnish government to participate in Operation Atalanta with one warship proved to be successful. With its own small contribution, through FNS Pohjanmaa and the Finnish Crisis Management Force in the Indian Ocean, Finland has again been able to make an effort to help stabilise one of the world's crisis areas.

The Finnish Crisis Management Force and FNS Pohjanmaa did very well in the Operation, which is proved by the successful implementation of all of the tasks assigned to them and the unusually positive interest towards the Operation of citizens and the media. In addition to this, the positive publicity gained by FNS Pohjanmaa in Finland, Europe and Africa is also proof of the maritime operation's success and possibilities for Finland's national visibility.

Maritime crisis management is an inexpensive and flexible way of participating in crisis management. FNS Pohjanmaa was well-suited for the task of protecting vulnerable shipping in an operation such as Atalanta – the main task of the Finnish Navy in Finland being also to protect sea lines of communication. Technologically, the vessel worked excellently, it offered its personnel satisfactory premises and possibilities for passing their free time. The vessel's command and control systems were satisfactory for the Operation and the vessel is capable of different tasks at sea.

As in 1956, keeping the Suez Canal open and sea lines of communication secure are a focus of international attention even today. World trade and the sea lines of communication it depends upon require the safe use of the sea in order to function.

Operation Atalanta is of great importance and has a great effect. Up to the present, the Operation has been successful in reaching its objectives. At sea, the interests of different states and actors have a uniting effect, not a dividing one. Operation Atalanta is a part of the EU's extensive efforts to further the stabilisation of Somalia. The international community still has a lot to do in order to solve the problems welling forth from the ruins of the failed state of Somalia and help the state back onto its feet.

Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) – Personal Views and Experiences of being a Mentor in Afghanistan

Aki Leino

OMLT in Brief

Mentoring is a method where information and knowledge – also so-called silent knowledge – is transferred from a more experienced person to a less experienced one. In a one-to-one reciprocal relationship, a skilled, respected and experienced expert (mentor) provides advice, supports and promotes a less experienced person who wants to develop in their work or studies. The relationship is based on openness, mutual trust and equality. It aims at the professional and psychological development of the person who is mentored (mentoree), their career development and success in work and studies. The mentoree is an apprentice, student, trainee or friend. The mentor is like a master, teacher, trainer, encourager or friend.

Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) activities are originally based on training for Iraqi troops as well as on professional guidance for the Iraqi Army leadership provided by the Americans. The experiences in Iraq were encouraging and the US decided to implement the same method also in Afghanistan. However, the US soon found that their troops were insufficient for carrying out mentoring activities and battle missions simultaneously. In its Resolution 1833 (September 2008), the United Nations Security Council urged member states to allocate additional funds for ISAF. The Resolution emphasised support for the development of Afghanistan's national security forces. Mentoring was extended to include all ISAF troops. At the same time, the US assumed the role of mentoring the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) and handed over the responsibility of mentoring the Afghan National Army (ANA) to the ISAF troops. To a certain extent, the US still mentors parts of ANA's troops using Embedded Training Teams (ETT).

Finland was offered the possibility of mentoring in connection with the Staff Talks in 2007, and two Finnish officers were at once sent to Afghanistan to assess the situation and investigate the possibility for Finnish activity. On the basis of this research, the first Finnish mentors began their work in 2008 at Camp Shaheen, the base of the Afghan National Army's 209th Corps in Northern Afghanistan. The first mentors were assigned as mentors of the Army Corps's Chief of Staff and Chief of Intelligence as well as mentors of the 1st Brigade's Chief of Personnel and Chief of Artillery. In addition to this, two officers were placed in the OMLT movement control centre (MCC) along with two NCOs as drivers/security detail.

For the part of the Finns, mentoring activities have been expanded to include in addition to the aforementioned tasks also expert mentoring in the ANA Signals School, Engineer School and the different units of the Support and Logistics Battalion. The amount of mentoring will increase in the future as the number of ISAF and US troops is decreased when the responsibility for security is handed over to the Afghan authorities. This development is

natural at this stage in the operation. As the number of ANA troops increases, also the Finns' OMLT tasks will increase. It should be noted, however, that the mentoring of different staffs will decrease and more focus will be placed on mentoring and training for lower echelons. The NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NMT-A) has taken over the responsibility for coordinating the OMLTs. Because of this, the OMLTs are now more involved in Regional Command (RC) planning. According to the plan for 2014, several countries have made known that they will withdraw from Afghanistan, but have still committed to operating in the area as a part of NATO even after 2014. This means that Afghanistan will not be left to its own devices. Afghanistan and its different authorities will be trained and mentored until they themselves are able to train and lead their troops - this is still likely to take some time. It remains to be seen what Finland's military effort in Afghanistan will be after 2014.

Personal Experiences

While there are more than one hundred OMLTs active in Afghanistan, there is no Finnish-only OMLT. This is partly due to the fact that the Finns belong to the two multinational OMLTs in Afghanistan. There are also Finns in mentoring tasks directly under NTM-A, which means that they do not belong expressly to a certain OMLT. This tells us that Finnish expert know-how has been recognised, and we have had the opportunity to show the level of our know-how in the mentoring tasks we have been given. Internationally, we have come to be known as a conscientious; hard-working but flexible warrior people who fulfil the duties we are given. We have earned this reputation partly due to our close proximity first to the Soviet Union and now Russia, as well as through our actions during the Second World War.

While interacting with different nationalities, I have noticed that these Finnish characteristics are always mentioned at some point. I have also noticed that even in international headquarters and joint operations these characteristics are often brought up – usually in a positive sense. The British value our flexibility and capability for implementation, the Germans value our flexibility and effectiveness as well as our professional skill, our colleagues from the Nordic countries often want a Finnish leader in order to get decisions made and the Afghans have respected us for being demanding and for treating them as our equals as soldiers.

In mentoring and as part of an OMLT the most important quality is being able to get along with everyone and being able to work while taking into consideration the different working methods of other nationalities. Sometimes it has been difficult to adjust to the rather bureaucratic German fashion of staff work and correspondingly sometimes one has felt too bureaucratic in working with the Americans – although naturally the Americans also have their own form of bureaucracy, but it is a more flexible kind. OMLT mentors have many different partners in cooperation, ranging from coalition forces to the Afghan authorities. Cooperation with other people working in OMLTs varies according to the operational environment, but in general tasks are carried out in cooperation with other coalition soldiers in the area. This can pose challenges especially in for example planning, coordinating and leading convoys.

Religion

OMLT staff work with people of different cultures who have different values. Right from the start, mentors are struck by the Islamic environment. Guidelines and instructions relating to culture given on different training courses are not always sufficient. This is not to say that our training was for nothing. I for one noticed that soldiers are soldiers all over the world and discussions and interests are similar for the most part.

Although the soldiers of the Afghan Army include people from many different ethnic groups, they are all proud to be Afghan soldiers – it is good to always keep this in mind. Afghanistan is an Islamic state and this means that also its army is Islamic. This also means that religion plays a significant part in the routines of the army. Prayers are the most visible and audible part of these routines even though the Afghans themselves do not emphasise this in any particular way. In addition to this, different official meetings and parades are begun with prayer. The Islamic culture is very much present in the everyday lives of the mentors. In this respect, mentoring tasks will not be all that fruitful or long lasting if one's own limited conceptions of other cultures and religions conflict with the aforementioned.

Understanding the Whole Picture

According to the mentors' job description, they are to live, eat, fight and sleep together with the person(s) they are mentoring. Of course it must be understood that it isn't always possible to fulfil all of these aims, but it is good to keep them as objectives. In practice, the OMLT mentor does not function in the exact meaning of the word mentor – in reality activities are much more extensive. As ANA develops, mentors are placed all the more in the role of advisor. In some cases this has sometimes led to a situation where ANA officers feel that the mentor reinforces their own status within ANA as an ANA officer with a prestigious foreign advisor.

Mentors must have a good grasp of the different entities involved and especially know the organisations within which they are working and the people they are working with, as well as what other people the work may relate to. Even for ANA, these aspects are not always clear, not to mention to a mentor who has just arrived in the area. For this reason, I did my best to get to know all the different kinds of partners in cooperation, official ones and unofficial ones. This made it easier for me to perceive the tasks of the different parties within the sphere of activities. Coordination was needed especially in training ANA, which was the responsibility of the American training provider Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI).

This MPRI organisation is made up of former soldiers and police who work as a group of unarmed instructors in American camps and under American command. Mentors must identify possible shortcomings in ANA know-how and together with ANA plan what training is needed in order for activities to be improved in a certain field. In this, ANA, MPRI and OMLT form a kind of three-point alliance. Even so, arranging the actual training and related issues fell almost entirely on the shoulders of the OMLT's mentors. But in the end – IT WORKED!

On NATO's OMLT Course in Poland, we were closely familiarised with the entire ISAF organisation and learned how it is part of a greater whole that is connected to political decision-making within NATO and also how the OMLT relates to all of this. This gave us excellent prerequisites for understanding at least in part why certain things happen in Afghanistan in a given situation. Naturally, the roles of all the different parties involved did not become totally clear during the course. Actually, this did not happen until having worked in the area of operation for a few months. It was not until one had worked with all the different actors of the organisations in question at a personal level, that one understood how their pieces fit together in this great puzzle.

When all of the aforementioned was finally clear, I felt that mentoring and work in the OMLT became easier and I was able to convey a broader perspective on things also to those I was mentoring. Understanding very complex entities was sometimes difficult for the Afghans. Especially among the older officers, it was often apparent that already for a long time, throughout the different conflicts during their lifetime, they had led units no larger than a company, and long-term planning and preparation as well as leading larger formations was challenging for them.

The Chief of Intelligence I mentored was not always able to see more than his own area of operation and Afghanistan. It was difficult for him to perceive how e.g. the general situation in Southern Asia affects Afghanistan and especially its Northern part. Or how Afghanistan's neighbouring states and their different actions could directly or indirectly affect the security situation in Northern Afghanistan. Control over the smallest details was characteristic of the Afghans, but integrating the overall situation and analysing it from a broad perspective was unfamiliar and difficult. This was and still is the greatest challenge in ANA training – long-term planning, comprehending and defining complex entities as a part of activities.

Language Skills

Those who apply to go abroad on peacekeeping or other foreign tasks are required to demonstrate their language skill by means of having passed an examination. This should be an absolute requirement for participation in international tasks also in the future. In general, I have not seen problems relating to this among Finns. However, I noticed that several colleagues from other countries were really in trouble because of their poor English language skills. In practice, using the English language is an absolute prerequisite in OMLT tasks. In mentoring it is often necessary to use an interpreter, and the language skills of local interpreters are not always the best. By being able to use English in a very versatile way, it was possible to get the meaning of what the interpreter was saying even if his speech was not all that easy to understand.

The relationships I created were often based on being able to make conversation fluently and naturally in English. In this respect, soldiers of many countries, Finland included, who did not possess good language skills were not able to carry out their tasks as required because their spoken English hindered their ability to communicate. In the end, because of this, many soldiers in mentoring tasks did not bother to create the relationships needed to facilitate getting things done – they felt they were embarrassing themselves. As we can

see, possessing language skills and being able to use them is a requirement for successfully fulfilling one's tasks. Fulfilling the tasks requires more than just giving tasks and supervising other mentors. Through social interaction in everyday life, mentors are able to build trust among different parties using their language skills.

Flexibility

In all duties of the OMLTs it is absolutely necessary to be flexible both when dealing with colleagues and Afghans. This does not mean that the OMLTs are not a military organisation. Especially when working with the Afghans, a mentor will notice many instances where his own absolute requirements in preparing a matter can still be flexible. It is better to go around a brick wall, than to keep banging one's head against it trying to get through. Within the Afghan culture, certain things are done in a certain way, which can be very different from what we are used to. The main thing is however, that things get done and that the end goal is reached, even if it means that the mentor must help thing along with a bit of pressure. However, we still have to take into consideration that most Afghan officers know what needs to be done, it is just that they have not yet structured it in their minds. This is why mentors are needed, to help put things in order and steer modes of action in the right direction in order to reach the given objective. One has to be patient and be able to wait and let the Afghan make the decision on what should be done and how it should be done.



Discussion during a planning session

Professional Skill

Mentors are expected to be professional in their mentoring tasks. Those selected for the task have already been found to have the know-how needed to carry out the task. Working as instructors in our Finnish military service system is excellent practice for Finnish mentors. Finns value the individual and his training. As a small country, we have taken note of this and when a Finnish mentor goes on a mentoring mission, he already has experience of being a kind of mentor in conscript training. Professionally speaking, Finnish soldiers have done well, even excellently, in comparison to others. Mentors must try to spread this same professional pride to the people they mentor. For my part I noticed that the Afghans valued a person's know-how, but would easily add to the burden of the expert in question. The Afghans felt that since this person is so good at what he does – let him do it well, and we will all look good.

A Soldier or a Diplomat

As I left for OMLT duties and was familiarized with mentoring, it made me think about the task I faced. I felt that I had not been given sufficient knowledge of what this task involved. As I was researching my task, it became clear that my role would be that of a kind of military advisor. The NATO OMLT Course in Poland helped to broaden the mind somewhat, and it soon became clear that being a mentor requires both the skills of a soldier and a diplomat. In Afghanistan, my own actions and field of special knowledge as a soldier came into question. How I would be able to pass on my knowledge to the ANA officers was another matter. Rather soon, however, I noticed that the training and guidance I had imagined was only one part of mentoring.

Getting things understood proved to be a challenge due to illiteracy, incompetence and unwillingness. Sometimes I would try to think of many different ways to get the ANA officers to understand what it was we wanted to teach them. I almost always came up against the fact that their own culture, its different ways and the pressures it creates affected their actions. As soldiers, the ANA officers and I understood things very well from our own points of view. It was no good just giving orders and placing demands on the ANA officers. You had to negotiate issues and ideas into the mind of your mentoree so that he felt that he himself had just thought of or come to a certain conclusion. By using a kind of diplomacy, even such matters turned out well.

Another approach to the matter of being a soldier or a diplomat is when the mentor acts as a kind of go-between for different partners in cooperation and at the same time teaches those he is mentoring to act in the same way. I often had to link together representatives of ANA, ANP, ISAF and the Americans for negotiation on how to smoothly move things along. These meetings proved to be very fruitful and with a good conscience I was able to note that I had achieved something. Also in the role of soldier I sometimes ended up in the role of diplomat when it was necessary to take the side of my mentoree and ANA when duties were divided among ISAF and the Americans in relation to operations.

Conclusion

The OMLTs and their mentors have already achieved a great deal of small victories in mentoring the Afghans. The feedback from other mentors and the Afghans themselves has been mainly positive with regard to the Finns. As Finnish mentors we have also contributed to keeping the Finnish flag high alongside the armed forces of the larger countries. Mentors have wanted and done much more in their tasks than could have been asked or required of them. Each peacekeeper who has served in an OMLT in Afghanistan can be proud of his contribution to furthering the training of the Afghan Army.

Coping with Operational, Physical and Mental Demands in Crisis Management Operations – a Medical Perspective

Vesa Salonen

The present-day working environment in a crisis management operation (CMO) presents several challenges for the individual soldier as well as for the military force as a whole. In this article I will describe this spectrum from a personal standpoint. Every soldier reacts to these challenges in his/her own personal way, but general trends can be observed. I am not going to present scientific data on these reactions but rather present a picture as it has formed from my own observations, filtered and adapted by my medical training and experience. The reader is kindly asked to understand the limited nature of these observations as well as the conclusions drawn.

The Demands of the Mission

Every operation has its own characteristic and sometimes unique features. This is one of the things that make CMO an interesting, even addicting, field to work in. There are also features that are common to most, if not all CMOs.

In most operations there is some level of military threat. This is often asymmetric and created by irregular troops. Quite often it is not possible to differentiate between actions of opposing military forces (OMF) and those of criminal operators. Improvised explosive devices and the use of civilian clothing as disguise make the OMF especially unpredictable. It is therefore necessary to maintain a high state of alert 24/7.

Criminal activity may also take physically less threatening forms such as bribery and extortion. These present a demand of personal integrity and high moral standard on the individual peacekeeper. If these demands are not met, it is difficult to achieve and maintain the trust and respect of the local population. On the other hand, local operators are known to have traced relatives of peacekeepers with the intention of controlling the soldier by threatening the family back home. Piracy with its complex organisation and legal implications is a challenge in itself.

In order to fulfil operational tasks, the soldier must be able to communicate and collaborate with the local inhabitants and host nation officials. There is usually a language barrier to overcome – you cannot achieve the best possible results by using only global “Bad English”. This means that you either must learn the local language or resort to the more feasible alternative of employing an interpreter. With this you face other challenges: the language skills of the interpreter and his trustworthiness. There are also the different moral and ethical values to be dealt with.

The natural conditions, i.e. the terrain, climate and animals, present demands on the soldier. The mountains and deserts of Afghanistan, the old cultural landscape of the war-battered Balkans, coastal East Africa with its harbour cities as well as the Indian Ocean itself have all challenged me and my fellow soldiers. All these physical surroundings are quite different from our northern home country and therefore require adaptation. Dealing with tropical heat, a harsh mountain climate and biological threats of a scale far beyond that existing at home requires planning, preventive measures and training for every individual soldier. It is not enough to survive but we must also be able to fulfil our mission.



Helicopter evacuation from Camp Warehouse, Kabul

How to Meet the Challenges?

A Finnish military crisis management force is recruited in a manner that differs from the way many other nations accomplish the same. Every soldier, whether he be a regular professional or a reservist, is a volunteer. This method gives the advantage of good personal motivation and it allows complementing the military expertise of the regulars with the special skills and experience that reservists have gained in a civilian profession. A thorough pre-deployment training is given to everyone, regular and reservist alike. This training ranges from brush-up training in military skills to preventive medicine, tactical combat casualty care as well as cultural education.

Terms of employment are another important issue that determine the ability of personnel to cope with challenges in the area of operations. Sufficient pay, feasible length of deployment, satisfactory length and frequency of leaves all serve to build up the ability to face physical and psychological stress. In the past, Finnish peacekeepers have served longer periods of deployment than soldiers of other nations. Periods of twelve months and even longer have

not been uncommon. This would not have been possible without a regular leave system of 1–2-week leaves after every 4–6-week period spent in the area of operations. Insurance coverage in case of illness or injury falls into this category, too. With the increasingly demanding operative tasks, the length of deployment has become shorter. The sufficiency of current insurance coverage has also been questioned.

A soldier needs the tools of his trade just like any other professional. Weapons, communications, vehicles, medical gear and equipment, personal clothing as well as protective gear all have to meet the demands of the task. A worker with good tools is a happy, or at least a satisfied, worker. It has been said that a Finnish peacekeeper force is generally over-equipped both in terms of quantity and quality. The quality and quantity of peacekeepers' equipment, however, are determined by careful cost-benefit analysis. If changes are introduced, the margin of safety must be re-evaluated very carefully.

Even if everyday life in a military outfit may be cramped, tiring, monotonous as well as dangerous, there are compensations. Group spirit and comradeship carry you a long way. This is not limited to your own unit and national contingent. It extends to other nationalities, especially to those foreign soldiers who you live with and work with.

Accommodation arrangements, including toilets and washrooms, are an elementary but crucial component in the welfare of a soldier. The space where his bunk is is the closest thing to home during the mission. There are differences in these arrangements depending on the operation, the duration of a mission, local circumstances and logistics. Obviously, the goal is to find the best solution for everybody. For a Finnish soldier things start to look good when the first camp sauna has been completed and is operational.

Whatever the tasks of the individual soldier are, there is always – and must be – time for relaxation and rest. It is imperative that appropriate room space is allocated for these purposes. Much of the leisure activities are arranged by the soldiers themselves. The contingent chaplain – if the contingent is lucky enough to have one – is generally a part-time welfare officer.

Keeping in touch with family and friends back home is easier than it was just 10–15 years ago. Telephone and internet connections are high on the priority list for this use, even if command and control purposes are priority number one. Sufficiently frequent leaves give the soldier a welcome interruption from the stress and routines of life in the area of operations. They allow the soldier to travel back home and stay up to date with the everyday life of loved ones as well as with practical matters.

Medical support has a wide spectrum of roles in securing the soldiers' ability to work in a strange and hostile environment. These range from preventive medical measures to care for the sick and injured. Continuous training of all soldiers in tactical combat casualty care is the responsibility of the medical personnel. This goes on throughout the deployment and complements the essentials learned in pre-deployment training.

Medical staff co-operates with the chaplain and the social welfare officer – if there happens to be one – in providing the troops with psychosocial support. This may be anything from debriefing after a critical incident or fatality to counselling in family relations. Much of the

work is taking care of small everyday matters such as sick calls and bureaucratic tasks. The medical service is, however, an important enabler of operations. The senior medical officer serves as the doctor for the contingent as well as the medical advisor to the contingent commander.

The Stress of Everyday Life in the Area of Operations

Even with all the support measures and safety nets described above, the soldier meets the stress in the field – or at sea – in his own personal way and primarily in his own mind as well as his heart.

The perpetual threat may slowly become a trivial everyday matter, part of the routine. It blends with the routines of military life, some of which have been instituted for protection against danger. Occasionally the basis of these routines becomes obscure and they are followed only because they are routines. Or even worse, alertness decreases and routines are neglected altogether.

In these circumstances it is imperative to take care of the soldier next to you. It also works the other way around: when you need help, you can count on him to help you in return. Practical experience suggests that even if it is necessary for the military organization to provide psychosocial support, the most important support is that given by the fellow soldier. I am convinced that the personal skills and mindset necessary to give this “buddy support” can be trained. Fortunately this type of training has been added to the training programme within the past few years.

Every group of soldiers forms its own unique psychodynamics. Occasionally, if other measures fail, the leader must resort to difficult personnel decisions in order to accomplish a favourable working atmosphere. The ideal is not always reached, but satisfactory is good enough. And then there are the instances where everybody and everything locks in place in an apparently effortless manner and delightfully impressive operational results are reached.

It is a demanding task to describe to an outsider the atmosphere prevailing at a safe house in Jowzjan province, Afghanistan, after a long-range patrol. The team lounges around after showers, finally with clean clothes on, stomachs full of proper food, chatting leisurely. The desert waits for them again tomorrow. But right now it's time for an episode of “the Band of Brothers”.

The European Union Battlegroup (EUBG) Concept and the Nordic Battlegroup 2011 (NBG11)

Markku Laine

Background

The initial idea for the EU and Nordic Battlegroups (BGs) was born at the European Council Summit on 10–11 December 1999 in Helsinki. During the Summit, the Council produced the *Headline Goal 2003* and specified the need for a rapid response capability that members should provide in small forces at high readiness. The idea was reiterated on 4 February 2003 in Le Touquet, where the need to improve rapid response capabilities was highlighted as a priority, "including initial deployment of land, sea and air forces within 5–10 days". This was again noted as essential in the *Headline Goal 2010*.

Operation Artemis in 2003 tested the EU rapid reaction capability and deployment of forces in a short timeframe – with the EU going from *Crisis Management Concept* to operation launch in just three weeks, then taking another 20 days for substantial deployment. The operation's success provided a template for future rapid response deployments allowing the idea to be considered more practically. The following Franco-British Summit in November that year stated that, building on the experience of the operation, the EU should be able and willing to deploy forces within 15 days in response to a UN request. It specifically called for "battle-group sized forces, each around 1,500 troops, offered by a single nation or through a multinational or framework nation force package".¹

Scenarios

A scenario is the political and military context within which it is envisioned that an EUBG might be deployed. NBG11 used four of the five scenarios described in the FINABEL report as guidance for potential missions and tasks. The fifth scenario; *stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice* was discounted on the recommendation of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) as being an unrealistic task for an EUBG. The Concepts and SOPs were developed within the framework provided by the FINABEL studies' four scenarios, which are;

Conflict Prevention; in this scenario an EUBG may be employed to take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation or resumption of conflict. This is most likely to be as a show of the UN's and EU's intention to engage in the area rather than as a force capable of tackling the root cause of the tension.

¹ Requirement Specifications NBG11

Separation of Parties by Force; are operations carried out to reinforce and maintain or rebuild peace between belligerent parties not all of whom consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities.

Evacuation Operations; are designed to rescue and evacuate non-combatants who are under threat of violence in a foreign country to a place of safety.

Humanitarian Assistance; is where NBG11 could provide security as well as participating in the delivery of humanitarian aid and specialist engineering support as part of a co-ordinated operation to assist in areas of humanitarian crisis or natural disaster.²

Tasks

The Battlegroups are intended to be deployed on the ground within 5–10 days of approval by the Council. They must be sustainable for at least 30 days, which could be extended to 120 days, if resupplied.

The Battlegroups are designed to deal with tasks relating to the Common Security and Defence Policy, namely the Petersberg tasks (military tasks of a humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking nature).

Planners claim that the Battlegroups have enough range to deal with all these tasks, although such tasks ought to be limited in "size and intensity" due to the small size of the Battlegroups. Such missions may include conflict prevention, evacuation, aid delivery or initial stabilisation. In general these would fall into three categories; brief support of existing troops, rapid deployment preparing the ground for larger forces or small scale rapid response missions.

Nordic Battlegroup 11 (NBG11)

"Ad omnia paratus" ("Prepared for anything")

The European Union (EU) has two Battlegroups constantly on standby, ready to be deployed in crisis areas virtually anywhere in the world. During the first half of 2011 the Nordic Battlegroup 11 (NBG11) was one of these.

The Nordic Battlegroup 11 (NBG11) was an EU Battlegroup whose troop contributing nations (TCNs) were Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Norway and Sweden. Sweden was the Framework Nation (FN). If deployed, Croatia would have been a sixth TCN by bilateral agreement with Sweden. The NBG consisted of something in excess of 2,000 soldiers from five countries. Sweden had the lead responsibility for the Nordic Battlegroup and the Force Commander was Swedish Brigadier General Stefan Andersson. This was the second time that Sweden had been responsible for one of the EU's Battlegroups, the last occasion being

² Requirement Specifications NBG11

during the first six months of 2008. Sweden contributed around 1,600 soldiers to NBG 2011.³

The NBG and other Battlegroups form one of a number of important instruments that make up the EU's crisis management capability and they can be deployed rapidly when needed. The Battlegroups must be capable of participating in the EU's crisis management operations, including the initial, and often most dangerous, entry phase. They must be capable of stand-alone operation for a limited period across the whole of the conflict spectrum ranging from support of humanitarian aid to armed combat. A Battlegroup must be capable of being deployed and in place ready for action in the conflict area within ten days of a decision by the EU to mount the mission. Force endurance without resupply has been set at 30 days, but this must be extendable to a period of up to 120 days.

Nordic Battlegroup 11 (NBG11) Order of Battle (ORBAT)

The NBG 11 Order of Battle (ORBAT) described an operational multinational joint force consisting of just over 2,200 troops from six different countries. Sweden as framework nation contributed roughly 1,650 troops, Finland provided 200 troops, Norway 150, Ireland 140, Estonia 50 and Croatia approximately 30 troops.

NBG ORBAT has been the governing document for the organisation of the NBG. It has been revised several times.

From the beginning, the NBG 11 consisted of troop contributing nations from Sweden, Finland, Norway, Ireland and Estonia. Croatia joined the NBG 11 in late autumn 2010 to increase air medevac capability. The NBG 11 has, in line with the EUBG concept, been a small force with associated advantages and disadvantages.

³ Requirement Specifications NBG11

NBG 11 consisted of four larger sub units; Core Battalion (Core Bn) including Engineer Company, ISTAR, Logistic Bn and Expeditionary Air Wing (EAW). In addition to these there are smaller sub units in the force; a Multinational Military Police unit (MNMP), a CBRN unit, a Local Air Picture unit (LAP), a Geographical Support unit (GEO) and a Multinational Civil Military Cooperation unit (CIMIC).⁴




Figure 1. Nordic Battlegroup (NBG11) the Order of Battle

In January 2009 a core of staff officers commenced planning for the alert period, which for the NBG 2011 was between 1 January and 30 June 2011. On 31 August 2009 the "Key Nucleus" of the Force Headquarters arrived in Enköping in order to establish a functional staff. During the autumn of 2009 the main focus was education and internal processes. The spring of 2010 was used for planning, case study and training in the form of the Combined Joint Staff Exercise (CJSE 10). The autumn of 2010 consisted of an intense exercise period with exercises Illuminated Summer 10, Initial Effort 10 and Joint Action 10. As of 1 January 2011, the Nordic Battlegroup was on standby to be deployed within 10 days. All personnel were meant to be at their operating bases within 48 hours after the decision to launch an operation was taken.

The unit used a modular organisation with a mechanised infantry battalion at its core. During NBG 2011 this was the 192nd Rapid Reaction Battalion, which was organised around the regiment *Norrbottnens regemente* (I19). During 2011, a framework exists for the integration of additional resources. These resources range from artillery, air defence, and intelligence to additional logistical support. Additional support in the form of air, naval and special forces assets will be allocated based on the operational tasks that the unit is expected to perform.⁵

⁴ Requirement Specifications NBG11

⁵ Requirement Specifications NBG11

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Building Capabilities for Troops in Crisis Management – Nordic Battlegroup 2011 FINCOY

Tommi Sikanen

Introduction

This article is about the training experiences of the Finnish Infantry Company that belonged to the Nordic European Union Battlegroup during 2010–2011, the so-called Nordic Battlegroup, or NBG11. The lead nation of this battlegroup was Sweden. The goal of the training was to achieve a company capable of performing a variety of crisis management tasks in an otherwise Swedish battalion by the time the six-month standby period would start on 1 January 2011. The cornerstones of success in this task were a thorough recruitment process, careful and flexible planning and the commitment of all personnel to the task at hand. Although the company will never work in its original composition again after the standby period, the Finnish peacekeeping reserve has gained many highly-trained and capable individuals.

Background

The Finnish Nordic Battlegroup 2011 (NBG11) contingent consisted of 200 soldiers and was trained under the Finnish Navy in the Nyland Brigade in Raasepori during 2010 and spring 2011. The spearhead of the contingent was an Infantry Company (FINCOY) of 145 soldiers. The other parts of the contingent were a National Support Element (NSE) and a few smaller groups for special tasks, such as a Civil-Military Co-operation Group (CIMIC). In the NBG structure, FINCOY was part of an otherwise completely Swedish Core Battalion (COREBN). This battalion was the striking force of the NBG11.

Approximately 10% of FINCOY's personnel were professional officers or NCOs that were recruited from within the Finnish Defence Forces. They applied, were interviewed by the CO and then chosen in co-operation with the Navy Command's Personnel Division. It is noteworthy that the chosen professional soldiers were from both the Army and the Navy, and from seven different brigades/equiv. The rest of the personnel were recruited from the reserve so that the positions were advertised on the Internet. Approximately 450 persons applied for the 130 FINCOY openings. These were narrowed down using various tests over two days in the Nyland Brigade. The tests included an English language test, psychological tests, physical tests, medical tests and interviews. The result of this traditional recruiting process was a group of soldiers with very different backgrounds. The average age was 27 and approximately 50% had previous experience from peacekeeping operations. They started their service depending on their task during spring 2010, at the latest on 28 June 2010.

Planning and Preparing the Training

The planning of the training cycle had started already in 2009 with the Navy Command project officer drafting a general plan to ensure that training areas and other critical resources could be booked. In January 2010, the key personnel of FINCOY started their service and the planning of details. The defining factors of the training were soon identified to be:

- 1) EUBG concept in general and the possible tasks of the battlegroup
- 2) COREBN organisation and the other units in it
- 3) COREBN modus operandi in and out
- 4) The organisation and designated material of FINCOY
- 5) The lessons identified and learned from operations (mainly KFOR and ISAF)
- 6) Resource factors
- 7) The professional skills and background of those chosen for the NBG.

Key personnel defined the desired endstate for different time periods. This was done by repeatedly reviewing the list displayed above with a calendar in hand. It was quickly recognized that the actual training of some abilities would have to be deferred to the actual standby period. An additional, backup training plan was made, mainly for December 2010, in the eventuality that the NBG11 would be deployed immediately in January 2011. The training needs of the key personnel were also identified.

The training period was divided into six phases:

- 1) Basic combat training for everybody
- 2) Specialized training
- 3) Crisis management training
- 4) Company training
- 5) International exercises in Sweden
- 6) Recovery and packing (If necessary, final training)

The next phase in planning was to develop the general plans into detailed training plans and reserve the necessary resources. This work took the best part of spring 2010 with the recruiting process.

Key personnel received their training during an intensive two weeks in April 2010. This was important so that all the leaders would know all the equipment and have a uniformed understanding of the details before the actual training of troops.

The Training Period 7/2010 – 12/2010

Basic combat training took approximately two months. The purpose of this phase was to train all personnel to use their equipment and to build the foundations of functional squads. This required numerous hours of basic combat training on a soldier, fire and manoeuvre team, patrol and finally squad level. KASI simulators were used in one exercise and the squads were tested in a live fire exercise.

During the specialized training phase the infantry platoons moved to train the platoon's basic tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). The Command Platoon and Service Support Platoon concentrated on their own tasks without forgetting combat training (i.e. force protection during operations).

Crisis management training was conducted in the Pori Brigade and included basic framework task training for all personnel as well as training in crowd and riot control for the infantry platoons. During this phase the basic combat skills were adapted to different scenarios. The hallmark of traditional Finnish peacekeeping, a friendly and open approach, was also trained.

The company training phase was very short because of the demands of basic training and the timetable of the international exercises in Sweden. For this reason the main company training would be done in Sweden and only the basic procedures training in Finland.

The international training phase consisted of three two-week exercises of which the first was a coy exercise in a loose battalion frame. The second was a battalion live exercise and the third was a NBG live exercise. These extremely well prepared and executed exercises gave FINCOY the opportunity to prepare on all levels for all possible NBG tasks. After returning from Sweden the personnel concentrated on recovery from the both physically and mentally very demanding training period and prepared the materiel for the standby period.



Training taking control of a harbour (Photo: Jari Tenhunen)

The Standby Period 1/2011 – 06/2011

As mentioned earlier, training had to be continued when the standby period started. Some longer courses (i.e. EOD-2), which had not been possible before, were organized. In addition FINCOYs modified Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC), the ones used in the possible operation, arrived in December, which caused a demand for training. The standby period was divided into four phases:

- 1) The course phase where new capabilities were acquired and integrated into TTPs
- 2) The repetition and development phase where the FINCOY's capabilities were developed further
- 3) The national defence phase where FINCOY was trained to better serve the purposes of national defence on a coastal jaeger course. This phase was organized because all Finnish soldiers have a wartime task and in the conscription system all training must also serve this end. This ensured the capabilities of this unit were put to use in the best way possible from a national defence point of view. The scenarios of this phase were not crisis management but all-out war.
- 4) The dismantling phase

The development of soldiers' physical performance capabilities was a priority throughout the standby period. For each week that FINCOY spent in barracks, at least six hours of working time were designated for physical training. This was seen as fundamental because of the lessons identified from the physically very demanding training phase and of the demands of the possible areas of operation.

In the end...

Planning and executing training for a company of this kind was an extremely challenging task, as it demanded great flexibility from key personnel. First and foremost the will, the motivation and the capability of the soldiers to learn and develop was remarkable. This caused the training plan "to live" all the time in a positive way. The negative aspect was the fact that FINCOY's materiel did not arrive early but almost one article at a time during the whole training period and even partly during the standby period. This was problematic in terms of training because some things could not be taught to the troops in an ascending and logical way. In addition, even though we initially thought we would have plenty of time, time was always a critical resource. If you really want to develop a capability to a level where it can be deemed as mastered, it must be rehearsed dozens of times in dozens of different scenarios and settings. And a single soldier must have done his or her moves hundreds and even thousands of times.

The training as a whole was very intensive and concentrated on the most difficult situations. The philosophy behind this was that when the going gets tough, the only way to survive is to be able to conduct combat as troops. This is the lesson identified from ISAF. And that must be rehearsed time and time again. The possible scenarios and tasks of the EU battlegroups also demanded hard performance capabilities. This is not at odds with the traditional strengths of Finnish peacekeepers, the social intelligence we have as individuals. This was proven by this unit.

NBG11 FINCOY became an extremely capable unit for all possible tasks: from national defence through soft peacekeeping tasks to difficult combat tasks in a difficult crisis management setting. The soldiers will be a great asset to the Finnish peacekeeping reserve even though the best capability, a combat-ready unit, was lost when the company was disbanded at the end of the standby period. All in all, the NBG11 experience was very valuable because this was the first time in Finland since the war when a professional Infantry company was trained in traditional infantry tasks. The most valuable lesson identified for the personnel involved was that traditional combat training and crisis management training are not two separate things but that they actually support one another.

Special Operations Force – Professional Soldiers as part of the EU's Battlegroup

Ali Mättölä and Janne Jaakkola

Finland contributed a contingent to the Dutch-led EU Battlegroup (NLBG) during the first half of the 2011 standby period. Contrary to how Finland usually participates in a EU Battlegroup, the Finnish contingent in the NLBG was composed mainly of professional soldiers. This contingent, the Special Operations Force Task Group (SOTG), had gone through special operations training and was specifically designed to perform special operations assignments. Finland also manned several positions in the battlegroup's multinational Force HQ: that of ACOS J5, the deputy chief of the Intelligence Division, and that of the officer in charge of the special forces' operations in the Operations room.

Special Operations Force Task Group, SOTG

The Utti Jaeger Regiment was ordered to form the Finnish contingent for the battlegroup. This was in fact part of a more long-term plan that had begun years earlier to develop a Finnish Special Operations Task Group. The EU battlegroup provided the Utti Jaeger Regiment with the perfect opportunity to develop its special operations capability within a multinational framework. The core of the SOTG was made up of regular personnel from the Utti Jaeger Regiment, which was then complemented with necessary know-how from the FDF's other forces and the reserve. The SOTG can be considered as a tailor-made operational element with a functional organisation and manning.

The SOTG organisation included a commander and HQ, a Forward Operation Base element, national support elements and a special jaeger unit. The total strength of the force was 110 soldiers of which over half were regular personnel from the Utti Jaeger Regiment.

The organisation was divided into three lines of operation: operational, tactical and support. The Operations Section was in charge of executing and planning the missions and tasks given to the Task Group, and of managing interoperability between the different components of the battlegroup. The Tactical Section was in charge of implementing tactical tasks. The Support Section ensured the requisites for command and support were in place and it also managed maintenance and support.

Preparations for the EU Battlegroup 2011 standby period actually began in late summer 2008. As part of this preparation, and in order to gain some experience, the Task Group's core personnel took part in ISAF's third line support effort in the run-up to the Afghan elections in spring 2009. The operation gave valuable insight into how to develop equipment and training, and it proved that groundwork conducted over many years is worth the effort.

The NLBG experience can be divided into four approximate phases:

- Planning 2008 – March 2010
- Training of core personnel 1 April – 18 July 2010
- Training 19 July – 31 December 2010
- Standby period, incl. support and dismantling, 1 January – 30 June 2011

The Task Group's main components became part of the battlegroup in July 2010. Training took place for the most part in autumn 2010. Its main objective was to attain interoperability with the Dutch and Germans. During the standby period, the Utti Jaeger Regiment's task was to maintain readiness to take part in an EU crisis management operation as part of the Dutch-led NLBG11.

Battlegroup

The Battlegroup's Force HQ was mainly composed of the Dutch 13 Mechanised Brigade's HQ. The core battalion was a Dutch air assault brigade. Germany was the Framework Nation, i.e. it was responsible for overall support and logistics.

Special operations capabilities are not usually directly placed in a tactical-level unit (battlegroup). Rather, they operate as support elements on an operational level as air force and naval units do. From this point of view, one of the shortfalls with the NLBG11 arrangements in terms of special forces' operations was the lack of an operational level of special operations command. In practice this meant that operational level planning tasks were divided between the FHQ and the SOTG. Despite this shortfall, there were advantages to this arrangement too: having the SOTG as part of a BG made its activities more visible, meaning they were able to demonstrate their capacities.

The European Rhino 1 exercise conducted in September-October 2010 focused heavily on cooperation and interoperability between the BG's different elements and nationalities. For the SOTG this meant completing joint tasks with the BG's conventional troops where interoperability was taken to the lowest level possible – which is not how SOFs usually operate. This was seen as essential to ensure interoperability in the battlegroup as a whole.



Training in the Netherlands (Photo: Elina Jääskeläinen)

Tasks in the Battlegroup

The SOTG's tasks can be roughly divided into three categories. Special Reconnaissance (SR) can involve surveying and recceing targets and areas, as intelligence gathered by technical means can never give all the necessary information. An impression and evaluation of a situation in a target area are one of the most valuable capabilities special forces have to offer. The intelligence generated by special forces in crisis management operations is often of a critical nature, especially when operating in the zones of influence of rebels and terrorist groups.

Direct Action (DA) missions are short attacks conducted against a designated target or about influencing the impact of fire power. Special forces always strive to avoid engagement. The force will always aim to be in a position where it can determine the time and place for action. In a crisis management operation such missions can be, for e.g., the search and capture of key rebel figures.

Military Assistance (MA) missions are probably the least known about. Owing to their special training and equipment, special forces are capable of independent action, have a light footprint and have the ability to operate in challenging circumstances. This means they can be used, for e.g., to keep in contact with local authorities, leaders and other significant people exerting an influence. One of today's most important capabilities is the ability to engage in partnering, which is the ability to train and operate together with the security authorities of the host nation.

On Training and Evaluation

The training given to soldiers could be summarised by the following slogan "Move – Shoot – Communicate – Medicate". Training was planned so that it incorporated experiences from operations between 2006 and 2009 and pointers from foreign special forces. The desired level of the achieved skills, and hence the training, was established through a NATO evaluation.

Capabilities were determined using NATO standardization agreements, as no divergent EU standards were set. Preparing for demanding crisis management missions is about going down to the tactical level, i.e. interoperability, which ameliorates countermeasures and operational efficiency. In the end, what you want to avoid are situations where units working on the same mission do not know or recognise each others procedures or expressions.

The SOTG's capability demands are made up of five distinct capabilities.

- Deployment creates the precondition for projecting troops to the area of operation. Without exception, this takes place in cooperation with other troops being deployed to the operation.
- Effective engagement in the area of operation is a prerequisite for fulfilling the mission.
- Leadership includes the requirements for leading the unit.
- Support defines the operational and tactical level support, supporting and support requirements.
- Force protection includes active troop countermeasures and other necessary protective measures.

The SOTG's interoperability was evaluated in three phases. The functionality of medical care and the use of helicopters was inspected during a national exercise in Finland. Another evaluation was conducted in connection with the BG's main exercise in Holland. It consisted of 600 questions and the final report was 177 pages long. The evaluation was monitored by NATO country observers.

A group of seven evaluators from the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) conducted a Special Operations' Evaluation of the SOTG in March 2011. This particular SOTG was the first special operations unit to be evaluated using NATO's Special Operations Evaluation system.

The evaluation process was heavily tied to SOTG's capability-building. The evaluation was connected to the SOTG's participation in the NLBG11, which saved a lot of money. This standby unit was evaluated in connection with the regular training dispensed during the standby period. This is how it should be done in future, too. Although the evaluation was specifically linked to multinational crisis management, the unit being evaluated is also a wartime unit that can be deployed for all FDF tasks.



Training capturing a high value target (Photo: Elina Jääskeläinen)

OPERATION HELIOS Set the Standard

The culmination of the standby period was standby exercise 2, Operation HELIOS. The exercise was conducted as a live fire exercise in the Pahkajärvi area. This demanding rescue and evacuation operation was an exercise in having special operations, helicopters, mechanised troops (CV90), reconnaissance and the Air Force (F-18, C295) work as one functional unit. The actual functional execution of the exercise was only the tip of the iceberg, as the prerequisites for a successful exercise had already been created in the months running up to the exercise. It took nearly five months just to form the 190-strong unit of soldiers, acquire the necessary external SOF-support and integrate the unit internally.

Operation HELIOS was the culmination of three years of work to acquire a Finnish unit capable of any assignment that is conform to Western standards. The project began in early 2008 upon the decision of the then commanding officer of the regiment. The decisions and priorities that were taken between 2008 and 2010 were crucial to achieving this ultimate goal.

Conclusion

The Finnish Defence Forces special operations system has developed to a level where its capabilities can be evaluated using the same capability requirements and standards that are used to evaluate NATO's own special operation forces. The Utti Jaeger Regiment's units can operate in national and multinational joint operation environments and carry out special operation reconnaissance, combat and support tasks in cooperation with other supportive elements.

The efficiency or inefficiency of a special operations force depends on how well the overall effort is managed. A special force's capability is often interpreted as something taking place on a tactical level, as a sum of the knowledge of an individual and group. The part played by long-term guidance and support is hardly ever acknowledged. What also stay relatively hidden from the public eye are the years of hard work put into C4 and support systems - the very elements that success depends on a tactical level. The unit itself is not usually capable of executing a special operation; it needs a considerable amount of support. The conventional ratio is 1 to 2 meaning that for every soldier in the field there are two people in headquarters or support duties. Building up a capability takes years of dedicated effort.

A personnel of a high calibre is Finland's special operation's biggest asset. In future we must ensure that the people that are recruited are as capable, that they want to stay on and that their will to serve does not wane. It is probable that the considerable pressure set on armed forces will be felt particularly by the special operations forces and helicopters, mainly because of the worsening financial situation. Nevertheless, the demands that are set for such operations prove at the same time that there is a need for such capabilities. This is something that absolutely must be taken into account when developing the Finnish special operations. When it comes down to it, it is a question of fulfilling one the FDF's three main tasks, namely military crisis management.

In a project such as the battlegroup, the Utti Jaeger Regiment will have gained valuable lessons learned that it can share with the entire regiment. Although the battlegroup was never deployed, the standby period was by no means a waste of time: it was an impetus for many significant undertakings and projects.

* * * * *

The following are some of the development projects that were carried out during the SOTG period:

Building and development of the C4 system.

- Basic training for Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC)
- Introduction of NH90 helicopters in all SOF mission types, incl. FASTROPE, Helo Casting and relevant safety instructions.
- Personnel recovery (PR) training and how to carry out procedures in practice, incl. air force combat search and rescue (CSAR) support.
- Integration of SOF and support units' operations, incl. ground/air force, on an SOTG level.
- Technical Exploitation Operations
- Comprehensive Soldier Fitness: a training programme to enhance the spiritual strength of SOF soldiers.
- Training of crisis and support personnel in debriefing and defusing.
- The adoption of the Lessons Identified & Lessons Learned processes in the planning and leadership activities of a task group-level unit.
- Training in the use of unit-specific support weapons for SOFs (incl. NLAW and 81 mm mortars).
- CBRN
- Training in communication and media relations

Commentary – the Future Direction of Finnish Military Crisis Management

Oskari Eronen, Jari Mustonen and Markus Peltola

Over half a century after our first troop contribution to international peacekeeping, military crisis management can still be a hard sell in Finland. Finnish security and defence policy clearly defines national defence as the number one priority for the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF),¹ international peace support operations are becoming both more expensive and more dangerous for the personnel, and prospective cuts to the defence budget are not helping. While few people would question the utility of Finland's contribution to and participation in military crisis management altogether, it is admittedly not always clear what the Finnish contribution actually achieves.

We may argue that the measuring or assessing of the effectiveness of the Finnish contribution to military crisis management has long been neglected. The lack of a systematic framework for assessing the impacts of Finland's military contribution makes it difficult not only to validate the results achieved but also to develop and improve its ways and means. This is precisely why the experiences gathered in the articles of the present volume are so important: they provide insights into how the people involved see the role and value of military crisis management.

This commentary has two purposes. Firstly, it addresses the issue of the effectiveness of the Finnish contribution to military crisis management by examining the other articles in this volume from the perspective of impacts, asking what has been achieved. Secondly, likewise based on the other articles in this volume, it seeks to identify some of the key future challenges for Finland's continued participation in military crisis management.

An Emerging Framework for Assessing Effectiveness

While it is fair to say that assessing the effectiveness of crisis management has to date gained little attention from politicians, policymakers and people actually involved in crisis management, there are signs of positive development. A good example is the drafting by an inter-ministry working group of a framework for assessing effectiveness.

This framework addresses the issue of effectiveness in two dimensions. The first dimension is national vs. international impacts. National impacts are consequences that directly affect Finland – her objectives, values, interests, and so on. International impacts affect actors other than Finland: the international community, other countries, or the theatre of operations. The second dimension is the scope of the impacts. A distinction is made between political-strategic impacts on the one hand and operational impacts on the other.

¹ For instance in *Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2009*, p. 91.

The above yields a fourfold matrix of impacts, as shown in Figure 1. While this is admittedly rather a simplistic way of looking at the framework, it nevertheless provides a tool for recognising the diversity of impacts – and of potential goals – in crisis management. The interesting question for our purposes is to see how the articles in the present volume describe the impacts of Finnish participation in military crisis management.




Figure 1. Dimensions of the impacts of crisis management

EUNAVFOR Atalanta

The article by Mika Raunu discussing Finnish participation in the EUNAVFOR Atalanta operation touches on the issue of effectiveness on many levels. As he points out, the operation gained success in protecting the delivery of humanitarian aid to the region and assisted and protected the civilian personnel on the vessels in the area of operations, thus contributing to the success of the mission. The Finnish participation can therefore be said to have had a direct international operational impact.

Raunu notes that participation in the operation was viewed favourably in both the national and the international media, illustrating Finland's willingness to assume responsibility in international operations. Raunu further mentions the positive impact that assisting the Korean fishing vessel had on relations between Finland and Korea. He indicates that by contributing to the security of shipping lanes Finland was also protecting her own economic interests. All these can be considered national political or strategic impacts. From the national perspective, the successful completion of tasks assigned to the Finnish vessel is also a positive outcome.

Participation in this operation improved the Finnish Navy's ability to conduct international maritime operations and yielded valuable practical experience for the development of national capabilities as well, thus having an operational national impact in Finland.

In view of the above, we may estimate the Finnish participation in EUNAVFOR Atalanta to have had a positive impact. However, its impact on the prevailing social instability and lack of rule of law in Somalia and the region – the root cause of the piracy – has been limited. The operation may well have been successful in executing its rather narrow mandate, but as the author points out, the magnitude of the overall problem requires a comprehensive approach that the international community has not yet adopted. Without such an approach, the results achieved by the mission and Finland's contribution to it may be short-lived.

Building Readiness – Benefits of Participating in the EUBGs

Three of the articles (Jaakkola & Mättölä; Laine; Sikanen) address the development of national capabilities for contributing to the EU Battle Groups. Even if the Battle Groups were never deployed in the field, it is useful to look at the impact of capability development related to EUBG participation.

Sikanen focuses on the development of a force formed of reservists and professional army personnel for the Nordic Battle Group. As the principal impacts of this effort he mentions valuable lessons in recruiting, training and preparing a unit, which will be beneficial for future exercises and training at the national level. The impacts of NBG involvement will thus be mainly manifested in national operations: recruiting and training a military unit for the purpose of participating in operations abroad supports both the national defence task of the FDF and its contributing to international operations. However, the fact that the unit was never actually deployed and was disbanded as soon as it attained operational capability naturally diminished the impact of EUBG participation, especially from the perspective of sustainability and effective use of resources.

Jaakkola and Mättölä discuss the development of the Special Operations Task Force consisting mainly of professional army personnel. Unlike in Sikanen's account on the NBG, Jaakkola and Mättölä see the continuity of SOF capability developed during the EUBG build-up as its key strength. The unit developed can continue to be used in the future, both in international operations and in national defence tasks. The link between the two responsibilities of the Defence Forces – national defence and international military crisis management – improves the effectiveness of such activities. As earlier experiences have shown, creating a capability based on the current needs of the operations involves a considerable risk that this capability will never be used, thus undermining its impact. In the Finnish defence policy context, the EUBG experience also highlights the significance of what is known as the 'one-track policy': if capabilities are developed only for international operations, there is always the risk that the political decision to deploy them will never be made.

We may also argue that even if the EUBGs were never deployed, the mere fact of their existence serves to strengthen the international military position of the EU. Therefore Finland's participation in the Battle Groups supports the key foreign and security policy goal of strengthening the Union.

The Value of OMLT in Afghanistan

The article by Leino concerning OMLT activity in Afghanistan discusses the assessment of effectiveness at the political and strategic levels. The contribution of the OMLT mentors to the Afghan National Army has resulted in “a series of small victories”, as Leino puts it. The Finnish mentors have been an integral part of the international efforts to develop native Afghan security capacity, with a direct operational impact. This supports the strategic priorities of both Finland and the international community. Leino further notes that OMLT participation has introduced Finland into the military community of the major Western armies. However, the effectiveness of actors from a single nationality as part of a larger international support effort cannot be easily measured; this must be done in the context of an overall assessment of the impacts of the action. OMLT is of only limited value for national defence, its domestic impact consisting mainly of improving the personal skills of the individuals involved.

Summary

Looking at the articles in this volume from the perspective of effectiveness, it becomes clear that Finnish participation in international military crisis management has many different impacts: improving Finland’s image abroad; promoting national economic interests; strengthening national defence capability for instance by improving personnel expertise; and contributing to the stability of hotspots around the globe.

Every so often, especially in public discourse, it is explained that the rationale and motivation behind Finnish participation in crisis management operations is the gaining of political prestige and the bearing of our responsibility as a member of the international community, as well as the making of a contribution in the target country. While these continue to be valid considerations, the articles referred to above seem to indicate that more attention should be paid to impacts on the national level and with respect to our national capabilities. Obviously, through contributing to international crisis management operations the Defence Forces gain valuable lessons and experiences for developing our national defence – which is its primary task. The links between international operations and the development of national capabilities should be explored in more detail, also in public debate, in order to make it quite clear what the rationale behind our participating in these operations really is. However, whenever such a claim for increased operational effectiveness is made, it should also be assessed to what extent and how this goal is fulfilled. Recognising this would contribute to the public debate on the motivation for our participation in military operations abroad and facilitate the planning of our contribution so as to take the angle of developing national capabilities into account.

Emerging Requirements

The idea of assessing effectiveness has very much to do with improving the ways in which Finland contributes to military crisis management. It is impossible to summarise adequately in one brief article the change that has happened with regard to peace operations during the last 20 years.² Here, based on articles in the present volume, we wish to raise a few topics that are not new on the international scene of crisis management but which have only lately gained traction with regard to Finland's participation in military operations.

Rapid Reaction and Effectiveness of Capability Build-Up

Rapid reaction became one of the key concepts of the past decade, a development to which the collection of articles and themes in the present volume also testify. After the painful experiences in the Western Balkans in the 1990s, the EU and NATO have spent enormous amounts of time and resources in building capacity to respond rapidly and in increasing the mobility and geographical reach of the forces of their respective Member States. This has obviously happened not just because of the need for rapid reaction capabilities in crisis management but also because of the readjustment of their defence to the realities of the post-Cold War era, an effort known as transformation. Since the Helsinki Declaration in 1999, the EU has been developing a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), involving the building of EU Battle Groups (BGs). Similarly, NATO has established the NATO Response Force (NRF).

The original goals for these arrangements were exceptionally ambitious in both scope and scale. In reality, rapid reaction arrangements have for the most part remained unused due to a lack of political will. To this day, the world has not yet witnessed a conflict 'suitable' for the deployment of the EU Battle Groups, causing increased frustration brought on by self-imposed expectations.

A critical requirement for rapid response is timing, not only of entry but also of exit. How can an intervention be limited to an initial phase of stabilisation, preventing the participants from being sucked into longer-term reconstruction and peacebuilding by military means? As Laine reminds in his article on planning, it is unrealistic for BGs to undertake the latter tasks. The scenario of becoming trapped in the theatre of operations involves the risk of the EU being pressured to send in more resources and establish a more permanent presence.

It is noteworthy that while armed forces in the West have eagerly been building up their rapid-reaction capabilities and mobility, over the past 15 years or so most of the tasks they have undertaken have led to a prolonged presence in conflict zones. Some of these locations are easier to cope with and have even been turned into 'the southernmost boot camps' of the armed forces involved (Bosnia, Kosovo), whereas others call for continuous adjustment to an ever-changing situation on the ground and political commitment to endure public pressure at home (Afghanistan). Perhaps, indeed, what is most sorely needed in crisis management is stamina, not quick responses.

² Previous volumes in the FINCENT Publication Series (1–3) have explored in more detail some of the key features of this paradigm shift: a need for comprehensiveness, cultural complexity in the operational environment and security sector reform.

If, as Laakkonen suggests in his article, the future has only an increasingly demanding strategic, operational and logistical environment in store for crisis management efforts, how feasible is the Euro-Atlantic rapid reaction concept, including the BGs and the NRF, considering its track record? EU military structures and Member States have introduced the notion of 'enhancing the usability of BGs', concentrating on fine-tuning the operational and financial aspects of the exercise. But strengthening the ability to intervene hardly compensates for the lack of political will to intervene, which begs the question of whether resources are being used effectively.

From the domestic perspective, Finland could make the case that it is in her interest to seek the maximum benefit from this international cooperation for the development of national defence. To truly attain this objective, however, would require profound changes to the way the FDF are formed and a heightened appreciation of the connection between tasks 1 and 3 of the FDF (national defence; participation in international crisis management). The case of Nordic Battle Group (NBG) illustrates the dilemma well: development of a capability takes time in planning and exercising, but once the target level is reached, the unit is disbanded as the readiness period expires. There is an upside and a downside to the conscription system.

Special Operations Forces

On a positive note, the development of Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) shows how the national and international tracks can be synchronised for mutual benefit. The SOTG article by Jaakkola and Mättölä describes carefully planned steps over a period of three years leading to a fully operational NATO-evaluated Special Operations Forces (SOF) unit, which will be maintained as a permanent capability administered by the Utti Jaeger Regiment.

Demand for SOF capabilities will increase in the future, not only in NATO operations but also in EU and UN operations. These will involve tasks in reconnaissance, military assistance as well as direct action (i.e. targeted combat operations). As Jaakkola and Mättölä point out, SOFs are particularly suitable for operating on a light footprint in demanding environments.

We may therefore expect that SOFs will be an appealing asset when considering Finnish participation in crisis management. Such operations would also provide the best possible proving ground for further development of the new capabilities. The highest hurdle to overcome may be political misgivings. Indeed, SOF tasks in direct action would be a totally new area for Finland. On the other hand, it should be noted that our (conventional infantry) forces in northern Afghanistan already engage with armed opponents on a regular basis. Firefights can even be predicted with a degree of probability when planning a patrol in certain areas.

Robust Action Needed

Rapid reaction forces and Special Operations Forces in international operations are part of a wider trend of expanding the range of tasks and resources in responding to the evolving nature of conflicts. These developments are sometimes collectively known as 'robust action'. The

term originated in UN peacekeeping, emerging as a catch-all term pertaining to situations where firm action involving the use of force is necessary. The dilemma of robustness is intimately linked to the role of consent in military interventions, i.e. the question of how far an operation can go in coercion without undermining its core mission to ensure peace. In his article on future strategic environments, Laakkonen explores these tensions in a discussion of the relation of consent and compliance and the role of spoilers.

Transnational crime may become a source of friction with regard to robust action, and combating such crime is likely to become an increasingly important common interest and objective in military operations, as Laakkonen points out. Operations of this kind throw up highly complex legal issues, as witnessed in Finland when preparing for the EU Atalanta operation in the Indian Ocean: an entirely new Act had to be enacted simply to allow a Finnish naval vessel to sail under the EU flag for three months.

There are also plenty of challenges on the ground. Protection of the civilian population has emerged as one of the key tasks of peace missions. It is now regularly added to the mandates specified in UN Security Council resolutions, immediately after the traditional duty to establish a safe and secure environment. Protection sounds good and is easy to sell to policymakers and the public, but it is much less clear what this sort of mandate actually means in operational and tactical terms. The UN has initiated efforts to create concepts and provide training to fill this gap, and the EU seems to be following suit. One of the key issues should be the ability to address robustly the horrible reality of sexual and gender-based violence in conflicts.

New capabilities and robust tasks come with a cost, as the examples above demonstrate. Psychosocial support provided by the FDF for individual soldiers and units has improved significantly over the past couple of years. But what about politicians and the public? Are they prepared to accept bad news if the conditions in a crisis management operation get worse rather than better and the action becomes more robust?

New Realities on the Ground Challenge Personnel and Logistics

Salonen and Leino describe present-day realities of military life in the field with seasoned experience and firm judgment. Conditions in the field affect not only individual soldiers and field units but also the command, control and support systems at home. Addressing these concerns requires modifications to be made to planning, training, C2, logistics and supply, and HR management. For instance, every soldier should be trained in cultural awareness, and a unit of such individuals should be leveraged in cultural interoperability efforts with the community in which they are stationed.

As tasks and conditions become more demanding, the importance of recruiting qualified personnel also increases, as Jaakkola and Mättölä point out. Over the past ten years, the percentage of reservists in Finnish contingents deployed has been slowly but steadily decreasing, and the percentage of professional soldiers has correspondingly been increasing.

This is apparent in the operations in Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean, and in the NLBG detachment.

Even though the total number of Finnish military personnel in international operations has declined drastically, the FDF face a shortage of qualified applicants. Finland had considerable difficulties in filling the promised mentoring positions for the Afghan National Army between 2008 and 2010. What is particularly acute is the shortage of women soldiers, who can provide access to the widely neglected potential sources of information in any operation – the local women.

To remedy these problems, the FDF should perhaps reassess its HR management, including recruitment, training and education, salaries and benefits, insurances and support in case of physical or psychological injuries, career paths, and so on. Even more importantly, to maintain the claim that crisis management is a career that can become addictive, the FDF and other sectors of government should reconsider the way crisis management is being publicised to possible recruits and the public at large.

SSR as a Token of Change

A recent proliferation of security sector reform (SSR) activities exemplifies the emergence of new requirements for the military. Either in the course of the peacebuilding cycle or at the very outset of their mandate, operations are tasked with training and mentoring national security forces. The transition from large-scale military operations to supporting roles in SSR and training is clearly a strategic reorientation for Western countries in search of lighter and cheaper means to exert an impact in fragile states and post-conflict settings: we want the 'locals' to take more responsibility.

In fact, the notion of a transition from causes to structural change and of a transformation from outputs of intervention to local ownership lies at the very core of crisis management logic. Häikiö, in his article on learning and training, argues that these processes are the two most important fundamentals in a strategic overhaul of crisis management.

Leino vividly illustrates how multifaceted and demanding the mentoring, advising and training tasks can be and how patient we must be in expecting impacts on the ground. The intensity of such work begs the question of whether a mentor can ever go on holiday. The question may appear amusing but conceals a dilemma faced by persons participating in SSR of activities. From a military perspective, Finland seems well-positioned for the job due to our strong traditions and experience of training in the conscript system; and our officers are indeed renowned for their efficiency, resilience and independent problem solving skills.

The weak spot in Finland's aspirations towards increased SSR participation may lie in our organisational culture, mindsets and group dynamics. Salonen rightly underlines the importance of team spirit and camaraderie to the wellbeing of soldiers in operations far from home. However, the Finnish tradition of tight cohesion within a contingent and supplies brought from home – sauna and sausages being the most popular – run the risk of isolating

Finns from other nationalities and, most importantly, from local nationals. SSR positions are typically spread across a wide area, and forces are divided into small teams with members from several nationalities and professional backgrounds. In many aspects, SSR places the military in conditions similar to those in civilian crisis management.

The Time for Decisions

To conclude, Finland faces tough but unavoidable questions: To what end are we developing crisis management capabilities? Should they be tailored to fairly cost-effective technical assistance and advisory tasks such as SSR and OMLT? Should they be tailored to gathering experience in order to improve our wartime forces? Should they be tailored to tasks calculated to yield the highest visibility and respect in the eyes of other nations? Whatever the answers are, one thing should be stressed: the political decision-makers should provide a clear manifestation of the political will to use the capabilities that have been developed through the hard work in the Army, Navy and the Air Force.

No matter how Finnish crisis management capabilities are to be developed in the future, the issue of effectiveness and the impacts of our contribution must be thoroughly considered in the decision-making process. The need to assess what the most effective use of our very limited resources would be may become a decisive factor when deciding on our participation in crisis management operations. In order to make sure that our limited resources are deployed as effectively as possible, it is imperative to first have a shared understanding of what the desired impact of our crisis management activities is, both nationally and internationally.

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From Lessons Identified Towards Lessons Learned

In every violent crisis there are similarities in the logic of conflict resolution. Still there are not enough similarities to purely leave international response up to existing models. New concepts have to include old systems, but action must increasingly be based on new initiatives. In all countries national expertise has to develop along with international aspirations and hopefully even more rapidly and flexibly. There is a special need for Finnish military participation in every future crisis. However, Finnish expertise cannot be taken for granted forever. Finland has to work hard to be where it should be - at the forefront of handling specialized and difficult military tasks. This requires constant learning from ongoing and past crisis management operations.

Lessons identified become lessons learned only when lessons are understood, adopted and applied in future endeavors. The professionalism of crisis management is best understood when seen as a common and nationwide task and not a matter of individuals. Even so the competence derives from individual expertise and experiences. This publication compiles a collection of the tactical, operational and strategic thoughts of its writers. The writers share their views deriving from operations in the field and at sea. The aim of this publication is to promote an understanding of crisis management in training and future planning.

This publication is the fourth in the Publication Series of the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) and focuses on many aspects of military crisis management; planning, training, co-operation, leadership, mentoring, coping, structures and capability development.

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