Security Sector Reform – Beyond Civil-Military Cooperation

Finnish Defence Forces International Centre

Edited by Tuomas Koskenniemi

Finnish Defence Forces International Centre

FINCENT Publication Series 1:2010

FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES INTERNATIONAL CENTRE
FINCENT PUBLICATION SERIES 1:2010

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM – BEYOND CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

EDITED BY TUOMAS KOSKENNIEMI

FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES INTERNATIONAL CENTRE
TUUSULA 2010

Tuomas Koskenniemi (ed.): Security Sector Reform – Beyond Civil-Military Cooperation
Finnish Defence Forces International Centre
FINCENT Publication Series 1:2010

Cover design: Harri Larinen
Layout: Heidi Paananen/TKKK

ISBN 978–951–25–2133–3
ISBN 978–951–25–2134–0 (PDF)
ISSN 1797–8629

Printed in Finland
Edita Prima Oy
Helsinki
2010

Contents

Preface

Since its emergence in the late 1990s, the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR) has captured an ever-growing interest among academics, policy-makers and experts. The factors driving this debate appear to be twofold. On the one hand, the increasing interconnectedness of world politics at all levels has led states and organisations to pursue solutions that would grasp the complexities of a postmodern environment better than the traditional policies of the past. As it is pointed out in the European Security Strategy, none of the new threats – such as terrorism, state failure and organised crime – is purely military, and all of them tend to spread if neglected.[1] On the other hand, in the face of increasing costs of peace support operations abroad and tightening budgets at home, there is a growing urgency to improve efficiency and coordination. The actors abound: the OECD DAC[2] definition of SSR covers all institutions, groups, organisations and individuals that have a stake in security and justice provision, including defence forces, intelligence and security services, police, justice, border management, customs, ministries, legislative bodies, civil society groups and private sector security services.[3]

The most fundamental lesson identified in the United Nations Secretary General's report on Security Sector Reform is that security is a precondition for sustainable peace, development and human rights.[4] Or as it is stated in the report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy: "there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace."[5] While there may have been good historical reasons for security and development communities to mind their own businesses, the concept of SSR strongly implies that in order to tackle their common challenges, these two fields should learn to work together more closely. After decades of separation, this has not always been easy: even when the actors have managed to work out promising ideas despite their differing mindsets, these have too often been strangled by bureaucratic obstacles.

Nevertheless, this diversity could also be turned into an advantage. The EU in particular is uniquely equipped for providing the tools for successful SSR activities. As the European Security Strategy legitimately boasts, "[w]e have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity".[6] The African Peace Facility of the European Commission is an example of an instrument that combines funding for peace support operations with more long-term capacity-building projects and development of early response mechanisms. At a government level, recent years have witnessed equally interesting attempts to pursue an integrated or whole-of-government approach to security and development.

In Finland, we like to consider cooperation and coordination between various branches of government, civil society, public and private organisations among our traditional strengths. As regards security and development, alongside other Nordic countries we have been

[1] EU 2003.
[2] Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
[3] OECD 2007.
[4] UN 2008.
[5] EU 2008.
[6] EU 2003.

pioneers in focusing on human security and encouraging civil-military cooperation. The Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) has been an active participant in the process: together with the Crisis Management Centre Finland which specialises in training and recruiting experts for civilian crisis management and peace-building missions, the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management was established in 2008. The two previous publications in this FINCENT series discussed the need for comprehensiveness and the importance of paying attention to cultural aspects in modern crisis management.[7]

Nevertheless, when it comes to putting the principles of Security Sector Reform into practice, there is still much to learn – also beyond the national perspective, as an article in this publication by Ms. Michaela Friberg-Storey of the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy demonstrates. Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy, published in November 2009, is a step in right direction, calling for enhanced capacity to support SSR and rule of law development, discussing distinct financing mechanisms for SSR activities and recommending the establishment of a strategic coordination group. It is encouraging to see that these proposals have also been echoed at the political level, most importantly in the Government Report of Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009. What is now needed is an effective operationalisation of the proposals and their determined implementation.

Responsible for training and education in military crisis management, FINCENT is constantly striving to keep abreast of the latest developments in the field. This publication originates in the perception that more and more Finnish experts will be deployed to challenging SSR missions that require a thorough understanding of a wide range of issues dealing with security, development, rule of law and good governance. Among the myriad of slightly differing SSR concepts, guidelines and best practices by the EU, UN, OECD, NATO and other organisations, there is a demand for both basic information on SSR and a deeper reflection on our own capacities and priorities. To address related challenges, FINCENT and CMC Finland will organise a pilot course in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) for civil and military experts this autumn.

Naturally enough for a military institution, the main motivation behind this publication has been to discuss the roles and tasks for soldiers within the broad framework of Security Sector Reform. At the same time, we are perfectly aware that these activities only cover a small part of the whole, and that it might even be questionable to write about SSR without inviting comments from our partners within the Finnish government, international institutions and neighbouring countries. The focus is still firmly on the security side of the security-development nexus, and any attempt at a comprehensible discussion on SSR should obviously include contributions from the justice sector, police, civil society groups or even private sector security actors. Despite its shortcomings, we hope this publication could nevertheless serve its purposes in initiating new ideas for the development of SSR capacity building at different levels and institutions as well as deepening the cooperation between different actors.

Esa Vanonen
Lieutenant Colonel
Commandant FINCENT

[7] Eronen 2008, Ådahl 2009.

References

Eronen, Oskari (ed.). 2008. *Needs of Comprehensiveness: Building Blocks for Finnish Crisis Management*. FINCENT Publication Series 1:2008.

European Union. 2003. *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy.*

European Union. 2008. *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. Providing Security in a Changing World.* S407/08.

OECD. 2007. *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform. Supporting Security and Justice. Paris:* OECD.

United Nations. 2008. *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform. Report of the Secretary-General.*

Ådahl, Susanne (ed.). 2009. *Varying Cultures in Modern Crisis Management*. FINCENT Publication Series 1:2009.

Introduction

Tuomas Koskenniemi

In all businesses, every now and then a new concept captures people's imagination. When organisations become convinced that it will not remain a short-lived fad, new practices and procedures have to be learned. Often this requires new mindsets which some are quicker to adopt than others. Eventually the change becomes a necessary condition as the world will keep changing around us.

Although Security Sector Reform (SSR), originating in the 1990s and gaining prominence in the mid-2000s, is still a rather new concept, it has already proven that it is no fad. In the future, we are likely to see not only an abundance of new SSR missions but also a growing number of more small-scale projects, assessments and evaluations. Accordingly, there will be an increasing demand for SSR experts nationally, at the EU level and in other international organisations.

Compared to many traditional tasks of defence forces, SSR often appears too slippery to land on anyone's desk without a conscious commitment by the leadership and a clear division of responsibilities. Sometimes the reasons may be purely practical: if there is no separate SSR budget, the opportunities for initiative are limited. Participation in small-scale but long-term projects, where the military is but one of the many actors involved, requires a new type of flexibility in planning and resourcing.

The present publication is not intended to be a comprehensive treatise on the principles of Security Sector Reform. Instead, our aim is to put a little flesh on the three letters by showing what SSR can and cannot be, what are its greatest promises and most significant challenges. Having said that, it should not be possible to read through the articles without gaining at least an elementary understanding of the concept and what is required of its practitioners. Drawing on existing literature and personal experiences, the nine contributors from various branches of government, institutes and international organisations not only present the motivation behind SSR, but offer interesting perspectives on ongoing conflicts.

Despite resemblances between various definitions that are slowly being canonised, there is still no commonly accepted understanding on what constitutes SSR. By evoking images of more traditional civil-military coordination, the title of this publication suggests that, on the military side, the concept of SSR owes much to the previous efforts that have been made towards a more comprehensive crisis management. At the same time, it is recognised that participation in Security Sector Reform will bring within reach of military experts entirely new tasks that demand new skills.

This publication derives from the need to better understand the defence-related SSR tasks and will inevitably exclude many promising points of view. On the other hand, it is our hope to encourage discussion on the topic: many terrains of SSR remain relatively uncharted and, even at the risk of conceptual vagueness, we should still be careful in limiting the narrative too much. It has been pointed out by several authors in this publication that

SSR is inherently a political project. In addition to calling for the political leadership to set priorities for SSR action, this notion reminds us of the importance of free debate on what SSR could and should mean.

The concept of Security Sector Reform is closely related to the broadening of the security agenda after the end of the Cold War. Policy-makers have awakened to a proliferation of "new threats", that have appeared alongside more traditional national security issues. Problems such as environmental degradation, international crime, or urban poverty are increasingly addressed in terms of security. In the same vein, there has been a growing debate on the subjects and objects of security. Should the concept be reoriented around, not only states and citizens, but also individuals, groups, or even humanity as a whole? These considerations have given rise to a discussion about an increasing linkage between security and development and contributed to concepts such as "human security".

Accordingly, discussing a common understanding of security, the Report of the UN Secretary-General on supporting Security Sector Reform refers to "certain fundamental values" described in the UN Millennium Declaration[1]: "Men and women have the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice". The report stresses that the broader understanding of security has strengthened the collective commitment of the UN to protect civilians and those most vulnerable to violence on the basis of the rule of law. Critics, however, have cautioned that extending the field of security too much may result in a "securitization" of society: application of orthodox and potentially unfeasible mindsets and practices to problems that would be better tackled by other means.[2] It is thus important to ask *whose* security is at stake in Security Sector Reform and how security is best provided.

In the oft-cited OECD DAC definition of SSR, the security and justice system is seen to include all institutions, groups, organisations and individuals – both state and non-state – that have a stake in security and justice provision.[3] According to this definition, "[t]he overall objective of international support to security system reform processes is to increase the ability of partner countries to meet the range of security and justice challenges they face". This, in turn, would create preconditions for political, economic and social development. Four overarching goals are set to guide all SSR activity:

1) Establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system.
2) Improved delivery of security and justice services.
3) Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process.
4) Sustainability of justice and security service delivery. [4]

In line with the UN and OECD understandings of SSR, the intrinsic interrelatedness of security and development has become established wisdom in the Finnish foreign policy discourse. Codified in documents such as the Development Policy Programme 2007, Government Report of Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009, Comprehensive Crisis

[1] UN 2000.
[2] Cf. Krause and Williams 1997, Lipschutz 1995.
[3] Among other actors, these include: defence forces, intelligence and security services, police, justice, border management, customs, ministries, legislative bodies, civil society groups, and private sector security services.
[4] OECD 2007. The DAC uses the terms security sector/system reform almost interchangeably.

Management Strategy 2009 and Africa in Finnish Foreign Policy, it is also a starting assumption for most articles in this publication. Indeed, the resolution of the philosophical debate on the merits and weaknesses of this approach is not necessary to see the importance of all actors speaking to each other in a small country. As some of the articles suggest, this may yet require more institutionalised forms of cooperation.

Despite the growing bandwagon of SSR practitioners, important questions remain. While the relative looseness of the theoretical framework may increase its flexibility, the lack of commonly accepted definitions will continue to cause frustration for more practically oriented experts wishing to tackle the concept. At the practical level, SSR activities often demand a long-term commitment that is difficult to reconcile with political decision-making cycles. Even in the face of increasing SSR training, deployability of experts is likely to remain a challenge. Furthermore, as the articles in this publication demonstrate with instructive examples, even deploying trained SSR experts with access to abundant resources will amount to little use if the activities are not planned with local actors after a careful consideration of local and regional dynamics, coordinated with other donors, owned by the local leadership, held accountable by the society as a whole and followed by rigid assessments. Considering the challenges, it is no wonder that there is still little empirical research on the merits of Security Sector Reform, and the track record of the capability of donors and recipients to live up to the concept's innovative potential remains disputed.[5]

Finally, there is the obvious normative question. While definitions of SSR are careful to stress the importance of local ownership and context-specificity, many have asked whether the state-building rhetoric inherently involves a bias towards the liberal Western conceptions of state and democracy.[6] Even if this was not the case, the stated principles have in practice often been overruled by the political motives of donors.[7] Consequently, it has been argued that the conventional focus on state-building may prevent the donors from seeing creative solutions that are already in place. Instead of capacity-building, there should thus be more talk of capacity-*identification*.[8]

No one can say if we are still going to speak of Security Sector Reform in 2030. Nevertheless, just as there have been support measures in the spirit of SSR before the invention of the term, as long as there is development aid, crisis management and other capacity-building efforts there will be a need for coordination and comprehensiveness. The articles in this publication build on the insight of the OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform that, rather than a magic wand to solve all problems, SSR should be conceived of as a framework to structure thinking about how to address diverse security challenges.[9]

Security Sector Reform – Beyond Civil-Military Cooperation is divided into three parts. The idea of the publication in its present form saw daylight at the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) in May 2010, when Tom Asplund and Jukka Sorvari presented a working paper on the military's tasks in SSR for a group of experts from the relevant ministries and training institutions. The study was well received, and it serves as a

[5] Bendix and Stanley 2008.
[6] For an overview of this discussion, see Moe 2010, 10–11.
[7] Bendix and Stanley 2008.
[8] Moe 2010; 19, 32.
[9] OECD 2007.

major inspiration for the opening article. Beginning with a discussion of the basic principles of SSR from the perspective of defence reform, Asplund proceeds to present military-related SSR tasks and their demands on potential experts. Having identified the need for more integrated training and coordinated human resource management, Asplund concludes by proposing the establishment of a national pool of SSR experts.

The first part is completed by Heli Siivola and Antti Häikiö, who both participated in the SSR meeting in May 2010. Already in the first publication of this FINCENT series in 2008, Siivola called for national SSR policy guidelines that would both outline the key principles and geographical focus for the Finnish SSR activities and address the questions of human and material resources.[10] In the present article, Siivola places the role of military experts in the context of the new Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy of Finland that was published in 2009. While she argues that SSR poses a new kind of challenge for the Finnish Defence Forces, which have thus far concentrated on more traditional crisis management, Siivola also points to the training of the Afghan National Army and participation in the EU Training Mission Somalia as potential openings. Finally, in a discussion on the way towards better and more operational SSR activities, Antti Häikiö demonstrates the limits of too postmodern an approach to the theory of SSR, by showing how confusion about concepts easily reflects on the practice. Accordingly, Häikiö lays out a strong argument for moving beyond civil-military coordination in the SSR debate.

The second part describes the achievements of the Finnish defence administration in the field of SSR, presents a nearby example of even better performance and examines the future SSR context for the Member States of the European Union. Anu Sallinen analyses the lessons learned from the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Georgia: along with its neighbours, Finland has participated in Security Sector Reform and transformation processes through the Nordic-Baltic Initiative. The initiative has been cited as an example of how small countries with limited muscle may participate in SSR through the pooling of resources.[11] According to Sallinen, this applies also to the Finnish defence administration that has so far had no separate SSR budgets.

Meanwhile in Sweden, the identification of Security Sector Reform as a key priority for promoting sustainable peace has led to the establishment of a national coordination mechanism, both at the ministerial and agency level, as well as participation in international SSR networks. Michaela Friberg-Storey of the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) describes the reasoning behind these decisions and the FBA's own role in the arrangement. Presenting the FBA's holistic understanding of SSR, Friberg-Storey suggests that the strength of a whole-of-government approach lies mostly in information sharing and coordination, not necessarily in a whole-of-government implementation. In many ways, her article provides an interesting point of comparison to the texts written by the Finnish experts.

While there may be useful lessons to learn from the Swedish experiences, an even more important yardstick for the Finnish SSR activities is presented by the policies of the European Union. Based on decisions taken at the political level and observations about trends in Brussels, Antti Kaski predicts an increasing EU engagement in SSR. Describing

[10] Siivola 2008, 66.
[11] Bendix and Stanley 2008.

the present EU approaches to SSR in theory and practice, he also anticipates pressures which the growing activity is likely to put on the Member States. Kaski concludes that even though SSR cannot be considered a coherent EU policy, it is useful as a framework or "check list" turning the policy-makers' attention to the peace and security problematic.

References to state-building, economic development or the importance of paying attention to human rights and gender perspectives are commonplace in the SSR literature. However, too often the discussion remains at an abstract level without real connection to the realities on the ground. To set the stage for the third and last part of the publication, Olli Ruohomäki takes on the difficult question of SSR's relation to state-building. Drawing on experiences from Afghanistan and Rwanda, he argues that the geopolitical objectives of donor states and the international community can sometimes undermine the goal of reinforcing state security in a host country. Approaching the theme from the development side of the security-development problematic, Ruohomäki concludes that when it comes to aid effectiveness, sustainability, local ownership and coherence of assistance, practitioners of SSR have much to learn from development cooperation.

It makes common sense to assume that a tenuous security situation hinders economic development. Nevertheless, as Pauliina Törmä demonstrates, drawing on a study on the economic footprint of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the presence of international troops will also have complex and inevitable implications for the local economy. Besides possible negative effects, such as inflation, corruption or dependence on the demand of foreign troops, Törmä argues that funds allocated to SSR can serve as an initial stimulus for economic development. Predictably, this would require changes in traditional mindsets and practices, both in capitals and on the ground. Taking into consideration the huge volume of international assistance compared to economic realities in host countries, even small adjustments in policies can produce significant results. Once more we return to the need for improved coordination: Törmä points out that even when the necessary know-how is available, it is often limited to development and other civilian actors.

It has been strongly stressed that Security Sector Reform must be gender sensitive from planning to implementation and evaluation.[12] Finland, on the other hand, has actively promoted the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. It was thus a logical development when Katja Grekula was deployed as Gender Advisor in the EU training mission Somalia, launched in April 2010. In the concluding article of this publication, Grekula gives a frank account of the daily challenges and rewards of her work. By way of vivid examples – the reader will find out how discussing AIDS with the young Somali trainees is an important element of SSR – she argues from yet another perspective for the necessary interdependence of security and development. Without first addressing the basic security needs of the population it is impossible to guarantee the protection of human rights or women's rights.

The arguments presented in the articles are those of the individual contributors and not necessarily those of the institutions they represent.

[12] UN 2008.

References

Bendix, Daniel and Stanley, Ruth. 2008. *Security Sector Reform in Africa: The Promise and the Practice of a New Donor Approach*. ACCORD Occasional Paper Series: Vol. 3, No. 2.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. 2009. *Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy.*. Publications of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 16/2009. Unofficial translation.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. 2007. *Development Policy Programme 2007. Towards a Sustainable and Just World Community*.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. 2010. *Africa in Finnish Foreign Policy*. Publications of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 8/2010. Unofficial translation.

Moe, Louise Wiuff. 2010. *Addressing State Fragility in Africa. A need to challenge the established 'wisdom'?* FIIA Report 22/2010. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs: Helsinki.

Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009. Government Report. Prime Minister's Office Publications 13/2009.

Siivola, Heli. 2008. "Security Sector Reform: Towards a Comprehensive Finnish Approach". In Eronen, Oskari (ed.). *Needs of Comprehensiveness: Building Blocks for Finnish Crisis Management*. FINCENT Publication Series 1:2008.

United Nations. 2000. *UN Millennium Declaration*. 55/2, 18 September.

UNSG. 2008. *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform.* Report of the Secretary-General. United Nations, 23 January.

OECD. 2005. *Security System Reform and Governance.* DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. Paris: OECD.

OECD. 2007. *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform. Supporting Security and Justice.* Paris: OECD.

PART I:
From Defence Reform to Comprehensive SSR

Military Experts in Security Sector Reform

Tom Asplund

In the Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy of Finland, published in November 2009, the need was identified to improve national capacities for supporting Security Sector Reform (SSR). This would also require better coordination not only between the civilian and military crisis management actors, but also between them and the development agencies. As a result, the author of this article, along with Col (ret.) Jukka Sorvari, was tasked by the Finnish Defence Forces to prepare an internal study on Security Sector Reform (SSR), with a focus on Defence Sector Reform (DSR) and the military's role in SSR-related activities. Drawing from this study and the author's own experience of SSR, the article aims to illustrate possible SSR-related tasks for experts with a military background and for suitably educated civilians. However, it should be noted that since Security Sector Reform covers a broad range of activities outside the military sphere, one should be cautious in highlighting military background over relevant civilian experience.

The Basic Principles of Security Sector Reform

Figure 1 presents the whole range of activities that make up SSR. At the top of the diagram, the political and strategic level provides guidance and supervision to Security Sector Reform. The sector level functions as the implementing echelon. Of course, any reform must be founded on identifying the threats and needs of the development of human and state security. The European Union has promoted the development of human security – including freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one's own behalf – as a significant SSR target. SSR therefore complements state and institutional security.[1]

[1] European Commission 2006.



Figure 1. Security Sector Reform (SSR)

The key columns (SSR sectors) are formed of various actors in the field of security (in the broad sense), such as defence, policing, intelligence, border control, judiciary, prison services, private security organizations, civil society and parliament. The horizontal lines cross-cutting the columns are examples of functions that are closely related to all sectors, such as administration, management, services, gender issues and human rights. Finally, especially in immediate post-conflict situations, Security Sector Reform comes close to related functions such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), small and light weapons control (SALW), transitional justice, as well as monitoring of elections.[2]

SSR can be implemented in different contexts. Traditionally, we tend to link it to post-conflict or post-catastrophe situations, to countries in transition from central authority to democratic authority, or to developing countries and fragile states. Security sector experts may also be sent to partner countries to develop their security sector structures in peaceful conditions. Personnel with a military education can be used for a number of tasks in reforming the security sector. Special attention should also be paid to the fact that developed countries such as the USA, UK, Norway and New Zeeland have recently resorted to SSR methods in the development of the police force and defence, following radical structural reconstructions and budget cuts.[3]

SSR requires an in-depth knowledge of, and cross-cutting specialist expertise in, various fields. At the strategic level, it can be considered a highly political process and a promising tool for ministries and political leadership. Reflecting this political dimension, SSR is influenced by

[2] Rumin 2009.
[3] Rumin 2009.

political and social structures, and is subject to the scrutiny of the civil society. Especially projects intended to reform military structures under the umbrella of SSR may influence the balance of power in a society. Special attention should thus always be paid to who would wish for, and benefit from, a defence reform involving, for example, the demobilization of existing forces or rebels, and the security vacuum that might temporarily result.[4]

Of equal importance to successful Security Sector Reform is to understand the sector-wide dimensions. Again, the military should not limit itself simply to civil-military coordination based on its own mandate and national funding guidelines. For the military leadership it may sometimes be tempting just to stick to their mandate and look for quick wins in force protection, resorting to civil-military coordination mainly to win the hearts and minds of the local population. Sector-wide understanding of SSR and the ability to position one's own activity in the greater context require good coordination skills and a capacity to connect with various actors in the theatre. International context, regional dynamics, environmental and cultural factors must also be taken into account. To achieve all this, the sharing of experiences through SSR education and pre-deployment training is a necessity. SSR training must thus always include representatives from a military background as well as civilians.

In addition to the political/strategic and the sector levels, the technical level of SSR activity also requires high-level thematic and cross-cutting skills in various disciplines: e.g. governance and oversight, gender issues and human rights. Furthermore, expertise in change management, fundraising and coordination can be considered assets.



Figure 2. SSR and crisis management[5]

[4] Rumin 2009, Morris 2010.
[5] Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008. Modified by the author.

Figure 2 presents SSR in relation to crisis management as it is generally understood. Security sector activities can be initiated before a conflict and continue during the conflict period. However, the main focus of SSR is on post-conflict state-building and capacity development.

It must be noted that SSR can also take place without connection to any conflict; this has been the case, for example, in countries that formerly belonged to the Soviet bloc. Indeed, there has been debate whether SSR should be a peace-time activity only. Recent, predominantly military, capacity building endeavours, for example in Iraq and Afghanistan, have been targeted by an academic critique. Consequently – often for marketing purposes – the term SSR has been misused to cover and validate bilateral capacity building efforts by parties engaged in the conflict.[6]

Reforming Defence Forces



Figure 3. Example of Security Sector Reform: reforming defence forces

Figure 3 presents an example of a comprehensive reform of defence forces under the umbrella of Security Sector Reform. The example is based on the structural objectives of the Finnish Defence Forces. SSR should be seen as a model for action, rather than the actual mission. Experience shows that expectations for SSR activities in donor states and partner countries are never identical. SSR must be tailored for each country and culture to suit the situation as an effective, coordinated effort. Evidently, the initiative for a structural defence or armed forces reform must come from the partner country. Initially, in the scoping phases of SSR, a full

[6] Morris 2010.

review of existing structures, cultures, available resources and possible political sensitivities must be conducted. Local and regional threat assessment combined with budgetary frames must obviously define the necessity, structure and feasible size of armed forces.

In the example above, the primary actors in the Security Sector Reform would be the Ministry of Defence and the defence forces. The Ministry of Finance would play an integral role in the financing and budgeting, and the Ministry of Justice in the fundamental legislative work.

For a successful reform of defence forces, a renewed vision and strategy for the defence organisation are required. The strategy must describe how the vision should be achieved during the reform process. A political decision is needed on the desired end state, strategy and the democratic oversight mechanism. When developing or reforming the defence forces, it is important to consider the culture of the society and its impact on developing the national defence. Cultural change is a long process and requires significant investment in forming the necessary arguments for change in order to obtain approval from the various parts of the society.

To achieve the predetermined goals, the administrative structures must follow the strategy. This requires careful design of new infrastructure as well as preserving the functioning parts of existing structures. The equipment and material capabilities, making up an integral part of military defence systems, must also be taken into consideration. An efficient organisation needs skilled personnel, necessary training and career planning capabilities, and development of effective recruiting processes. All this requires financial planning in order to maintain economic sustainability in the long-term.

Supporting a partner government in a way that enables it to take responsibility for the entire reform process as soon as possible is a key principle of SSR. To achieve this, it is important to ensure the ownership of the process and activity from the beginning. Political buy-in by national stakeholders is of central importance to ensure a sustainable reform process. A dialogue with third countries is also an important instrument for helping the donor states and partner countries to agree on common objectives and priorities for action.[7]

The planning of so-called exit strategies – reducing and eventually withdrawing the crisis management assistance – is sometimes associated with SSR. Donor states tend to formulate their priorities for support, development funding and financing based on rather short term engagements (usually 3 to a maximum of 5 years). When this is the case, sustained support threatens to be dependent on international and national political interest, even global media hype.[8] Donor states and organisations have a central role to play in consulting, training and facilitating the work of partner country personnel. The demand for support must be expected to last for years, even decades. Consequently, a balance between quick-win projects and a more long-term engagement is needed.

[7] European Commission 2006.
[8] Morris 2010.

Potential SSR Tasks for Military Experts

SSR activities can also be considered as a timeline where three different phases can be identified. In the SSR **scoping phase (1)** a need assessment and scope study of potential projects are conducted by integrated evaluation teams. The **inception phase (2)** consists of programme design, preparation, initial action and comprehensive evaluation. This should involve seasoned SSR experts. Finally, in the **implementation phase (3)**, Security Sector Reform proceeds to full implementation of activities, with a constant regard to follow-up, evaluation and lessons learned. At this phase, expertise in reporting, training, mentoring and evaluation methods is needed.

Different phases of reform require different knowledge, background and expertise. In the past, both crisis management and development co-operation have too often been based on inadequate research and evaluation prior to initiating action. In the scoping and inception phases, the current status and necessary reform measures must thus be thoroughly analysed.[9] It is also essential to recognise the importance of, and work with, local representatives already in the early stages of the scoping phase and continue their involvement throughout the SSR process.

The implementation phase includes several tasks suitable for beginners. Gathering knowledge and experience in basic reform administration, these individuals can later participate in the monitoring and review tasks. Evaluation tasks require expertise in implementation as well as monitoring and inspection.

In addition to the professional skills in their respective fields of Defence Sector Reform, the military personnel are expected to understand the requirements of a comprehensive SSR. Acquaintance with the history and culture of the host country is of special importance. It is the only way for the international actors to obtain practical on-site understanding of the culture and the current status of security establishments. Donors should strive to develop a whole-of-government approach to support SSR. Integrated teams that bring together technical expertise with the necessary political, management and communications skills are critical. Cross-government training is required to give all the parties involved a strategic, political and technical understanding of SSR.[10] Experts working at the strategic level need to have a diverse background in military operations and defence administration, including staff positions in international missions. Experience in organisational change management is always an advantage.

[9] OECD Development Action Committee 2007.
[10] OECD Development Action Committee 2007.



Figure 4. Tasks for military experts during an implementation phase of an SSR programme

Figure 4 presents potential SSR tasks for persons with a military background. Military skills and experience are particularly useful in the reform of defence systems, intelligence apparatus, border protection and private security organizations. Military knowledge is also an advantage in post-conflict situations where disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into society (DDR) or small and light weapons control (SALW) are being implemented, for example during a collection of weapons and ammunitions. In addition, since former combatants may become a key threat to the society if they have no access to decent living conditions, the establishment of a functioning reservist and veteran system can facilitate their reintegration. Unfortunately, too many countries still do not recognise war veterans by law.

SSR assessment experts, monitors and evaluators are also needed for various assessment tasks that are always involved in SSR. In addition to an in-depth knowledge of SSR, these experts should possess management expertise and reporting skills. Experts in training and military education may be used as team leaders and facilitators for training activities.

Based especially on experiences from the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, mentors and trainers are of central importance in revitalising a national army and developing its operational capability. Finally, military experts can be needed as military advisers and liaison officers for civilian operations acting in the same theatre.[11]

More and more, experts with a military background are also needed in civilian crisis management operations.[12] Possible tasks include transport and logistics, supply, CIS and human resource management (figure 5). Of course, each SSR operation will examine and tailor its staff requirements separately.



Figure 5. Possible areas of responsibility for military experts

Training M ilitary SSR Experts

Many military experts have never been involved in reform processes and need specific training in the programme design and management. In addition to technical expertise, an understanding of the basic principles of SSR and political processes is necessary, as well as a working knowledge of the history and culture of the partner country. As a means towards better civil-military cooperation, the fresh field experience of personnel returning from operations should be fully exploited in training.[13]

[11] Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy 2009; http://www.dcaf.ch/issat/_docs/ISSAT%20Factsheet_Nov_24.pdf , 30.7.2010.
[12] Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy 2009.
[13] Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy 2009.

Since SSR is not only about increasing operational efficiency but also about the culture of accountability and good governance, a corresponding set of skills is required from SSR experts. This includes know-how in institutional reform, change management, financial management, strategic planning, human resources and training. Of course, it is a big challenge for donor governments to ensure that the necessary skills are available and deployed at the right time – experienced and skilled personnel are always a limited resource.[14]

The Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy of Finland stresses the importance of promoting knowledge of humanitarian legislation as well as human rights and gender issues in crisis management training. Emphasis must also be given to the local culture and religion. Trained personnel must be able to recognise human rights violations and react accordingly within the limits of their mission-specific mandates. Sensitivity to human rights and gender issues should be mainstreamed in all activity and reflected in the interaction with colleagues and locals.[15]

Naturally enough, the highest demands are upon the leaders of the integrated assessment team. They have to be able to manage the complete reform package, exercising both academic and operational methods and mastering negotiation skills towards the authorities in host countries as well as donor states. Military leadership experience can also be an asset in tense security situations.

Regardless of the increasing interest in SSR, many challenges remain. In order to develop and maintain a pool of personnel possessing the necessary knowledge and skills, SSR experts of today and tomorrow must be provided with opportunities for appropriate training. This is also vital for developing an "SSR professionalism" and strengthening a commitment to its principles. By synchronising the SSR education with the annual training calendars of national training providers, it is ensured that SSR experts at a required level are available when needed. Seminars and workshops, organised by, among others, the UN, EU, AU, and many state actors, are useful in providing additional information and new perspectives to SSR activity.

[14] OECD Development Action Committee 2007.
[15] Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy 2009.



Figure 6. How to become a military SSR expert

What's Next? Follow-up Proposals and Further Action

In 2006, a concept paper by the European Commission recommended forming pools of SSR experts as a means towards developing the EU's SSR activities.[16] To maintain the capacity to deploy high-level SSR experts for short, medium, and long-term SSR activities, the paper concluded that cooperation between the commission and the Member States must also be improved. The aim should be to ensure coherence of skills, training and equipment for the experts who are deployed to partner countries as a part of ongoing SSR efforts. This also requires better human resource management policies.

The EU is currently developing an SSR pool of experts. The initial calls for contributions were distributed in May 2010, and preparations for forming SSR expert teams have been undertaken in cooperation with the member states. Accordingly, in order to be prepared to offer suitable staff to this pool, Finland should not only fully participate in the available training activities but also start a discussion on establishing a national pool of SSR experts, involving expertise in the following domains:

- Policy and strategy
- Defence sector
- Intelligence sector
- Criminal justice

[16] European Commission 2006.

– Police
– Border control/customs
– Public finance
– Civil society.

Job descriptions as well as the criteria for fulfilling these tasks have been established in EU documents, presenting the required knowledge and background.[17] The most pressing needs are perhaps found in the field of change management and human resource management. Because of the whole-of-government nature of all SSR activity, only a jointly designed cross-government SSR activity plan and common training will enable both military and civilians to efficiently work together in future SSR operations. SSR experts, be they military or civilian, must have a shared vision in order to avoid unnecessary conflicts.

As Finland's participation in SSR activities increases, the involvement of military experts becomes very desirable. In most cases, this would mean supporting the civilian authorities. Developing a pool of Finnish SSR experts would greatly facilitate the necessary sharing of information and know-how. A pool of experts would also make it easier to conduct joint SSR training.

In the beginning, the pool would mainly be trained abroad, resorting to established courses and training facilities. Starting from 2011, and in cooperation with the EU and Nordic partners, Finland should consider organising a basic level SSR introduction course (3–4 days) as well as another, more advanced course. The Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management offers an excellent framework for the planning and development of these courses. It is already planning a DDR pilot course to be organised in November 2010. The National Defence University should also be centrally involved in the process, conducting research, advancing SSR knowledge among young officers and bringing its expertise to the joint training activities.

At the political level, priority areas for Finnish SSR action should be identified and supported by training. In accordance with this policy, recruitment of Finnish (civilian and military) experts for SSR assignments at the EU level should be encouraged. Ideally, experienced senior officials could be paired with young professionals to enable the passing on of knowledge and field experience. As a more practical matter, the terms of duty for personnel participating in SSR assignments abroad should be established, including a mechanism to deploy Finnish Defence Forces staff on military assignments in a civilian crisis management operation.

[17] Council of the European Union General Secretariat 2010.

References

Commission of the European Communities 2006. *A Concept for the European Community Support for Security Sector Reform.* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. COM (2006) 253 final.

Council of the European Union General Secretariat. 2010. *Call for Contributions for the Pool of EU Security Sector Reform experts*, annex 1 (Document 10793/09), 13 April 2010.

The Finnish Defence Forces International Centre. 2010. *Sotilaat turvallisuussektorin uudistuksessa*. Working Paper.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 2009. *Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy.* Publications of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 16/2009.

Morris, Angus. 2010. Lecture on Defence Reform in GFN-SSR Practitioners' Course. Birmingham, 18 January 2010.

OECD Development Action Committee. 2007. *DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR)*.

Rumin, Serge. 2009. SSR Concepts & Contexts: Lecture in the Whole of Government Training on Security System Reform (SSR) / Train the Trainers Course in SSR – Stockholm, 2 June.

UNDPKO. 2008. *Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*.

SSR in the Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy

Heli Siivola

The Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009 stresses that violent conflicts call for a comprehensive approach from crisis management organisations and participating states. As outlined by Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb in a recent speech, the challenges of comprehensive crisis management should be seen through three lenses:

– First, there is the organizational challenge of strengthening coordination between international actors such as the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), NATO, African Union (AU) and NGOs.

– Second, there is the functional challenge of bringing together the different strands of action – civilian and military crisis management, development aid, humanitarian assistance etc.

– Third, there is the challenge of local ownership. International efforts need to be better linked with local ownership and responsibility.[1]

Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy

In order to address these challenges the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) appointed a working group to draw up Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy. The working group comprised representatives from the MFA's Political Department and Department for Development Policy, Prime Minister's Office, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defence and the Defence Command.

The strategy, published in November 2009, concentrates on situations in which Finland participates in the management or prevention of international conflicts, or in post-conflict reconstruction by means of military and civilian crisis management. Its focus is on multinational crisis management operations and their interaction with development and humanitarian actors, as well as the local authorities and population. The aim is to improve coherence and effectiveness, with due regard for each actor's area of responsibility and expertise.

The strategy seeks to answer two questions: How can Finland develop its own crisis management capabilities and participation in a more comprehensive manner? What can Finland do to promote a comprehensive approach to crisis management at the international level?[2]

[1] Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2010.
[2] See: Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009.

Security Sector Reform as a Key Challenge to a Comprehensive Approach

From the very beginning it was clear that Security Sector Reform (SSR) would be one of the topics that needed to be addressed in the strategy. While Finland had been actively involved in the development of the EU Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform[3], its national implications had not yet been fully discussed. The EU was about to set up an SSR pool of experts underlining the need to improve experts' availability for EU action. At the same time, real world developments in the Western Balkans and Afghanistan highlighted the importance of local capacity building.

The strategy approaches SSR on the basis of the broad definition applied by the EU, OECD and UN. As summarised by the UN Secretary-General, SSR "has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law"[4]. SSR thus goes beyond the training and equipping of the key security actors and institutions, such as the military, police, judiciary and prison system. It also involves promoting the security sector's accountability and good governance as part of the wider state-building.

Taking into account the wide scope of SSR, it is obvious that we are talking about a lengthy process with multiple actors involved. In post-conflict situations, the mandates of crisis management operations often include – or sometimes even focus on – support for the initial steps of SSR. The realities on the ground may call for fast solutions e.g. with regard to military and police reforms. The strategy stresses that the ownership and commitment of local actors to the reforms, as well as the coordinated use of crisis management and development cooperation measures, is essential. International support efforts need to be planned and conducted with the local authorities.[5]

In countries recovering from conflict, defence reform, and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, often gain the most attention. There are good reasons for this. For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) shortcomings in defence reform and the DDR process form a major obstacle to development and human security. As noted in a recent Oxfam policy briefing note "it is communities, in particular women and girls, who pay the highest price for the failure of defence reform"[6]. A more coherent and efficient approach to defence reform and DDR is needed, both within and between local governments and international donors.[7]

Defence reform should not be seen in isolation from the wider Security Sector Reform. At the same time more resources – both in terms of civilian crisis management and development cooperation – are desperately needed to support police and judiciary reforms in fragile states

[3] Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 18, 36–38.
[4] UNSG 2008, 6.
[5] Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 36–37; OECD 2007, e.g. 23, 42.
[6] Oxfam 2010, 2.
[7] Oxfam 2010.

and post-conflict situations. Otherwise there is a danger that the roles of the key security actors and institutions become distorted[8].

The Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy stresses the need to improve civilian oversight and the democratic control of the security sector. Particular attention should be paid to the role of the civil society and anti-discriminatory measures. The strategy acknowledges that SSR is a highly political undertaking. The sensitivities and risks involved in local capacity building must be recognised.[9]

Enhancing Finland's Capacity to Support Security Sector Reform

As noted in the strategy, the focus of Finnish civilian crisis management participation is already on the training, mentoring and support measures related to SSR and rule of law development. For example, almost 60 Finnish civilian experts currently participate in the EU's rule of law mission in Kosovo, aimed at building up the country's police, judicial and border management. Moreover, with around 30 civilian experts, Finland is one the biggest participants in the EU police mission in Afghanistan, which supports the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements. While the figure may be small compared to the scale of the task at hand, it represents a major input from the Finnish side.

EU Member States are committed to advance the availability of experts for civilian crisis management. Finland has been actively working to this end. The Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009 set the objective of significantly raising the number of Finnish experts in civilian crisis management operations. At the moment around 160 seconded Finnish experts participate in civilian crisis management tasks abroad. The Ministry of the Interior develops domestic capacity building for civilian crisis management, in accordance with Finland's National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management[10]. Particular attention is paid to the areas of police, rule of law, border security and human rights.[11]

With regard to military crisis management, SSR represents a new type of challenge. Finnish military participation has concentrated on more traditional crisis management tasks aimed at contributing to a safe and secure environment. The nature of the participation has been very different from that of civilian crisis management. The latter is based on deploying civilian experts to individual tasks within a multinational organisation. In military crisis management individual military personnel usually serve as part of a larger Finnish troop contingent. SSR-related training, mentoring and support tasks do not replace more traditional forms of military crisis management but expand their scope.

[8] E.g. with regard to DRC, a recent Crisis Group Africa Briefing notes that "Because of the structural weakness of the police, the army is still deployed to deal with major outbreaks of public disorder." International Crisis Group 2010, 16.
[9] Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 36–37.
[10] Ministry of the Interior 2008.
[11] Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 9, 50–51.

Participation in the training of the Afghan National Army within the framework of the NATO-led ISAF operation has been a new opening in Finland's military crisis management. Finland has also supported the Afghan defence reform with material and through NATO Trust Funds. The EU Somalia Training Mission (EUTM), which was launched in April 2010 to contribute to the training of the Somali security forces, is another recent example of the increased emphasis on SSR-related tasks in military crisis management. Finland participates in the operation with three military trainers and a gender advisor.

The Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy stresses that SSR-related tasks are expected to increase in international crisis management. Finland must also continue to actively participate in these tasks within the framework of military crisis management. Moreover, personnel with military expertise are also needed in civilian missions for certain tasks related to SSR and disarmament. The strategy notes that the defence establishment is generating a national troop register for military crisis management. The objective is to create a high-quality troop register which encompasses wide-ranging capabilities and expertise. In this context also the capacity to participate in advisory and training tasks and other expert assistance will be improved.[12]

The question of SSR funding was perhaps the most debated issue during the preparation of the strategy. The strategy notes that Finland finances SSR efforts from several different items in the budget. It notes that non-military SSR measures in developing countries largely fulfil the criteria set for development cooperation, and that sufficient resources should also be guaranteed for such SSR measures which do not qualify as official development assistance. The strategy emphasises that different financing sources should be used in a way that supports a comprehensive approach. It suggests that Finland should look to other countries' experiences, with a view to developing its own activities. In this context the needs and possibilities of setting up a distinct coordination or financing mechanism for the purpose of SSR funding should be assessed.[13]

[12] Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 9, 38, 50, 56.
[13] Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 8, 10, 40-43.

Military Experts in Security Sector Reform – Some Recommendations Arising from the Strategy

Taking into account the objectives set in the Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy, FINCENT's initiative to discuss the role of military experts in SSR-related activities is very welcome. In this publication, Tom Asplund rightly places emphasis on the need to increase the availability of Finnish military experts to SSR tasks and to develop related training.

With regard to the follow-on work, I would like to highlight three points arising from the strategy:

1) A comprehensive approach to SSR

The overall aim should be a comprehensive approach to SSR, that is built on local ownership and overcomes the functional and organizational challenges described above. In reality a piecemeal approach cannot always be avoided but, to quote Asplund, "a sector-wide understanding of SSR and the ability to position one's own activity in the greater context" should be a minimum requirement.

The strategy stresses that the best effect is achieved by participating in multinational operations and activities.[14] The main emphasis is thus not so much on creating a comprehensive Finnish SSR team covering all sectors, but on enhancing Finland's capacity to rapidly deploy versatile and competent civilian and military personnel to serve in multinational teams and organisations. Finland can also support a comprehensive approach by promoting joint training in the field of SSR.

The role of personal relations in promoting a comprehensive approach should not be underestimated. The strategy notes that while the framework for cooperation is usually set at the headquarters level, actors on the ground largely determine the functioning of practical cooperation. It is important that Finnish crisis management personnel have the necessary background information and capabilities to advance practical cooperation on the ground. Training and education play a key role in this.[15]

2) Promoting gender, human rights and international humanitarian law

The strategy stresses the need to strengthen crisis management personnel's knowledge of questions related to development, human rights and gender, as well as humanitarian law and the principles of humanitarian aid. Particular attention should be paid to the status of women and the protection of children in armed conflicts as well as to cultural awareness and respect for local values.[16]

Promotion of gender, human rights and international humanitarian law is especially important with regard to the military's role in SSR-related activities. As Asplund argues, these themes should be an integral part of the training of Finnish military experts who are to be deployed to SSR tasks. Moreover, Finnish military experts involved in SSR tasks on

[14] Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 12.
[15] Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 35, 52.
[16] Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 7,9, 52–54.

the ground should, on their part, ensure that issues related to gender, human rights and international humanitarian law are embedded in the training programmes of local soldiers. They should, in particular, promote the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and its follow-on Resolutions 1820 and 1888.

3) Making use of lessons learned

Taking into account the relatively short history of the Finnish Defence Forces in SSR support, it is essential to collect and analyse lessons identified from previous and ongoing assignments. Finland should actively participate in the lessons learned processes of the EU and other international lead organisations. Also Nordic cooperation could be strengthened in this respect. The strategy emphasises that experiences and lessons should be shared between military and civilian crisis management. This also calls for the improvement of national lessons learned processes. Cooperation with the Crisis Management Centre Finland should be further enhanced.[17]

For example, the experiences and lessons from the EU mission assisting defence reform in the DRC (EUSEC RD Congo) could be of interest in view of further developing the Defence Forces' capacity to participate in SSR tasks. Whereas EUSEC is, in formal terms, a civilian crisis management mission, in practice it is a civil-military operation and many of its personnel have a military background. As the strategy notes, in the future it may become increasingly challenging to classify crisis management operations as being of a purely military or civilian nature[18]. This is especially true in the field of Security Sector Reform.

Finally, with regard to the civilian oversight and democratic control of the defence forces, it would be useful if the Ministry of Defence could build on FINCENT's initiative and analyse ways to enhance Finland's support of promoting good governance in defence establishments.

[17] Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 61.
[18] Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 60.

References

Reports and policy documents

Commission of the European Communities. 2006. *A Concept for the European Community Support for Security Sector Reform.* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. COM (2006) 253 final.

Council of the European Union. 2005. *EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)*. 12566/4/05.

Council of the European Union. 2006. *Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform*. 2736th General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 12 June 2006.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 2009. *Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy.* Publications of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 16/2009.

Ministry of the Interior. 2008. *Finland's National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management.* Approved by the Finnish Government on 28 August 2008.

UNSG 2008. *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform.* Report of the Secretary General. United Nations, 23 January.

Speeches and briefing notes

International Crisis Group. 2010. *Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda.* Africa Briefing N°73, 8 April 2010. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/B73%20Congo%20-20A%20Stalled%20Democratic%20Agenda%20ENGLISH.ashx, 16.8.2010.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 2010. *Introductory remarks by Mr. Alexander Stubb Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland.* Seminar on Nato´s New Strategic Approach – Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management. Helsinki, 4 March 2010. Speeches, 3/4/2010. http://formin.finland.fi/Public/Print.aspx?contentid=187377&nodeid=15145&culture=en-US&contentlan=2, 16.08.2010.

Oxfam 2010. *Defence reform like people matter*. An Oxfam International briefing note on DR Congo briefing note, January 2010. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/droi_20100701_5drc6_/droi_20100701_5drc6_en.pdf, 16.8.2010.

From Theory to Practice: Towards Better and More Operational SSR Activities

Antti Häikiö

Interdependences and linkages between post-conflict crisis management and Security Sector Reform (SSR) are evident in the current activities in host nations, but tend to blur in the procedures and practices of donor states and the international community as activators and facilitators. SSR has been high on the agenda for years, but its impacts, outcomes and sustainable results are still little known. As speakers, writers and readers about SSR abound, the lack of reliable information may also result from the casual use of terms and language without better knowledge of their meaning. This article begins with the introduction of five viewpoints of civilian crisis management within the broad and complex framework of SSR. Hopefully, this will assist the reader to better understand the text and the title.

First, even the comprehensive approach to crisis management – the common playing field of SSR – does not always include both military and civilian actors. There are several missions without military elements working for security and safety of a society, such as police and border reforms. Independent military missions can reform the defence forces and military as a part of the SSR.

Secondly, terms such as "civil-military operations" and "civil-military coordination" should be more precisely defined for implementation in the field. Too often too simple language applies: when a soldier wears a green uniform, everyone without it – be they police, international or local, or ordinary citizens – are considered civilians. In any society, the security sector has multiple actors with official and unofficial, different and specified roles crucial to the functioning of the security sector as a whole.

Thirdly, SSR is not primarily an international project. It is a local effort, in which the needs, benefits and ownership are grounded in, and defined by, the local community. The international community plays a supporting, facilitating and advisory role with the aim of leaving the stage as soon as possible, with a well-planned exit strategy.

Fourthly, in a broad civil-military engagement, the (lack of) civilian capacity is currently a much bigger problem than the military capacity, competence, knowledge and skills. This imbalance may cause serious difficulties to the current SSR projects, especially if not identified, admitted or openly reported.

Fifthly, in order to achieve clear communication and common understanding, institutions and individuals should be careful when using terms and expressions such as crisis response, crisis management, peace-building, humanitarian aid and assistance, development aid and cooperation, disaster management, internal and external security, SSR and DDR. This is important to avoid both political confusion and practical misunderstandings.

Lessons of the Past – and Present

It is now 2010 and 16 years have passed since the Rwandan genocide, 15 years since the end of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 years since the war and bombings in Kosovo, and more than 8 years since the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

However, this same year of 2010 is less than two years after the major trials of the Rwandan genocide court cases, international military and civilian missions are still operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, and Afghanistan has more civilian casualties than ever before during the missions of the UNAMA and ISAF.

While the human suffering is countless, financial costs have also been enormous in all belated peace-processes. The costs and casualties have had a political impact in the participating countries' domestic policy and electorates. Thus the conclusion is easy: we must do better. International engagement must be more efficient and effective.

After a report by the UN Secretary-General in July 2010 that pointed out continuing severe challenges in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, it may be too ambitious to expect better results or rapid societal and structural changes in the security sector, perhaps not counting social benefits such as pensions or parcels of land issued for the farming fighters.

In a positive development, participating states and multi-governmental organisations have learned the value of evaluation and assessment. Previously the political-strategic decisions were protected by reporting only the positive points, achievements and success stories in the weekly, monthly and special reports even in the restricted distribution.

There are also recent examples of new and innovative thinking. The Senior Civilian Representative of NATO in Kabul, Ambassador Mark Sedwill issued a lesson-report on the comprehensive approach that NATO, ISAF and others have tried to achieve – being one of the first open reports with key findings of operational issues still running and relevant.

Whose Problem – Ours or Theirs?

Do the challenges of SSR, and crisis management in general, pose a bigger problem for the main organisations – UN, NATO, EU and OSCE – or for the societies and communities to which they are trying to bring stability? Who owns the process, and who is required to improve it?

These questions lead to another: if a reform takes 10–20 years, are the difficulties caused more by external and international players or by the root causes within a host nation and its communities?

Among the major actors, the European Union has the shortest history. Lacking a long tradition, however, it is able to learn. The EU also has other advantages, ranging from funds and finances to highly-skilled experts in the fields of police, justice and legislation,

border, customs, taxation, trade and economy, agriculture, forestry, industries, seas, air and environment. This mixed tool-box enables the use of more targeted measures than the other organisations. Nevertheless, the EU's results are yet to be seen in, for example Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Mainly based on the former first and third pillars of the European Union (the European Community and the Justice and Home Affairs), the EU has, in its own functions, all the necessary expertise to cover the civilian aspects of the security sector. The post-Lisbon EU, and in particular the coming External Action Service (including crisis management), represents the closest attempt yet at a whole-of-government approach, if and when the EU is able to use its comprehensive capacity and operationalise the *acquis* in its missions.

Lacking a tradition of external action, though, the EU easily becomes a victim of its particular nature as a more political than professional institution. Weaknesses in the field operations can thus originate from the higher level, from the contribution of the member states at the level of the capitals, or from the lack of strategic culture, planning and guidance in the Brussels bodies. Accordingly, any assessment of EU action in the theatre should include an evaluation of the political prerequisites from the Member States to the strategic guidance and concepts in Brussels. This should always take place before pointing at potential failures of the operation itself – or, worse, accusing the troubled local stakeholders.

Avoiding unnecessary politicisation of its operations, the EU should strengthen the implementation of its concept paper on the lessons and best practices in the CSDP operations, endorsed during the French presidency in 2008. Another improvement would be the realisation of the plan to establish a pool of experienced SSR experts, even though the previous pool of rapid civilian experts, the Civilian Response Team (CRT), has not yet been much utilised.

Good, Better, Best Practices and Skills

Reforming any sector of a society is a political, institutional and organisational process – and a largely top-down one. Policies, concepts and strategies are needed. UN Security Council resolutions have been comprehensive in the aim of guiding the peace-building and state-building efforts. In a post-conflict society, there is hardly a need for Security Sector Reform in isolation, but rather the reforms are related to much wider state-building. For example, in the post-war process of Kosovo, President Ahtisaari's Comprehensive Proposal has been the most extensive plan to date, covering both the international, regional and local aspects, including the security sector.

However, successful implementation and sustainability cannot be achieved without changes in both policy and practice. Two fundamental aspects of international engagement are especially critical to facilitating reforms in a post-conflict situation:

(1) *Transition skills* are needed for the development of local ownership in a host nation, beginning from an equal participation of the people in the democratic process, and extending to institutions, structures and services.

(2) *Transformation skills* are based on the transfer of the competences and capacities of international expertise and models. These consist of knowledge, skills and attitude (including values). The most used methods of transformation are capacity-building, training and education. So far the focus has mostly been in the quantity and not yet the quality or outcome of activities. In the future, the latter are needed as well to ensure real sustainability.

Far too often, the excuse for the slow progress of post-conflict reform is that "a generation is needed to forget the past and take a step forward". This applies to almost any topic of post-conflict discourse, often with a reference to "see how long it took in our own countries". Trying to cover the lack of transition and transformation skills, this pretext does not consider the number of powers and reform mechanisms in play, invoking the history of developed countries where the needs for reforms were less urgent than in the country of engagement.

As an example, the one-third participation of women in the political institutions of the local and central administration in Kosovo took only a few years in comparison to Finland, where the current gender balance in the political institutions was the result of nearly a hundred year historical process since the establishment of universal suffrage. Women are essential agents also in the security sector. The international community is not yet the best model. For example, among the thirteen EU Heads of Missions in Kosovo there are no women, and none of the eleven EU Special Representatives is a woman, as of August 2010.

Call for Holistic, Societal and Programmatic Reforms

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) usually follows an armed conflict but precedes SSR – although DDR is still far too often understood as a project management task. Nevertheless, disarmament faces obstacles if the last "R" – reintegration – is not the core of the process or program. Who would give up an AK-47 if it has been the main tool in providing for the personal or family income, and there are no alternatives that would offer a similar livelihood?

In the modern strengthening missions (to differentiate from executive, replacing and interim administrative mandates), a significant step has been taken by integrating methods of result-based management with a programmatic approach to traditional mission management. This has worked especially to dissolve the current confusion between old-fashioned monitoring-advising missions and the more robust approach needed for providing advice on agreed *acquis* as well as monitoring the results. This development is closely connected to notions of transition and local ownership. An example is provided by the EULEX Kosovo where criteria, standards, programmes, projects and action fiches are not only shared and agreed with the local stakeholders, but the results are also reported publicly on the internet.[1]

[1] http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/tracking, 8.9.2010.

Joint Operations in SSR: Civil-military Interoperability

Civil-military coordination has been an essential part of peacekeeping, and there has been a growing demand for it since the beginning of modern crisis management. Its status, however, has been less clear within the framework of SSR. In a development that is to be encouraged, the political mandates and key objectives of the UN, EU, OSCE or NATO missions can nowadays be easily studied, which leaves very little space for gaps or overlaps. At a political-strategic level, exchanging the Concepts of Operations between actors is also relatively easy. There should not be a single military or civilian mission member stating that he/she does not know what another official player is working with or what his/her authority is based on. This may still not be sufficiently clear at the field office level, and the main responsibility lies with the higher HQ's.

While the joint, common or comprehensive approach is well-recognised in the policies, concepts and strategies of all multi-governmental organisations and their member states, its practical applications are much less tested. There are still military commanders who recommend addressing all issues that are not covered in a green uniform to the civil-military (CIMIC) cell – not understanding that the criminal intelligence of a police mission needs to talk to the military intelligence; the Situation Centre and Police Operations Room need to exchange situational awareness with the Joint and Tactical Operations Centres, legal officers must communicate with legal advisors and political affairs talk to political advisors.

Likewise, there are plenty of civilian actors who have no idea of how a well-structured military organisation or its chain-of-command operate, turning to military camps with trivial and even private needs. The simple solution is to increase the knowledge on both sides. Joint training and exercises are always easier to organise at home, before entering the theatre and common working environment. Truly mixed missions are still to be seen in the post-conflict state-building. An integrated mission must be well trained and exercised before the deployment, in order to avoid finding itself in troubles due more to internal reasons than the root causes of the conflict.

Civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan, 2006. Photo: Finnish Defence Forces.

An Agenda for Action

In the path towards better and more operational SSR activities, the following interoperability issues should be tackled in order to understand the development from the immediate aftermath of a conflict to a state of sustainable and democratically controlled security. In many cases, the list can replace the simplified and generic vocabulary of civil-military operations with more specified terminology.

- Military support to police operations; interoperability with the international and/or local police
- Military support to (a) the public order, (b) serious crime investigation and prevention
- Military's role in integrated border management (border, customs and police)
- Joint aspects of the fight against organised crime
- Joint aspects of cross-border crime, trafficking
- Joint aspects of corruption and financial crime
- Mechanisms and services for the exchange of intelligence information: state intelligence, criminal intelligence, military intelligence
- Military's role in protecting civilians in high-risk and dangerous action such as de-mining, transporting high-risk goods, protecting infrastructure and industries such as electricity networks or chemical production
- Military's role in post-disaster situations and catastrophes
- Humanitarian assistance (e.g. logistics, medical, housing)
- Military and defence education

– Joint coordination and communication mechanisms at local and regional level with other security and official actors

The grey zone between the borders of international crisis management as external action on the one hand, and reforms taking place in the local society on the other hand, often becomes foggy for the actors in the field. The transition in Kosovo is a good example. Since 2000, local elections had gradually transferred the responsibilities from the UN interim administration to local institutions. After the declaration of independence, the UN reconfigured its tasks and the highest UN court gave an opinion according to which the independence was legal – even though the NATO-led KFOR and the EU-led police, border, justice and customs mission still use some of the powers and authorities that traditionally belong to the state monopoly. Do we know what powers and in which cases? If not, we are not managing the reform.

And if we do not manage it ourselves, how can we go and teach others?

PART II:
Context for the Finnish SSR Activities

Lessons Learned from the Balkans, Ukraine and Georgia

Anu Sallinen

The Nordic-Baltic Initiative

The Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have a long tradition of defence cooperation. The target has been to optimise interoperability between respective defence forces and structures, increase cooperation within the security and defence sectors and increase impact on the global security environment. A new step towards these goals was taken when a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the Nordic Defence Ministers in November 2009 establishing a new, more comprehensive Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO).[1]

Before the restructuring, the joint Nordic cooperation could already boast a successful record in the Baltic Sea region, where it had been focused on strengthening the security and defence policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in order to assist them in achieving their goal of full integration into the Euro-Atlantic organisations of the European Union and NATO.[2] Since 2004, the Nordic and Baltic countries have been working closely together in the field of defence and Security Sector Reform, forging together new areas of cooperation. In 2005, this led to the establishment of a joint Nordic-Baltic Initiative (NBI). Since then, the Nordic and Baltic countries have aimed to optimise interoperability between their respective defence forces and structures, as well as to increase the cooperation within their security and defence sectors.

SSR Work in the Western Balkans

The first natural targets for Nordic-Baltic SSR activities were the countries of the Western Balkans. The international community has invested heavily in the region and much progress has been made in initiating reforms to develop and sustain national democratic structures. Also the NBI activities aim to facilitate this process by providing input, support and assistance to the Security Sector Reform and transformation processes of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Based on good experiences in the North, one of the aims has been to encourage and support increased inter-regional cooperation in the Western Balkans. However, much more still needs to be done to consolidate the achieved progress and to assist these countries in their path towards Euro-Atlantic integration.[3]

[1] http://www.nordcaps.org/?id=125, 4.9.2010; http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?s=520, 4.9.2010.
[2] http://www.ambberlin.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/6FF493E4-61E1-429E-ACB5-081F7799A224/0/NordicInitiative.pdf, 4.9.2010.
[3] http://www.ambberlin.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/6FF493E4-61E1-429E-ACB5-081F7799A224/0/NordicInitiative.pdf, 4.9.2010.

Examples of NBI activities in the area include:

– Education and training programmes

  The NBI countries have offered scholarships and sponsored students at international military colleges and institutions such as the Baltic Defence College and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. There has also been a heavy investment in English language training, recognising the fact that proficiency in English is the basis of interaction with the international community.

– Albanian Logistic Capability Initiative

  The NBI countries have cooperated in developing and implementing a NATO-compatible logistic system for the armed forces of Albania. The Initiative has also actively supported the Peace Support Operations Training Centre in Sarajevo as well as the Peacekeeping Operations Centre in Belgrade (PSOTCs). The aim of the PSOTCs is to provide professional military education and peace support operations training for the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in order to increase the interoperability between their peace support forces and those of NATO.[4]

– Defence reform, downsizing and resettlement programmes in Serbia (PRISMA[5]) and Macedonia (LEPEZA)

  The Nordic Initiative has been able to utilise its combined resources effectively by supporting PRISMA through the establishment of a Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) Training Centre in Belgrade which, when fully up and running, will assist former NCOs to retrain in order to get new jobs or start a new career in the private sector. In addition, the Nordic Initiative has provided substantial financial support to the NATO Trust Fund, thereby providing wider assistance to redundant military personnel affected by the defence reform agenda.

[4] http://www.ambberlin.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/6FF493E4-61E1-429E-ACB5-081F7799A224/0/NordicInitiative.pdf, 4.9.2010.
[5] http://www.ambberlin.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/6FF493E4-61E1-429E-ACB5-081F7799A224/0/NordicInitiative.pdf, 4.9.2010.

SSR Activities in Ukraine and Georgia

Furthermore, the Nordic Countries, alongside their colleagues in the Baltic States, have embarked on an initiative towards Ukraine and more recently, Georgia. As a by-product, practical cooperation between the five Nordic and the three Baltic countries is enhanced.

The Initiative in Ukraine was launched in 2006. Currently the Nordic-Baltic Initiative covers three different areas:

– An internet-based ADL learning system[6]

  The Advanced Distributed Learning system, based on the former BALTVIMA server, is being introduced to Ukraine by Norway to strengthen Ukraine's ability to attain NATO's interoperability standards. The system will be a useful supplement to resident education in its ability to serve a larger audience.

– Support for the Multinational Staff Officers' Centre (MSOC) at the National Defence Academy[7] in Kiev

  The Nordic and Baltic countries are assisting the MSOC with one resident officer/instructor (at present from Sweden). His main responsibility is to serve as supervisor and instructor in courses related to UN- and NATO-led Peace Support Operations.

– Expert teams as part of the NATO-Ukraine JWGDR Professional Development Programme[8]

  The expert teams were established within the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group for Defence Reform (JWGDR) Professional Development Programme and in close cooperation with the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine. The objective of the programme is to assist Ukraine in enhancing the professional skills of key civilian officials and strengthen the capacity of security sector institutions to carry out effective defence management and implement Euro-Atlantic standards. The Nordic-Baltic Expert Teams have been assisting especially in parliamentary and public relations, legal issues and civil-military cooperation.[9]

The activities in Ukraine are currently under revision. New areas of cooperation are proposed, for example in the area of environmental issues, while some old ones, such as the working group for civil-military cooperation, will be closed down.

In Georgia, the Initiative was launched in 2009. Increasing the Nordic-Baltic impact on the global security environment was especially important for the Baltic States in the aftermath of the Georgia-Russia conflict in 2008. Since the opening was politically difficult for Finland, which was at the time chairing the Nordic cooperation, a compromise was reached according

[6] http://www.fmn.dk/eng/Documents/LeafletNBI_eng.pdf, 4.9.2010.
7 http://www.fmn.dk/eng/Documents/LeafletNBI_eng.pdf, 4.9.2010.
[8] http://www.fmn.dk/eng/Documents/LeafletNBI_eng.pdf, 4.9.2010.
[9] http://www.fmn.dk/eng/Documents/LeafletNBI_eng.pdf, 4.9.2010.

to which the NBI countries could decide whether they wanted to participate in the activities in Georgia or not.

SSR Activities from the Finnish Point of View

The Finnish defence administration has no separate SSR budget, which makes it very difficult to plan new projects or to join ongoing ones. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has been very helpful with, and interested in, the plans and projects of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the limitations in its funding principles have made it hard for the MFA to assist the MOD financially. ODA-based funding[10] for defence-related activities is basically impossible. This leads to the fact that not only should the MOD, MFA and the Ministry of Interior have a serious discussion about Finnish national goals and funding issues for SSR activities in the future, but they should also include the Defence Forces more closely in the planning and resourcing. The Defence Forces have often been the actor capable of providing competent staff rapidly for defence-related SSR activities.

From time to time, it has been quite embarrassing to sit as a Finn at the same table with other NBI countries when they have presented their goals, and especially their budgets, for SSR activities. Because of the lack of a comprehensive SSR strategy that would enable us to better coordinate our participation in various activities, Finland has practically ended up in a situation where the other countries do not even ask anymore whether we want to join a project or have any plans for new ones. Of course, we should remember that not all SSR activities are defence-related, which leads to the fact that Finland is lacking a comprehensive SSR strategy.

On the other hand, Finland often gets credit from the other countries for not rushing into projects which later turn out to be failures. In this respect, and in the context of International Relations as an academic practice, it can be argued that Finland represents clear-cut rationalist thinking. Recognising that states are still important actors in world politics despite their diminished role compared to international organisations and multinational corporations, we acknowledge the need to work together at different levels and with different actors. In a way, Finland occupies the middle ground between some of its neighbours that strongly emphasise aspects of moral solidarity and others that practise more traditional realist thinking.[11]

Despite the above-mentioned difficulties in fulfilling the aims and goals in SSR-related activities, the following priorities were set by the defence administration for 2010:

1. Participation in the development of the Kosovo Security Force through the NATO Trust Funds.
2. Preparing to take part in the planned support and training operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina by sending experts if needed.
3. Participation with 14 specialists in the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia. Finland does not have any NBI nor bilateral cooperation plan in the field of defence with Georgia.

[10] Official Development Assistance. The main objective of ODA is to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6043, 4.9.2010.
[11] Knutsen 1997, 253–254.

4. Continuing the assistance to Ukraine in the NBI framework. There are no bilateral cooperation plans with the country.
5. Focusing the Finnish participation in civilian crisis management on EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL Afghanistan and EUMM Georgia.
6. Continuing the support to the Afghan security sector.
7. Possible Finnish assistance to Georgia in the NBI will be decided later.

Conclusions

The NBI's approach to SSR activities is pragmatic and flexible. There are no strict rules defining what constitutes an NBI project or any SSR activity in general: instead, the concept provides the participating countries a forum in which new approaches can be freely identified and discussed. The NBI also serves to maximize the limited resources of these countries in a way that has a much greater impact on the grass-root level than might have been possible through an individual approach.

At least for the foreseeable future, the main focus of the Nordic-Baltic Initiative will remain on the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Georgia. The African continent will also feature on the agenda; in 2008, the Nordic Defence Ministers agreed to support African Capacity Building (ACB) by providing support to the Eastern Africa Standby Force. To coordinate these projects, a Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff (NACS) was established in 2009 in Nairobi, Kenya.

Still, without being too critical, it is important to notice that it is often this very flexibility that has led to a situation where all the eight NBI countries have specific projects in areas which they consider to be the most suitable for help and assistance from their own national point of view. For some of the countries, it has also been important to conduct SSR activities by keeping their flags flying high. Because of these reasons, the great idea of cooperation and the use of joint resources have not always been realised. This is an important lesson that we have to learn. New fora for SSR activities are not needed; we just need to put the existing ones under strict revision. We also need to further develop a comprehensive approach to the whole security sector, not only to the armed forces, but also to the police, legal system and other authorities.

References

Books

Knutsen, Torbørn L. 1997. *A History of International Relations Theory*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Internet links

http://www.nordcaps.org/?id=125, 7.9.2010.

http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?s=520, 7.9.2010.

http://www.ambberlin.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/6FF493E4-61E1-429E-ACB5081F7799A224/0/NordicInitiative.pdf, 7.9.2010.

http://www.fmn.dk/eng/Documents/LeafletNBI_eng.pdf, 7.9.2010.

http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6043, 7.9.2010.

http://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Pages/TheNordiccountriesinAfrica.aspx, 7.9.2010.

http://www.nordcaps.org/?id=125, 7.9.2010.

http://www.intermin.fi, 7.9.2010.

http://www.defmin.fi, 7.9.2010.

http://www.formin.fi, 7.9.2010.

The Folke Bernadotte Academy and Security Sector Reform

Michaela Friberg-Storey

Policy Background for Swedish Participation in International SSR Efforts

Sweden's international SSR efforts are carried out jointly by several actors and authorities. The National strategy for Swedish participation in international peace-support and security-building operations[1] is an important basis for these efforts. The strategy was created in 2007 in order to respond to a need for providing general guidance to Sweden's action in international peace-support and security-building operations, based on the Government's objectives in this area. It directs efforts for combined civil and military action in the areas of operation where Sweden takes part.

As a part of the implementation of the strategy, an inter-ministerial Steering Committee for SSR was set up by the Government Offices. The Committee has representatives from the Ministries for Defence, Justice and Foreign Affairs. In order to specify Swedish contributions to SSR, the Committee developed a guiding document on SSR. [2] This document has no formal status as a strategy or policy but is a memorandum complementing the National strategy for Swedish participation in international peace-support and security-building operations, specifically in the area of SSR.

At an agency level, the Steering Committee established the Swedish National Contact Group for Security Sector Reform (NCGSSR) to implement the guiding document as well as to facilitate information sharing and coordination of SSR and SSR-related efforts by relevant Swedish agencies, nationally and internationally. NCGSSR is made up of five governmental agencies: the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Swedish National Defence College, the Swedish National Police, the Swedish Armed Forces, and the Folke Bernadotte Academy.

Recently, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs adopted a policy on security and development[3]. The policy focuses on the importance of both peace and state-building efforts and gives further directions for Swedish engagements within security and justice reform in conflict and post-conflict countries. In order to reach the overarching goal of promoting sustainable peace that enables development, SSR activities are given a special priority. The policy states that Sweden is to pay special attention to SSR in support of the protection of civilians, democratic control mechanisms of the security sector and coordination of security and justice sector efforts.

---

[1] Government Communication 2007/08:51.

[2] Promemoria: *Svensk inriktning avseende säkerhetssektorreform*. No formal translation to English exists.

[3] *Policy för säkerhet och utveckling inom svenskt utvecklingssamarbete* UF/2010/38380/SP. No formal translation to English exists.

Developing an SSR Programme within the Folke Bernadotte Academy

The Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) is a Swedish governmental agency dedicated to improving the quality and effectiveness of international conflict and crisis management, with a particular focus on peace operations. Established in 2002, the FBA functions as a platform for cooperation between Swedish agencies and organisations and their international partners. The FBA also has a mandate to promote capacity development and carry out multifunctional education and training in these areas, and to develop and support method, doctrine and research initiatives. Other engagements and activities include supporting peace projects, carried out by Swedish civil society, and offering good offices for conflict management initiatives, such as facilitated dialogue between parties in conflict. The FBA furthermore, recruits and deploys Swedish civilian staff to a number of international peace operations and missions.

The FBA's Department for Policy, Research and Development (PRD) hosts a number of thematic programmes dedicated to different areas of the agency's core competence, such as the programmes for rule of law (RoL), conflict prevention in practice and disarmament and demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). The FBA's SSR programme was created in 2007 in order to respond to an increased need for coordination and elaboration of Swedish efforts in the area of SSR.

The FBA's Understanding of SSR

Over the past decade SSR has emerged as one of the key areas in which to assist post-conflict and destabilized states. The security sector is critical in promoting peace, stability, rule of law and good governance, and as such preventing countries from lapsing, or re-lapsing, into conflict. The concept of a holistic understanding of SSR has emerged parallel with the notion that security and peace-building need to include a number of actors and processes, both within the military as well as the civilian fields.

SSR is today an important factor in international programmes for development assistance, security cooperation and the promotion of democracy. The FBA's work on SSR is founded on the understanding that a reformed security sector is crucial in creating conditions for sustainable peace, democracy and development. Therefore, SSR should be viewed and implemented in a holistic manner. The SSR programme at the FBA aims to contribute to SSR and the transformation of security institutions, through facilitating these institutions in taking on more efficient, legitimate and accountable roles in society. Gender and human rights are two fundamentally important principles for the implementation of SSR engagements which also include civilian oversight of the security sector.

The SSR work builds on the elementary recognition of adapting programs to the unique context through analysing the specific needs of each country. As a donor, it is important to understand that SSR is not an external program but has to be anchored from within the society. As such, local ownership and commitment is crucial, as SSR initiatives are always carried out in close cooperation with relevant partners in the host country. A whole-

of-government approach to SSR is promoted through cooperation with several agencies, organisations and missions.

As the SSR concept covers a range of areas in a society, it is being constantly developed due to both lessons learned and as a subject within academia. Proper access to both security and justice is a common goal of SSR, not least concerning coming to terms with informal security and justice providers. Therefore, the inter-linkages between security and justice must be recognised.

The FBA's SSR Activities

The FBA is engaged in several SSR-related efforts and activities.

National and international coordination

The FBA carries out the coordination of SSR issues and activities among national and international stakeholders, including the facilitation of national coordination processes at different levels, as well as the participation in international institutions for consultation on SSR issues and training.

The mandate of the above mentioned Swedish National Contact Group for Security Sector Reform is, inter alia, to conduct joint fact-finding and assessment efforts in countries where Sweden aims at supporting national SSR process. The NCGSSR aims to develop the SSR knowledge and capacity of Swedish official institutions through mutual exchange of information and working methods as well as through concrete operations. The NCGSSR also has the task to assist the Government Offices in assessing SSR issues, often with the assistance of institutions who are not permanent members of the NCGSSR. The FBA acts as a focal point for the coordination of the NCGSSR's joint work and convenes and chairs its monthly meetings. The FBA likewise coordinates a broader network of authorities and institutions which meet a few times a year to consult on their respective SSR activities.

The FBA is a member of the International Association for Security Sector Reform Education and Training (ASSET). This is a network of organisations and institutions dedicated to capacity-development in SSR, which continuously develops joint activities, pools training resources, and meets yearly to exchange experiences.

The FBA represents Sweden on the governing board of the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT). ISSAT provides support to the international community to reinforce and strengthen their individual and collective efforts to improve security and justice and builds the capacity of its members to increase effectiveness in support to SSR processes.

Education, capacity-building and training

The FBA carries out education, capacity-building and training on SSR, targeting both practitioners and policy makers. The FBA regularly offers week-long SSR courses, as well as shorter ones, along with training and lectures especially adapted to the needs and requests of

national and international institutions, as well as peace support operations. The FBA gives presentations on SSR on a regular basis, as an integrated part of pre-mission training and other courses given by the Academy.

In the FBA's SSR courses, participants acquire an understanding of the definitions of SSR and how the concept has developed. The guiding principles of SSR are explored as well as concepts for how to develop an integrated approach to SSR in peace operations. The specific challenges and opportunities arising in post-conflict situations are analysed bearing in mind the importance of sustainability. The participants gain insight in several of the key areas of SSR and specific program design, while remaining aware of the holistic approach needed in Security Sector Reform. Participants are provided with the required theoretical knowledge by experienced practitioners. Case studies, interaction between the participants and exchange of experience are also important parts of the course, put in practice through a co-learning methodology that brings out the unique competence of each participant.

Currently, the FBA is, together with international partners, including ISSAT, developing an advanced SSR training programme. This will focus on the methodological aspects of the practical application of principles related to SSR activities and programmes. The advanced training will include tools for, and technical aspects of, assessments, programme design and implementation, as well as monitoring, review and evaluation.

As SSR has become a priority in international operations, the FBA facilitates the joint understanding of the concept of SSR principles in a number of police and military operations, for example through the VIKING exercise[4] and the Multinational Experiment (MNE).

Research and methodologies

The FBA works to develop tools and methodologies that improve the delivery of SSR. For instance, the FBA has, together with the NCGSSR, developed a tool for SSR needs assessment[5], which can be used in background studies and preparations for SSR programming.

The FBA has created and financed an internationally composed working group of eminent scholars in the field of post-conflict SSR. The group promotes research and offers a forum for the exchange of ideas, findings, networking and joint research. In particular, it attempts to promote systematic, rigorous and broad comparative studies, including large-scale field surveys, which are of policy relevance. The ultimate goal is to improve and inform policy.

The FBA contributes actively to SSR policy discussions and the development of appropriate responses to emerging issues and challenges requiring new and effective solutions. In order to contribute to the international discourse on SSR and related issues, the SSR programme participates in international fora and discussions as well as other relevant training and workshops.

[4] In 2011, the 6th VIKING exercise will have a special focus on SSR and DDR.
[5] Swedish Contact Group Security Sector Reform Assessment Framework.

The SSR programme also initiates and commissions studies on different themes related to SSR. Recently, studies on vigilante groups in Liberia[6] and customs in SSR[7] have been completed.

SSR assessments

In 2008 the NCGSSR was assigned by the Government to carry out an assessment of the situation and needs related to the ongoing SSR process in Liberia, and also to report on potential areas of engagement for Sweden. The assessment was carried out with the guidance of the Assessment Framework developed by the NCGSSR and also served as an opportunity to test the tool in the field. Following the suggestions of this assessment, an SSR expert has been appointed to Liberia in order to coordinate the different Swedish engagements related to SSR. Similar studies are planned to proceed in 2010 and 2011, in a number of partner countries.

Operational support and contributions within the SSR framework

The FBA can contribute not only through capacity building, but also through operational support within the framework of SSR missions and projects. For instance, the FBA has received the task, in several Swedish development cooperation strategies, of contributing to capacity development and operational initiatives within SSR, over the next few years.

One of the countries where the FBA is involved is Afghanistan where, in the national strategy for cooperation with Afghanistan[8], it has been given a mandate to contribute to the support of strengthening local capacity within the area of SSR and RoL. Following broad consultation and needs assessment, the FBA has presented a project proposal of possible activities to be undertaken in cooperation with other actors in the region.

The FBA also has long-standing engagement in Africa and has, on a regional level, supported the African Union (AU), for example in training. In relation to SSR, the FBA has financially supported the SSR unit at AU. The FBA has been an associated partner to the Zimbabwe Peace and Security Program (ZPSP) since it was established in 2009. The program aims at contributing, through the provision of impartial and professional technical assistance, to effective and sustainable modernization and transformation of the security sector in Zimbabwe. The FBA has facilitated capacity-building in SSR for the Steering Committee as well as other capacity-building initiatives.

In the national strategy for Sweden's cooperation with South Africa[9], the FBA is given the opportunity to develop competence in conflict and crises management, with particular focus on peacekeeping missions, in cooperation with corresponding partners in South Africa, through training, capacity building and research.

The FBA seconds Swedish staff (currently more than 90 persons) to a large number of missions and peace operations which work with SSR as part of a broader peace-building

[6] Kantor and Persson 2010.
[7] Publication forthcoming.
[8] Samarbetsstrategi: Afghanistan 2009–2013/UD 10.022. No formal translation to English exists.
[9] Strategi för Sveriges samlade samarbete med Sydafrika 2009–s2013/UD 09.113. No formal translation to English exists.

agenda. These include National Security Advisor to EUSR Kirgizstan and strategic positions within EULEX Kosovo. The FBA also deploys Civilian Observers to the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, who operate in Joint Monitoring Teams, in support of the International Security and Stabilization Strategy (ISSS) for Eastern DRC.

Challenges and Promises

As the focus on SSR continues to grow, the FBA receives more requests for assistance. The FBA has grown significantly since it was established in 2002, both in size and responsibilities. Faced with further national and international development and common recognition of the SSR concept, the FBA needs to be flexible and adaptive. Even though the SSR unit was established as late as 2007, the developments have been significant and need to continue.

Just as cooperation is crucial in SSR processes, constructive national coordination needs to be taken further into the field. During the last few years, the whole-of-government aspects of SSR have received increased attention. Whole-of-government coordination takes place both in donor and host countries, and it is important to facilitate and contribute to the development of political will for the process among different governmental actors in the host country. Sometimes, however, whole-of-government coordination takes place within the donor countries but is overlooked within the host countries themselves. Having said that, in the view of the FBA, it is also important to take into consideration that a great part of the advantage with a whole-of-government approach lies in information sharing and coordination, not necessarily in a whole-of-government implementation. It is seldom desirable, or possible, for each donor to implement a full SSR, covering all the sub-sectors. With a whole-of-government approach to the coordination of efforts however, a comprehensive complementary SSR reform with local ownership is enabled.

In a constantly changing globalised world, actors participating in international peace-building efforts need to pay attention to the local contexts in which they work, and be perceptive to learning from others. Above all, there is a need to further merge academia and the practitioners working with SSR, to ensure mutual reinforcement and improve practices and develop processes according to the lessons learned.

References

Books

Kantor, Ana and Persson, Mariam. 2010. *Understanding Vigilantism, Informal Security Providers and Security Sector Reform in Liberia.*

Documents

Government Communication 2007, *Nationell strategi för svenskt deltagande i internationell freds- och säkerhetsfrämjande verksamhet,* 2007/08:51, Stockholm.

Promemoria 2007, *Svensk inriktning avseende säkerhetssektorreform,* 17 December, Stockholm.

Government Policy 2010, *Policy för säkerhet och utveckling inom svenskt utvecklingssamarbete,* UF/2010/38380/SP, Stockholm.

FBA Publication 2010, *Swedish Contact Group Security Sector Reform Assessment Framework*.

Government Policy 2009, *Samarbetsstrategi: Afghanistan 2009–2013*, UD 10.022, Stockholm.

Government Policy 2009, *Strategi för Sveriges samlade samarbete med Sydafrika 2009–2013*, UD 09.113, Stockholm.

Security Sector Reform and the European Union

Antti Kaski

According to the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the EU principles on development policy, Security Sector Reform (SSR) is an integral part of the EU's engagement in different areas of the world[1]. The commitment to conflict prevention, post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction was reiterated in the report on the implementation of the ESS[2]. At the same time, to balance the focus on security, the EU has insisted on working to "build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity", and flagged commitment to "long-term engagement which is the ultimate requirement for lasting stabilization"[3]. The EU views SSR from a perspective of comprehensive security and as a flexible approach applicable from short to long term.

In a complex system such as the European Union, any concept manifests in multiple ways and this is also the case with SSR. Although defined in various EU concept documents and working papers[4], SSR can hardly be considered a coherent EU policy. It is rather used as a framework or a "check list" for various types of action in support of peace and security in countries outside the EU. This is not, by any means, to say that there is a fundamental problem in the SSR work carried out by the EU, but rather the contrary. The value of the SSR approach is in turning the policy-makers' attention to this fundamental cluster of security-related domains of the society. It aims to bring together the various instruments, from development aid to military crisis management operations, in order to support the country and people in question. In this way, the SSR approach broadens the state security discourse through applying the comprehensive security concept[5], and thus includes the concern of human security[6].

In this article, I will take a look at the way the EU approaches SSR both in its conceptual undertakings and in practice, touching upon the work done by the European Commission, in justice and home affairs (the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice), and in the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU (CSDP). It is apparent that SSR is rising in importance in EU engagement in countries outside the Union. At the same time, there is a growing demand for cooperation, coordination and coherence. This may be facilitated by the eventual functioning of the European External Action Service (EEAS). I will also touch upon the role of Member States, including Finland, within and in relation to the SSR work of the EU, discussing the responsibilities SSR, as supported by the EU, creates for the Member States (MSs) and how the MSs could best respond to these requirements.

[1] Council of the European Union 2003; Official Journal of the European Union 2006/C 46/01.
[2] Council of the European Union 2008.
[3] Council of the European Union 2008.
[4] Notably: Council of the European Union 2005a; 2005b; 2006a; Commission of the European Communities 2006.
[5] On comprehensive security, see, for example: Buzan & Hansen 2007, Vol. 3 & 4.
[6] On human security, see: United Nations Development Programme 1994; Commission on Human Security 2003; Glasius & Kaldor 2005.

Security Sector Reform as Defined by the EU

In its SSR approach, the EU builds on the work of more experienced agencies in the field, namely the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD and the United Nations, both of which define the security sector in relatively broad terms[7]. Based on the OECD DAC definition, a security sector, as viewed by the EU, encompasses not only the traditional state core security actors (e.g. military, police, border guards, intelligence), the justice institutions (e.g. judiciary, prisons, prosecution), and the non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security companies, guerrillas), but also more generally the democratic principles, transparency, the rule of law, and relations to the civil society in the field. Building especially on the UN definition, the EU also forges links between the security sector and the wider field of stabilisation and reconstruction such as transitional justice, disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants, small arms and light weapons control, and human rights[8]. Importantly, the OECD and the UN emphasise the responsibility of every state to determine their own priorities in the SSR.

Hence, the EU, on the one hand, refers to a broad definition of the security sector and, subsequently, is active in SSR through various forms of pre-accession assistance, development cooperation, conflict prevention and crisis management support and operations[9]. For example, according to the relevant EU documents, the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of former combatants is an integral part of Security Sector Reform.

On the other hand, it appears that the practical EU action in the field has often focused on providing support to the core security actors and the judicial institutions. However, this apparent discrepancy between the broad concepts and the more focused or narrowly defined support operations may not entirely correspond with the whole reality of EU work, because much of the pre-accession assistance provided to future EU Member States and the development cooperation, both financed by the European Commission, is often not referred to as SSR work, whereas the CSDP, by definition, is involved in issues of security. Hence, often only the CSDP operations are viewed as supporting the SSR.

The principle of local ownership by the authorities of states in fragile situations also tends to put more emphasis on the building of, say, capable and equipped military and police forces than on the engagement with the civil society or human security. A government on the brink of war or civil unrest is more likely to ask for instant security force capability than to focus on prison conditions or long-term development goals. Considering the broadness and the certain ambiguity of the SSR approach, it seems safe to conclude that although the EU follows the OECD and the UN in its conception of SSR, the work the EU carries out under the SSR label, in particular within the CSDP, is more focused on supporting the core security actors and the judicial institutions.

According to the EU Concept on the SSR[10], the EU action is guided by a set of principles including i) democratic oversight, transparency and accountability; ii) local ownership; iii) a broad, coherent and multi-functional approach that addresses wider governance and security

[7] See especially: OECD 2005; 2007; United Nations Development Programme 1994.
[8] United Nations Security Council 2007.
[9] See also: EU Presidency 2007.
[10] Council of the European Union 2005a; 2005b; Commission of the European Communities 2006.

concerns of the people; iv) approach tailored to specific needs of a country, its people and the political environment; v) coordination within the EU and with other international actors; and vi) measurement of progress and the lessons learned.

Security Sector Reform as EU Policy and Action

The individual Member States' national policies aside, the EU is involved in SSR mainly through European Commission instruments, in justice and home affairs (the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice), and through the CSDP. The Commission is engaged in SSR-related support in numerous countries on all continents. It has supported reform in countries and regions in immediate post-conflict situations and those undergoing long-term democratisation processes. The Commission Instrument for Stability and the African Peace Facility have become important financing sources in the field as they can be used more flexibly in response to acute crisis situations than the regular development assistance. The Commission has also supported work in the field of SSR through its various other financial instruments such as MEDA (to countries in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership), TACIS (*to countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States*), ALA (to developing countries in Asia and Latin America.), EDF (to African, Caribbean and Pacific states and overseas countries and territories), etc. Most of the Commission's SSR work falls within the official development assistance (ODA) as agreed at the OECD DAC. The European Commission's overall ODA has been increasing and has annually reached more than 10 billion euros since 2008[11].

In the EU justice and home affairs – i.e. the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ), the focus is on issues such as terrorism, organised crime including trafficking in human beings and drugs, corruption, and management of migratory flows. Obviously, all of these also have an external dimension[12]. The geographic priorities for the external dimension of FSJ include: EU enlargement (help to adjust to the acquis); transatlantic dialogue; implementation of the Common Space on FSJ with Russia; Western Balkans stabilisation; implementation of FSJ Work Plans (or similar) with countries of European Neighbourhood Policy and countries with EU Association Agreements or Partnership and Cooperation Agreements; and developing a JLS aspect in relations with China and India. The thematic objectives in FSJ include cooperation on border management; law enforcement cooperation on combating terrorism and organised crime; judicial cooperation; and assisting judiciary and judicial reform. The EU also aims at deepening relations with international organisations in the area of FSJ[13].

Although the Commission is by far the biggest funder of development assistance among the EU institutions, SSR has been most discussed within the domain of the CSDP. According to the EU Concept for CSDP support to SSR[14], the EU may undertake military and civilian operations and integrated civil-military actions for conflict prevention and crisis management. These may be conducted in an immediate post-conflict situation, in a transition and stabilisation phase or in a stable environment complementing Commission assistance.

[11] http:// www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/ 17/ 9/ 44981892. pdf, 24 July 2010; European Commission 2010.
[12] See also: Council of the European Union 2010.
[13] http:// ec.europa.eu/ justice_home/ fsj/ external/ fsj_external_intro_en.htm, 24 July 2010.
[14] Council of the European Union 2005b.

The EU Concept refers to a multitude of possible areas of SSR activities performed through CSDP[15]. These could include support for defence reform with the focus on defining defence policy, planning, structures and administration; training of armed forces (incl. in democratic principles, international law, and human rights); and equipping the armed forces e.g/i.e through establishing mechanisms for procurement, maintenance, financial regulations etc. Another area for possible SSR support within the CSDP is the police sector, including the relevant non-statutory bodies, through assessment of policing needs, defining objectives of a policing policy fully integrated in the rule of law (RoL) sector; organising and educating the police sector; guiding in daily tasks; and launching public awareness campaigns.

The CSDP action can also be directed to the strengthening of justice/rule of law elements in the SSR. This may, similarly to the defence and police sectors, include assistance in identifying needs, reorganisation and education, equipping the facilities; enhancing public awareness; as well as assisting in drafting the legislation; developing emergency RoL mechanisms and transitional justice institutions; and promoting the rights of victims. In addition, the CSDP action may support the border and customs sectors or focus on the financial and budgetary aspects of the SSR. Finally, an essential element of the SSR can be the support of the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation of combatants.

The Concept for CSDP support to SSR emphasises the need of a UN Security Council resolution or an invitation by a host partner state or international or regional organisation as the legal basis for an EU action. The SSR action would be set up under the political control and strategic guidance of the Political and Security Committee of the EU. The details of the specific operations are defined case by case, but following the various guidelines – on security, recruitment, civil-military coordination, gender equality, financing, procurement, chain of command, public information strategy, etc. – agreed in different instances of the Council of the EU. In addition, the EU aims at both close coordination and cooperation with countries outside the EU and international organisations, and including third states' personnel in its operations.

Security Sector Reform and CSDP Operations

The best examples of CSDP action in the field of SSR include the crisis management operations in Guinea Bissau and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Although the EU has been engaged with SSR for a long time, including through the CSDP, the recently ended civilian crisis management mission, EU SSR Guinea Bissau was, remarkably, the first EU operation to carry the phrase "SSR" in its name. The mission was to focus on providing advice and assistance in the implementation of the National Security Sector Reform Strategy. Particular emphasis was given to finalising basic legislation underpinning the new security structures in the sectors of defence, police and justice. Another good example, the operation EUSEC RDC, is to provide advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in defence reform. The EUSEC is also to help in preventing and addressing human rights violations, especially focusing on the fight against sexual violence and children affected by armed conflict. The sister operation of the EUSEC, the EUPOL RDC, supports the Congolese

[15] Council of the European Union 2005b.

authorities in police reform, including the human rights and judicial aspects related to policing.

In fact, due to the very nature of the Common Security and Defence Policy, all CSDP operations either focus on some aspects of SSR or have an SSR element in their mandate16. The operation EUTM Somalia, situated in Uganda, supports the training of security forces for the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. The naval operation EU NAVFOR Atalanta focuses on the prevention of piracy off the coast of Somalia, but is also, albeit to a lesser extent, engaged in supporting coast guard authorities in the region. The military crisis management operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina is to contribute to the stability and security of the country by its presence, and has non-executive capacity-building and training support tasks. As part of the EU support to the SSR in Bosnia Herzegovina, the EUPM mission assists the local authorities in the police reform process. The largest EU civilian crisis management mission EULEX Kosovo aims to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs areas.

The main tasks of the civilian crisis management mission EUMM Georgia are to monitor and analyse the compliance of the conflict parties with the ceasefire agreement and the situation of the internally displaced persons and refugees, and contribute to the reduction of tensions through confidence-building measures. The EUJUST LEX is to train Iraqi judges and prosecutors; whereas the mandates of the two CSDP missions in the Middle East, the EUPOL COPPS and the EUBAM Rafah, are, respectively, to provide support to the Palestinian Authority in the policing arrangements and the criminal justice sector; and to be ready, if the political situation allows, to monitor the operations of the Rafah border crossing point on the border between Israel and Gaza.

Finally, in its framework of a "Comprehensive approach towards Afghanistan", the EU launched the EUPOL Afghanistan mission to contribute to the establishment of civilian policing arrangements in the country through monitoring, mentoring, advising and training at the level of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, regions and provinces. The mission also aims at working to improve the broader rule of law, especially to support the justice reform.

The main challenges for CSDP operations – and more generally, capacity building missions aiming to support the SSR – lay both in the local conditions such as a difficult security situation and the fragility of the governance structures, and in factors related to the functioning of the mission. The latter include challenges in the coordination within the EU and with the MSs as well as with other relevant international actors, especially the UN, and in some cases the African Union, NATO, or the US, for example; and the lack of adequate resources that can both prevent missions from reaching their objectives on the ground and translate into a loss of political influence at the strategic level[17].

[16] For an overview of CSDP operations, see for example: http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/ showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en, 24 July 2010.
[17] See, for example: Gross 2009.

The Future of SSR in EU External Action and the Role of the Member States

Both the formal decisions taken by the Council of the EU and the observations about the trends in EU support to third countries back the argument of an expansive EU engagement in area of SSR. This has also increased the pressure on the Member States to provide adequate capabilities for the assistance activities. Much of the SSR work is financed by the Commission and conducted by various intergovernmental organisations, such as institutions of the UN family and non-governmental organisations. However, when it comes to the CSDP actions, the situation is different as the recruitment of personnel to civilian and military CSDP operations directly draws on the resources of the MSs. The difficulty to find qualified professionals in the fields of, for example, justice or penitentiary, has been carefully noted both in the EU and in the MSs, but it has been difficult to find quick solutions to the problem. Some MSs have created national strategies[18] which include the enhancement of personnel resources through more efficient recruitment and career development.

The gap between the political will to deploy and the lack of adequate personnel is amplified in situations where there is a need to send support more rapidly. The Council decided in 2008 to create deployable European Expert teams in the field of SSR. This followed suit in the creation of Civilian Response Teams some years ago. The essential elements are an up-to-date roster of experts with adequate profiles and advance training.

Another main challenge is to better coordinate the actions with relevant actors outside the EU, between the EU institutions and the MSs, and within the EU. First of all, it is worth reiterating that it is the role of the host country to lead the SSR. However, when outside support in the coordination is needed – as often may be the case – the UN is in the leading position unless the local government and the international actors have agreed on a different division of labour.

Within the EU, including between the EU institutions and the MSs, there has been increasing attention given to a more coherent external action. In case actions take place in an area where the Council has appointed an EU Special Representative, he or she should ensure the overall political coordination of EU actions on the ground. However, there are both very good and less encouraging examples of internal EU coordination on the ground. In the field, personal relations often seem to play a greater role than formal arrangements that at least do not prohibit a meaningful interaction between different EU players.

On the level of strategy and planning, there are various guidelines and concept documents aiming at more effective coordination between the different institutions, namely between the Commission activities and the CSDP operations. However, only recently the coordination within the EU seems to have more substantially improved. This may be due to the increased attention to coordination and the joint guidelines and strategies subsequently adopted, as well as the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the prospect of a functioning European External Action Service (EEAS) comprising the main part of the Commission's external relations and the CSDP (among other substantial parts of the General Secretariat of the Council). The plausible prospect is that the policy coherence will be greatly improved with

[18] For example: Finland's National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management 2008.

the establishment of the EEAS, including through the role of Catherine Ashton as the Head of the EEAS, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the Vice President of the European Commission.

The Lisbon Treaty does not, nevertheless, change the competencies between the Council and the Commission. Interestingly, there has already been increased discussion on whether certain activities should be carried out by the Commission or as CSDP action. For example, the border management support at Rafah has been a CSDP mission, whereas the EU border assistance mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine is conducted by the Commission. As the CSDP mission of SSR Guinea Bissau ended, many activities were planned to be continued by the European Union delegation in Guinea Bissau, the former Commission delegation. There seems to be both financial and political reasons why some activities have fallen into the domain of the Commission and others to the Council. Commission action may be financed by one of the Commission's financial instruments, whereas the Civilian CSDP missions draw on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget of the EU. The treaty reserves the action with military implications to be conducted only by the Member States and therefore all the military operations have to be financed by the MSs outside the EU budget.

Finally, a reference needs again to be made to the security-development nexus and the comprehensive approach. One reason to develop the SSR approach was to try to enhance the dialogue between the development community and the traditional security sector players in the donor countries. The development was supported by the widening of the security concept towards the understanding of comprehensive security and human security. As a consequence, there is also an increasing number of actors such as the World Bank and the IMF studying their possibilities to influence or support the SSR. The EU is developing a comprehensive approach to crisis management and individual countries are establishing whole-of-government policies and comprehensive crisis management units to lead more coherent external policies in the field – a good example being the Stabilisation Unit of the UK Government. This development is very welcome as it is reasonable to plan and execute coherently, together with all relevant actors, any SSR action on the ground – at the same time respecting the particularities of the different sectors and expertise of professionals, be they, say, military, police, justice, or humanitarian personnel.

References

Buzan, Barry & Hansen, Lene (eds.). 2007. *International security*, Vol. 3 & 4. London: Sage.

Commission of the European Communities. 2006. *A Concept for the European Community Support for Security Sector Reform.* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. COM(2006) 253 final.

Commission on Human Security. 2003. *Human Security Now*. New York: Commission on Human Security.

Council of the European Union. 2003. *A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Security Strategy*.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, 20.7.2010.

Council of the European Union. 2005a. *Initial Elements for an EU Security Sector Reform (SSR) Concept*. 11241/05.

Council of the European Union. 2005b. *EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)*. 12566/4/05.

Council of the European Union. 2006. *Council Conclusions on a Policy framework for Security sector reform*. 2736th General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 12.6.2006.

Council of the European Union. 2008. *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World*. S407/08.
http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/ ueDocs/ cms_Data/ docs/ pressdata/ EN/ reports/ 104630.pdf, 20.7.2010.

Council of the European Union. 2010. *Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: "Towards a European Security Model".* 5842/2/10. http:// register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/ en/ 10/ st05/ st05842-re02.en10.pdf, 20.7.2010.

EU Presidency. 2007. *EU Presidency Statement - United Nations Security Council: Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Role of the Security Council in Supporting Security Sector Reform*. PRES07-013EN. http:// www.europa-eu-un.org/ articles/ en/ article_6788_en.htm, 20.7.2010.

European Commission. 2010. *EU Donor Profiles*. Accompanying document to COM(2010) 159, SEC(2010) 418, SEC(2010) 419, SEC(2010) 420, SEC(2010) 421, SEC(2010) 422. http:// ec.europa.eu/ development/ icenter/ repository/ eu_donors_profiles_2010.pdf, 24.7.2010.

Glasius, Marlies & Kaldor, Mary. 2005. *Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Project, Principles and Practicalities*. London: Routledge.

Gross, Eva. 2009. *Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the EU's Contribution*. Occasional Paper 78, April 2009. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.

http:// ec.europa.eu/ justice_home/ fsj/ external/ fsj_external_intro_en.htm, 24.7.2010. *Justice, freedom and security – an important element in the EU's relations with third countries*. European Commission.

http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/ showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en, 24.7.2010. *EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)*. Council of the European Union.

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/9/44981892.pdf, 24.7.2010. *Table 1: Net official development assistance in 2009. Preliminary data for 2009.* OECD.

Ministry of the Interior. 2008. *Finland's National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management.* Approved by the Finnish Government on 28 August 2008.

OECD. 2005. *Security System Reform and Governance*. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series.

OECD. 2007. *OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform (SSR). Supporting Security and Justice*.

Official Journal of the European Union. 2006/C 46/01. Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: 'The European Consensus'.

United Nations Development Programme. 1994. *New Dimensions of Human Security*. Human Development Report. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

United Nations Security Council. 2007. *Statement by the President of the Security Council*. 20 February 2007, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security: role of the Security Council in supporting security sector reform".

PART III:
SSR in Practice: Challenges of State-building

SSR and State-building

Olli Ruohomäki

The capacity of fragile states, suffering from the legacy of armed violence, to perform their basic functions is often weak. Security, rule of law, taxation, service delivery, as well as the management of economic development and the environment are functions that require assistance from the international actors that engage with fragile states and situations. The establishment, reform and consolidation of these functions are key elements in the state-building process.

This article briefly examines the impact of donor interventions in the field of security as part of the state-building process. In particular the essay reflects on the key issues that donors face in relation to their impact on a state's consolidation of security. The prospects of successful state-building hinge on the effectiveness of Security Sector Reform. One of the key messages of the article is that there is much to be learned from the field of development policies and practices regarding the concepts of aid effectiveness, coherence of assistance, ownership and sustainability.

Security as Part of the Development Agenda

Security is fundamental to people's livelihoods, reducing poverty, and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It relates to personal and state safety, access to social services, and political processes. Security is crucial for improved governance. Ineffective security structures and mechanisms contribute to a climate of fear, give rise to authoritarian leadership and corruption, and affect negatively on poverty reduction. Addressing security issues has become part and parcel of the broader human security agenda.

There is broad agreement within contemporary development discourse, which deals with state fragility and stabilisation, that there needs to be a monopoly of violence that is subject to democratic control, respect for human rights, and principles of good governance. OECD governments have agreed on the need to help partner countries establish appropriate security structures and mechanisms, to manage change through peaceful means. Security Sector Reform (SSR) is an essential part of this assistance.

Assisting countries emerging from violent conflict is a real challenge. This is particularly true in the security sector. There is a set of issues that donors grapple with, which include: 1) context, coherence of assistance and aid effectiveness; 2) the strategic trade-offs between geopolitical objectives and individual state security; 3) the issue of fragile political settlements and the emerging security sector; 4) ownership and sustainability of the security sector. This article, addressing primarily the armed forces and the police sectors of SSR, draws, to a large extent, on policy debates under the rubric of the OECD Development Assistance Committee's work on conflict and fragility, with additional reflections of the author's personal experiences from various conflict zones.

Context, Coherence of Assistance and Aid Effectiveness

Context

International actors need to have an in-depth knowledge of the specific context in each situation they become involved in and develop a shared understanding of the responses that are needed. There are qualitative differences between post-conflict countries, as in deteriorating governance environments, countries experiencing gradual improvement in terms of governance environments, and those undergoing a prolonged crisis. Sound political analysis is needed to understand the different constraints of political will, capacity and legitimacy in each situation. This is particularly relevant to security issues, which are inherently sensitive. Interventions must be judged for their impact on security, conflict, poverty, and domestic reform. Furthermore, it is crucial that the political economy of the conflict is well understood by the actors concerned. Such questions as who controls the resources, how they are divided, what is the logic in decision-making, how tradition affects local politics, who are the drivers of change, how are public positions filled, and so on, must be asked to mitigate against adverse effects of outside interventions. There are no blue-print approaches. Institutional designs need to be based on "tailoring and stitching" from existing local and national resources and available mechanisms.

Coherence of assistance

Military assistance has often been dealt with within donor countries by military and diplomatic authorities. Trade interests may at times figure in the background. In most cases military assistance has been poorly connected to the authorities in charge of development assistance. For example, the creation of a national army in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) came to a halt, largely because of disjointed interventions of a variety of external actors both in OECD and non-OECD countries. Different donor agencies provided support to different units within a dysfunctional army, where there was no unified chain of command. When individual donors deal with individual units, on a bilateral basis, it should be obvious that the resulting training programmes and other assistance do not add up to a coherent up-to-standard package.

In contrast to the situation in the DRC, Sierra Leone's SSR has been dubbed as a major success story. This is attributed to the fact that one single donor, namely the United Kingdom, has employed a holistic approach to the security sector (army, prisons and border control).

Recognition of the connection between security and development issues in addressing state fragility has led to the rise of SSR processes and efforts by the OECD DAC to develop common approaches. In addition, the introduction of "whole-of-government" approaches, involving those responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance within donor countries to address the disconnections between various actors, is a significant step forward.

It should be noted that the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to support some aspects of SSR, namely the armed forces, remains restricted. Hence, non-ODA sources need to be used to support activities in this area. Some countries, such as the Netherlands and the

United Kingdom, have established financial instruments that combine ODA and non-ODA funds to provide rapid and flexible support for activities at the juncture of peace, security and development. Finland does not have such a financial instrument, but nearly 90% of the funds that are allocated to civilian crisis management activities are reported as ODA. Nonetheless, more joint analysis, joint missions, joint training missions, and the fostering of integrated planning would further enhance the "whole-of-government" approach.

Aid effectiveness

Aid effectiveness (i.e. co-ordination, harmonisation of policies and procedures, an effective division of labour among actors working in a partner country, aligning assistance behind government strategies, avoiding the development of parallel systems without thought to transition mechanisms and long-term capacity development) is part and parcel of contemporary development policies and practices, but the interventions in the field of security lag behind in this respect. Development cooperation is traditionally based on an understanding that change is a slow process and that obstacles are structural in nature. This implies long-term engagement with various kinds of local actors, both state and non-state, and factoring in the risk of various setbacks. In addition, development actors emphasize proper consultative planning processes and stress the time it requires to build sustainable mechanisms to manage conflict through the establishment of resilient political and service delivery systems. One of the lessons in terms of aid effectiveness is the importance of identifying functioning systems within existing local institutions and working to strengthen them. The above example of the lack of success in the Security Sector Reform of the DRC is a clear example of little consideration being given to these basic principles of aid effectiveness. Hence, there is much to be learned from the field of development policies and practices that must be studied and adapted to suit the specific needs of assistance to the security sector. Failure to learn from experiences in the sphere of development assistance risks failure in SSR.

Geopolitical Objectives versus State Security

Experiences from Afghanistan and Rwanda point to the fact that the geopolitical objectives of donor countries have not necessarily been conducive to building the security sector of the countries concerned. On the other hand, the reverse appears to be the case in Palestine. In Afghanistan, geopolitical objectives – in particular the "war on terror" – have initially figured more prominently on the agenda of the international actors than reconstructing a national army and an effective police force. The aim of ensuring short-term stability, and fighting the Taliban, meant that donor countries funded local strongmen and tribal leaders. Only later did the creation of a national army and a police force rise to the forefront of the SSR agenda, although the success record has been mixed. The problem here is that once local strongmen and tribal leaders have been supported by the international actors it becomes difficult to deter them from pursuing their interests through armed action. The creation of a monopoly of violence, subject to democratic controls in the case of Afghanistan, has become almost a "mission impossible".

In the case of Rwanda the international actors have hesitated in providing long-term support for the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF), as there have been fears that such support would empower it to invade Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and further destabilise the fragile situation in the Great Lakes region. It is worth noting that Rwanda maintains a larger army than it ideally would like to. This is due to the regional conflict dynamics and the legacies of the recent past. However, the RDF is involved in establishing companies that build and repair roads, which generate income and maintain the livelihoods of its soldiers. As regards Palestine, the ongoing Security Sector Reform, with a focus on building the capacity of the civil police and the judiciary, is directly linked to the international support of the Palestinian Authority. This is essentially about state-building and it appears, that for the time being such support contributes to the stability of the Palestinian territories, which in turn advances the wider geopolitical objectives of promoting peace in the Middle East.

The examples of Afghanistan and Rwanda illustrate the fact that it is difficult to pursue both geopolitical objectives and state security at the same time. Securing short-term peace does not necessarily lead to longer-term stability. In some cases the geostrategic objectives of donors may even compete with each other, as is the case with the involvement of China and the United States in Africa.

Fragile Political Settlements and the Emerging Security Sector

In most post-conflict situations, the international community involved in stabilisation operations is faced with immense pressure to support the process of forging a political settlement to end violence and achieve short-term peace. In many cases the achieved political settlements are problematic, mainly because they are not inclusive and contain the seeds of renewed violence and insecurity. The role and nature of the emerging security sector remains a key issue. In the interest of short-term peace, Ministries of Defence and Interior are often allowed to be captured by powerful local strongmen who continue their predatory activities. Consequently, the process of building a legitimate and accountable security sector is stymied from the start. In some cases, one of the parties of the conflict is not fully integrated into the state security sector.

In Afghanistan, a strategic mistake was made when the Taliban were not included in the Bonn Process. This gave them the incentive to pursue violence in an attempt to alter the political settlement. It is worth noting that only now, over eight years later, is there talk about engaging with the Taliban in dialogue. At the same time the powerful warlords of the Northern Alliance were supported by the international community in the hope of securing the short-term peace of key areas in their control. In addition, donors and the Afghan government allowed the capture of the Ministry of Interior by a succession of warlords, paving the way to further difficulties in building an accountable and effective Afghanistan National Police.

In Nepal the peace agreement of 2006, that ended years of violence between Maoist insurgents and the government, not only called for the integration of members of the People's Liberation Army into the security forces, but also suggested attractive packages for those who would be rehabilitated. In addition, the peace agreement stipulated the democratisation and civilian control of the army. However, as of 2010, the reform of the security sector has hardly begun and most of the Maoists remain in cantonment sites waiting for the process to move forward.

Ownership and Sustainability of the Security Sector

Ownership

It should be obvious that if there is little partner-country ownership and leadership in SSR the results and impact of any external support will not carry far. Ownership begins with a strong expression and commitment of the political will of the leadership to carry out reform measures. A successful SSR programme is rooted in the reforming country's history, culture, legal framework and institutions. Issues of corruption may figure in the background and must be tackled forcefully. For example, there are cases where there are "ghost" soldiers or police on the rosters, with commanders collecting extra pay. In some instances, when SSR is not fully on the national agenda, civil society involvement can open entry points for dialogue. For example, in El Salvador, civil society mobilisation to document the extent and effects of armed violence on the population produced compelling results that catalysed government involvement to address the problems raised by activists. In Palestine, the NGO, Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), has involved Palestinian civil society in consultations concerning what kind of security force, particularly civil police, is needed. This process has helped to address the legitimacy deficit of the security forces, that has been prevalent in Palestinian society.

Sustainability

The sustainability of an accountable and effective security sector is very much linked to financial sustainability, organisational structures and management processes, not just training or equipping the security forces. There are constant tensions between the reduction of fiscal deficits and increases in security expenditure. A properly planned and managed security system assists governments in allocating scarce public resources cost-effectively.

A discussion with locals in Kashmir, 2008. Photo: Mika Kalmari.

In the case of fragile states these questions are especially pertinent as the capacity of the state to generate funds to sustain the public sector tends to be weak. For example, in the case of Afghanistan, there has been much debate about the size of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and the need to increase the number in order to take on the security responsibility from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The current size is 134,000 with the aim of doubling the number in the near future. Much less attention has been drawn to the question of how the fledging Afghan government will be able to pay for the investments and expenditures required by the ANA. In a similar vein, one of the points of contention in the potential integration of Maoists into the Nepalese army is the question of what constitutes an appropriate size of the armed forces for post-conflict Nepal. The current size of the army is approximately 95,000 and there remain approximately 19,000 Maoists, to be integrated into the security services. Both Afghanistan and Nepal face immense challenges in basic service delivery (i.e. water and sanitation, education and health provision, and infrastructure) for the needs of the civilian population, and hence the costs of the security sector cannot be considered without reference to the needs of other sectors.

References

OECD DAC. 2005. *Security System Reform and Governance*. Paris: OECD.

OECD DAC. 2007a. *Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.* Paris: OECD.

OECD DAC. 2007b. *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States*. Paris: OECD.

OECD DAC. 2008. *Concepts and Dilemmas of State-Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience*. OECD: Paris.

OECD DAC. 2009a. *Journal on Development.* Paris: OECD.

OECD DAC. 2009b. *Armed Violence Reduction – Enabling Development*. Paris: OECD.

OECD DAC. 2010. *Do No Harm – International Support for Statebuilding*. Paris: OECD.

Ruohomäki, Olli. 2005. The Bad Governance Challenge Facing Fragile States. In Olli Ruohomäki (ed.) *Development in an Insecure World: New Threats to Human Security and their Implications for Aid Policy*. Elements for Discussion Series. Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Helsinki.

Ruohomäki, Olli. 2008. Broader Perspectives: Good International Engagement in Fragile States. In Oskari Eronen (ed.) *Needs of Comprehensiveness: Building Blocks for Finnish Crisis Management.* Fincent Publication Series 1. Finnish Defence Forces International Centre: Tuusula.

Ruohomäki, Olli. 2009. Striving for Balanced Approaches in Crisis Management: Reflections on Organisational Cultures. In Susanne Ådahl (ed.) *Varying Cultures in Modern Crisis Management.* Fincent Publication Series 1. Finnish Defence Forces International Centre: Tuusula.

Supporting Economic Development through Security Sector Reform

Pauliina Törmä

Introduction

In peace operations, the efforts to enhance security and development are inextricably linked.[1] As missions have grown in length and complexity, it has become impossible to view their different sectors as separate or sequential. Rather, the various efforts take place simultaneously and affect one another in numerous ways. While this is often seen as a vicious circle – the lack of security preventing economic development and the lack of development fuelling violence – the situation also opens up new opportunities for mutual benefits for security and development actors in peace operations.

In 2008, twelve International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troop contributing nations, representing approximately 70% of the troops in Afghanistan, spent more than $12 billion in support of the ISAF.[2] The amount exceeded the Afghan GDP[3] and was more than twice as much as the total official development aid net disbursements for Afghanistan.[4] Since 2008, the number of ISAF-troops has gone up from 50,000 to 120,000, suggesting that the spending on ISAF operations has further increased in the past two years.

While economic development is not the responsibility of military actors, the sheer magnitude of ISAF spending in Afghanistan implies that the military presence can have significant economic implications – both positive and negative. Restoring peace and security is the foremost task of security actors, but the funds allocated for military operations as well as Security Sector Reform (SSR) may also function as a much needed stimulus for the nascent post-conflict economy. Redirecting more funds towards the local economy can help to create jobs, build economic capacities, encourage the development of the infrastructure and generate tax revenue.

In theory at least, many of the goods and services required by the operation and its personnel could be procured from local sources instead of transporting goods from abroad or contracting foreign service providers. Indeed, ISAF-troops and other international actors in Afghanistan are increasingly employing local personnel and procuring local goods and services, such as construction material, food supplies, electronic equipment, vehicle spare parts, clothing, office supplies and even banking services. However, few nations and organisations have so far had policies or clear guidance that encourage local procurement.

[1] OECD DAC 2005, 16.

[2] This figure includes only the military spending, not spending in reconstruction or development activities.

[3] Afghan GDP was approximately $10.6 billion in 2008, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 02.08.2010.

[4] The Official Development Aid net disbursements for Afghanistan from all donors reported were approximately $4.9 billion in 2008, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CSP2010, 02.08.2010.

As defined by the OECD DAC[5], "the overall objective of security system reform is to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy."[6] In addition to preventing and addressing traditional security threats, a state should thus be able to generate necessary conditions for the mitigation of the vulnerabilities of its people.[7] This article argues that supporting economic development through Security Sector Reform could not only boost the local economy but also enhance the overall effectiveness of peace operations, helping to achieve the end-state of SSR as defined above. However, recognising the existing opportunities and providing support in a fair and non-distorting manner requires new mindsets and practices, including training, cooperation and information sharing among security and development actors, both on the policy making level and among military and other staff in the field.

In the following, the linkages between SSR and economic development will be discussed in the context of peace operations, highlighting the effects of the lack of economic development on SSR activities. The practical suggestions provided are mostly based on NATO and the ISAF troop contributing nations' experiences in Afghanistan, but the arguments promoted in this paper are essentially applicable to any international operation, whether military or civilian in nature. Lack of security may limit the possibilities for undertaking the suggested measures, but the underlying principles remain the same for international efforts in any country with an under-developed economy, whether in a conflict, post-conflict or even a peace situation.

Security for Development...

Economic uncertainty is one of the most acute concerns in people's daily lives. Security, on the other hand, is fundamental to reducing poverty and enabling economic and social development.[8] In states emerging from violent conflict, reforming the security sector is thus central in ensuring the transition from peacekeeping to longer-term reconstruction and development.[9] To emphasise this fact, the Government of Afghanistan has not only adopted enhancing security as an additional Millennium Development Goal but also included security and rule-of-law issues in its development strategy.[10]

In fact, some of the most active promoters of SSR and early developers of the concept have come from the field of development assistance, including organisations such as the OECD DAC, the United Nations Development Programme and the United Kingdom Department for International Development.[11] OECD DAC's guidance remains among the most significant and detailed guidelines on how to plan and execute SSR activities.[12]

[5] Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
[6] OECD DAC 2005, 16.
[7] OECD DAC 2005, 16.
[8] OECD DAC 2007, 13.
[9] Hänggi 2009, 338.
[10] UNDP 2007.
[11] Hänggi 2009, 338.
[12] See OECD DAC 2005; OECD DAC 2007.

… and Development for Security

While it has been widely recognised that a poor security situation undermines the socio-economic development of a country, it has become ever more apparent that, for its part, the low level of socio-economic development also hinders the efforts to bring about peace and stability. Just as economic development is difficult in an insecure environment, the success of SSR is unlikely if the state is not capable of developing its economy and improving the economic opportunities of its citizens.

Firstly, without economic development and capacity-building, a country is unable to collect and manage revenues and, consequently, to maintain a security system without strong and continuing international involvement.[13] Secondly, particularly in the case of Afghanistan, the lack of economic development and good governance seems to prolong the conflict, encouraging insurgency and providing incentives for the people to support local powerbrokers in the absence of a functioning and accountable government capable of providing basic services. Starting from the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programs, the success of SSR is also dependent on the availability of economic opportunities for the former combatants to find alternative livelihoods and enhance their living standards.

The Need for Comprehensive Approaches

Acknowledging the nexus between security and development, international organisations and governments engaged in peace operations have adopted various integrated, comprehensive and whole-of-government approaches that aim to streamline the efforts of security, governance, development and humanitarian efforts. The increased number of actors and activities in post-conflict situations makes harmonisation, coordination and integration among them essential. There is not yet enough research to show whether these approaches have truly increased the effectiveness of peace operations, but at the minimum they have helped to increase awareness and understanding about diverging objectives and working methods among key actors.[14]

While reforming a security sector is in itself a comprehensive undertaking, economics is rarely touched upon in discussions on SSR.[15] However, as has been demonstrated above, the success of SSR is closely linked to the success of economic reconstruction and development efforts. The practical measures suggested in the following paragraphs are intended to demonstrate how funds allocated for SSR and other security-related activities can serve as an initial stimulus for the local economy, thus applying a comprehensive approach in practice.

This does not imply that security actors should extend their area of responsibility. Economic development remains, and should remain, the responsibility of development (and in some

[13] World Bank 2006.
[14] Meharg 2009, 229, 235.
[15] From time to time, concerns are expressed over local governments' ability to manage security structures in the long term. In order to meet short-term security and stability objectives, the international community often plans and implements SSR in isolation from the overall national budget and other sectors' needs. This undermines the governments' ability to finance the costs of security sector through state revenues after international support is reduced. World Bank 2006.

cases humanitarian) actors. However, if used wisely, the significant amount of international assistance allocated to SSR can have long-term effects, not only on security, but also on the sustainable economic development of a country.

Security Sector Support for Local Economy

In 2006, a study commissioned by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations[16] found out that while UN peacekeeping operations contributed to the development of local economies primarily through the restoration of peace and security, they also provided direct support for economic reconstruction and development through locally procured goods and services, the hiring of local personnel, and the mission subsistence allowances paid for the mission staff and spent in the mission area. Contrary to common perceptions, the negative impact of peacekeeping missions on a local economy, mainly through increased inflation, was only limited. Instead, the peacekeeping operations played a major part in providing an early stimulus for the local economies recovering from a conflict.

Local procurement practices, the hiring of local personnel, and measures to reduce unintended negative impacts, particularly on labour markets, were suggested as means to increase the positive local economic impact of peacekeeping operations. Adapting this study to a NATO-led operation, and in order to support its comprehensive approach in Afghanistan, NATO launched a project in 2009 to evaluate the economic footprint of ISAF in Afghanistan. The magnitude of ISAF spending proved to be significant, but the potential to use this spending in support of the local economy remained largely untapped.

The SSR activities consume a large part of the international assistance appropriated for Afghanistan. In 2001–2009, over 45% of international aid for Afghanistan was committed to the security sector, including the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP).[17] SSR is only a part of ISAF operations, and ISAF is not the only actor responsible for SSR in Afghanistan, although it has a significant role in the reform of the Afghan security sector, especially through its contribution to the development of the operational capability and equipment of the Afghan National Security Forces.

NATO Afghan First Policy

In 2008, approximately 13% of NATO's common funded expenditure was spent in locally procured goods and services, including the direct hiring of local personnel. Among the ISAF troop contributing nations the level of local procurement was estimated to vary between 1% and 30%. In order to strengthen the positive economic impacts of its presence in Afghanistan, NATO adopted an Afghan First Policy that aims to increase the portion of NATO common funds directed to the local economy, through the local procurement of goods and services as well as increasing the employment of the Afghan labour force.[18]

[16] Carnahan et al. 2007.

[17] Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2009, 13.

[18] NATO Afghan First Policy is part of a wider effort to increase local procurement in Afghanistan, promoted by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and some individual ISAF troop contributing nations. See http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1760&ctl=Details&mid=2002&ItemID=4338, 19.8.2010.

According to the former NATO procurement rules, companies originating from the area of operations were only eligible to bid for NATO contracts after companies from NATO allied countries, and its partner countries, were considered. The NATO Afghan First Policy gives Afghan companies, that are participating in the NATO procurement process, a preferential status "whenever the acceptable standards for security, quality, price and reliable supply are met".[19]

Providing all military requirements from local sources is not possible, nor is it the aim of the policy. However, being by far the largest spenders in Afghanistan, even a small increase in local procurement by NATO and the ISAF troop contributing nations could create significant additional growth in the Afghan GDP. Additional benefits of local procurement include support for building local capacities as well as savings for the international troops in procurement and transportation costs. The economic impact of the ISAF presence is emphasized by the security situation, which has left many regions of the country beyond the reach of humanitarian and development actors and, hence, limited other than military sources of economic support.

The Afghan economy is growing and developing rapidly and opportunities for local procurement are numerous. Due to concerns over creating inflation and a dependence on the demand from international troops, careful consideration and regional assessments are required when procuring from local companies. These considerations are less acute when local procurement supports the activities taken up as part of SSR, as this demand is likely to continue after the international presence is reduced. The United States, for example, has given notable contracts in the production of clothing and equipment for the ANA and ANP to local companies, encouraging particularly women-owned companies to bid for these contracts.[20]

Doing Business with Local Companies

There are numerous examples of local companies providing goods and services for ISAF more efficiently and with lower costs than their counterparts in ISAF nations. However, implementing the Afghan First Policy is not easy: corruption, insufficient quality of products and the lack of knowledge of the local marketplace among procurement officers are the most notable barriers to local procurement.

Injecting large amounts of money into a country that has for decades lacked a well functioning legal economy and an accountable government easily leads to increased levels of corruption. Moreover, there are indications that the influx of international funds has led to the empowerment of local powerbrokers, worsening the security situation and prolonging the conflict rather than working towards solving it.[21]

[19] NATO 2010. Due to the funding principles of NATO operations, the NATO Afghan First Policy is only applied to NATO Common Funds, which in practice form a minor part (in 2008, $662 million) of the overall operational costs. ISAF troop contributing nations are, however, encouraged to review their national policies and practices accordingly, as many have done already.

[20] See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/world/asia/30iht-afwomen.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1, 2.8.2010.

[21] Wilder and Gordon 2009.

Concerns over the quality of goods and services seem to present the most difficult obstacle for local procurement in Afghanistan. The requirements and standards set by the ISAF military authorities and in the capitals of the ISAF troop contributing nations are not easily met by local businesses, no matter how willing and capable they are to provide the required products. Many of the quality problems can be overcome through careful mentoring and advice, including provision of clear instructions and patience for reruns when the quality requirements are not met the first time. This may require adjustments in mindsets and working methods, especially among the efficiency-oriented military personnel, as well as cooperation among experts from both the military and civilian fields, but the benefits, that include local capacity building and support for the local economy, should outweigh the potential costs, especially when they are evaluated comprehensively from both security and developmental standpoints.

Procurement officers – deployed often in short rotations – may not be familiar with the local environment and may prefer to use the familiar rather than local companies. Research among selected ISAF troop contributing nations has shown that the nations may have the necessary information and skills available, but know-how is often limited to development workers and other civilian actors and used only to manage the funding used by civilians and for civilian purposes, even when there is a clear willingness by the military to follow the same practices. The most cohesiveness is found in those nations where comprehensive or whole-of-government approaches are extended to include the military as well as civilian actors, and where these approaches are applied all the way from the capital level to the operations on the ground.

Currently there is ongoing work to put in place the necessary modalities within ISAF structures to mitigate the negative economic effects of the ISAF presence, particularly as regards corruption, and to provide the procurement personnel information and skills to work with local companies. However, as ISAF remains a distinctively nationally-led operation, many of these measures would need to be repeated on national levels as well. While UN operations are funded from a common pool of funds, NATO operations are primarily funded directly from the budgets of the individual participating states. Consequently, national actors define the policies and practices on spending of a majority of funds used for the ISAF operation.

Conclusions

Security Sector Reform is not only about transforming and developing military capabilities. The wider conceptions of SSR promoted in this publication cover a number of other institutions, including the whole justice sector. In a post-conflict situation, SSR is also part of an overall peace process and the wider its coverage, the more linkages there are between the efforts to reform the security sector and other parts of the society.

For those involved in SSR or other security-related tasks, economic development often appears a distinctive realm of humanitarian and development actors. While in many respects this is the case, the areas where the efforts of different actors could be mutually enforcing are worth further investigation. Above, one such area – the support that security-related

activities can provide for economic development – has been introduced. This applies particularly to the initial phases of an operation, when other actors and means of support are not yet fully functional, as well as to areas where continuing insecurity or lack of resources limit other types of economic support. While it may be a small part of the overall process, local procurement of goods and services can have a significant effect on the local society. Most importantly, many of the skills and know-how required for the implementation of such practical changes are already present or easily available. Mobilizing them requires only a small change in mindsets and practices – in other words, the ability to see and make use of the opportunities for mutual long-term benefits in the security and development realms.

References

Carnahan, Michael; Gilmore, Scott and Durch, William. 2007. 'New Data on the Economic Impact of UN Peacekeeping', *International Peacekeeping* 14(3): 384–402.

Hänggi, Heiner. 2009. Security Sector Reform. In Chetail, Vincent (ed.): *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Meharg, Sarah Jane (ed.). 2009. *Measuring What Matters in Peace Operations & Crisis Management.* Kingston: School of Policy Studies.

Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2009. *Donor Financial Review.* November 2009.

NATO. 2010. NATO Afghan First Policy.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_62851.htm, accessed 2 August 2010.

New York Times. 2010. *U.S. Military Experiments With Empowering Afghan Businesswomen*.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/world/asia/30iht-afwomen.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1, accessed 2 August 2010.

OECD DAC. 2005. *Security System Reform and Governance*. Paris: OECD.

OECD DAC. 2007. *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform. Supporting Security and Justice*. Paris: OECD

OECD. 2010. Country Statistical Profiles.
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CSP2010, accessed 2 August 2010.

UNAMA. 2010. *UN envoy urges international community to buy Afghan goods*. http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1760&ctl=Details&mid=2002&ItemID=4338, accessed 29 August 2010.

UNDP. 2007. *Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007. Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and the Search for Justice*. Islamabad: Army Press.

Wilder, Andrew and Gordon, Stuart. 2009. 'Money Can't Buy America Love', *Foreign Policy*, 1 December 2009.

World Bank. 2006. *Post-Conflict Security Sector and Public Finance Management: Lessons from Afghanistan.* World Bank Social Development Notes, Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, No. 24/July 2006.

World Bank. 2010. Databank.
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD, accessed 2 August 2010.

Working as Gender Advisor in the EU Training Mission Somalia

Katja Grekula

Security is a Precondition for Building up a Viable Society in Somalia

I have written this article based on my personal experiences and discussions with European soldiers as well as Somali NCO[1] trainees during my lessons on human rights and gender affairs at the Bihanga training camp in Uganda. Somalia is undergoing the worst humanitarian disaster in the world: 3.6 million Somalis are dependent on external humanitarian assistance, there are 1.5 million internally displaced persons (IDP) and five hundred thousand refugees in neighbouring countries. Due to the unstable political situation in the country, it has also witnessed a massive violation of human rights. In such circumstances, the already less favourable social position of women gets even worse. Therefore, to improve the situation of Somali women, the general humanitarian and human rights situation must get better as well. All this requires a more or less secure and stable society. Without first solving the security issues it will be impossible to guarantee the protection of human rights or women's rights in the country.

One example of the human rights problems in Somalia is the reported use of child soldiers by both the extremist Muslim group al-Shabab and the Transitional Federal Government. The EU is bound by the Paris Principles which provides guidelines on children associated with armed forces or armed groups. The two Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention and the Conventions on the Rights of the Child set 15 as the minimum age for recruitment or participation in hostilities. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child establishes this minimum age at 18 years. In addition, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court states that conscripting or enlisting children under 15 into national armed forces or armed groups or using them to participate actively in any kind of hostility is a war crime. Somalia, however, has ratified neither the Additional Protocols nor the African Charter. In Uganda, where the EU training takes place, the minimum recruitment age to the army is 13 years[2]. The EUTM has committed to train only recruits over the age of 18.

A Challenging Job in Challenging Circumstances

Everyone I talked to before starting my lessons thought that my job – teaching gender affairs to illiterate Somali recruits who have seen nothing but war and destruction in their lives – was impossible and even dangerous. However, it was in the course of human rights and gender affairs training for the European soldiers that my convictions were first put to the test immediately after my arrival at the rudimentary training camp. With hindsight, I confess to have overestimated their knowledge on human rights and women's rights. Not

[1] Non-commissioned officer.
[2] Full consent and secondary education are required.

wanting to underestimate the soldiers, I gave a far too theoretical presentation, more suitable for professionals in this field. It seems that we Europeans, strong supporters of equality in its all different forms, tend to assume that we have a profound knowledge about human rights and women's rights. In fact, when you really start to discuss the actual content of these rights you notice that it is not quite the case.

Teaching Somali NCO trainees at the Bihanga Training Camp in Uganda, 2010. Photo: Ludo Verbinnen.

Problems Originating from Cultural Relativism

It was highly interesting to listen to the critique by some of the European soldiers. What authorises us to bring and impose the "Western" human rights and women's rights to Somalia? Might they not simply be happy as they are now, living in their own social system? Confronted with the obvious counterargument – what authorises us to bring arms and military training to them either? – the soldiers did not find the issue at all problematic, since they were only "doing their job" without questioning the relationship of the military to the larger picture of politics and society in general. I was even told that these kinds of missions would be much easier and more efficient without the meddling of civilians, who do not know anything about waging a war. (To me, the EUTM Somalia is a peacekeeping operation or, more precisely, a training mission.) I understand perfectly well the coping mechanisms of soldiers performing demanding and stressful duties, but I am not sure about their viability. After all, in the future even this person, who had obviously never heard anything about a

comprehensive approach to crisis management, will be increasingly working together with civilian experts.

It also took time for the European soldiers to understand that the training was based on a normative approach and did not aim at a descriptive analysis of the present situation – I was criticised for not understanding the realities prevailing in Africa. The majority of human rights violations were explained by the cultural realities, as well as the normal procedures and disciplinary measures of the military. Personally, I strongly disagree with these explanations which only serve as poor excuses for guaranteeing inaction.

I was also accused of being an extremist feminist. This appeared strange, taking into consideration the fact that at least fifty per cent of the presentations focused on general human rights or international humanitarian law. It seems that talking about only women's rights is still a very sensitive and polemic topic. Of course, should women be treated equally with, and be granted the same chances to enjoy human rights as men, this would significantly affect the present power structures in society.

I have had to work hard to justify my presence in the EUTM Somalia as a civilian expert with no military background, since the majority of the soldiers have no understanding of civilian crisis management as a separate and more specialised career path. It might be true that the army is a subculture with its own rules and values. This, however, should not prevent the civilians from treating the soldiers in exactly the same manner as any other persons.

The Fine Art of Building Trust and Mutual Respect

The most positive side of my work has been teaching the Somali NCO trainees. Contrary to everybody's expectation, they have been just adorable. I have been teaching 194 NCO trainees for a week, one hour per day. The lessons started with an introduction to human rights and international humanitarian principles in order to familiarise the trainees with the idea that every human being has human rights. After children's rights, the right to education and economic rights, the lessons continued with gender affairs and sexual violence in both conflicts and the domestic sphere. The most sensitive issues like female genital mutilation (FGM), child marriage and gay rights were not raised until the end of the training. In fact, there was active discussion on every possible topic related to love and life in general. Growing up in the shadow of an AK-47, most of the Somali trainees have never had the chance of an education. It was eye-opening to discuss children's rights with former child soldiers; one could only express the wish that the next generation will have it better, even in Somalia.

As an educated, unmarried, 38-year-old woman with no children, who had come to work in another continent in the company of military men, I was intentionally using my "otherness" in the eyes of these Somali soldiers. My aim has been to make them at least a bit more tolerant in respect of different lifestyles. The key message was – live and let other people live, even if you would not accept their choices, since it will not harm you or your life. In fact, the best discussions we had were on gay rights, a great taboo in the Somali society and Africa in general. Even our Kenyan interpreters were a bit afraid to raise this topic.

On the one hand, I took a very practical approach to women's rights, since it is useless to criticize polygamy to a man with four wives. Treating them all equally well is a beginning. On the other hand, it was interesting to see my students disagreeing and having arguments within their own group, for example, on FGM. There are regional differences in this practice; while some of the trainees stressed that it is only symbolic, others were talking about the pharaonic circumcision. Significantly, they all agreed that it is not a Muslim habit. I tried to remind the trainees of their responsibility and role as fathers and men in general; if they would not expect the women to be circumcised, the women would not need to go through the practice, since of course every woman wants to find the best possible husband. While the major concern seemed to be the ability to control female sexuality, I tried to stress the responsibility of men in keeping up sexual morality, since here too it takes two to tango.

Sex, sexuality and love affairs seem to interest every human being regardless of country or cultural background. The NCO trainees truly are in great need of basic information regarding sex education; during a lesson on HIV/AIDS, one of the trainees told me that, according to what he had heard, it was the condom that causes one to get the HIV virus. At the moment we have had only one HIV positive case amongst the trainees, but it is probably only a matter of time before more cases will be revealed. This man has divorced 18 times, having only two wives at the moment, but the case reflects quite well the present realities in the field.

I learned much myself during the lessons. It almost brought me to tears when, during the last lesson, one of the trainees gave me a thousand Somali shilling note as a gift so that I would not forget them. Based on my experiences with the trainees, I believe that it is possible to build a bridge of common humanity and mutual respect even over the deepest cultural divisions.

Women, Peace and Security

Surprisingly enough, there are seven female Somali recruits undergoing the Uganda People's Defence Force's (UPDF) basic training. I had a chance to talk to one of them who is able to speak English fluently and had been working on the Finnish tuberculosis project in Mogadishu in 1986. She is a 38-year-old widow with six children who are being cared for by her mother back in Mogadishu. Her husband was killed by al-Shabab's troops about two years ago.

When I asked what made this woman join the army, she immediately replied "training". She wanted to learn and not to stay ignorant for the rest of her life like the majority of her compatriots. At the moment, studying in Mogadishu is impossible if one does not have lots of money, and even money does not bring security. The army offers her military training, security, basic healthcare, food and shelter – the basic needs which are missing from the majority of the civilians in Somalia. For these women and their children, studying at the university remains a distant dream.

The woman soldier was convinced that to create education opportunities, healthcare and jobs, one must first have peace and security. This is exactly why she was serving in the TFG's

Security Forces; the al-Shabab wants to close the society for women and leave them without any liberties or rights.

Challenges for a Gender Advisor

Some of the biggest challenges for a Gender Advisor in EUTM Somalia arise directly from the weak mandate of the operation. Since everything except the training falls outside of the mandate, it is not possible to intervene in any of the human rights violations committed by the UPDF. Nevertheless, I receive constant information on malnutrition, poor living conditions and maltreatment of Somali trainees. The situation escalated when, during basic training of the UPDF, the Somali recruits started to protest non-violently against their trainers. The UPDF retaliated with tough measures, and the confrontation ended up with violent action being taken by both sides. As a result of this incident, seven Somalis undergoing basic training and three NCO trainees were repatriated to Somalia.

Uganda is a sovereign state, and my protests over uncompromised freedoms under international law or the principle of non-refoulement prohibiting the return of persons to places where their lives or freedoms could be threatened yielded no result. Neither was the decision affected by the fact that the Atalanta operation does not send captured pirates back to Somalia, even if no countries are willing to accept them. Since there are no guarantees of a functioning legal system in Somalia, these pirates are simply set free.

The leadership of the EUTM might have expected Finland to deploy a "nice" and "feminine" Gender Advisor to fill the female quota and to give a human face to the mission. In a professional of not only human rights and gender affairs but also International Relations, humanitarian law and EU policies, it probably got more than it was asking for. A civilian serving in a uniform – I was deployed by the Finnish Defence Forces as a military officer equalling the rank of a captain but not belonging to the chain of command – also tends to annoy some of the soldiers.

It is also a fact that you are never one of the guys. For a woman soldier it might be possible, but not for a civilian expert. However, perhaps a Gender/Human Rights Advisor should never even try to completely integrate into a military organisation, since objectivity and professional integrity must be maintained in all possible situations. I have adopted a purely normative approach to my work; personal opinions aside, all the guiding principles of my work are based on international human rights instruments or other legal mechanisms. It is not my duty to justify or legitimise the present state of affairs when it does not correspond with these principles, but to make a change for the better possible.

To conclude, I have noticed that the tasks of a Gender Advisor are not limited to the duties and responsibilities of the job description. Among other occupations, I have found myself acting as social worker, sex-educator, therapist, lawyer, and historian. The most useful asset in this work has been my pitch dark and sardonic sense of humour, and the ability to see the funny side in everything.

Abstracts

Military Experts in Security Sector Reform

Tom Asplund

While defence-related activities cover only a small area in the wide field of SSR, there is a steady demand for military expertise in issues ranging from border control to disarmament. Introducing first the basic principles of SSR from a military standpoint, the article then proceeds to discuss more spec ialised aspects of Defence Sector Reform. It is argued that the different phases of an SSR project demand different types of expertise, and that becoming a military SSR expert requires a basic understanding of all the activities, actors and cross-cutting themes. This, in turn, is only achieved through joint training. To enable Finland's full participation in the upcoming EU pool of SSR experts, the article proposes the establishment of an integrated national pool. Improving coordination, facilitating training and supporting the deployment of Finnish SSR experts, such a pool would also be an important step towards a shared vision of Finnish SSR priorities.

SSR in the Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy

Heli Siivola

An enhanced capacity to support Security Sector Reform (SSR) and rule of law development is one of the key objectives of Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy. According to the strategy, this should include both increased participation in SSR tasks by civilian and military crisis management, as well as sufficient and coordinated funding for SSR-related activities. The strategy stresses that sustainable results require local ownership and commitment, as well as coordinated use of crisis management and development cooperation measures, in their support. The focus of Finland's civilian crisis management participation is already on training, mentoring and support tasks, related to SSR and rule of law. In military crisis management, participation in the training of the Afghan National Army and the EU Somalia Training Mission represent new openings.

From Theory to Practice: Towards Better and More Operational SSR Activities

Antti Häikiö

SSR has inspired more concepts and strategies than functional, operational and practical means and mechanisms. 15 years after the Dayton agreement and 11 years since the end of the war in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo still host a military operation and several civilian missions. Both crisis management and societal reforms, including those in the security sector, should thus be more efficient. Security Sector Reform, however, is more a local project than an international task. So far the international community has not been

effective in its support and facilitation role. Two critical fields that require development, both in crisis management and SSR are, firstly, the transition of ownership, responsibilities and services to the local actors, and secondly, the transformation of international standards and best practices from international to local use.

Lessons Learned from the Balkans, Ukraine and Georgia

Anu Sallinen

Since 2005, the Nordic and Baltic countries have worked closely together in the field of Security Sector Reform. The activities of the Nordic-Baltic Initiative have supported the Security Sector Reform and transformation processes of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Furthermore, the countries have embarked on initiatives towards Ukraine and, more recently, Georgia. The Finnish defence administration has no separate SSR budget, which makes it hard to plan new projects or join ongoing ones. Consequently, ministries together with the Defence Forces should discuss national goals and funding issues in SSR-related activities and establish a comprehensive strategy. Instead of creating new fora at the international level, the existing ones should be put to better use.

The Folke Bernadotte Academy and Security Sector Reform

Michaela Friberg-Storey

The Folke Bernadotte Academy is engaged in several SSR-related efforts and activities, such as national and international coordination, education, capacity-building and training, development of tools and methodologies, SSR assessments, operative support and contributions within the SSR framework. The Swedish National Contact Group for Security Sector Reform (NCGSSR) was established in 2007 in order to facilitate information sharing and coordination of SSR and SSR-related efforts by relevant Swedish agencies, nationally and internationally, in compliance with guiding documents on SSR.

Security Sector Reform and the European Union

Antti Kaski

Security Sector Reform plays an increasing role in the policies of the European Union towards third states. Based on the OECD and UN conceptions, the SSR work of the EU covers a wide range of activities bringing together development instruments, actions in the field of justice and home affairs and the Security and Defence Policy of the EU. The growing engagement in the field of SSR increases the demand for better coordination and sufficient resources and capabilities.

SSR and State-building

Olli Ruohomäki

Consolidating state security is a crucial element in successful state-building. The legitimate monopoly of violence needs to be established. This means that political settlements have to be inclusive and the capture of key security sector ministries by local strongmen must be avoided. As engagement in fragile states is a complex endeavor, SSR in such situations requires an in-depth knowledge of the context. The recognition of the connections between security and development issues, in addressing state fragility, has led to the rise of SSR processes and efforts by the OECD DAC to develop common approaches. The prospects of successful state-building are diminished if many of the lessons learned from development policy debates and practices, concerning aid effectiveness and the coherence of assistance, are not taken into account in SSR. Donors are gradually learning to grapple with questions relating to ownership and sustainability, that play significant roles in determining the success of SSR, but much work remains to be done.

Supporting Economic Development through Security Sector Reform

Pauliina Törmä

Security is a key condition for economic development and, conversely, development is needed for security. In post-conflict peace operations a large part of the international assistance is channelled to Security Sector Reform. If used wisely, these funds can have long-term effects on both the security and the economic development of a country, as they can provide a stimulus for the local economy recovering from a conflict. However, this requires changes in the traditional thinking and practices, both on the policy making level and on the ground, as well as measures to avoid unintended negative impacts on the local economy. The likely reward would be the enhanced overall effectiveness of a peace operation.

Working as Gender Advisor in the EU Training Mission Somalia

Katja Grekula

In April 2010, the EU launched the military training mission (EUTM) Somalia in order to contribute to the strengthening of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and other institutions in Somalia. This support takes place within the framework of the EU's comprehensive engagement in Somalia, with a view to stabilising the country and responding to the most important needs of the Somali people. Finland found it especially important to address the human security needs of Somali women and children, deploying for the first time in Finnish peacekeeping history a Gender Advisor to a military mission.

Authors

Mr. Tom Asplund currently works for the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre as a researcher on SSR. He has extensive experience in military and civilian crises management, having served in various UNDPKO missions as well as in NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. He has also served with EUMM as Deputy Head of the Regional Office in Pristina as well as Head of Administration for the ICO Office in Mitrovica.

Ms. Michaela Friberg-Storey is heading the Security Sector Reform Programme at the Folke Bernadotte Academy. She has spent the past decade in the field working for the EU, UN and the OSCE. Amongst other positions she has been the Director for the EU Integration Office in Kosovo-UN as well as running the Election Field Operation for the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. She has an academic background in political science.

Ms. Katja Grekula is acting as a Gender Advisor to the EUTM Somalia in the Bihanga training camp in Uganda, where the EU is providing specialised training to the Somali Security Forces trainees. Earlier Ms. Grekula has worked as Expert for the Finnish League for Human Rights. She graduated from the University of Tampere in 1998, her major being International Relations with a special focus on Peace and Conflict Studies. She also holds a European Master's Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation, with a special focus on Women's Rights, from the European Inter-University Centre in Venice.

Mr. Antti Häikiö, the National Coordinator of Civilian Crisis Management training, research and evaluation, in the Ministry of the Interior, Finland, has had extensive field experience since 1993 in the service of the UN, NATO, OSCE and EU crisis management and peace-building missions. His last assignment was as the Head of Best Practices, Training and Evaluation in the EU's largest civilian crisis management mission, in Kosovo 2007–2010. He has also conducted evaluations in development projects. Mr. Häikiö is a member of several non-governmental organisations, such as the Crisis Management Initiative, Unifem Finland and the Nokia Reserve Officers Club.

Dr. Antti Kaski, PhD, works as a Faculty Member in the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. A Counsellor at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, he has held various positions in the MFA including one at the Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU. As part of his academic career, he has worked as an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Turku, a Visiting Fellow in research institutes in different countries, and the Editor of *Kosmopolis. Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies and World Politics*.

Mr. Tuomas Koskenniemi works as an advisor at the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre. Before editing this publication, he worked for FINCENT and the Ministry of Defence, dealing with African capacity building, Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU, and situational awareness.

Dr. Olli Ruohomäki is a senior advisor with the Department for Development Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland. He has worked on post-conflict reconstruction and development programmes that the Finnish Government has financed in East Timor, Kosovo,

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nepal and Afghanistan. Prior to the current assignment he served as the deputy representative of Finland to the Palestinian Authority. He has also served with the United Nations in war-torn Cambodia in the 1990s and worked for World Vision in Laos. In addition, he has worked as a researcher at the Finnish Academy.

Ms. Anu Sallinen is currently working as a ministerial advisor on situational awareness at the Ministry of Defence. In her previous position she worked as a ministerial advisor on Nordic and Baltic countries. Ms. Sallinen has also worked for several years on strategic planning, both at the Defence Forces and at the Ministry of Defence, as well as having conducted research at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs on Nordic defence.

Ms. Heli Siivola is an advisor for Security and Development at the Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. In 2008–2009 she acted as the secretary of the working group which drew up Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy. Prior to her current assignment she has worked in the Ministry of Defence of Finland and the Permanent Representation of Finland to the European Union.

Ms. Pauliina Törmä works at NATO International Staff, seconded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Crisis Management Centre, Finland, in the framework of NATO Partnership for Peace. Her work includes participation in a project that is aimed at assessing the economic impact of ISAF and the ISAF troop contributing nations' activities on Afghanistan, including the identification of means to increase the support that the ISAF presence can provide for the local economy.

Finnish Defence Forces International Centre

Security Sector Reform (SSR) has been widely accepted as a promising framework with which to confront the ever more complex challenges of peace and security that the international community is faced with. It is based on the insight that security and development go hand in hand: there cannot be one without the other. In the face of increasing costs of peace support operations abroad and budget pressures at home, there is also a growing urgency to improve efficiency and coordination.

Responsible for training and education in military crisis management, the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) is an active participant in the national dialogue on peace and security matters. Acknowledging the objectives set at the political level, FINCENT contributes to laying the foundations for the deployment of Finnish experts to challenging SSR missions that require a thorough understanding of a wide range of issues dealing with security, development, rule of law and good governance.

The primary goal of this third volume in the FINCENT Publication Series is to promote knowledge of the defence-related SSR tasks. However, as these activities only cover a small part of the broad field of SSR, comments were invited from a distinguished group of experts at government institutions and international organisations. Approaching the concept from a multitude of perspectives, the concise articles paint a diverse picture of the promises and challenges of Security Sector Reform.

www.fincent.fi

FINCENT
P.O.BOX 1
FI-04301 Tuusula
FINLAND

Tel. +358 299 800
Fax +358 299 540 901
fincent@fincent.fi
www.fincent.fi

ISBN 978–951–25–2133–3
ISSN 1797–8629